The retired Venezuelan diplomat, scholar and author of 20 books, Alfredo Toro Hardy puts us to the test in his book published in the summer of 2020. He proposes us two crucial questions: Did China challenge the United States too hard and too soon and, by doing so, seriously affect the chance to attain its objectives? Can Washington still contain China’s ascend­ancy and retain its current leading status?

China can achieve economies of scale more rapidly than any other country, but even in the case of China it is true that “the biggest mistake that a rising leader can commit is to provoke a confrontation with his most powerful rival before the point of maximum opportunity had been attained”. Neither China, not the US accepts the number two position easily, therefore the confrontation between them is extremely intense.

In an interview with Mercy Kuo, author of a weekly column on U.S. Asia policy at The Diplomat, Ambassador Alfredo Toro Hardy revealed in November 2020 an enlightening idea: “The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States had an ideology as its core underpinning element. This emerging Cold War is not based on ideology, as China is not trying to sell the virtues of communism to anyone, not even to its own population. On the contrary, the rivalry between China and the U.S. is based on the capability shown by each of them to outmatch the other in terms of results. This means that the core element of the current Cold War is efficiency”. This idea is supported by solid arguments throughout the book, structured around nine chapters, one more captivating than the other.

The first one, “The Good Years”, emphasizes in a historical perspective how the United States and China were able to follow their national interest and cooperate at the same time. That consistency was prevalent for almost four decades. Starting with 1969, for the Chairman Mao Zedong was evident that reconciliation with the United States would prevent the Soviet Union from attacking China. Subsequently, the bilateral relationship was shaped by the following “trilogy”: The Shanghai Communiqué corresponding to Nixon’s visit in August 1972, Carter’s normalization of diplomatic relations with China in January 1979 and the so-called Third Communiqué of August 1982, during the Reagan Administration.

Jimmy Carter’s decision to recognize the Chinese communist regime was underpinned by potential economic and political benefits (access to the Chinese market but also a pressure tool against the Soviet Union). Moreover, China would not seek any more to constrain the American leadership in Asia. In its turn, China would benefit from: (1) the US-Japan alliance, which would constrain Japan’s military resurgence; (2) a stronger position against the Soviet Union and (3) the economic opening to the West (access to capital, technology and markets). It is worth noting a detail: at that time, the Soviet Union was a common strategic threat.

Together with the consolidation of Deng Xiaoping’s power in 1978, “pragmatism took control of China”, and in order to acquire foreign technologies, capital and expertise, it was launched the process of reform and opening-up, requiring a long term stability in relation with the United States. The “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was accompanied by a pragmatic model allowing trial and error, in other words, “crossing the river by feeling the stones”. At the same time, the principle of “one country, two systems” (socialist system combined with market forces in the special economic zones) meant abundant foreign investment and technology, while preserving the key role of the state. China joined the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 1980, a confirmation of starting the process of gradual integration into the international economic order.

The essence of the Chinese vision on its own development and relationships with other countries is synthesized in Deng Xiaoping’s speeches during his South China tour of 1992: “Observe carefully; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership”; “Enemy troops are outside the walls. They are stronger than we are. We should be mainly on the defensive”; “Development is the absolute principle” and according to this goal, there is no conflict between a market economy system and a state-planned one.

While Jiang Zemin (1993-2003) and Zhu Rongji (1998-2003) had as the main task China’s transformation into a strong and fast-growing economy, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (2003-2013) had to maintain stability and promote “a harmonious society within a harmonious world”. A good relationship with the United States was a common goal of the four generations of Chinese leaders, from Mao to Hu and Wen. Complementarities between the two economies were evident again and again. The term “Chimerica” (coined in 2007 by Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick) expresses a strong symbiosis of the “yin and yang of the global economy” (according to Mark Leonard, the co-founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations), based on different preponderant behaviours of the two halves of Chimerica, East and West: saving versus spending; producing manufactures versus producing services; exporting versus importing; running surpluses and therefore piling up reserves versus running deficits and issuing dollar-denominated bonds bought by East Chimericans.

In spite of various crises in the bilateral relationship (Tiananmen in 1989, Taiwan Strait 1996, the US bombardment of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the air incident near Hainan Island in 2001 etc.), cooperation prevailed through four generations of Chinese leaders and seven American administrations (Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush G.H.W., Clinton, Bush G.W.). Year 2008 is described as an inflexion point, as argued in the second chapter.

 In “The Unraveling”, the increasing contrasts and collisions between the United States and China and their corresponding roots are highlighted. In 2004, two concepts related to China were coined. The first one, the country’s “peaceful rise”, was a “brand” or “soft power marketing strategy” endorsed by Chinese intellectuals, in order to invalidate the “China threat theory” and present it instead as a nation in search for mutual benefit in relation with other partners. The second one, “Beijing consensus”, describing the development policies pursued by China, was introduced by Joshua Cooper Ramo, author of New York Times bestsellers and vice chairman of Kissinger Associated (the consulting company of the eponym former US secretary of state). Presented in antithesis with the Washington Consensus, the pillars of Chinese policy are synthesized by its critics in the literature as incremental reform plus innovation in association with experimentation, plus export-led growth, plus state capitalism plus authoritarianism.[1] However, its supporters point to its pragmatism, its pathway allowing for trial and error and subsequent adjustments, which underpins it as a viable economic model for developing countries.

China was already in the limelight and it seemed that it was finally materializ­ing the long-awaited moment, when the curves of China’s emergence and US’ decline were crossing each other. Therefore, it was exactly the strategic position of strength which had been waited for in order to be able to give up the low profile attitude, recommended by Deng Xiaoping.

In 2008, in the middle of the international financial crisis, the limits of the US’ economic might were demonstrated, after its “war on terror” had showed the adjacent limits at the level of military power and hegemonic standing. By contrast, China was able to avoid the crisis and moreover to emerge stronger in a year when the successful Beijing Olympic Games gave an impetus to the Chinese self esteem.

Referring to China’s soft power of that period, Ambassador Alfredo Toro Hardy considered it as a success. China, in search of “a multipolar and peaceful world”, managed to convince both developed and developing countries. A representative of a developing country, Venezuela, the diplomat concluded that the developing countries were attracted by China, as they saw it as “a benevolent and respectful power that did not wish to impose its own convictions upon others”, while its economic model was a “credible path to development that clearly differed from the abrasiveness and rigidity of the Washington Consensus”. However, its attitude on “non-negotiable issues” such as Taiwan, Tibet or Xinjiang, as well its position in the South China Sea and collisions with contenting parties but also India, Japan, South Korea and of course the US underlined China’s assertiveness. And that became more and more visible under Xi Jinping’s leadership.

Since 2013, China’s motto had been: “striving for achievement”, meaning that it is time to act, as the country is powerful enough. Ambassador Alfredo Toro Hardy underscores that three major Chinese strategies are fuelling the perception that China is heading towards world economic dominance: (1) the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); (2) “Made in China 2025”, which envisages China’s global supremacy in key strategic sectors, mainly cutting-edge technologies; and (3) military modernization, where China’s armed forces aim at becoming number one.

In China’s White Paper on its Policies on Asia-Pacific Cooperation, it is underlined that “China has committed itself to working with the United States to build a new model of major-country relations featuring non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and mutually beneficial cooperation”, meaning an equal footing treatment. Various Chinese objectives and strategies are considered “a direct challenge to the supremacy of the United States”. China has the resources to become prosperous, as projected in its “Dream of National Rejuvenation” and also a world technological power by 2049 (at the 100^th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China), as enabled by “Made in China 2025”. But many analysts consider that Xi Jinping’s words have become too “ominous”, and this generates the perception that China is ready to fight in order to reach its goals, which cancels its power of attraction. This assertion is already recurrent in many studies, including the recent report by the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC), titled “China’s Soft Power in Europe: Falling on Hard Times”.[2]

Chapter three, “Sailing against the wind” starts with a remarkable assertion: preoccupied with other regions such as the Middle East, the United States had not realised until 2008 that it was in a middle of a competition with China. The response action was started in 2011, when then Obama’s Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and later Obama himself outlined the US’ “pivot to Asia”, i.e. “a comeback to East Asia as a priority focus of U.S. foreign policy”. Military cooperation and “shared prosperity” (for instance, via the Trans-Pacific Partnership TPP, often described as an “economic NATO”) were two of the main tools used by the US in order to attract partners in the region to contribute to the containment of China. The US did its best to prevent major allies to participate in key Chinese projects and initiatives, such as the multilateral development bank named the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, but not with much success. Donald Trump took over the “containment” element, but adapted to its vision. The embrace of protectionism became dominant starting with 2017, even in the name of national security if necessary, in an attempt to stall China’s innovation process. 

Since China’s dependence on the American market is still substantial and the country is in the transition towards a consumption- and innovation-driven growth, is it possible that Deng’s prescription of keeping a low profile was abandoned too early. China is still confronted with many unsolved issues and vulnerabilities, such as the debt, demographic, aging and middle-income traps. Therefore, the right questions but still without the right answers: “Why not wait for the ripe fruit?” and “Why sailing against the wind?”

Until 2008, China had almost unrestricted access to US’ universities, laboratories and companies and it was also able to benefit from its soft power, while the US’ attention was focused elsewhere, especially in the Middle East. From 2008 to 2012, in spite of its ability to avoid the effects of the international financial crisis, China did not attract the whole attention of the US. In my opinion, it was the Belt and Road Initiative itself which put a definitive end to Deng Xiaoping’s rule of keeping a low profile and generated an unexpected acrimony not only from the developed countries but also from many developing ones, including India.

In the section on “Two kinds of legitimacy”, it is correctly stated that economic growth provides the Chinese leaders with a strong legitimacy in relation with their own society. However, the second type of legitimacy mentioned by Alfredo Toro Hardy, namely nationalism (understood as an argument entitling China to a position of privilege) is not typically Chinese, but it is not the right place to start a debate on this topic.

In the last part of this chapter, the author launches an evaluation instrument in order to answer the leitmotif complementary questions: “Again, did this come too early for the Chinese or, conversely, is it already too late for the Americans to reverse the Chinese ascendancy?” The specific toolkit proposed is “weighing the com­prehensive national power of both countries, through a balanced power profile”, by taking into account six different aptitude categories: the convergence aptitude, the mistakes avoidance aptitude, the univer­sality aptitude, the military aptitude, the economic aptitude and the technological aptitude.

These aptitudes are analyzed in a comparative manner during the next six chapters.

The fourth chapter deals in 14 sections with the American hegemony, culminating with the George W. Bush Administration (partially because of September 11) and the prerogatives of the country’s national interest. According to these prerogatives, Ambassador Alfredo Toro Hardy concludes that “the overwhelming nature of U.S. power exempted it from com­pliance with international norms and rules” and the George W. Bush Administration “abandoned global values and cooperative multilateralism in pursuit of egoistic national interest and militant unilateralism”. The world became “one of ‘satellites’ and not of allies, one of ad hoc coalitions and not of multilateral institutions, one of ‘with us or against us’, one of punishment to dissidence and not of encouragement to cooperation, and one in which preventive action prevailed over international law”. Such attitudes were accompanied by an evident negative perception of the US among its closest allies and it was Barack Obama who managed to prevent the US to become “a very lonely power”, “sufficiently powerful as a force to be reckoned with, but insufficiently so as to be followed as a leader”.

Obama chose a dual course, on the one hand, multilateralism and collective action, on the other hand, increased presence wherever most needed, with the goal to transform the obtained power into influence. Various successes, such as the Paris Agreement and the Iran Nuclear Deal are just two examples of cooperative multilateralism. Skilful cooperation with China is considered one of the factors of success.

At the same time, Obama understood that China benefited from the US’ lack of attention in the Asia-Pacific and therefore a strong and rapid comeback in the region was vital. The result was the “pivot to Asia”, already mentioned.

Barack Obama’s achievements were compromised by Donald Trump’s unilateralist and even isolationist approaches, meaning “abdication, the voluntary relinquishing of power and responsibility”. The American diplomat Richard Hass defines this kind of abdication as a “withdrawal doctrine”. The American scholar Robert Kagan considers it as “the worst possible response to disturbing events around the world”. Trump withdrew his country from a long list of international agreements, including the Paris Agreement, the Iran Nuclear Deal, the TPP and also the United Nations Human Rights Commission. These actions as well as the US-China trade war were justified by his wrong credo, “that national sovereignty, and not international cooperation, is the foundation of international relations”. Even the G7 was “fractured in two groups”: the US on one side, the rest on the other. The combination of George W. Bush and Donald Trump eroded much of the US’ international legitimacy and offered China a host of unexpected opportunities.

The following eight sections of the fourth chapter focus on China’s convergence capacity. Its capacity broadening started in 2001 after its accession to the World Trade Organization and continued with parallel processes, including that of becoming the centre of the global value chains and the core of the Asian integration. South-South cooperation intensified tremendously due to China. China’s share in the gross world product measured in purchasing power parity surpassed that of the US however the former had a voting power at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) almost five times lower than the latter. The IMF reform offered China a larger voting power, but not the correct one and the US is still able to block major reforms. That inequity was one of the reasons why the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) decided to launch their own multilateral development bank, the New Development Bank (idea proposed in 2012, institution founded in 2014) and why China proposed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2013 (founded in 2015).

The Belt and Road Initiative unveiled by President Xi Jinping in 2013 is described as one of China’s development strategies developed in order to “consolidate its posi­tion at the centre of the global supply and manufacturing networks which will be the key to the global economy over the coming dec­ades” (according to the Professor of strategic studies Hugh White, quoted many times in this book). It explains also why China is a strong supporter of free trade and globalization as well. The BRI is also defined as “the most ambitious initiative to improve regional economic integration and connectivity on a transcontinen­tal scale: involving ‘hard’ infrastructure along six overland corri­dors, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road; ‘soft’ infrastructure, such as the financial system, to enhance efficiency and facilitate economic flows; and policy reforms and institution-building to pro­mote trade and foreign direct investment among the 70 or so BRI countries. There is talk now of expanding it to Latin America or to shipping routes across the Arctic, dubbed the ‘Polar Silk Road’” (according to the senior research fellow Anabel González).

Such examples underscore the two different directions of the convergence aptitudes of the US and China: Washington evolved from being the epitome of globalization and the standard-bearer of the most successful hegemonic system ever to becoming a “unilateralist and isolationist country”. Conversely, China went from the total closeness of Mao’s days to “being the undisputed leader of globalization and, according to Parag Khanna, the main promoter of a 21st century Asian-led order”.

In the section “Stick and carrot” the author presents another enlightening idea: “It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that its leading role in globalization and its economic growth perspectives have been able to shield China, to a significant extent, from its nationalistic excesses.” In the section titled “A Beijing-Moscow Axis”, the author emphasizes that “China has gotten closer to Russia in an integral strategic association with a very wide spectrum”.

Summarizing, the author underlines that “in terms of convergence aptitude, Washington’s con­fusing ‘withdrawal’ and Beijing’s active international engagement are clearly leaning the scale in China’s direction”.

The fifth chapter on the “Mistakes Avoidance Aptitude” postulates that “in this Cold War in the making, the country that commits” fewer “mistakes will undoubtedly hold the better position. At this point in time, both China and the U.S. have made serious ones: China by overreaching its nationalism, the United States by squandering one of its biggest assets, its allies”. One can remark powerful anti-China coalitions both within the United States and outside (see for instance the Quad, made of the US, Japan, India and Australia). China’s way of addressing sensitive issues such as Taiwan, Hong Kong-China and Xinjiang does not bring it a good score. But the US makes also mistakes and its vulnerabilities are not only in relationship with its allies, but also in terms of social divide (economic inequality/polarization), regional divide and political divide, which underlines that the situation is particular critical in the United States.

The following chapter concludes that “the universality aptitude of China is inadequate, and can, in no way, aspire to compete with the American one. If that is indeed the case, not even the prevalence of the other remaining aptitudes would help China succeed in materializing a Sino-Centric World. Conversely, just the retention of this aptitude to a certain extent would help the U.S. remain highly relevant in the global scenario”. Therefore, taking into account this aptitude category, the US is better positioned than China. In our opinion, if the BRI had had the expected acceptance and also the support from the developed world, it would have given China the strong advantage as regards the universality aptitude. In the absence of this large-scale acceptance, the US is much better positioned, in spite of its multiple mistakes.

The seventh chapter, “The Military Aptitude”, brings many arguments in favour of China’s power and skills: the artificial island construction process in the South China Sea; the fact that “China has developed an intermediate-range area denial strategy that can be accurately implemented from its South China Sea outposts”, while “the United States needs to come near its targets in order to be effective”; China’s offset strategy, such as “its asymmetrical strategy of finding and exploiting the U.S.’ soft spots” and “its civic-military fusion, based on dual-use technologies with both civilian and mili­tary applications”. Moreover, “if the U.S.’ first use of its strategic nuclear arsenal is deterred, while China’s conventional ballistic missiles as well as other weapons in its asymmetric arsenal are capable of matching the impact of America’s tactical nuclear weapons, the superiority of the U.S. in this field can essentially be neutralized. It is quite possible, there­fore, that even attaining the capability to outspend the United States at will, China will not try to match its overkill capability, considering it superfluous”. Could the game end in a tie?

As regards “The Economic Aptitude”, China, as the centre of the most dynamic part of the world – namely Asia – generates and at the same time enjoys unlimited opportunities, beyond risks such as excessive indebtedness. The transition from the development model based on investment and exports to one driven by consumption and innovation is part of the solution. The US is evidently lagging behind in many regards, with the exception of the technological advance as a whole. Besides, the US “finds itself in a Catch-22 situation”. “In order to confront China’s economic rise, the United States has to embrace the Fourth Industrial Revolution to its full extent”, but this makes the job disruption maintain its upward trend. As for China, such disruptions are the best solution to the demographic trap. Ambassador Alfredo Toro Hardy concludes that „technology and rejuvenation thus become inseparable notions. Under those circumstances, the search for economic prosperity and nationalism, the two strongest legitimizing forces of the regime, blend in their support to technology”. If one takes also into account the US’ volatile political system and increasing populism, China’s score is better than that of the US as regards the economic aptitude.

The last chapter, “The Technological Aptitude”, underscores that besides buying and funding foreign technology (or “picking from the low-hanging trees”) and benefitting from forced technology transfer and even theft, China has developed its own capacities and has become an “innovation superpower”. It has a leading role in space exploration, it is a world leader in artificial intelligence, it is home to a third of the world’s unicorns, it is the world’s leader in renewable energy, it accounts for more than half of global electric car sales, it makes more than half of the world’s electric vehicle batteries and is also home to 99% of the world’s electric bus fleet. It has world-class technological hubs, e.g., Zhongguancun (in Beijing, surnamed the “Silicon Valley of China”), Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Zhangjiang (in Pudong, Shanghai) and Dalian.

China benefits from three advantageous factors: (1) the support given by the State; (2) its sheer size and (3) its educational effort. However, the US is still the number one worldwide, and the author puts forward three strong arguments: (1) the number of Nobel Prizes awarded to the United States; (2) the commanding rank of its top universities; (3) its clusters of innovation.

The US-China technological correlation is best described by an Independent American Task Force: “China is investing significant resources in developing new tech­nologies, and after 2030 it will likely be the world’s largest spender on research and development … China is closing the technological gap with the United States, and though it may not match U.S. capa­bilities across the board, it will soon be one of the leading powers in technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, energy storage, fifth-generation cellular networks (5G), quantum informa­tion systems, and possibly biotechnology”.

Finally, the Venezuelan author emphasizes that “the struggle for technological supremacy in certain key areas is dependent on the efficiency of two very different technological development models: The state-guided and funded one, and the market oriented one”. As a representative of a developing country, perhaps the author is more demanding vis-à-vis the United States and more lenient toward China, but on the whole the book is generally unbiased, well structured and argued. After reading the complex and stimulating analyses included in this book, the reader might correlate the title question China versus the US: Who Will Prevail? with another relevant interrogation: Which system will prevail?

About the author

Alfredo Toro Hardy CV, click here

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[1] Williamson, J. (2012). Is the “Beijing Consensus” Now Dominant? Asia Policy, (13), 1-16. Retrieved April 30, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/24905162.

[2] The report can be downloaded at: https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/publications-ifri/ouvrages-ifri/chinas-soft-power-europe-falling-hard-times.