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Interview with Radu Magdin, political analyst: “Transposed into sustainable and fair solutions, the European cooperation and solidarity are the main mechanisms that can get Europe out of the crisis.”
The COVID-19 pandemic puts the EU member states and institutions in a position where they must rethink the way resources have been managed, in order to reduce, as much as possible, the economic, social and political crisis that occurred while prevention measures were taken. At the same time, the reaction of the EU and its member states actually highlights the values and principles constituting the foundation of the European concept.

Radu MAGDIN

22/06/2020 Region: European Union Topic: Various Topics

Radu Magdin, political analyst and former advisor to prime ministers in Romania and the Republic of Moldova, identified and analysed the perspectives and challenges to the cohesion of EU in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, in an interview offered to Vladimir-Adrian Costea for the Geostrategic Pulse.



Vladimir-Adrian Costea: For several months now, the Coronavirus pandemic has taken over the global headlines, leaving in the background the concerns of the international community. The EU member states continue to be affected by this virus. Under these circumstances, will the EU still be the same after the tsunami caused by the COVID-19 pandemic?

 

Radu Magdin: Every crisis over the past decades has put the European Union face to face with some fundamental choices, which have marked its identity and course of action. The crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic has multiple dimensions, and we are just beginning to comprehend their complexities. In simple terms, we can anticipate from the start that the EU, seriously affected by the pandemic, will undergo major changes. Given its shortcomings, of which even its leaders are aware, the EU finds itself especially in the position to self-assess its ability to act and its short, medium and long-term priorities.

 

The overall priorities of the EU as a whole, as well as of its member states, will be best emphasised in the context of negotiations over the Union’s multiannual financial framework, which caused strong reactions among its members ever since the first drafts circulated before the COVID-19 pandemic spread. In the meantime, the European Commission resorted to compromise, especially regarding the allocations for agricultural and cohesion policies, which are crucial for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The differences in the level of development of individual member states have always caused major disagreements over matters of vision and priorities, and the post-crisis efforts of social and economic recovery must take into account the need to deal with these disagreements.

 

As far as the capacity to take action is concerned, the crisis caused by COVID-19 has tested the European Union, which initially had a slow response, but somehow recovered in the process. In other words, the EU’s bureaucratic apparatus had a difficult jumpstart, just as expected at a time when the EU member states had already implemented severe measures on a national level, including closing the borders and ceasing exports of medicines and essential medical equipment, decisions unacceptable under different circumstances. Besides, the European Union doesn’t have enough leverage on healthcare, and the absence of extensive challenges to the public health of the entire bloc it did not sought to assume extend powers, over time. There are no clear intentions to change this approach, but a broader discussion on the European Union resilience to major challenges should take into consideration the matter of healthcare systems as well.

 

Another subject to think of when the crisis is over, is the EU’s role in the world and its ability to stay relevant in the competition between great powers, a competition intensified by the COVID-19 crisis; to what extent will we be able to talk about a Global Europe, and how do we define this concept in unforeseeable circumstances. The strength the European Union has globally cannot consist only in its ability to respond to crisis (otherwise slow), but also in its ability to predict dangers in time and create long-lasting alliances with likeminded countries, alongside which the EU can succeed within multilateral formats.

 

To what extent do the solidarity, cohesion and cooperation between the member states and the EU institutions still remain principles that have helped the Union remain united in front of these challenges?

 

Firstly, I would like to highlight the essential differences between the three dimensions of the relations between the EU member states on one hand, and the relations between the member states and the European institutions on the other. Speaking of cohesion, it is crucial to see the fact that it was a problematic matter for the European Union even before the outbreak of the pandemic, given the well-known major differences between the member states as far as their development is concerned. These differences have grown during the Coronavirus pandemic, as the social and economic systems, the resources, services, as well as the physical and digital infrastructures of each country have been strongly tested by the effects of the pandemic. It is true that the Coronavirus pandemic reached the less developed countries of the EU later, which is explicable, and its effects continue to be smaller. However, the cohesion, and most of all the mature discussions on the budgetary allocations for the cohesion policy in the upcoming financial cycle, should remain on top of the European agenda; and the crisis we are going through should remain a lesson on the importance of consensus within the EU.

 

As regards the cooperation and solidarity between the EU member states, on one hand, and between the member states and the EU institutions, on the other, I believe these are key principles for the elaboration and implementation of joint measures to alleviate the sanitary crisis and to facilitate the economic and social recovery. In the beginning, the EU member states have focused, naturally, on their internal efforts to counter the crisis. Then, the intervention of the European Union focused on restoring and building the confidence of the European citizens in coordinated and solidary actions, hence the initiation of the rescEU, the coordinated repatriations of the EU citizens, the launch of the largest economic package in the world and the adaptation of future financing tools to the demands in time of crisis. I believe that the European cooperation and solidarity, transposed in sustainable and viable solutions, are the main mechanisms that can get Europe out of the crisis and can restore the trust in the European values, including at a time when the future of the EU is under debate.

 

What are the cleavages that have resurfaced in the EU during this time? To what extent did the reaction of the EU contribute to enhancing/reducing tensions and grievances?

 

The cleavages that can be analysed in the context of the Coronavirus crisis are not different from the ones that have always existed within the EU, and first of all, I am referring to the weak cohesion between the member states and the major differences between the health services at European level, which could have proven catastrophic, should there have been a higher number of infected in countries situated in the centre and east of the European Union. We have all seen how European countries with advanced health systems were overwhelmed by the number of cases and we have imagined what could happen in our area under similar circumstances.

 

In the context of the Coronavirus crisis, the most important cleavages are those that are just beginning to be visible. For example, economic cleavages will make the European countries recover from the crisis differently, at a different pace and with some social and political costs that are yet difficult to assess. The economic support packages at the level of every country are still extremely important, not only financially speaking but also as perspective and ability to generate trust. This is why we take a look at Germany, which has launched both financial support packages and clear policies of economic recovery.

 

At the same time, the cleavages in education and respect for rules will make the elimination of restrictions in the European countries have very different effects and we shouldn’t rule out a second wave of infections, which will be closely followed this time by a second wave of mistrust on a national level. Under crisis, trust in leadership is the most important tool, which must be managed very carefully. Should there be no trust in the leaders, the action taken will always create tensions within society and will generate a breeding ground for populism. Last but not least, I wish to emphasise that the existence of educational cleavages makes us more vulnerable to disinformation and fake news originating from within or from outside the country, and serving the same purpose – to weaken the trust in a system and, in time, make room for destructive leaders.

 

What were the main steps undertaken by the EU to support the countries affected by the COVID-19 pandemic? What kind of support do the EU institutions provide, especially with regard to education and health?

 

The European Union has mobilised support resources as it went along, including by adjusting policies already existent, and that have proven restrictive in the context generated by the Coronavirus pandemic. The immediate measures included the repatriation of European citizens, especially by organizing flights from third countries, emergency financial support (for the first time in history, the European Commission activated the “escape clause” to allow exceptional financial support), establishing a EU supply of medical equipment – the so called rescEU, issuing recommendations regarding the measures to limit the spread of the Coronavirus and testing strategies, and ensuring the movement of goods and people under the circumstances created by the crisis.

 

The longer-term measures are those which aim at rendering the regulations regarding state aid more flexible, at allocating resources for the research and development of specific treatments and, especially, at the economic recovery plan. The European Commission proposed a 2.4 trillion Euro economic recovery plan, that was declined by the Next Generation EU instrument – based on finances collected from financial markets, as well as by the financing instruments designed as part of the consolidating process of the EU’s long-term financial framework, which is being negotiated on at a European level. I would also like to mention the SURE instrument, a temporary support instrument to reduce unemployment risks in an emergency situation. The instrument, which provides the member states financing up to almost 100 billion Euros for the costs related to the development, or extension of national technical unemployment programmes until December 31st 2022, with the possibility of a new extension, will be available once all the member states provide their collaterals for the loans.

 

In terms of the health strategy, between January and now the European Commission mobilised almost 550 million Euros to develop vaccines, new treatments, tests and medical systems that could help stop the spread of the Coronavirus. It is a very high amount, and it is only natural that most of the EU’s medical efforts should focus on research, taking into account, as I was saying, the limited of the Union in this area. However, the European Commission allocated 3 billion Euros to finance the instrument dedicated to emergency support and the joint rescEU equipment reserve, Romania and Germany being the first countries to store it.

 

As far as education in a broader sense is concerned, the efforts at the level of the European institutions focus, for now, more or less successfully on countering disinformation, by means of the tools they already have at the European level. Besides, in this field, the Commission and the European External Action Service cooperate with other EU institutions and member states, including by means of the rapid alert system established in March 2019, as well as with international partners from G7 and NATO. Hereinafter, we expect the measures announced on the 10th of June in this respect, namely strengthening the strategic communication and public diplomacy in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and everywhere else in the world, as well as the support given to the media and to independent journalists, to be implemented. As far as classical education is concerned, I am convinced that the efforts to strengthen this system on a European level will contribute to the economic recovery on medium and long-term, especially by supporting the requalification mechanisms and so on.

 

How do you see the response of the EU and its member states to the latest challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic?

 

The Coronavirus pandemic is unprecedented. No other pandemic in European history has expanded under the current connectivity and interdependency conditions. Faced with such a threat, the EU countries reacted before the European institutions, as they should have, to protect their citizens. From my point of view, the toughest challenge was closing the borders, based on decisions taken at a national level and then at a European level – in a sequence we would have never thought possible. Once the borders were closed, the issues related to the transportation of goods and people – an issue nobody thought we would be facing nowadays – intensified both the first effects of the crisis and the public discourse. Subsequently, the answer of the EU, although somehow late, was as coherent as it could be under the circumstances and taking into account the EU’s legal framework.

 

The crisis is ongoing, so the only useful evaluations at this moment are sequence evaluations, in order to figure out the next steps. Under the circumstances of the pandemic, each European country will take the decisions it finds logical from an epidemiologic and economic point of view. On a European level, however, I believe that the approach should still be coordinated and active so that it allows us to return to a relatively normal state and to some of the key European debates, presently suspended or limited due to the crisis.

 

What are the perspectives after the pandemic, in the context of an imminent social and economic crisis? Do you believe in the possible emergence of a new political crisis in the European Union?

 

According to the main financial institutions, an economic crisis at the level of the European Union is imminent. All predictions show a loss in the GDP and economic trade, factors that inevitably lead to an economic crisis. An economic crisis is always accompanied by a social crisis as the prospects of stability for the people fade, and because of certain phenomena, such as unemployment, decrease of the purchasing power, fluctuations of the exchange rate – which are already visible in Europe.

 

At the same time, it is important to remember the fact that the possibility of a political crisis at the level of the European Union has never been neglected. Under the current circumstances, just as we have learned from the economic crisis in 2008, there will be a proper environment for populist leaders, who will gain ground “helped” by disinformation, among other. On the other hand, I still hope that the populist discourse, built on the logic of finger-pointing to problems without finding a solution, will not meet the expectations of the European citizens, who will emerge off this crisis marked by serious losses and in search for real solutions.

 

Who are the players who find an economic and political opportunity in the fight for resources and influence in the EU?

 

Closely related to what I have said before, the players who will find political opportunities in times of crisis are, first of all, the populist politicians, as well as state and non-state actors engaged in a hybrid war for the destabilisation of the European Union. As far as the economic opportunity is concerned, it is an open issue to all European countries able to adjust and find ways to use the European toolbox for the benefit of their own economies. The “winners” of this crisis will be those who manifest a reasonable form of economic patriotism, who will focus on consolidating European capabilities, but without sacrificing the European solidarity, cooperation and integration.