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After the Pandemic. Perspectives and Challenges Regarding the Reversal of the Social and Political Values
These days, we feel tempted to imagine a world that will try, after the pandemic, to redefine itself in order to find a new balance. In the process, we tend to stop relating to the world that we know and in which we used to live. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, globalization and development had made the world in which we used to operate extremely dynamic, by virtue of our social interactions. Individuals and states were equally trying to maximize their resources and harness their potential.

Summary

In this article, we tackle the prospects and challenges that could be predicted in a situation witnessing a gradual overcoming of the COVID-19 pandemic. In order to understand the process of reversal of social and political values, we refer, at the same time, to the human nature and to the mechanisms specific to the actions taken by state actors on the international stage. Our analysis aims to identify the prospects of redefining the relationship between domestic and collective security.

 

Key words: human nature, resilience, domestic security, collective security, COVID-19


Lockdown and reopening by Arcadio Esquivel, Costa Rica, 06.05.2020 (© CagleCartoons.com)

 

Foreword

These days, we feel tempted to imagine a world that will try, after the pandemic, to redefine itself in order to find a new balance. In the process, we tend to stop relating to the world that we know and in which we used to live. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, globalization and development had made the world in which we used to operate extremely dynamic, by virtue of our social interactions. Individuals and states were equally trying to maximize their resources and harness their potential. Essentially, we were familiarized with rules that were clear, but, at the same time, we accepted that there was continuous change, brought about by the dynamics of power and influence. When faced with new threats, the world we lived in provided us with the apparent guarantee of an appropriate level of resilience.[1] The fall of the Twin Towers, terrorist attacks followed by the arms race and the taunting that could even lead to a new world war, failed to shake the foundations of the world.

Our ability to adjust to new threats and act on the go has been obvious including during the COVID-19 pandemic. With the help of technology or with a better practising of physical distancing,[2] the stress of (self)-isolation at home (gradually) diminished. Surely this experience affected us to different degrees, depending on one's capacity to understand the need and scope of the preventive measures. The experience has not changed us fundamentally, even if our points of reference have changed. Basically, we are abandoning the zero-sum game without automatically wanting what is best for others. The isolation of the “lepers”[3] requires the way medical and financial resources are distributed to be reconsidered. The access to education and quality medical care is a privilege only for certain social groups, and this only widens the existing rifts and gaps nationally and in internationally. The national medical resources become, in the current context, the main diplomatic negotiation tool.

Overall, the Coronavirus pandemic reverses, at least for a certain period, the fields of strategic investment, and makes obvious the exponential increase in the legitimate demand to secure access to medical, digital and educational services meant to meet the needs of the people belonging to vulnerable groups. Yet, there is no focus on investments in the security of the IT systems, even though the level of exposure and use of these systems has registered a significant increase since countries affected by the pandemic started imposing restrictions. Adaptation to the digitalisation process poses a challenge, yet it is crucial in diminishing the gaps seen in training and managing human resources.

After the pandemic, in all likelihood we will assess the damages and try to recover, economically and psychologically. We will thus give additional value to human and material resources, and, at the same time we will (re)define (tacitly) the social contract.[4]

 



After the lockdown by Gatis Sluka, Latvijas Avize, Latvia, 15.05.2020 (© CagleCartoons.com)

 

From the Shock of Isolation to the Shock of Liberation

On a psychological level, (self)isolation, the sudden surrender of a familiar lifestyle caused an (inherent) shock[5] of which we are all more or less aware. We have adopted a different lifestyle and we have been (and still are) going through a process of adaptation to the preventive measures. This situation is (in some cases) comparable (yet not similar or identical) to that of a detainee, even though we are not serving a sentence (like house arrest) We are free, but responsible at the same time. (However paradoxical it may seem.) After the lifting of restrictions, even if partially, there will most probably be another psychological shock – that of having to adapt to a new lifestyle, at least for a while.[6]

Social[7] and dynamic[8], an individual has the ability to adapt to extreme situations, an ability prevalent among state and non-state actors. Change is, therefore, not structural but limited to a timeframe. Fear of the unknown, lack of energy, the pressure felt because of the imminent economic and social crisis, are bound to influence in the short and medium term the actions of the players. Here we should distinguish between those who accept these measures even if burdensome, and those who do not accept them and take risks. A swift/quick reaction in this case can represent an important advantage.[9] Promoting the country brand[10] is a priority if the country wishes to reposition itself globally, thus contributing to the establishment of a new global agenda as well.

The shock induced by the gradual lifting of restrictions engages new energies that aim, in a competitive environment, to capitalize on the needs and behaviours brought out by the scope and evolution of the (self)isolation measures. More explicitly, one can identify two sectors that generate considerable financial resources and that swiftly need a new approach: 1) tourism and 2) sports competitions, because physical distancing considerably reduces revenues. The main problem is posed by the discrepancies, among the population, as far as the level of education is concerned, clearly seen throughout the period of restrictions imposed during the state of emergency.

The interference of the state in the private lives of the individuals will gradually diminish, and the focus will turn to individual responsibility, rather than to social responsibility. Recovering from the economic crisis will be the main legitimate concern of state actors, as will be recovering from the social crisis. The perception and fear of the risk of being infected with the coronavirus will have to be minimized if we want to be able to return to the “normalcy” we were used to. Ensuring a reserve of medical resources in the near future will be a priority if the population is to feel reassured.

The main focus should be on research, a vital element in a competitive environment (par excellence). At the same time, politically and economically speaking, it will make a “huge difference” whether the vaccine against the coronavirus will be produced in the US, China or the United Kingdom. According to the New York Times, sources from the FBI and the US Homeland Security are preparing a report accusing the authorities in Beijing of espionage and attempt to steal data from researches done by the US.[11] The competition between these great state actors over the discovery of the cure for the Coronavirus is, on a medium term, similar to the race of nuclear arms, meant to strengthen their position on the international stage. Fundamentally, finding and approving a treatment will have social and political implications with a direct impact including on diplomacy, and become (in the first place) a national asset. Supporting this assumption is the reaction of Agnes Pannier-Runacher, secretary of state at the French Ministry of Economy, who criticised the decision taken by the multinational French company Santofi following its CEO's announcement that the US would have priority in receiving the vaccine as a result of its financial contributions.[12]

 



Hope of the World by David Fitzsimmons, The Arizona Star, Tucson, AZ, 08.04.2020 (© CagleCartoons.com)

 

Lessons (not) Learned. From Globalization to Narrow-Minded Nationalism?

Politically speaking, the rhetoric of national triumph, in a world where the threat is global, is indicative of the rise of political nationalist movements, which are more clearly against globalization. To the followers of “liberating” nationalism, globalization is not a solution, but rather a “threat”. Managing the crisis was initially seen as a national issue; even taking the physical distancing measure was, in certain cases, justified by the consensus regarding some national values pertaining to the imperative of ensuring the health of all members of society. Since international support and cooperation were rather scarce, encouraging a rhetoric based on the idea of nation should not surprise one. Such narrative existed and will continue to exist independent from the nature and size of threats, therefore, in certain cases there are attempts to ignore the significance and support that globalization can provide to coordinate efforts and distribute resources, commensurate with the size and intensity with which the virus spreads.

Gradually, narrow nationalism started to gain currency vis-à-vis the visibly more evident polarization on the Beijing-Washington axis, as a result to the repeated accusations directed at the Chinese communist regime. In a competitive environment,[13] the criticism directed at the authorities in Beijing on to the way they have informed their foreign partners regarding the evolution of the spread of the virus, questioned their honesty.

By contrast, one should mention the actions taken by the EU to provide financial support and the necessary medical equipment, to launch common public acquisitions, increase the production of individual protection equipment and stimulate research in order to find treatments and vaccines.[14] Concretely, the EU allotted 140 million euro to develop vaccines and new treatments, as well as diagnostic tests.[15] More precisely, through its research programme Horizon 2020, the EU gave 48.5 million euro to finance 18 projects and 140 research teams. The Enhanced European Innovation Council Accelerator raised 164 million euro to support start-ups and SME that find innovative solutions to combat the COVID-19 epidemic.[16] Moreover, the European vaccine innovative developer CureVac received 80 million euro in grants to launch, by June 2020, the clinical trial of a vaccine. The support lent to the member states to facilitate the return to a sustainable economic growth represents a “safety net” for EU employees, enterprises and countries; its value amounts to 540 billion euro.[17] Making access to structural funds flexible was another action meant to offer immediately needed support to “diminish the social and economic prejudices caused by the pandemic”.[18]

The EU’s institutional efforts were doubled, even if partially, by the solidarity among the member states; we are mentioning here the support given to Italy: (1) France donated 1 million masks; (2) Germany sent 7 million tons worth of medical equipment (ventilators and anaesthetic masks); (3) the Czech Republic offered 10,000 personal protective suits and artificial respiration devices (made through 3D printing); (4) Austria, Germany and Luxembourg took over patients; and (5) Poland, Romania and Germany sent teams of doctors.[19]

The EU and its member states initiatives have been useful not only to managing the COVID-19 pandemic, but also to diminishing the populist rhetoric, which accuses the EU member states of being incapable of a quick and efficient reaction in times of crisis. The risk of upending the European citizens' values is reduced by the alleviation of the social and economic effects due to the adoption of restrictions and preventive measures, as well as to physical distancing.

The involvement of the EU and its member states is an exception compared to the changes at global level, more and more visible in the political sector. Despite the EU’s concrete actions, populist rhetoric and Euroscepticism are still on display in the European area, including blaming the EU’s (relatively) delayed reactions. At the same time, there are discussions regarding seasonal workers, which highlights the questionable attitude of the national authorities towards citizens of other member states.

 

A New Horizon of Expectation. Domestic Security Versus Collective Security

When facing an “unseen enemy”, the (self) isolation experience determines, at individual level and depending on the level of education, the (re)definition of the horizon of expectation. The reversal of the hierarchy of values and needs determines, in the medium and short term, a (partial) change in lifestyle. Whether we like it or not, the individual adapts to the situation if he becomes aware of the size of the danger and penalties. Other than that, the COVID-19 pandemic does not have a significant impact on individual decisions. In such circumstances, the reluctance to change and to adopt preventive measures may bring about certain behaviours that aim at defying the restrictions imposed by the authorities. For example, the spread of the virus did not discourage the protesters who contested the restriction of their personal freedom in the name of preserving the common good.[20]

 

The protesters by Bruce Plante, Tulsa World, 22.04.2020 (© CagleCartoons.com)


On a larger scale, the restrictions were applied rather through measures taken at national level, and the cooperation among countries was obvious particularly when they established transit corridors. Borders became visible (once again), which changed the functions and principles of collective security.[21] The principle of equality and equal security,[22] the right of each country to ensure domestic security to justify the limitation of the freedom of movement and border control[23] prevailed. At European Union level, one of the first measures witnessed was the closure of its external borders.[24] which highlights the emphasis on internal security.

In the current context, the desire to create “a world without borders”[25], which has been promoted for the last thirty years by supporters of globalization was significantly refuted by the complex and uneven practices to regulate and militarize the borders.[26] ”Sovereign security sites”,[27] the borders serve as territorial limits where norms that include or eliminate multiple forms of mobility apply and are prioritised according to the level of the threat.[28] Minca and Rijke noticed that paying increased attention to borders actually strengthens the rhetoric supporting walls building.[29] tendency explained by Wendy Brown[30] as “a sign that the state is losing its power rather than a show of strength”.[31] The shape of borders changed, especially under the influence of globalization and of the emergence of new digital and communication technologies.[32] Borders (visibly) define the dimension of internal security, and the measures taken by the countries affected (mainly) depend on the rate at which the COVID-19 infection spreads.

The emphasis put on internal security influences the way migration flows are perceived, especially when it comes to migrants who come from highly affected areas. The level of tolerance towards the integration of these people is down and will, most likely, go even further down. A clear example is provided by the violent reaction of some ultras towards a young Asian man who was forced off a public transportation vehicle, an incident that took place before the pandemic in Bucharest.[33]

After the pandemic, the prospect of reducing the risk of infection will be seconded by the dire need to have (limited) resources redistributed to the more vulnerable categories, who are many and have diverse needs, and this is an important dimension. Loss of jobs, inability to pay loans and bills, the extra costs for the acquisition of protection equipment and disinfectants, to which one should add personal traumas, are the main factors that heighten the egotistical dimension of expectations at individual level. Moreover, it can be said that in certain cases, security is strictly all about the individual, especially about those people who react violently towards those with whom they share the same spaces. Overall, socially, stereotypes and the limited resources dictate a different logic, one which demands isolating certain people and groups perceived as presenting a high risk of infection. In some instances, when there are registered cases of infection with COVID-19, in the name of internal security, physical distancing leads to the expulsion of certain communities/social groups from the vicinity.

Coordinating efforts at global level to answer to the crises and challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic is poor as far as planning, programming and managing its consequences, and, at the same time, made difficult and delayed by the dire need to manage the situation (first) at national level. The most overlooked element is the promotion of the exchange of good practices, and this actually highlights the individual approach to identifying and implementing certain measures to prevent the risk of becoming infected with coronavirus.

Diplomacy becomes valuable (once again) through the will and interests of some of the best trained players who have abundant medical resources or significant ability to negotiate and purchase. At the same time, diplomacy gains a strong component through volunteerism or the mutual exchange of resources. The focus is on solidarity (and on gaining trust), by the respect shown to the vulnerable situation in which the countries most affected by the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic find themselves.

Overall, just like the unconventional threats that highlighted the dire need to strengthen collective security, the COVID-19 pandemic brings (again) to the table the need to generate synergies between the different levels of domestic security of each country. Clearly, the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic brings into focus the need to have a mechanism that is integrated in the security framework and that allows the swift identification of effective measures to evaluate and manage the new threats. In order for us to be able to adopt swift and comprehensive measures that aim at preserving the resilience of the security systems, it is necessary to transfer sovereignty by merging and integrating each security system in a comprehensive framework regulated by a transnational legal instrument. At global level, the COVID-19 pandemic clearly alters the public agenda, health becoming the main concern – as it requires more effort and resources allotted concomitant with the reduction of discrepancies in order to decrease, as much as possible, the level of vulnerability of every security system.

 


Corona Sysiphos by Martin Sutovec, Slovakia, 16.04.2020 (© CagleCartoons.com)

 

 

NB:  Vladimir-Adrian Costea is a graduate student at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, under the supervision of Prof. Georgeta Ghebrea PHD. (E-mail: costea.vladimir-adrian@fspub.unibuc.ro). He has published articles on clemency and the state of occupancy of Romanian prisons in magazines such as Studia, Romanian Political Science Review, Revista de Drept Constituțional (Constitutional Law Magazine), Revista Română de Sociologie (The Romanian Sociology Magazine) and Revista Polis (Polis Magazine).
        Publishing current paper was financed through „Entrepreneurial Education and Professional Counseling for Social and Human Sciences PhD and Postdoctoral Researchers to ensure knowledge transfer from the field of Social Sciences and Humanities to the Labor Market” Project, co-financed from European Social Fund through Human Capital Programme (ATRiUM, POCU/380/6/13/123343).

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FRIEDMAN, Thomas L., The World Is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century, London, Penguin, 2006.

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[1]Peter J, Burnelland Peter Calvert, The Resilience of Democracy: Persistent Practice, Durable Idea, London, Frank Cass, 1999; Jonathan Joseph, Varieties of Resilience, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018.

[2]World Health Organization, WHO expert mission to Belarus recommends physical distancing measures as COVID-19 virus transmits in the community, 21.04.2020,https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/who-expert-mission-to-belarus-recommends-physical-distancing-measures-as-covid-19-virus-transmits-in-the-community.

[3]Michel Foucault, Abnormalities, Courses at Collège de France 1974-1975, translation Dan Radu Stănescu, afterword Bogdan Ghiu, Bucharest, Univers Publishing, 1999, p. 94.

[4]Jean-Jeaques Rousseau, Despre contractul social sau principiile dreptului politic, translation and foreword study by N. Daşcovici, published, afterword and notes by A. Bârna, Bucharest, Mondero Publishing, 2007.

[5]Jonas Hanway, The Defects of Police. The Cause of Immorality and the Continual Robberies Committed, Particularly in and about the Metropolis, London, J. Dodsley,1775.

[6]Ibid.

[7]ARISTOTLE, Politics, bilingual edition, translation, comments and index by, foreword study by Vasile Muscă, Bucharest, IRI Publishing, 2001, §3.

[8]Fernando Savater, Politica pentru fiul meu translation by Corneliu Rădulescu, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing, 1999 [1992], p. 29.

[9]IgorAnsoff and Patrick Sullivan, Optimizing Profitability in Turbulent Environments: A Formula for Strategic Success, Long Range Planning, Vol. 26, No. 5, Printed in Great Britain, 1993, pp. 11-23.

[10]Peter van Ham, The Rise of The Brand State, The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2001, pp. 1-5.

[11]David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, U.S. to Accuse China of Trying to Hack Vaccine Data, as Virus Redirects Cyberattacks, TheNew York Times, 10.05.2020,https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/10/us/politics/coronavirus-china-cyber-hacking.html.

[12]“Va fi bătaie mare pe vaccinurile anti-coronavirus/Franța se contrează cu SUA pentruvaccinuldezvoltat de Sanofi”, EuroPunkt, 14.05.2020,https://europunkt.ro/2020/05/14/va-fi-bataie-mare-pe-vaccinurile-anti-coronavirus-franta-se-contreaza-cu-sua-pentru-vaccinul-dezvoltat-de-sanofi/.

[13]Igor Ansoff, Patrick Sullivan, Optimizing Profitability in Turbulent Environments: A Formula for Strategic Success,Long Range Planning, Vol. 26, No. 5, Printed in Great Britain, 1993, pp. 11-23.

[14]UE împotriva COVID-19,https://europa.eu/european-union/coronavirus-response_ro.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Coronavirus Lockdown Protest: What’s Behind the US Demonstrations?, BBC, 21.04.2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52359100.

[21]Olga Dorul, Conceptul de securitate colectivă în dreptul internaţional contemporan, Revist amoldovenească de drept international şi relaţii internaţionale, 2008, pp. 68-73.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid.

[24]European Commission, Travel and Transportation during the Coronavirus Pandemic, https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/travel-and-transportation-during-coronavirus-pandemic_ro.

[25]Thomas L. Friedman,The World is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century, London, Penguin, 2006.

[26]Reece Jones, Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move, London, Verso Books, 2016; Reece Jones și Corey Johnson, Border militarisation and the re-articulation of sovereignty, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 41(2), 2016, pp. 187–200; Mary Gilmartin, Patricia Burke Wood și Cian O’Callaghan, Borders, Mobility and Belonging in the Era of Brexit and Trump, Bristol, Policy Press, 2018, p. 10.

[27]Karen E. Till, Juanita Sundberg, Wendy Pullan, Charis Psaltis, Chara Makriyianni, Rana Zincir Celal, Meltem Onurkan Samani, Lorraine Dowler, Interventions in the Political Geographies of Walls”, Political Geography, 33 (1), 2013, pp. 52–62.

[28]Gilmartin, Burke Wood and O’Callaghan, Borders, Mobility and Belonging in the Era of Brexit and Trump, p. 12.

[29]Claudio Minca and Alexandra Rijke, Walls! Walls! Walls! Society and Space, 2017, available at: http://societyandspace.org/2017/04/18/walls-walls-walls/.

[30]Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, New York, Zone, 2010.

[31]Gilmartin, Burke Wood and O’Callaghan, Borders, Mobility and Belonging in the Era of Brexit and Trump, p. 12.

[32]William Walters, Border/Control, European Journal of Social Theory, 9(2), 2006, pp. 187–203; William Walters, Rethinking borders beyond the state, Comparative European politics, 4, 2006, pp. 141–159, apud. Andreas Müller, Governing Mobility Beyond the State. Centre, Periphery and the EU’s External Borders, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 23.

[33]Revoltător. Un tânăr asiatic a fost bătut și dat afară din metrou de suporteri rapidiști, isterizați de teama coronavirusului, Digi24, 26.02.2020, https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/evenimente/revoltator-un-tanar-asiatic-a-fost-batut-si-dat-afara-din-metrou-de-suporteri-rapidisti-isterizati-de-teama-coronavirusului-1266411.