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The “Leave” Mirage: from a Lesser Europe to the Need for Cooperation in a Post-Brexit Context
We shall wrongly understand the political meaning of Brexit if we fail to make reference to the timeline of the Brussels-London negotiations, and to the economic, social and political evolutions specific to the United Kingdom. An overall analysis of the evolution of the United Kingdom towards its withdrawal from the EU and Euratom helps us understand the contrast between the initial concept of a lesser Europe and the dire need to cooperate after Brexit.

Summary

We shall wrongly understand the political meaning of Brexit if we fail to make reference to the timeline of the Brussels-London negotiations, and to the economic, social and political evolutions specific to the United Kingdom. An overall analysis of the evolution of the United Kingdom towards its withdrawal from the EU and Euratom helps us understand the contrast between the initial concept of a lesser Europe and the dire need to cooperate after Brexit.

 

Key words: Brexit, cooperation, negotiation, populism, the European Union

 

(Daily Mail, 1st of January 1973)

 

     The Triumph of Populism. The Temptation to Give up the Social Contract

 

     The actual occurrence of Brexit marks the triumph of populism, which was the basic concept for the campaign that supported the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, as the people’s trust in traditional parties and European institutions[1] faded away, while public concerns increased and the need to cooperate at a community level[2] decreased. The strategy to delegitimize the populist phenomenon by deriding political leaders for their discourses (in contrast with the rhetoric of the traditional parties), together with the attempt to personify the “Leave” option exclusively by Nigel Farage, have allowed the society to grow further apart. Seeing Nigel Farage as a buffoon[3], the supporters of the European Union thought, ever since the beginning, that Brexit would fail, which is why the referendum was perceived by the Prime Minister, David Cameron as a double opportunity - strengthening legitimacy (within the UK and the EU) and discouraging later initiatives coming from the populists and the Euro-sceptics.

     Nota bene! Euroscepticism didn’t appear out of nowhere, as a result of David Cameron’s referendum regarding the UK’s remaining in the EU. A good example in this case is Nigel Farage’s speech on the 29th of October 1999, in the European Parliament, when he referred to the option of the UK Independence Party to request the withdrawal of the UK from the EU.[4] At that time, Farage the MP highlighted the fact that being part of the EU affects the UK, since beef trade had been limited by the EU, as a follow-up to banning UK beef exports in 1996.[5] Farage criticized the requirements of the EU, seeing that the equal treatment of all EU members was unjust, if they were to consider the difference in their development.[6] The solution that Farage came up with for the United Kingdom “to rejoin the real trading world” was, ever since 1999, represented by the option “Leave”.[7]

     When the referendum for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and from the European Atomic Energy Community took place, the stake of this initiative was not, paradoxically, fully acknowledged. These aspects are in full contrast with the principles of social contact promoted by Thomas Hobbes, concepts which have been at the basis of the development of modern societies.[8] Overall, the social contract represented the will of the community, which invested in a certain authority to protect it from the conflicts that may occur among its members, because “a man is a wolf to another man”. (Homo homini lupus est.)[9] According to Hobbes when the members of the community stop feeling protected, the social contract ends and is replaced by another.[10] Applying Hobbes’ pattern to Brexit we notice the existence of the choice to give up European membership, at the same time with the dire need for a minimum cooperation, which seeks to prevent the occurrence of negative consequences to the United Kingdom and the European Union.

Brexit made room for many studies dedicated to the rise of populism and Euroscepticism,[11] to the changes in voting patterns,[12] as well as to the institutional architecture of the EU (starting with Article 50 in the TEU).[13] Our analysis aims at depicting how the “other” is seen by the supporters of Brexit, as well as looking into the prospects of cooperation after Brexit, on which the withdrawal agreement doesn’t present any guarantees, but instead focuses on the cooperation between the United Kingdom and the European Union. We aim to highlight that the actual occurrence of Brexit brings along mainly mutual cooperation.[14]

     A coordinated withdrawal and the transition period following Brexit still has a lot of issues to solve, such as registration rights of the citizens in the EU, the protection of personal data, judicial cooperation on criminal matters, asylum, migration and border control. The withdrawal agreement marks the finalization of tough negotiations between the UK and the EU; however, there still are a lot of issues to solve by the end of the transition period.

 

     “Remain” vs. “Leave”

 

     On the 23rd of June 2016, British voters expressed their vote for the second time on whether they wished to remain in the EU, following the vote in 1975, when 67% opted to remain in the European Economic Community.[15] The result in 2016 is a major challenge to the EU member states as it puts a high amount of pressure on the economic, financial, social and political areas of the European community, as “Leave” was voted by 51.9% of the population.[16] Unlike Greenland exiting the EU (following a referendum in 1985, in an autonomous territory of 60.000 people),[17] Brexit takes place on a much larger scale, given the fact that the United Kingdom is one of the largest contributors to the EU budget.[18]

     Originally, the referendum started by the Prime Minister David Cameron found its legitimacy in the promise to negotiate more favourable agreements for the United Kingdom in order to maintain its status as an EU member.[19] The negotiation plans made public in 2013 by the Conservative Party were structured by Cameron starting from the premise that “the answer to our problems isn’t necessarily a greater Europe. Sometimes it is a smaller one.”[20] The terms of the Conservative Party meant EU reformation from the following perspective:

(1) Economic governance - so that the decisions taken for the Eurozone are optional for all non EU members;

(2) Competitiveness - supporting the free flow of capital, goods and services;

(3) sovereignty - a proposal that meant the end of Britain's obligation to work towards an "ever closer union", the enhancement of the role of national parliaments which could stop the unwanted proposals of the European Parliament;

(4) Immigration - the protection of public services, school system and medical system from the pressure exerted by the increasing flow of migration. The proposal envisaged also the restricting the rights to free movement for new member states, whose economies had not converged with those of the existing member states, as well as limiting the access of the European citizens to the benefits of the social system.[21]

 

     David Cameron’s proposals focused on increasing the flexibility level within the EU, so that the amendments of the EU treaties were implemented according to the specific issues of each member state.[22] Matters regarding the breach of the fundamental freedoms of the single market, limited access to social welfare for the EU citizens have been labelled as “highly problematic” by the European Commission, as they were considered “a direct discrimination of the EU citizens”.[23] Cameron’s proposals meant less cooperation or no cooperation at all, meaning withdrawal from the EU. Thus, the referendum campaign hadn’t been focused on redefining the EU anymore; the options of the voters had been clear, even if the Labour Party supported, in 2019, the idea of a new referendum.[24]

The referendum campaign focused on two main topics - the United Kingdom’s contribution to the budget of the EU and the management of the migration flow, Brexit supporters citing economic and social imbalance mainly caused by the refugee crisis.[25] Lack of jobs and the increase of the real-estate market[26] tore the United Kingdom apart even more, as the EU membership was presented by the “Leave” side as one of the main causes for the poor living standards.[27] The populist rhetoric contributed to the dissatisfaction of the voters, so withdrawal from the EU seemed the only option for better living standards.[28]

 

(Jack Taylor/Getty Images)

 

     Overall, the campaign focused on redefining the “other”, and its rhetoric was aimed at highlighting the “unfair competition” between the citizens of the United Kingdom and the citizens from the other EU members, as well as the refugees. The solution provided by Brexit supporters was based on “unfair competition” as well, as a consequence to the significant restriction of the rights of the EU citizens. Moreover, Cameron’s referendum came at a time when the EU was not only facing economic, social and political distress, but also when the subject of the reformation of the EU hadn’t been on the EU’s public agenda. The actions of the European Commission regarding the future of the Union were taken only after the results of the referendum had been validated, a referendum that lead to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the EU and from the Euratom, by means of Article 50 from the TEU.

 

     We Have a Deal, but Are Looking for a Majority. Sensitive Negotiations between Brussels and London

 

     The referendum regarding the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU had London and Brussels involved in two rounds of negotiations, focused on two major objectives:

     1. The period previous to the referendum when the Prime Minister, David Cameron, advertised the United Kingdom’s main concerns.[29] These actions started at the European Council meeting on the 25th and 26th of June 2015, when David Cameron made known his intentions to holding a referendum.[30] Another important moment was the new settlement for the United Kingdom within the EU, a proposal issued by the President Donald Tusk, on the 2nd of February 2016.[31] The decision taken by the EU heads of state and government present at the European Council meeting on the 17th of December 2015, clarified issues regarding economic governance, more specifically the voluntary participation of member states whose currency was not the euro to the further deepening of the economic and monetary union.[32] As for competitiveness, heads of state and government stressed out the need for “the establishment of an internal market in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured” this objective meaning the EU “will pursue an active and ambitious policy of trade”.[33] The Conservatives’ concern regarding security was emphasized by the members of the European Council, who highlighted that when a treaty is revised, it would be done with the consent of all EU members and it is the only option when referring to increasing or reducing the attributions of the EU.[34] Moreover, European leaders insisted on the fact that should treaties be revised, they would take into account the special status of the United Kingdom, which “is not committed to further political integration into the European Union”.[35] Social benefits and free movement of workers within the EU was one of the most sensitive issues during the negotiations. European leaders insisted on justifiable restrictions on free movement, by adopting legitimate measures for “avoiding or limiting flows of workers of such a scale that they have negative effects both for the Member States of origin and for the Member States of destination.”[36] The necessary requirement for the decision of the heads of state or government to take effect was based on the Government of the United Kingdom informing the Secretary-General of the Council that it had decided to remain a member of the European Union.[37] Overall, these amendments met with the concessions made for the United Kingdom in European treaties:

- Not to adopt the euro and therefore to keep the British pound sterling as its currency (Protocol No 15).

- No to participate in the Schengen acquis (Protocol No 19).

- To keep exercising border controls on persons, and therefore not to participate in the Schengen area as regards internal and external borders (Protocol No 20).

- To choose whether or not to participate in measures in the area of freedom, security and justice (Protocol No 21).

- To cease to apply as from 1 December 2014 a large majority of Union acts and provisions in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty while choosing to continue to participate in 35 of them (Article 10(4) and (5) of Protocol No 36).[38]

 

     European leaders adopted during the European Council meeting in February 2016, the decision meant to consolidate United Kingdom’s status within the European Union, a decision both legally irreversible as well as obligatory.[39] The British government decided to subject this new agreement to the referendum on the 23rd of June 2016, which lead to its invalidation. The common reaction of European leaders and the Netherlands Presidency came right away after the results keeping their ground and to the document “Decision of the Heads of State or Government, Meeting within the European Council, Concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union”, which states that the decision taken on the 18th and 19th of February 2016[40] was no longer valid and would ceased to exist. There would be no negotiations.[41] Besides, the European leaders insisted on the United Kingdom’s responsibility to implement the results of the referendum “as soon as possible”, no matter the difficulty regarding the withdrawal of a member state from the union.[42] Furthermore, the EU leaders brought up for the first time the relationship between the EU and the UK (as a third party) based on the principle of mutual recognition of the interests of both parties as to the establishment of a balance between rights and obligations.[43] The attitude of the EU leaders marked the end of the previous Brexit negotiations, which had a negative result due to the fact that the UK gave up the Agreement proposed by the heads of the member states and the refusal to reprise any negotiations regarding remaining in the EU.

     2. Following the implementation of Article 50, the negotiations followed the path towards withdrawing according to a Deal or without it, as well as establishing the terms of the withdrawal and the transition period. The main challenge was having a majority that would support the withdrawal Agreement (especially within the Parliament of the United Kingdom). The first stages of the negotiating process were Prime Minister Theresa May’s engagement (2nd of October 2016) to start the implementation of Article 50 by the end of March 2018, as well as the points of view of the United Kingdom and the EU.[44] The EU’s points of view were presented by Donald Tusk, president of the European Council, on the 13th of October 2016, during his speech at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, when he set conditions regarding the access to the single European market, the free movement of citizens, goods, capital and services.[45] After the 29th of March 2017 official notification of the amendments in Article 50[46], the special European Council (Article 50) met on the 29th of April 2017 and unanimously adopted the guidelines to the negotiation of Brexit[47]; then European leaders agreed on a gradual approach of the negotiations, in order to get a Deal based on an orderly withdrawal.[48]

     The first round of negotiations started on the 19th of June 2017, when the parties discussed for the first time sensible aspects regarding citizens’ rights, financial claims and the border with Northern Ireland.[49] After the sixth round of negotiations between Michael Barnier, the EU’s head negotiator and David Davis, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, European leaders adopted a new set of guidelines for the second phase of the negotiations, regarding the transition and the framework for the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU.[50] They were later seconded by a new set of guidelines regarding the position of the EU’s 27 states in the transition period.[51] The negotiations mandate given to the Commission was based on the United Kingdom accepting the whole EU acquis on the entire duration of the transition period, as if “the country were still a member state”, without “participating in or nominating or electing members of the EU institutions, nor participating in the decision-making of the Union bodies, offices and agencies.”[52]

The first version of the withdrawal Agreement was made public by the European Commission on the 28th of February, 2018[53] and was adopted by the European Council (Article 50) during a special meeting, on the 25th of November, 2018, along with the Draft Declaration on the future relationship between the EU and the United Kingdom.[54] The Strasbourg Agreement between the European Commission and the United Kingdom, signed on the 11th of March 2019 was aimed at unblocking the negotiations, focusing on the judicial clarifications and guarantees regarding the nature of the protection solution.[55] The London political uncertainty made Theresa May request a two year extension of the withdrawal, by 30th of June 2019.[56] The EU leaders agreed to postpone Brexit until the 31st of October 2019[57], so that eventually the United Kingdom to ask for a last extension, until the 31st of January 2020. [58]

     Putting an end to the negotiations meant having the necessary majority in the British Parliament to agree with the withdrawal Agreement, which was achieved by Prime Minister Boris Johnson, after the early elections on the 12th of December 2019. The United Kingdom House of Commons rejected the text of the withdrawal Agreement three times, especially due to the Northern Ireland Protocol (backstop), which had the EU avoid a “hard border” between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.[59] After more than three and a half years since David Cameron’s referendum, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU and Euratom (with a transition period until the 31st of December 2020) marks the end of a political crisis that the Conservative Party had been facing, whose leaders had to negotiate the Agreement with the EU heads of state and government, and which had been rejected by the British Parliament. Theresa May’s resignation and the election of Boris Johnson were the highlights of the political crisis the Conservative Party had to face.

 

     Cooperation after Brexit. Prospects and Challenges

 

     The EU and the United Kingdom signing the withdrawal Agreement on the 24th of January 2020, followed by its approval by the European Parliament on the 29th of January mark the end of the stages that led to Brexit on the 31st of January 2020, 24.00 CET, which made the United Kingdom a “third country”.[60] Avoiding the “no-deal” scenario allows the United Kingdom to gradually withdraw from the EU, while focusing on mutual bilateral cooperation throughout the transition period (until the 31st of December 2020).[61] More specifically, during this time, the United Kingdom will still operate as an EU country but will no longer have representatives in the institutions of the EU.[62] It is worth mentioning that both parties may agree by the 1st of July 2020 on the extension of the transition period for “no longer than a year or two”, which could, on a short term, minimise the effects Brexit’.[63] The separation from the EU will not create a void in the relations between the United Kingdom and the EU, since both parties engaged themselves in starting the negotiations for a future partnership.[64] Even if giving up its membership doesn’t meet the expectations of the two parties involved, on a symbolic level it signifies the restructuring of the social contract, giving it more flexibility in the mutual cooperation process. Good faith and mutual respect are the main values that the most recent relations between the United Kingdom and the EU are based on.[65] Mutual assistance and protection for the citizens of the EU and the nationals of the United Kingdom and their families, but also for economic operators and judicial and administrative authorities will be provided in compliance with the non-discrimination principle and without damaging mutual sincere cooperation.[66]

     The main issues amended by the withdrawal Agreement refer to: (1) equal treatment for EU-27 citizens who live or have lived in the United Kingdom and for the UK citizens who live or have lived in other member states, including their fair treatment and the guarantee that their status be subject to the principles of reciprocity, equity, symmetry and non-discrimination; (2) the settlement of financial obligations, contingent liabilities and prior commitments related to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the U, as audited by the European Court of Auditors; (3) “the recognition of the unique position of and the special circumstances of the island of Ireland, in order to mitigate the effects of the withdrawal on the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, ensure the continuity and stability of the peace process and avoid a hardening of the border”.[67]

The main stakes regarding the nature of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU, following the transition period are: (a) the registration procedures of EU citizens including those from Northern Ireland;[68] (b) ensuring the continuity of data protection of the EU citizens, which will be processed following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU;[69] (c) the creation of a comprehensive security partnership, which will ensure law enforcement and internal security after the UK will cease to access the EU’s information systems;[70] (d) avoiding ad-hoc decisions in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters;[71] (e) clarifying whether the United Kingdom is willing to continue its cooperation with the EU in matters regarding the Common European Asylum System and the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund;[72] (f) border management following the loss of its full Frontex membership status.[73]

 

(European Parliament/Twitter)

 

Bibliography

 

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Letter from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Opinion on Conclusion of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (2018/0427(NLE)).

 

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Baciu, Cornelia-Adriana and Doyle, John (Eds.), Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe

Begg, Iain, The EU Budget and UK Contribution, National Institute Economic Review, 236 (1), 2016, pp. 39-47.

Crouch, Colin, The Familiar Axes of Politics are Changing, with Momentous Consequences, Political Reform, IPPR, edition 23.2 of Juncture, September 22, 2016.

Fitzi, Gregor and Mackert, Jürgen, Turner, Bryan S. (Ed.), Populism and the Crisis of Democracy. Politics, Social Movements and Extremism, vol. 2, London, New York, Routledge, 2019.

Hobbes, Thomas, De Cive, Philosophical rudiments concerning Government and Society, English version published by Howard Warrender, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1983.

Hobbes, Thomas, The Leviathan, the Matter Form and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, published by Michael Oakeshott, New York, Collier, 1962 [1651].

Merkel, Wolfgang and Kneip, Sascha (Eds.), Democracy and Crisis. Challenges in Turbulent Times, Cham, Springer, 2018.

Mounk, Yascha, The People vs. Democracy. Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 2018.

Norris, Pippsa and Inglehart, Ronald, Cultural Backlash. Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Preda,Cristian Între Grexit şi Brexit: cronica politică a celor mai recente crize europene (Between Grexit and Brexit: the Political Chronicles of the Most Recent European Crises), Iași, Adenium, 2016.

Risks and Opportunities, Cham, Springer, 2019.

Rydgren, Jens, Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe: What’s Populism Got to Do with It?, in Journal of Language and Politics, no. 16(4), June 2017.

Van Beek, Ursula (Ed.), Democracy under Threat. A Crisis of Legitimacy?, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

 

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The Telegraph – https://www.telegraph.co.uk



[1]Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonell, Twenty-First Century Populis, The Spectre of Western European Democracy, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 1.

[2]Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash. Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 6.

[3]Nigel Farage Is a Buffoon for Admiring Vladimir Putin, The Telegraph, 01.04.2014, available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/10737184/Nigel-Farage-is-a-buffoon-for-admiring-Vladimir-Putin.html.

[4]See Nigel Farage’s speech on the 29 October 1999, European Parliament, British Beef and Veal, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+19991029+ITEM-03+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=RO&query=INTERV&detail=5-030.

[5]Ibidem.

[6]Most people in the UK thought we joined a free trade area but this crisis demonstrates it is anything but that. While the UK has obeyed EU law to the letter, other countries are running a cart and horse through the rule book. The ‘level playing field’ is about as level as the decks of the Titanic after it hit the iceberg!

[7]Ibidem.

[8]See Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, the Matter Form and Power of A Common Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, published by Michael Oakeshott, New York, Collier, 1962 [1651]; Thomas HOBBES, De Cive, Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society, the English version published by Howard Warrender, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1983.

[9]Ibidem.

[11]See Colin Crouch, The Familiar Axes of Politics Are Changing, with Momentous Consequences, Political Reform, IPPR, edition 23.2 of Juncture, September 22, 2016, http://www.ippr.org/juncture/tilted; Jens Rydgren, Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe: What’s Populism Got to Do with It?, in Journal of Language and Politics, no. 16(4), June 2017, pp. 2-3.

[12]See Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash. Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2018; Gregor Fitzi, Introduction: Political Populism as a Symptom of the Great Transformation of Democracy, in Gregor Fitzi, Jürgen Mackert and Bryan S. Turner (Ed.), Populism and the Crisis of Democracy. Politics, Social Movements and Extremism, vol. 2, London, New York, Routledge, 2019.

[13]See Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Globalization, Populism and Legitimacy in Contemporary Democracy, in Ursula van Beek (Ed.), Democracy under Threat. A Crisis of Legitimacy?, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019; Yascha Mounk, The People vs. Democracy. Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 2018; Lea Heyne, Globalization and Democracy: Does Denationalization Affect the Quality of Democracy?, in Wolfgang Merkel and Sascha Kneip (Eds.), Democracy and Crisis. Challenges in Turbulent Times, Cham, Springer, 2018.

[14]See Cornelia-Adriana Baciu and John Doyle (Eds.), Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe

Risks and Opportunities, Cham, Springer, 2019.

[15]Dan Sabbagh and Peter Walker, Justine Greening Endorses Second Brexit Referendum, The Guardian, 16.06.2018, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/16/back-second-brexit-vote-says-conservative-mp-justine-greening.

[17]See Cristian Preda, Între Grexit şi Brexit: cronica politică a celor mai recente crize europene (Between Grexit and Brexit: the Political Chronicles of the Most Recent European Crises), Iași, Adenium, 2016.

[18]See Iain Begg, The EU Budget and UK Contribution, National Institute Economic Review, 236 (1), 2016, pp. 39-47, available at: https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67030/1/Begg_EU%20budget.pdf.

[19]David Cameron Promises in/out Referendum on EU, BBC, 23.01.2013, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21148282.

[20]„David Cameron pune pe masa Bruxelles-ului condițiile rămânerii Marii Britanii în UE” (David Cameron Tables in Brussels his Four Key Demands for the UK’s Continued Membership of the EU), EurActiv.ro, 22.06.2016, available at: https://www.euractiv.ro/extern/david-cameron-pune-pe-masa-bruxelles-ului-conditiile-ramanerii-marii-britanii-in-ue-2430.

[21]David Cameron, A New Settlement for the United Kingdom in a Reformed European Union, 10.11.2015, available at: http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Donald-Tusk-letter_001.pdf.

[22]„David Cameron pune pe masa Bruxelles-ului condițiile rămânerii Marii Britanii în UE (David Cameron Tables in Brussels his Four Key Demands for the UK’s Continued Membership of the EU), EurActiv.ro, 22.06.2016.

[23]Ibidem.

[24]UK Labour Party Leader Corbyn to Back Second Referendum on New Brexit Deal: The Times, Reuters, 17.10.2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-corbyn/uk-labour-party-leader-corbyn-to-back-second-referendum-on-new-brexit-deal-the-times-idUSKBN1WW011.

[25]Mihai Alexandru Crăciun, „Brexit și de la capăt” (Brexit. Back to Square One), contributors.ro, 28.06.2016, http://www.contributors.ro/global-europa/brexit-and-de-la-capat/.

[26]Ibidem.

[30]Ibidem.

[31]Ibidem.

[32]European Council, The decision taken by the EU heads of state and government present at the European Council meeting regarding a new agreement for the United Kingdom within the European Union, Brussels, 2 February 2016, EUCO 4/16, available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21971/st00004ro16.pdf.

[33]Ibidem.

[36]Ibidem.

[37]Ibidem.

[39]European Parliament, Negotiations before the UK Referendum Regarding the EU, European Council, The European Council Meeting 18th, 19th of February 2016 - Conclusions, Brussels, 19 February 2016, EUCO 1/16, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21779/st00001ro16.pdf.

[40]A New Settlement for the United Kingdom in the EU), The European Council Meeting 18th, 19th of February 2016 - Conclusions, The Official Journal of the European Union, 2016/C 69 I/01, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016XG0223(01)&from=EN.

[41]European Council, Statement by the EU leaders and the Netherlands Presidency on the outcome of the UK referendum, 24 June 2016, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/press/press-releases/2016/06/24/joint-statement-uk-referendum/.

[43]Ibidem.

[45]Speech by President Donald Tusk at the European Policy Centre conference, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/press/

press-releases/2016/10/13/tusk-speech-epc/.

[46]European Council, United Kingdom Notification under Article 50 TEU, Brussels, 29 March 2017, XT 20001/17, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/XT-20001-2017-INIT/en/pdf.

[47]European Council, European Council Extraordinary Meeting - Guidelines (Article 50), Brussels, 29 April 2017, EUCO XT 20004/17, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21754/29-euco-art50-guidelines-ro.pdf.

[48]Ibidem.

[49]European Parliament, Brexit, Overview

[50]European Council, European Council Meeting - Guidelines (Article 50), Brussels, 15 December 2017, EUCO XT 20011/17, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/XT-20011-2017-INIT/ro/pdf.

[53]Commission to EU 27, European Commission Draft Withdrawal Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, 28.02.2018, TF50 (2018) 33, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_withdrawal_agreement.pdf.

[54]European Parliament, Brexit, Overview.

[56]European Council, Decision taken in agreement with the United Kingdom, extending the period under Article 50 TEU, Brussels, 20 March 2019, EUCO XT 20005/19, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/XT-20005-2019-INIT/ro/pdf.

[57]European Council, Joint decision taken in agreement with the United Kingdom, extending the period under Article 50 (Paragraph 3) TEU, Brussels, 11 April 2019, EUCO XT 20013/19, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/XT-20013-2019-INIT/ro/pdf.

[59]European Parliament, Brexit Deal or No Deal? The MPs discuss the Stage of the Negotiations, 18 September 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/ro/headlines/eu-affairs/20190912STO60949/brexit-cu-acord-sau-fara-deputatii-discuta-despre-stadiul-negocierilor.

[60]European Parliament, Brexit: Council adopts decision to conclude the withdrawal Agreement, 30 January 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/press/press-releases/2020/01/30/brexit-council-adopts-decision-to-conclude-the-withdrawal-agreement/.

[61]Ibidem.

[62]Ibidem.

[63]Ibidem.

[64]Ibidem.

[65]Council of the European Union, Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, interinstitutional file: 2019/0240 (NLE), Brussels, 18 October 2019, XT 21054/19, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/XT-21054-2019-INIT/ro/pdf.

[66]Ibidem.

[67]Committee on Constitutional Affairs (Rapporteur Guy Verhofstadt), Recommendation on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, XT 21105/3/2018 – C9-0148/2019 – 2018/0427(NLE), 23.01.2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2020-0004_RO.html.

[68]Letter from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Opinion on Conclusion of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (2018/0427(NLE)), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2020-0004_RO.html.

[69]Ibidem.

[70]Ibidem.

[71]Ibidem.

[72]Ibidem.

[73]Ibidem.