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Possible Decisive Offensive and Defensive Operations Are under Way in Ukraine
Sooner or later, most likely a "sooner" hard to quantify, one of the parties involved in the conflict in Ukraine will start offensive operations in the area.

PhD Eng. Stelian TEODORESCU

02/02/2023 Region: Russia Topic: Conflicts

https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-latest-news-russia-warns-us-germany-tanks-12541713?postid=3565451

Ukrainian troops have been having extensive military exercises lately, where they have been using tanks as well. In the context of data that show that Ukraine is getting ready for a massive, imminent attack from the Russian Federation, an important official from the Ukrainian security sector stated that the military offensive could take place in the following two or three weeks. The above-mentioned military exercises took place last week in Kharkiv, east Ukraine, behind the front lines, in an area further to the east.

In the same context, we must notice that various and numerous media outlets, as well as Western, Ukrainian and Russian social networks indicated that Moscow was getting ready to launch an imminent attack on Ukraine. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said that tis supports its own evaluation, according to which, during the following months, a military offensive is the “most likely scenario”.

As an argument that can confirm Russia’s intention, we can point out the declaration of the NATO leader, Jens Stoltenberg, who highlighted that “there aren’t any indicators” that Russia was getting ready for peace – and it could do just the opposite. He also mentioned that Moscow was able to mobilise 200,000 troops and continued to produce fighting gear, arms and ammunitions, domestically, but also through its partners, Iran and North Korea. The Iranian state press confirmed that on the 29th January 2023, Iran and Russia established direct financial communication channels between Iranian banks and over 800 Russian banks.

In the meanwhile, the ISW noticed that a Ukrainian military leader – Ivan Tymochko – stated that “the Russian forces are coordinating to strengthen their groups in Donbas, as part of an anticipated major military offensive”, and added that “they seem to be forced to launch an offensive, due to the increasing Russian internal pressure”. This is why it is important to mention that certain thinkers highlighted – regarding information that appeared and was analysed in social media – that Stoltenberg and Tymochko’s statements support IWS’ prognosis, according to which the Russian troops are getting ready to launch another attack in the following months, probably in Luhansk. In their turn, “Russian bloggers kept on pointing out that the Russian information space creates favourable conditions, and anticipates a Russian offensive”. Furthermore, the bloggers picked up a piece of news from the Russian Channel Telegram, according to which the current rhythm and nature of Russian operations indicate that the main forces to be employed in the anticipated offensive require a decisive offensive effort. Russian officials continue to take actions that suggest they are getting ready for a second wave of mobilisations. The Head of the Defence Committee of the State Duma, Andrey Kartapolov stated on the 28th January 2023 that the organisation he is leading was revising over 20 laws regarding mobilisations postponement, including those for families with disabled children or those with families with over three children. Russian military recruiters in Ostrov, in Pskov, are trying to recruit unemployed people for the volunteers’ service. The mobilisation departments within the universities in the districts of Saint Petersburg, Omsk and Vladimir asked students to provide military registration details, as part of the preparations for the second mobilisation wave, in February 2023.

Nevertheless, the Russian forces continued their ground attacks to regain the positions they lost west of Kreminna, and continue with ground attacks over the front line in Donetsk. They aim at gaining ground near Bakhmut, but they have not conducted any confirmed ground attacks in Zaporizhzhia. The Russian Minister for Defence, Sergey Shoigu, announced on the 30th January 2023 that the institution he manages will take over the weapons supply chain and ensure volunteer units with the weapons, equipment, clothes, medical supplies and food they need.

During all this time the Ukrainian forces have conducted counteroffensive operations as well, north-west of Svatove, and continued to hit the Russian forces assembled in the Luhansk area.

In the context of these offensive and defensive operations from both parties, it is still hard to predict exactly if and when the Russians will start their massive attack, the Ukrainians are monitoring closely with drones, satellites and people when the Russians move their mechanised infantry from Crimea to the eastern front in Donetsk and Luhansk.

One can anticipate that Russia continues to consolidate its military forces, while Vladimir Putin is leading his economy towards widely functioning in times of war, to produce new tanks and missiles. The Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, was put directly in charge of the operations in Ukraine, a move that many analysts believe predicts a major military offensive.

Analysing the current evolutions, we can say that the first phase of the Russian invasion is over – a disappointment for V. Putin’s forces, as they were repelled from the north, then from Kharkiv in September 2022, and from Kherson, west of the Dnieper River, in November 2022.

We can say that the second phase is characterised by an attempt to orchestrate a war of attrition, with thousand mercenaries, and Russian convicts, sacrificed for little territorial gain, around Bakhmut and Soledar, combined with massive missile attacks over power plants, transport infrastructure, energy production infrastructure, and water supply facilities. The second phase was a Russian failure as well, similar to the first. Russia used a large part of its cruise missile arsenal, and while the Ukrainian power grid was significantly damaged, the Ukrainian will power to fight and defend was really high.

The third phase of the war in Ukraine is about to start. Both combatants most likely wish to engage in complete combat, so they can establish a decisive advantage, using combined weapons systems – mechanised infantry, artillery, air forces and the navy.

A major offensive and defensive from both parties involved in this next phase of the war in Ukraine will have a major psychological impact, due to high risks that are very difficult to weigh. Many international analyses and prognoses draw attention over the fact that the future military actions that are to be taken could be considered offensive or defensive, in a war where Ukraine has a substantial leverage, because it has superior UAV technology, satellite and more precise missiles.

“It is a war waged by small special forces groups on boats” said Yaroslav Honchar, the head of ISTAR, on the southern front. He said that the Russians sent a specialised unit, the 80th Arctic Motor Rifle Brigade, which he described as “elite special forces trained to fight where it is cold and humid”. Likewise, it is believed that Ukraine is developing its own forces for special water operations, and the USA supplied patrol river boats in its last military support package. They could be used for raids on the Dnieper River.

The south provides Russia with the perspective of a strategic surprise, but the Ukrainians are aware of the danger. A Ukrainian intelligence officer highlighted that the Russians could push the front east of Hulyaipole, where the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk fronts meet, in a place called Velyka Novosilka. “It is a strategic point where, if the Russians do well and capture the area, could take their military operations up north, and our troops in Donetsk could be captured”, said the Ukrainian officer.

There are also serious questions whether the Russian forces have learnt from the tactical, operational and strategic lessons of last year’s fiasco, and whether they are in a better shape now, and capable to carry on properly coordinated attacks. “Russia’s large scale offensive capabilities are currently challenged”, said Dara Massicot, a former senior analyst of Russian military capabilities for the Pentagon. She is now a senior policies researcher for the “Rand” Corporation. Furthermore, she emphasized that the Russians “have tried the same thing last year and it did not work well, and the forces that remain are no that professional, and the equipment is not as good”. Nevertheless, we must not forget the fact that in various circles there is a belief, very hard to confirm or contest, according to which, “even poorly commanded, equipped, trained troops can be overwhelming, if they have the necessary manpower, and every week that passes represents another opportunity for the Russian armed forces to train, re-equip and reorganise”.

Hence, among the Ukrainian forces there is a rising sense of urgency, as they wish to take initiative and start an offensive, thus preventing a large scale Russian attack. However, they are frustrated that they do not yet possess the necessary tools to achieve their goals.

We can anticipate that Ukraine will try to strike where it believes the Russian lines are the weakest, especially in the east, in Luhansk, where the Russian enemy troops are exhausted and their morale is lower. “The Ukrainian military command will try to have the same approach as before, simultaneously preparing the battle field for operations headed in different directions, and later striking where the conditions are favourable”, said Oleksiy Melnyk, co-director for foreign relations and international security programmes for the think-tank Razumov Centre in Kyiv.

As such, one can assume that the next military actions in Ukraine could start simultaneously on three fronts (eastern, northern and southern), key actions that could take place in the following months and that would have different impacts. An attack on one front could be a diversion to set the proper environment for a large scale offensive somewhere else, or could be conceived to weaken the adversary’s capabilities and launch its own attacks.

As a conclusion, sooner or later, most likely in a time frame difficult to quantify, one of the sides involved in the conflict in Ukraine will trigger offensive actions, waiting for the start of what might end up to be the most intense phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war, so far, if not even the final, decisive phase for the entire region of the Black Sea basin. The question is who will strike first, and where?