The meaning and implications of Joe Biden’s victory in the light of the current international order, dominated by the great power competition, and especially from the perspective of the transatlantic relationships were pondered by Professor Ioan Mircea Pașcu, politician and academic with an exceptional career, in the interview offered to Geostrategic Pulse Magazine.

Geostrategic Pulse: Professor, you have been familiar with the United States of America and the transatlantic relationship for many years and in various capacities – at national level you have contributed to the process of institutional reform necessary for Romania’s Euro-Atlantic integration (as presidential advisor, secretary of state for defence policy, minister of defence, president of the Committee for Defence in the Chamber of Deputies etc.), while at European level you have represented the European Parliament – including as vice-president – in its relations with the USA and NATO.

From this perspective, but also from an academic perspective, we would very much appreciate your insight on the unexpected level of popular support for Donald Trump and what he represents for the Americans that have voted for him in spite of his behaviour and leadership style as president. It seems that the number of votes in favour of Trump cannot be explained only by the ongoing partisan and ideological war in the USA.

Is the level of discontent and distrust of Americans in institutions, policies and elites so high to justify the decisions – absolutely free and democratic if we may say so – to vote for a personality like Trump’s?

Ioan Mircea Pașcu: It is true that in 2016 Trump won on an anti-system platform, but I do not believe we can extrapolate by saying that everyone who voted for him – both in 2016 and in 2020 – were against the system. Many related to his style and/or felt they were ignored, many had economic grievances and so on and so forth.

However, it is true that the prestige of the American institutions has been damaged during Trump’s presidency. That made the president elect Joe Biden prioritize the restoration of authority and credibility of the US democracy and its institutions, by announcing important steps in that direction from the first days of his mandate.

What “lessons” should be learned by the Europeans in general and Romanians in particular, from the US presidential elections?

I think the most important “lesson” is the ability of the system to work under pandemic and while contested (even by one of the candidates). After all, this system has been working for more than two centuries and has made America the leader of the democratic world. The strength of the US system doesn’t necessarily lie with making as few mistakes as possible, but more with its ability to correct itself, in case such mistakes are made (see Watergate). I am confident that this will also happen now.

Joe Biden’s victory comes at a time when the USA is divided and unstable, as well as economically weakened by the COVID-19 pandemic.

To what extent will the new president succeed to overcome the domestic difficulties (especially bringing the Americans together) and reposition the USA as a global leader able to decisively and positively influence international stability and security, given the above as well as the complexity of the current and foreseeable challenges?

 In a programmatic article published by Foreign Affairs in spring, Joe Biden, then a candidate, expressly underlined that America should lead again under his presidency (“Why America Must Lead Again”), starting from the premises that the United States are the anchor of the international system mostly built by them, following World War II. The fact that this mission was abandoned under Trump’s presidency has brought us all today in an unpredictable world, marked by greater or smaller dangers that may became increasingly difficult to master; hence, the United States should take over once more and restore the balance in the system, based on a newly regained authority and credibility, and together with the other democratic countries. In order to achieve this, the Biden administration intends that their domestic list of priorities include, among other, rebuilding democratic institutions and the US power base, investing in education and in the health system, as well as maintaining military advances.

The transatlantic link has been subjected to a series of challenges in the four years of Republican administration, and the European capitals have long hoped for a return of Democrats to the White House. At the same time, the crisis caused by COVID-19 has come at a time of intense debate on the relevance and future of NATO, as well as on the transatlantic relationship.

On these grounds, what can you tell us about the way Washington will see and approach the transatlantic relationship during the years of Democratic administration, compared to how the Trump administration has dealt with the EU and NATO?

As far as the transatlantic relationship is concerned, I expect the new administration will return to better feelings towards Europeans and institutions on the continent – NATO and the EU. Mr. Biden has already stated that NATO was the bedrock of the US national security and that an alliance represented more than “dollars-and-cents”, opening the long awaited prospect for the USA to abandon its current point of view that the Europeans are more trade competitors than allies. Therefore, I expect the good transatlantic relations before 2016 to be restored, and closer cooperation in solving the big issues of the continent and the world.

How do you assess the impact of the implementation of EU strategic autonomy concept over the transatlantic relations?

While in the European Parliament – and I have been there enough time – I was simply overwhelmed by this “strategic autonomy” concept, while its most fervent supporters actually failed to define it at all, advancing generalities such as: “Europe must be capable of defending alone its own interests as much as it can, and, in this context, it must be capable of taking actions on its own etc. etc. etc.” Recently, however, the matter became clearer when the French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech in front university students in a Baltic country, and solved the “mystery”, claiming that the Europeans should stop buying weapons from the USA and start buying more European weapons (France’s share in the European defence industry being well known…). This is what the so frequently claimed European “strategic autonomy” seems to be about…

Can we expect to see major changes in NATO’s mission? What about the concept of security (on a European, allied and international level)?

With the US presidential election won by Mr. Biden, I do not believe we should expect changes in the missions of the Alliance, or even its disappearance, highly plausible should the Donald Trump have continued in the White House. His administration view started from the premise – still valid – that China has become the USA’s main competitor; and NATO, created solely to counter the threat posed by the USSR/Russia, risked to become irrelevant to the interests of the US, unless it performed a tight turn from Russia to China - as main adversary. Now, things became clearer and our expectation is to get back to the times before 2016, when the political-military cooperation between allies prevailed, not the economic confrontation. Of course, as I was saying, China will remain the USA’s prime competitor, but the new administration aims for a more sophisticated approach towards this country, combining determination and cooperation and giving up the permanent confrontation on all levels promoted by the previous administration.

What could be the role of the countries on NATO’s Eastern flank in this equation?

The role of the allies on NATO’s Eastern flank will not change: we will face the same threats, perhaps exacerbated by the energy dimension (the large natural gas deposits recently discovered in the Black Sea and in Eastern Mediterranean), the same problems caused by Russian activism, or the dormant conflicts that can break out at any moment (see Nagorno Karabakh). In other words, business as usual!

Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the complex situation in Ukraine, the frozen conflicts in the extended Black Sea region, the tensions between countries that have major interests in the area, they all make us look with even more concern at the regional security environment.

How does the USA perceive the continuous Russian development of offensive military capabilities in Romania’s proximity (the Crimean Peninsula)?

I believe that the new American administration knows very well what happens in our region. Let’s not forget that key people – such as Mr. Jim Townsend for example – who were responsible for the region before 2016 will take over as they go along, as they were the ones dealing for two years with the consequences of Russia’s actions in the Black Sea and in the Eastern Mediterranean between 2014-2016.

Can the development process of the Romanian Armed Forces, to which the USA has a significant contribution, lead to a more aggressive attitude by Russia?

I do not expect that by developing the Romanian armed forces and thus enhancing Romania’s defence capabilities we will make Russia feel more “deterred” than it has already been. After all, our decision to join the Alliance was based on the realisation that we could not defend ourselves against Russia’s might, should it decides to take military actions against us (of course not without military costs even for Russia). However, together with the other allies supporting us without hesitation we hope to reach a balance that would make such actions against us less and less likely.

Under these circumstances and given the fact that key segments of the Romanian borders also represent the Eastern frontier of NATO and EU, do you believe that extra measures should be taken besides the present commitments, to enhance our security and stability?

When I was asked, during the negotiations for NATO integration, what can Romania contribute with to the defence of the Alliance, I gave the same answer: firstly, it must be capable to defend itself as long and as well as possible, to diminish the costs of NATO’s assistance for us. I am giving you the same answer… With one amendment: we should be more active diplomatically, including in the extended area of the Western Mediterranean where we still have contacts and open doors, in order to enhance our profile and become more visible, which would also benefit our security.

Could Washington’s decisions to reduce the number of US troops deployed in Germany and to operate some redeployments on the European territory, including in our region, be part of a set of enhanced American security approaches and commitments to countries on the Eastern flank in general, and our country in particular?

When I was minister of defence, I remember that the secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld generated a lot of “waves” when he spoke of dividing the continent between the “old” and the “new” Europe… And more recently, we all know that Trump administration decided to reduce the number of American troops deployed in Germany and redeploy some of them to a more threatened area – that is our own. Personally, I believe that this “division” is a reality; however, it is not only a political issue, as it was in the beginning of the 21^st century, instead it became a military and strategic reality - the Eastern flank is more threatened than the “centre” of the Alliance. Other than that, I am waiting to see whether the new administration will stick or not to the decision to reduce the number of troops deployed in Germany taken by the previous administration, and if yes, what will be the actual numbers after all.

During his intervention – via videoconference – at the final plenary session of the 17^th annual meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club that took place on October 20-22, 2020 in Moscow, president Vladimir Putin asserted that the time of American-Russian bipolarity was long over, and players such as China and Germany were now heading for superpower status.

In your opinion, what is the future of the current world order? Is the time of the American unipolarity after the Cold War over? How could the multipolar international order anticipated by Vladimir Putin look like?

Once communism fell, the USSR dissolved and the Cold War ended, the international system moved from a “bipolar order” to a moment of American “unipolar order” (if we may say so) setting the course for a multiplication of the centres of power, and thus heading towards a “multipolar order”. Such a transition – triggered by the unavoidable exit from stage of the USSR – should have been, preferably, controlled to prevent the occurrence of imbalances. This only happened occasionally (the United States got “caught” in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and more recently have willingly given up honouring their commitments – see the swift withdrawal from Syria for example). These actions have fueled confusion and caused all kinds of anti-system forces to take over in various regions, contributing to the general disorder. That we are inevitably heading towards a multipolar order is an undeniable fact, the matter is that we must regain control over the current chaotic developments in certain areas, so that we can attempt a somewhat controlled transition. And to that end, the new American administration can have a substantial contribution, alongside the US traditional allies.

During the four years of Trump’s administration the competition between the USA and China resumed and intensified, involving Europe and with global effects.

What can you tell us about the future of this competition, taking into account that the course it has been set on in the past few years by the USA, but especially the complexity and depth of its engagement will make change very difficult?

China and the USA will continue to be strategic competitors for a long time to come. What will probably change is the way the two superpowers will “manage” the competition. As I was saying, Joe Biden promised that he will continue to be firm on China with regard to its commercial practices and human rights record, however, he will be open for cooperation in fields such as climate change, non-proliferation and health security.

The future president of the USA has already announced that on his first day of his mandate he will have his country re-join the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change.

What other steps to reset the political hour can we expect from Washington during Joe Biden’s mandate?

I find it difficult to come up with an answer at this time. The Biden administration already has its “hands full” as the Americans say, to have time to plan for other strategic actions. However, I expect that once it gets things started, opportunities hard to anticipate at this time will come up, as I expect some changes that took place after 2016 will not be reversed…