The Central Military Commission (CMC) is the supreme military leadership body of the China Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which commands not only the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) but also the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the Chinese Militia. Technically, there are two separate commissions; the Central Military Commission of the China Communist Party and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China, although, under the “one institution with two names” arrangement, they function as a single institution.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the military wing of the China Communist Party (CCP) and the main armed forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It consists of four forces – the Ground Forces, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Missile Forces – and four other forces – the Aerospace Forces, the Cyber Forces, the Information Support Forces, and the Joint Logistics Support Forces. The entire PLA operates under the absolute leadership of the CPC and is led by the Central Military Commission (CMC), whose chairman is the commander-in-chief of these military forces, namely the current Chinese President, Xi Jinping.

The CCP first established a military department in 1925. The CCP Central Revolutionary Military Commission was established in 1937, which later evolved into the Central Military Commission in 1945. After the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the military leadership was transferred to the People’s Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central People’s Government; during this period, there was no separate CCP organ. In 1954, the CCP Central Military Commission was re-established, while state military authority was transferred to the National Defense Commission (NDC). In 1975, during the Cultural Revolution, the NDC was abolished, leaving the CMC as the sole leading body of the military. In 1982, the State Central Military Commission was established to formalize its role within the government structure. In 2016, a major reform of the CMC bodies was undertaken, with the four general departments of the PLA being replaced by 15 departments reporting directly to the CMC.

The 20th Central Military Commission (CMC) of China is the supreme military command body, headed by President Xi Jinping (and General Secretary of the CPC). It is generally composed of a chairman, two vice-chairmen (Zhang Youxia[1], He Weidong[2]) , and four other members: and key department heads (Li Shangfu, Minister of National Defense, Liu Zhenli, Chief of the Joint Staff Department, Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department, and Zhang Shengmin, Secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection).

The CMC exercises overall control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including theater commands and the armed forces. The presidential accountability system is concerned with major decisions on national defense, which are made solely by the President of China, who has the final vote. Members typically head key departments, such as the Joint Staff Department, the Political Work Department, and the Logistics Support Department. Members are nominated by the President of China and approved by the National People’s Congress (NPC).

I have made such a detailed presentation due to information circulating from several international sources indicating that a coup attempt aimed at overthrowing the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, has been foiled in Beijing. According to several sources, the alleged main organizers of the conspiracy were the Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Liu Zhenli, and the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Zhang Youxia. Although the information requires further confirmation, on the night of January 18, senior military officials allegedly planned to arrest the Chinese leader. However, Xi Jinping was reportedly informed in time of the impending action, proactively left the government hotel where he was staying, and gave orders for the implementation of immediate countermeasures. According to the same sources, a group of alleged coup plotters and organizers who arrived at the hotel were met with gunfire from members of the president’s personal guard. It remains unclear whether the alleged coup attempt was the result of internal processes within the military leadership or whether a third country was involved. According to some unconfirmed information, General Zhang Youxia was detained, as there are indications that he had disseminated information about Beijing’s nuclear arsenal to another state.

I must mention that on the afternoon of January 24, 2026, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) suddenly confirmed what had been circulating in Chinese communities abroad for several days. A spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) – the Communist Party’s supreme military command – and Liu Zhenli, head of the CMC’s Joint Staff Department, were being investigated for “suspected serious violations of discipline and law,” without providing details. In the same context, Zhang is reportedly being investigated for efforts to create his own circles of influence within the Communist Party and, in particular, within the Central Military Commission – the supreme military decision-making body – creating divisions within the leadership, with part of the evidence against Zhang apparently coming from Gu Jun, the former general director of the state-owned company, China National Nuclear, which manages China’s nuclear programs.

The announcement stated that, following a decision of the CCP Central Committee, both leaders had been officially placed under investigation. The speed and bluntness of the announcement shocked observers in other countries. It served as definitive confirmation of widespread reports that the two most powerful operational commanders in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had already been detained.

However, it is worth mentioning that there are some significant pieces of information emerging on January 20, when Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were conspicuously absent from the opening ceremony of a high-level CCP training seminar for provincial and ministerial officials. The absence of the two officials immediately raised alarm bells. Moreover, on January 23, the head of the CCP Organization Department, Shi Taifeng, appeared to preside over the seminar’s closing session, but Zhang and Liu were again absent. By then, speculation about a major political-military rifts had spread rapidly. The official announcement the following day (January 24) confirmed the worst suspicions: this was not a routine anti-corruption case, but a purge at the top of the Chinese Armed Forces.

On January 23, US-based independent Chinese commentator Cai Shenkun posted on “X” that the arrest of Zhang Youxia and other officers was “real.” According to Cai, those detained included General Liu Zhenli, General Xiao Tianliang, and Lieutenant General Zhong Shaojun. The operation reportedly involved the Special Services Bureau of China’s Ministry of Public Security, the Central Guard Bureau (which protects senior CCP leaders), and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the domestic security and law enforcement body.

“This amounts to a large-scale military disorder,” Cai wrote. He also claimed that the arrests had already been communicated internally to provincial-level officials on January 22, with a wider dissemination planned for the following day. Cai warned that the purge was not over and that a large number of lieutenant generals, major generals, and even division commanders would soon follow in the wake of the ongoing process.

Jiang Wangzheng, a Chinese media figure based in Australia, reported further details from his sources. According to Jiang, on January 18, at around 10:00 p.m., all PLA officers in Beijing were suddenly ordered to return to their units and were put on standby.

Notably, on January 19, Zhang Youxia’s son and his executive secretary were also taken away. On the morning of January 20, Zhang himself was summoned for questioning. Jiang claimed that Cai Qi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP and a loyalist of Xi Jinping, personally supervised Zhang’s arrest and led a new CMC political verification working group. The reason, Jiang claimed, was simple: Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping had once been allies within the same interest bloc. But Xi wanted Zhang to go, and Zhang refused to step aside, and the resulting confrontation ended with Zhang’s removal.

Liu Zhenli, 61, is one of the PLA’s most experienced commanders. He previously served as commander of the former 38^th Group Army, chief of staff of the Ground Forces, commander of the Ground Forces, and chief of staff of the People’s Armed Police. In March 2023, he was appointed chief of the Joint Staff Department of the CMC, placing him at the centre of China’s war planning apparatus. His downfall alongside Zhang Youxia underscores the scale of the purge.

However, another question is to be posed: is Zhang Shengmin loyal, a traitor, or the next target?

With the removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, observers noted that of the commanders elected to the CMC at the 20^th Congress of the Communist Party of China, only Xi Jinping and Zhang Shengmin remained. Other important figures – Li Shangfu, Miao Hua, He Weidong, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli – fell one after the other.

Online speculation about Zhang Shengmin’s role has intensified. A user on the “X” network claimed that on the night of January 19, Cai Qi and Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong ordered a surprise raid on the CMC headquarters, and Zhang Shengmin was the one who led the guards to open the gates and guide the security forces inside to arrest Zhang Youxia.

If this whole scenario is true, Zhang Shengmin played a decisive role in Xi Jinping’s counter-coup – acting as an integrated loyalist, placed alongside Zhang Youxia. However, others do not agree with such a scenario and such an explanation, and as a result, some analysts speculate with another scenario according to which Zhang Shengmin, could attempt a last-ditch power move himself – or could become the next target in the purge initiated by Xi. For now, his fate remains uncertain.

According to other reports, on January 23, as news of Zhang Youxia’s arrest spread, reports emerged that his former superior, Liao Xilong, had died suddenly at the age of 85. Liao, a former director of the PLA’s General Logistics Department, was a powerful figure in previous military patronage networks. The timing caused consternation. A day earlier, Cai Shenkun[3] had reported that at the funeral of another retired general, wreaths sent by Zhang Youxia were suddenly removed. On the same day, CCTV Military Channel released a propaganda video in which a PLA soldier declared, “I came to serve on the southeast coast to go to war. Today, my dream is about to come true.” The video immediately sparked speculation that Xi Jinping might be preparing the PLA for a military operation against Taiwan, following the internal purge.

Reports of Zhang Youxia’s arrest quickly attracted attention in Washington, and on January 23, Michael Flynn, former director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency and former national security adviser, republished Cai Shenkun’s claims, specifying: “Breaking news: A coup appears to be underway in Communist China. Massive instability within the CCP and its military leadership. The consequences will have a direct impact on US foreign policy, the position of forces in the Indo-Pacific region, and the future trajectory of US-China relations.” Flynn issued a stark warning to Xi Jinping, urging him to prepare for the serious consequences of domestic unrest.

Taiwanese defence analyst Shen Mingshi noted that since the Third Plenary Session of the CCP in mid-2024, internal power struggles have intensified. With the annual “Two Sessions” approaching and the organizational and leadership arrangements for the 21st CCP Congress underway, further unrest is likely.

Chinese human rights lawyer You Feizhu wrote bluntly: “I advised Zhang Youxia to act faster. He did not listen and now he has been captured alive by Xi. I urge all PLA generals: stage a coup, return power to the people, or they will be purged further.”

There were online reactions, and they were even harsher:

• “This was not a ‘quasi-coup’. It was a coup, a counter-coup, and another purge.”
• “Xi has finally removed the PLA’s number two. His own faction is now exhausted. The party sees red.” One commentator, quoting the classic The Peach Blossom Spring, offered a rare note of hope: “At first extremely narrow, then suddenly open and bright.”

Whether the promotion of optimism is justified remains to be seen, as the consequences—for China, Taiwan, and the world—are only just beginning to manifest themselves.

Neil Thomas, a fellow at the Centre for China Analysis at the Asia Society Policy Institute, emphasized that “Xi Jinping has completed one of the largest purges of China’s military leadership in the history of the People’s Republic.”

Thomas, of the Asia Society Policy Institute, said the latest purge “makes China’s threat to Taiwan weaker in the short term but stronger in the long term.” A military escalation against the island would be riskier in the short term because of “a high-level command in disarray,” but in the long term it would mean the military has a more loyal and less corrupt leadership with more military capabilities, he said.

“I don’t think any evidence released or selectively leaked by the Chinese authorities necessarily reflects the main reason for Zhang’s removal,” said K. Tristan Tang[4], a non-resident Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum. Asked whether this might reinforce the idea that the removal of senior military officials suggests that China is not ready for war, Tang said it “does not fundamentally change that assessment.” “That said,” he added, “I also don’t think the combat readiness of the People’s Liberation Army has been seriously disrupted.” Tang also stressed that he sees no pressure on Xi to fill the CMC posts in the short term, “unless the goal is to create a domestic counterbalance to Zhang Shengmin,” the only current CMC member.

Many analysts have stressed that the purges are designed to reform the military and ensure loyalty to Xi. They are part of a broader anti-corruption campaign that has led to the punishment of more than 200,000 officials since the Chinese leader came to power in 2012. Since Xi Jinping took office for a third term in 2022, at least 21 high-ranking generals have been removed. For example, in October 2025 alone, eight high-ranking generals were expelled from the Communist Party on corruption charges, including He Weidong, as we have already highlighted. In addition, two former defence ministers have been removed from the ruling party in recent years for similar cases.

Before the dismissal of Zhang and Liu, the Communist Party expelled the other vice chairman of the commission, He Weidong, in October 2025. He was replaced by Zhang Shengmin, who is now the only member of the commission. In the context of the latest developments and recent changes, it is possible that the CMC will operate with only one of the six active members and with Xi at the helm as chairman. An editorial in the PLA Daily newspaper announced that, after the actions taken against Zhang and Liu, the party is moving towards “promoting the rejuvenation of the People’s Liberation Army and injecting strong impetus into building a strong military force.” In other analysis environments, analysts estimate that the purges serve a dual purpose. On the one hand, one of the objectives would be to reform the army, and on the other hand, another objective would be to ensure absolute loyalty in the political and military environment to Xi Jinping, who also chairs the Central Military Commission (CMC).

But it is unclear whether the five currently vacant positions will be filled soon or whether Xi will wait until 2027, when the selection of a new Communist Party Central Committee, the body also responsible for appointing new CMC members, will take place.

International analysts believe the purge is due to several factors:

• Anti-corruption: After the 2024–2025 scandals, senior officers overestimated their relationships with Xi and assumed they would avoid accountability for embezzlement.
• Emergence of opposition within the PLA: Since the military is directly subordinate to the CCP, any opposition tendencies may also exist within the party itself. Xi is concerned about potential developments similar to the collapse of the former Soviet Union.
• Paranoid approach: Some analysts compare Xi’s moves to the purges carried out by Stalin in 1937.
• It seems that current global developments are creating an atmosphere of heightened suspicion among Chinese leaders, most likely as China observes and analyses the damage caused by corrupt or incompetent generals in countries such as Russia, Iran, and Venezuela.

Some believe that the removals could have repercussions on China’s decisions regarding Taiwan, but the situation is still far from clear. In the future, planning for operations around Taiwan will most likely be carried out by new military leaders. Recently, the highest military rank was achieved by Yan Zhibin and Han Shengyan, who are now considered key members of the new military elite and potential candidates for the renewed CMC. Yan will lead the PLA Eastern Command, responsible for the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea, while Han will lead the Central Command, responsible for the defence of Beijing and neighbouring provinces. Both have experience in the PLA Air Force, which shows Xi’s intention to move to a modern strategic command, in which military aviation and missile forces will play a leading role. The selection of officers with a clean criminal record and personal loyalty is a central criterion for the new CMC. Participation in the CMC is a political position that requires approval by the CPC Plenum, and vacant positions may be decided to be filled, perhaps even at the next major party forum in 2026.

James Char, a Singapore-based Chinese security expert, said the military’s daily operations may continue as normal despite the purges, but Zhang’s targeting shows Xi is responding to criticism that the anti-corruption campaign has been selective so far. “Xi is filling the gaps with second-line PLA officers, mostly temporarily,” said J. Char, a fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. “Chinese military modernizers will continue to push for the two goals Xi has set for the People’s Liberation Army: to have its modernization virtually complete by 2035, and to transform it into a world-class armed force by 2049.”

[1] Zhang Youxia joined the People's Liberation Army in 1968 and came from the ground forces. For years, he was one of the most powerful figures in the country's military leadership.

[2] In October 2025, the Communist Party expelled the other vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, He Weidong, replacing him with Zhang Shengmin. In 2024, two former defence ministers were also expelled from the party due to corruption cases.

[3] Cai Shenkun is a well-known independent commentator on current events in China, a former journalist and blogger, recognized as one of the most influential bloggers by Phoenix New Media for many years. Known for his analysis, he has made known information about the fall of Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu, and is active on YouTube and other platforms. He has been characterized for many consecutive years as one of the "Top 10 Most Influential Bloggers" by Phoenix New Media. He analyzes Chinese current affairs and publishes news, being mentioned in the context of major political events in China. He has a YouTube channel where he publishes commentaries and analysis.

[4] K. Tristan Tang is a Vasey Non-resident Fellow (2026) and a Pacific Forum Fellow specializing in the PLA and the defence industry and foreign policy. He has written about the purge of China’s military leadership, arguing that it stems from Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and officials’ failure to meet the force-building requirements for a potential conflict in Taiwan, rather than from significant disruptions to combat readiness.