”Something very big has just happened.”

         This was the phrase that president Trump posted on Twitter on the night between the 26th and 27th of October. He didn’t provide any details but promised that the next day would make a clarifying statement.

Shortly after, the main American TV stations, including ABC and CNN beat the president to it and announced that the leader of the terrorist organisation the Islamic State, the “caliph” Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi had been killed. The event took place during a raid lead by the US Special Forces in a rural area in the north-western part of Syria, in the Idlib province, not far from the Turkish border. The operation benefited from informative support provided by the CIA, Turkish military intelligence and sources from the Kurdish coalition. During the attack, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, his three children and his two wives killed themselves by igniting their suicide vests. Later on, representatives of the US Administration stated that they would run DNA and fingerprints tests to confirm the death of the famous terrorist. Killing Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was the second major US counterterrorist success, after the killing of Osama bin Laden on the 2nd of May 2015, in his shelter in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad.

        Addressing the nation from the White House on the 27th of October, President Donald Trump stated, among others, that “Last night, the United States brought the world’s number one terrorist leader to justice. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is dead. […] Capturing or killing Baghdadi has been the top national security priority of my administration. […] No personnel were lost in the operation, while a large number of Baghdadi’s fighters and companions were killed with him.”

The disappearance of the “caliph” Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi (by his real name Ibrahim Al-Samarrai) doesn’t necessarily mean, in itself the ideological disappearance of Jihad. One of the first major steps taken by the remaining ISIS groups - whether active or dormant - will most likely be to name a successor (a tradition inherited from early Islam).

                                               Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi                                                                                                                                              Abdullah Qardash

          On the 31st of October, the A‘amaq (“Depths”) News Agency, which is linked to the Islamic State and relay its propaganda, issued an announcement according to which the “caliph” Al-Baghdadi had nominated a successor - Abdullah Qardash (photo above). An Iraqi of Turkmen origin, Abadullah Qardash was Baghdadi’s former cell mate during the time they spent in the famous internment camp Camp Bucca, established close to one of the most important ports in Iraq - Umm Qasr.

Between 2003 and 2009 more than 100,000 suspected Jihadists passed through the internment camp 

        He used to be a religious commissar and a general shari‘a judge for al-Qaeda, and top legislator and policymaker for ISIS. Before joining these organizations, he served as an officer in Saddam Hussein’s army.

Qardash’s future leadership of Daesh is problematic, since according to the tradition of early Islam, in order to be named leader he needs the approval of all the heads of the terrorist groups and Jihadist structures, including chiefs of entities that are affiliated to Al-Baghdadi’s “caliphate” and are spread across at least 12 states in the Middle East, Africa and the Asian Far East. To this we add many other, important or less important leaders who, throughout the existence of the Islamic State have tried to manoeuvre their way up its decision-making, command or financial ladder. This competition could affect the level of adhesion to, and unity around Al-Baghdadi’s will with regard to the continuation and escalation of Jihad against the “infidels”.

       However, there is another “post-caliphate” evolution of this Salafi-Jihadist terrorist structure. With Al-Baghdadi gone, the level of support for the 2014 rupture between Daesh and Al-Qaeda is expected to fade away since the latter has also suffered major losses among its traditional regional leaders (the case of Al-Nusra Front in Syria, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula). According to Arabic speaking analysts, this state of facts favours a reconfiguration of the relationship between Daesh and Al-Qaeda that is they would resume some forms of communication, cooperation and coordination.

Besides, the killing of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi may turn out to be - for many zealot Jihadists that have no future either in the Orient, or in their home countries - an incentive to the so called tha’r (revenge by bloodshed, or the traditional vendetta), which means that fanaticism and terrorist acts will intensify and will be harder to fight against.

       This is why one may say that the fight against Islamic terrorism is facing a new, unpredictable stage.

       Eliminating the terrorist leader Al-Baghdadi delivered, without a doubt, a harsh blow to the Jihadist group, yet not lethal. In the social and institutional chaos that keeps on inflicting damage on Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, chances are that, following a period of relative tranquillity Daesh could prove - just like Al-Qaeda did - a remarkable ability to adapt to evolutions on the frontline. In the short time following the demise of the former “caliph”, lone Jihadists or dormant Jihadist cells kept on engaging in sporadic, yet bloody terrorist attacks that resulted in human and material losses.

       There are at least four recent developments that call for caution and restraint when so triumphantly speaking about the disappearance of the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria”.

       Firstly, we are referring to the frequent ups and downs in the US policy regarding the American military presence in the terrorist conflict area. This is why there are voices, both within the area and outside it that allege that the Donald Trump administration is giving up on the fight against the Jihadist-terrorist phenomenon, while focusing on taking control over the oil and gas resources in the northern and north-eastern part of Syria.

       Secondly, we are referring to the protests in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon that together have generated a situation in which the territory freed from ISIS’ control cannot be managed well enough by their own governments, which are supposed to deny the presence of Jihadists. This is why vast territories in the southern part of Iraq, the center of Syria and the Lebanese Bekaa Valley may present themselves as uncontrolled areas and available for a gradual reassembly of the terrorist organization’s destructive capabilities.

       Thirdly, we are referring to the consequences of the decision - already put into practice - of the Turkish government to repatriate the more than 1500 Daesh prisoners detained in Turkey. The fact that there are no serious guarantees as far as monitoring the released prisoners to their destination means the terrorists could take advantage of the situation and seek support in the rural and tribal areas in order to reorganize a clandestine resistance and keep Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s legacy alive.

       Lastly, we are referring to the Turkish operation to establish a safety zone in northern Syria that is flawed, which can encourage the Kurdish community to follow Ankara’s example and get rid of the significant number of Arabic and foreign Jihadist prisoners held in Kurdish detention facilities.

       Killing Al-Baghdadi has beheaded the Islamic State; however, this doesn’t hold back individual and small groups/cells combat initiatives. Osama Bin Laden, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, Abu Muhammad Al-Julani (Al-Qaeda) were as many Salafists, whose disappearance did not prevent the rise of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s “caliphate”.

       Daesh isn’t gone and the war against Jihadist-Salafism isn’t over. This is why it would be useful if the leaders of the countries involved in the fight against terrorism on both sides of the Atlantic gathered together to share the lessons learned during four years of fight against terrorism, reach common conclusions, and take common decisions that would eventually be implemented through joint efforts.