It will soon be two years since 9 December 2017 when Iraq’s former Prime Minister, Haidar Al-Abadi, triumphantly and solemnly announced the liberation of his country’s entire territory from the presence of the terrorist-jihadist organization, “The Islamic State” (DA‘ISH in Arabic) and consequently the end of the war against the terrorist-jihadist phenomenon in the land situated between the Tigris and the Euphrates.

          However, three more months were needed by the USA led coalition to make the announcement (on 24 March 2018) - in a much reserved manner when referring to the anti-terrorist front in Syria - regarding the “regional defeat“ of the short-lived “Islamic Caliphate” in this country. Yet the announcement was accompanied by official warnings - that contradicted prior festive statements - regarding the activism and resilience of DAESH.  They demand the continuation of all operations related to the actual elimination of the influence, structures, support and financial means of the Islamic-fundamentalist organization.

         Ever since then and up until now, the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” hasn’t stopped providing, on a daily basis enough evidence that the organisation is still out there and it not only is on a slow but constant mend but keeps on proving its ability to adjust to the new rules of clandestine warfare. This reality is upon us and keeps on hitting us with various manifestations, such as violent attacks, suicide bombings and generally speaking, the same procedures, tactics and actions that have bled the region during DAESH’s short life span. On 16 September the “Al-Furqan” Foundation, one of ISIS’ media promoters broadcast a new audio message belonging to its “historic” leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi where he warned, “the terrorist attacks will go on and will soon reach a daily execution rhythm”. Baghdadi’s previous message had been broadcast this April, and had a similar content to the one on 16 September. It made analysts believe it had not been an imminent threat, but rather one of the “caliph’s” attempts to mobilise new jihadist warriors and to reassert the fact that ISIS still existed and was regrouping, but it did not show any signs of ever being as harmful and active as in its heydays.

         According to some jihadist statements (of DAESH terrorists in the custody of the Iraqi authorities) Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was harboured in the area of the Syrian city of Al-Bukamal, at the Syrian-Iraqi border. Similar information has been broadcasted by regional and Western media as well. The information, if true, posed another simple question: “if that was the case and the whereabouts of the terrorist were known, how come there haven’t been any attempts to capture or kill him?” Is there anything to gain from his being at large only to be used, in times of need, in the complicated military and political game that still takes place in the area between the Syrian Euphrates and Iraqi Mesopotamia? An overview of the Syrian-Iraqi geographical area highlights the fact that dormant terrorist factions or so-called active “cells” are still there. In Syria, they can be found in the Eastern part of the river Euphrates, especially in the desert area surrounding Palmyra, and in the proximity of the city and governorate of Deir Ez-Zor in the North-eastern part of the country. In Iraq, groups can be found along the Iraqi-Syrian border and on a strip situated in the far South-western part of the Iraqi Kurdistan. The strip lies between the Sinjar district in the Northeast and Ramadi and the Northern part of Bagdad.

          Frequent (and highly destructive) terrorist attacks and counter-terrorist military operations have raised, among analysts, the question whether we are witnessing the “reincarnation” of the terrorist group led by the imam Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. Or, is it just the resilience of the phenomenon that is meant, sooner or later, to slowly die until it becomes naturally extinct?

         It is true that the disappearance of the units and organisational structure of DAESH does not necessarily mean the disappearance of its ideology and doctrine. At the same time, a look at today’s facts must include the multiple and various differences between Syria and Iraq. We are referring to the social aspects, as well as to the different ways in which these countries have evolved domestically – after the demise of Saddam Hussein’s Baas regime in Iraq, in 2003 and after the start of the “Arab Spring”, in 2011 and that of the Syrian civil war.

          1. Iraq between Will and Realities

         “Iradat Al-Nasr” – “Victory’s Will” was the name of a massive operation that was launched on 7 July 2019 by the Iraqi army and security forces against DAESH’s multitude of separate factions. A year after the former Iraqi Prime Minister, Heidar Abbadi announced Iraq’s defeat of DAESH, the planning and start of this operation is in itself a decisive argument in favour of all analysis that argue that the fight against irrational Islamism is far from over. The front of the operation covered an area stretching from Iraq’s border with Syria in the West, to the Nineveh district and its capital, Mosul in the East. Nineveh is basically a “Sahel” that crosses Iraq from West to the East. Following the “official” end of the war against DAESH this region remains the main jihadist-terrorist “Bantustan” from where the terrorist cells of the former “caliphate” plan and launch their attacks in different areas in Iraq. The Islamic state managed to exploit the weaknesses of the Iraqi army and security forces that were exhausted and worn out by the three years of war, and quickly withdraw their Peshmerga and Kurdish fighters, only to further consolidate their presence and rebuild their numbers. In the areas of the oil fields in Kirkuk and Mosul, the Iraqi National Army is mainly preoccupied with the protection and functioning of the oil fields, refineries, oil pipelines and hydrocarbon fuels. One may say that the Iraqi fight against terrorism is mostly a reactive response to the operations of the Islamic State and less a series of actions that prevent, identify and eliminate the Islamist terrorist cells in the country, locations that the Iraqi planners and strategists actually know.

        Such a situation/scenario favours a guerrilla war led by the jihadists that have the environment (mountains and desert) on their side. It also favours the existence of some tribal Iraqi elements that are disappointed and displeased with the inability of the Iraqi government to meet their demands and provide them with the compensations and benefits they deserve, following the “victory” over the former Islamic State. What drew our attention was the fact that in one of the messages attributed to the “caliph” Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in the beginning of May, he clearly stated that “the war of Islam and that of the Muslim against the crusaders and their allies will be long. The war we fight today is temporarily a war of attrition against or enemies who must understand that Jihad will go on till the end of time.”

         2. Syria: A Dead, but Active “Caliphate”

         In March, the last DAESH stronghold in Syria fell - close to the city of Baghouz, at the eastern border between Syria and Iraq. More tens of thousands of Islamist fighters - native Muslims and Westerners who took to Islam’s ideology, and an important number of their families, including women and children - were captured by the Kurdish-Arabic alliance, or were arrested, and placed in detention camps and prisons. In Syria there are currently four such prison centres placed in the northern part of the country: camp Ain Issa, North of Raqqa, camp Al-Hol, in the eastern Hasaka countryside, and Al-Roj and Derek in the far north-eastern part of Syria, close to the Iraqi border. They accommodate, in very poor conditions, roughly 70,000 people. The coalition forces, the Kurdish minority and government sources draw attention on the fact that, far from diminishing the fanaticism of those in custody, these facilities are active centres for the promotion of radicalism and fanaticism. Should they be released, the prisoners represent a serious threat and a source for the reappearance of the jihadist terrorist organization. As far as the “Islamic state” terrorists that haven’t been captured are concerned, they have regrouped, just like their fellows in Iraq, in sleeping cells, but active as far as their ability to commit attacks is concerned (placing improvised explosive devices on major routes that have been used by the Kurdish and international allied forces, ambushes, car bombings and lethal attacks etc.).

        One may say this is a time when the active jihadist terrorism in Syria and Iraq has as an ultimate purpose the close monitoring and upkeep of their surviving capabilities should their need to come back arise on both sides - in Syria as well as in Iraq. There are few social, economical, institutional, religious and political opportunities to get rid of the deep causes that have made possible the appearance, development and implementation of the militant Islamic Jihadist terrorism.

         Between the will to win and obtaining an ultimate and certain victory the road is still long and unpredictable.

    NOTE: This article was written before the operation of the US Special Forces that killed Daesh leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.