Starting with May, the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz were once again in the forefront of the confrontations and strategic rivalries amplified by a state of neither peace nor war that is characteristic to the climate of the relationship between the western community (or at least a part of it) lead by the USA on one hand and the Iranian theocratic regime on the other. There have been drone attacks, that are more likely related to terrorism, sabotages, and piracy against at least 19 commercial ships (oil tankers) sailing under different banners (including Iranian).

         The war of the “oil tankers” doesn’t stand out by comparison to other previous conflicts, as it is accompanied by a parallel warfare - a highly hypocritical confrontational dialogue in which the parties keep on displaying openness for discussion and “conditional” negotiations, while constantly getting ready for war.

       This context is corroborated with Hassan Rouhani’s statement following that of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard who had announced the unveiling of three new types of medium-range missiles. Reinterpreting and acknowledging the old law of retaliation – enacted by the Code of Hammurabi and upheld by the Christian prophets and by the Islamic Shari’a - “eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth, hand for a hand”, the Iranian rhetoric brought to tour attention an innovative regional security equation formulated “security for security, strait for strait and oil for oil”.

          Why are these three stakes mentioned by the Iranian head of state? Speaking of security Rouhani bore in mind the perfect argument according to which “the West cannot have its own security and cannot use military means, at the expense of Iranians.” The proposed oil tank exchange is motivated by a more pragmatic argument: the release of the Iranian oil tanker seized by Great Britain in Gibraltar under the suspicion of delivering oil to Syria and as a reaction to the UK flagged oil tanker that had been seized by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz. It is the same, from an Iranian perspective, with the fossil fuels. Just as the West was and still is interested in protecting the oil flow coming from the Middle East, and particularly from the Persian Gulf area, Iran wants to be able to export its own oil and demands, as an absolute prerequisite to accepting contacts with the West the lifting of all sanctions and embargos that the Trump administration imposed on Tehran regime.

          Following the first maritime incidents in the Gulf that Iran was accused of having caused, directly or indirectly, president Donald Trump called, in June, for the creation of an international maritime coalition that would protect the oil transport in this part of the world, most specifically in the Hormuz strait situated between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. This would amount to an “armada” patrolling in a sensitive region, whose formation with a few exceptions is lagging, nevertheless. The USA’s argument is that every interested country should provide military escorts to their own ships that cross the area of the Persian Gulf and the Hormuz strait, with American air support. With the exception of France and the UK, the Europeans are sceptical about the project proposed by president Donald Trump and do not really wish to be involved in the “maximum pressure” policy adopted by the USA against Iran. Beyond the arguments destined for media, the European community, or at least a part of it, is still hopeful and remains interested in finding a friendly solution to the dispute that also ensures the continuation of the nuclear deal that the USA withdrew from in 2018.

         A clear distancing of the German chancellor Angela Merkel from the US proposals was stated in Berlin, and it threatens to induce further tensions in the relationship between Germany and the USA. It is difficult to say whether this situation is caused - according to some observers – by the Germany refusal to supplement its contributions to NATO’s treasury, or rather by concerns at the White House regarding the intense relationship between Germany and the Russian Federation, which from an American point of view represents the danger of Germany and the European community leaning towards an economic reliance on Moscow.

           From the Oil Tankers War to the “Oil War”

          In this context, on the 14th of September an unpredictable evolution took place, when two oil sites belonging to the Saudi colossus ARAMCO were the target of a drone and cruise missiles attack with around 19 points of impact, causing massive destruction; the Saudi oil production was reduced to almost half. The Washington administration pinned the attack on Iran (which denied the accusation, seeing it as just another pretext for the Trump administration to start a war against Iran). Nevertheless, the attacks were claimed by the Iran backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, through a statement noting that “Saudi oil is not more precious than Yemeni blood”.  Given the rich history of Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the affiliation to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard of the Yemeni rebels in Bab El-Mandeb, it is less significant whether the drones and the missiles came from Southern Yemen or Southern Iran, as long as in the case of this separatist movement Tehran proved, more than once, to be the planner of the attack, the supplier of the weapon, and the one pulling the trigger - by the hand of its proxies.

         The attack against the Saudi oil colossus ARAMCO is relevant as far as the climate and the state of play of the tensions in the Gulf region are concerned, and their main characteristic can be described as hesitant and still in an exploratory stage. Hesitant because the parties do not want war, but embrace, at the same time noisy slogans such as “total war with many victims”. Iran is well aware it cannot repeat the experience of the oil embargo imposed by the oil producers in the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973. That led to an end of the military confrontations, but it didn’t change anything of significance for the overall strategic equation. President Trump in his turn is aware that a new military endeavour in the Gulf that bears his signature isn’t the best electoral offer that would determine the US citizens to grant him a second mandate.

         The analyses and evaluations on this new Gulf crisis and on the strategic market of energy are still simmering. And the next issue of the Geostrategic Pulse could occur either in the context of a ”Phyrrus victory”, or in the context of different perspectives and global and regional approaches whose outlines are difficult to turn into a realistic projection.

          We Sanction, but We Do Not Attack...

         On one hand, the uncertainty that persists as far as the standings of the parties directly involved in the “oil war” (Iran, the USA, the Gulf monarchies, the Houthi rebels in the Yemen, the Iraqi militias - Popular Mobilization Forces) expresses the fact that none of them have taken a strategic decision and don’t want to take one because it would lead to a huge deterioration of the conflict.

       On the other hand, a war of attrition, through proxies, is seen in Tehran as an alternative with dual aim, while excluding a large scale war. It puts price pressures on the international fossil fuels market and implicitly on the western consumers, in the sense that they would change their minds regarding the sanctions imposed on Iran and regarding the “nuclear deal”.

       Last but not least Iran wishes to prove that its Arab neighbours and oil producers, starting with Saudi Arabia, are vulnerable and unprepared for a major military confrontation, relying on help from their American ally and eventually Israel.

Besides, in his first reaction to the attack on the Saudi colossus ARAMCO, president Donald Trump didn’t hide his frustration, stating: “The USA have not given up the idea of a political summit with Iran” (in the context of the UN General Assembly in the fall – where the summit never took place); he followed on with a meaningful phrase, underlying that “the USA are still open to dialogue and are willing to offer help to its allies, for a price and Saudi Arabia should take steps towards ensuring its own security.”

          A Weak Diplomacy

        Starting with the recent G7 summit in Biarritz, the French president Emmanuel Macron kept advertising the intense French diplomacy towards a de-escalation in the US-Iranian relations and a reunion between the presidents Donald Trump and Hassan Rouhani in the context of the UN General Assembly session in the fall of this year. On his part, the British prime minister Boris Johnson proposed the negotiation of a new “nuclear deal” with Iran. Lastly, shortly before leaving for New York to address the world from the UN stand, the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani advertised his intention to propose the regional and international community a peace initiative that prevents the irreversible degradation of the situation in the Persian Gulf and a large scale war. The UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres warned that the situation produced in the oil region of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf was “on the edge” from a military and security point of view.

       The backstage UN negotiations, consultations and dialogue have not brought the “light at the end of the tunnel”. Donald Trump’s speech could have been titled “The UN General Assembly - Iran, Iran, Iran”, a speech devoted to the familiar paradigm of the balance between “extreme pressure” and the wings of the dove, metaphors that did not bring any significant change to the course of this conflict under discussion. On behalf of Iran, Rouhani proposed a romantic alternative - a peace deal between Iran and the rest of the world, including the US and Saudi Arabia. This was a formal proposition, the ball fell on the other side’s court and they chose to stand aside. Diplomacy, and along with it the UN proved to be below expectations, even if they were low.

        NOTE

        What was the meaning of the attack against an economic sector that was vital not only to Saudi Arabia, but also at the level of the entire global energy strategy?

       It is certain that the attacks in Buqayq and Khurays were used by Iran mostly to narrow the options of the Trump Administration, proving that the “US policy of extreme pressure” can’t make the Iranians comply with US imposed conditions. At the same time the attack was meant to be a “trial balloon” for the ability and willingness of the USA and the European community to implement the military warnings to the Iranian theocratic regime.

       This is why a lack of resolute reaction from the West will be an indication for Iran’s freedom of movement in the future. An international attitude of “non-combat” would mean, to Iranians, a proof that the USA and an international community directly affected by Iran’s defiance are weak and disoriented.

       Soon after the ARAMCO attack, the head of the US diplomacy, Mike Pompeo paid an emergency visit to Riyadh to discuss with the Saudi allies the response actions to be taken. In the same context, on the 17th of September the Israeli elections reconfirmed a continuation of the aggressive, right wing regional policy of Israel. This actually means the continuation of the confrontations between Israel and its neighbors supporting Iranian policies. Which equally means the perpetuation and even intensification of the conflict situations in the entire Middle East.

      This status quo seems to be more and more dominated by the question when, not if, a war with Iran will take place and what forms will it take? If after the short “war of the oil tankers” - that didn’t have major consequences to Iran - the Tehran regime will easily get over the tensions generated by the ARAMCO attacks, one cannot rule out the possibility that the current Iranian regime decides to take more steps forward, and act against USA’s regional allies - whether it is the Arab monarchies in the Gulf or Israel, or even against the US presence in the area. An escalation of the tensions won’t let other actors stand by and watch, but encourage them to take advantage of the events in the Gulf to solve or influence burning strategic matters: Russia - with the Syria and Ukraine dossiers; China - with the events in Hong Kong, or even North Korea and its complicated relationship with the USA.