

Supplement

GEOSTRATEGIC PULSE

at No 269, 20 December 2018



Bleak See on the Black Sea


Russia raises the stakes




Supliment PULSUL GEOSTRATEGIC

la Nr. 112, 20 Decembrie 2011

Ultimele evoluții din Siria. Opoziția, acțiuni și așteptări



Regatul Hașemit al Iordaniei
oază de stabilitate și pace
în Orientul Mijlociu



Looking for geopolitical assessments and analyses?
Interested in the Middle Eastern developments?
In the Black Sea wider area?
What about the current security issues and the 21st century secret services?
Interested in the newest top-notch military equipment?
Want to know about the most relevant and recent geopolitical news and publications?
Looking for current elements of the economic development?

Subscribe to the Geostrategic Pulse!

One year - 24 issues (numerous Supplements, Commentaries, Alerts), published bimonthly



On line: secured payment on www.ingepo.ro

Bank transfer: account SC INGEPO Consulting SRL RO76BRDEO80SV35412140800 open at BRD Brasov; SWIFT - BRDEROBU, Romania

Collect: (upon receiving the first issue, valid for Romania only)

PDF version by e-mail: 1.198,00 RON/ 239,50 Euro/ 299,50 USD

Print: 1,255.20 RON/ 314,00 Euro/ 390,00 USD

For further details call +4 0268 470070; fax +4 0268 47 00 76 or contact us via e-mail: office@ingepo.ro; ingepo.vc@gmail.com

Bleak See on the Black Sea

Prof. Anis H. BAJREKTAREVIĆ¹



Following the latest events in and around the Black Sea, two old questions are reappearing. Both are inviting us for a repeated elaboration:

If a Monroe doctrine (about the hemispheric security exclusivity) is recognised at one corner of the globe, do we have a moral right or legal ground to negate it at the other corner? This irrespectively from the fact that Gorbachev-Yeltsin Russia unilaterally renounced the similar doctrine – the Brezhnev doctrine about irreversibility of communist gains.

Clearly, the ‘might-makes-right’ as a conduct in international relations cannot be selectively accepted. Either it is acknowledged to all who can effectively self-prescribe and maintain such a monopoly of coercion, or it is absolutely (revoked and) condemned as contrary to behaviour among the civilised nations.

Next to the first question is a right of pre-emption.

It is apparent that within the Black Sea theatre, Russia acts in an unwilling, pre-emptive and rather defensive mode. That is not a regime change action on the other continent following the rationale of extra security demand by exclusive few. Fairly, it is an equalising reactive attempt within the near abroad. For the last 25 years, all the NATO military interventions were outside its membership zone; none of the few Russian interventions over the same period was outside the parameter of former USSR.

Before closing, let us take a closer look on the problem from a larger historical perspective.

Una hysteria Importante

Historically speaking, the process of Christianization of Europe that was used as the justification tool to (either intimidate or corrupt, so to say to) pacify the invading tribes, which demolished the Roman Empire and brought to an end the Antique age, was running parallel on two tracks. The Roman Curia/Vatican conducted one of them by its hammer: the Holy Roman Empire. The second was run by the cluster of Rusophone Slavic Kaganates, who

1. Professor is editor of the NY-based GHIR (Geopolitics, History and Intl. Relations) journal, and editorial board member of several similar specialized magazines on three continents. His 7th book, ‘From WWI to www. – Europe and the World 1918-2018’ is to be realised in December. *Earlier version of the text was published by the Vision & Global Trends*

receiving (the orthodox or true/authentic, so-called Eastern version of) Christianity from Byzantium, and past its collapse, have taken over a mission of Christianization, while forming its first state of Kiev Russia (and thereafter, its first historic empire). Thus, to the eastern edge of Europe, Russophones have lived in an intact, nearly a hermetic world of universalism for centuries: one empire, one Tsar, one religion and one language².

Everything in between Central Europe and Russia is Eastern Europe, rather a historic novelty on the political map of Europe. Very formation of the Atlantic Europe's present shape dates back to 14th–15th century, of Central Europe to the mid-late 19th century, while a contemporary Eastern Europe only started emerging between the end of WWI and the collapse of the Soviet Union – meaning, less than 100 years at best, slightly over two decades in the most cases. No wonder that the dominant political culture of the Eastern Europeans resonates residual fears and reflects deeply insecure small nations. Captive and restrictive, they are short in territorial depth, in demographic projection, in natural resources and in a direct access to open (warm) seas. After all, these are short in historio-cultural verticals, and in the bigger picture-driven long-term policies. Eastern Europeans are exercising the nationhood and sovereignty from quite a recently, thus, too often uncertain over the side and page of history. Therefore, they are often dismissive, hectic and suspicious, nearly neuralgic and xenophobic, with frequent overtones.

Years of Useful Idiot

The latest loss of Russophone Europe in its geopolitical and ideological confrontation with the West meant colossal changes in Eastern Europe. One may look into geopolitical surrounding of at the-time largest eastern European state, Poland, as an illustration of how

2. Annotated from one of my earlier writings, it states as following: "...Early Russian state has ever since expanded north/ northeast and eastward, reaching the physical limits of its outreach by crossing the Bering straits (and the sale of Russian Alaska to the USA in 1867). By the late 17th and early 18th century, Russia had begun to draw systematically into European politico-military theatre. (...) In the meantime, Europe's universalistic empire dissolved. It was contested by the challengers (like the Richelieu's France and others-geopolitical, or the Lutheran/Protestant – ideological), and fragmented into the cluster of confronted monarchies, desperately trying to achieve an equilibrium through dynamic balancing. Similar political process will affect Russian universal empire only by late 20th century, following the Soviet dissolution. (...) Not fully accepted into the European collective system before the Metternich's Holy Alliance, even had its access into the post-Versailles system denied, Russia was still not ignored like other peripheral European power. The Ottomans, conversely, were negated from all of the security systems until the very creation of the NATO (Republic of Turkey). Through the pre-emptive partition of Poland in the eve of WWII, and successful campaigns elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Bolshevik Russia expanded both its territory and its influence westwards. (...) An early Soviet period of Russia was characterized by isolated bilateral security arrangements, e.g. with Germans, Fins, Japanese, etc. The post WWII days have brought the regional collective system of Warsaw Pact into existence, as to maintain the communist gains in Europe and to effectively oppose geopolitically and ideologically the similar, earlier formed, US-led block. Besides Nixon's reapproachment towards China, the collapse of the Soviet Union was the final stage in the progressive fragmentation of the vast Sino-Soviet Communist block (that dominated the Euroasian land mass with its massive size and centrality), letting Russia emerge as the successor. The sudden ideological and territorial Soviet break-up, however, was followed by the cultural shock and civil disorder, painful economic and demographic crisis and rapidly widening disparities. All this coupled with the humiliating wars in Caucasus and elsewhere, since the centripetal and centrifugal forces of integration or fragmentations came into the oscillatory play. Between 1989 and 1991, communist rule ended in country after country and the Warsaw Pact officially dissolved. Subsequently, the Gorbachev-Jeltsin Russia experienced the greatest geopolitical contraction of any major power in the modern era and one of the fastest ever in history. Still, Gorbachev-Jeltsin tandem managed to (re-)brand themselves domestically and internationally – each got its own label of vodka..." (*Verticalization of Historical Experiences: Europe's and Asia's Security Structures – Structural Similarities and Differences*, Crossroads – the Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal, 4 (1), page 111-112, M-MFA 2008)

3. Ethnically, linguistically and religiously one of the most homogenous countries of Europe, Poland in its post-communist concepts reinvigorates the faith (as being, past the days of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, massively de-Slavicized). No wonder as the Polish-born Karol Józef Wojtyła served the Roman Curia as *Pontifex Maximus* from 1978, to be replaced

dramatic was it³. All three land neighbors of Poland; Eastern Germany (as the only country to join the EU without any accession procedure, but by pure act of *Anschluss*), Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union have disappeared overnight. At present, Polish border countries are a two-decade-old novelty on the European political map. Further on, if we wish to compare the number of dissolutions of states worldwide over the last 50 years, the Old continent suffered as many as all other continents combined: American continent – none, Asia – one (Indonesia/ East Timor), Africa – two (Sudan/South Sudan and Ethiopia/Eritrea), and Europe – three.

Interestingly, each and every dissolution in Europe was primarily related to Slavs (Slavic peoples) living in multiethnic and multi-linguistic (not in the Atlantic Europe's conscripted pure single-nation) state. Additionally, all three European fragmentations – meaning, every second dissolution in the world – were situated exclusively and only in Eastern Europe. That region has witnessed a total dissolution of Czechoslovakia (western Slavs) and Yugoslavia (southern Slavs, in 3 waves), while one state disappeared from Eastern Europe (DDR) as to strengthen and enlarge the front of Central Europe (Western Germany). Finally, countless centripetal turbulences severely affected Eastern Europe following the dissolution of the Soviet Union (eastern Slavs) on its frontiers.

Irredentism in the UK, Spain, Belgium, France and Italy, or Denmark (over Faroe Islands and Greenland) is far elder, stronger and deeper. However, all dissolutions in Eastern Europe took place irreversibly and overnight, while Atlantic Europe remained intact, with Central Europe even enlarging territorially and expanding economically.

Deindustrialized, incapacitated, demoralized, over-indebted, re-feudalized, rarified and de-Slavicized

Finally, East is sharply aged and depopulated –the worst of its kind ever– which in return will make any future prospect of a full and decisive generational interval simply impossible. *Honduras-ization* of Eastern Europe is full and complete. Hence, is it safe to say that if the post-WWII Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe was overt and brutal, this one is subtle but subversive and deeply corrosive?

The key (nonintentional) consequence of the Soviet occupation was that the Eastern European states –as a sort of their tacit, firm but low-tempered rebellion – preserved their sense of nationhood. However, they had essential means at disposal to do so: the right to work was highly illuminated in and protected by the national constitutions, so were other socio-economic rights such as the right to culture, language, arts and similar segments of collective nation's memory. Today's East, deprived and deceived, silently witnesses the progressive metastasis of its national tissue.

Ergo, euphemisms such as *countries in transition* or *new Europe* cannot hide a disconso-

by the German-born Joseph Ratzinger in 2005. Prizing Roman-Catholicism over ethnic and linguistic roots, even harshly denouncing any Slavic sentiment as a dangerous *roter russischer Panlawismus*, 'fortress' Poland effectively isolates itself on a long-run as none of its neighbors is Catholic. To the contrary, the four fifths of its land-borders are shared with other Slavic states. To externally mobilize, the elites (in any Eastern European state) would need an appealing intellectual case – not a mere ethno-religious chauvinism. One of the leading Croatian thinkers, Domagoj Nikolic says: "Austrian Catholicism is not anti-Germanic, but Polish is anti-Slavic. Belgian Catholicism is neither antifascism dismissive nor anti-Francophonous, but our Croatian Catholicism is very anti-Slavic and is antifascism trivializing... That undeniably leads us to conclude that (Slavic) Eastern Europe suffers the authenticity deficit...Only the immature nations can suffer such a historical disorientation."

late fact that Eastern Europe has been treated for 25 years as defeated belligerent, as spoils of war which the West won in its war against communist Russia.

It concludes that (self-)fragmented, deindustrialized and re-feudalized, rapidly aged rarified and depopulated, (and de-Slavicized) Eastern Europe is probably the least influential region of the world – one of the very few underachievers. Obediently submissive and therefore, rigid in dynamic environment of the promising 21st century, Eastern Europeans are among last remaining passive downloaders and slow-receivers on the otherwise blossoming stage of the world's creativity, politics and economy. Seems, Europe still despises its own victims...

Terra nullius

Admittedly, by the early 1990s, the 'security hole' – Eastern Europe, has been approached in multifold fashion: Besides the (pre-Maastricht EC and post-Maastricht) EU and NATO, there was the Council of Europe, the CSCE (after the 1993 Budapest summit, OSCE), the EBRD and EIB. All of them were sending the political, economic, human dimension, commercial signals, assistance and expertise. These moves were making both sides very nervous; Russia becoming assertive (on its former peripheries) and Eastern Europe defiantly dismissive⁴. Until this very day, each of them is portraying the NATO enterprise as the central security consideration: One as a must-go, and another as a no-go.

No wonder that the absolute pivot of Eastern Europe, and the second largest of all Slavic states – Ukraine, is a grand hostage of that very dilemma: Between the eastern pan-Slavic hegemony and western 'imperialism of free market'⁵. Additionally, the country suffers from the consolidated Klepto-corporate takeover as well as the rapid re-Nazification.

For Ukraine, Russia is a geographic, socio-historic, cultural and linguistic reality. Presently, this reality is far less reflected upon than the seducing, but rather distant Euro-Atlantic club. Ukraine for Russia; it represents more than a lame western-flank' geopolitical pivot, or to say, the first collateral in the infamous policy of containment that the West had continuously pursued against Russia ever since the 18th century⁶.

4. Since the end of WWII in the Old Continent, there was no other external military interventions but to the Europe's East. To be accurate, in the NATO history (nearly as double longer than the history of the Warsaw pact), the only two interventions of that Block ever conducted in Europe were both taking place solely on Eastern European soil. While the two Russian (covert) interventions since the end of the Cold War aimed at its strategic neighborhood (former Soviet republics, heavily inhabited by ethnic Russian; Abkhazia-South Ossetia and Crimea-East Ukraine), and were (unsuccessfully) justified as the encirclement preemption, the US-led NATO intervened overtly. In both NATO cases (Bosnia and Serbia-Kosovo), it was well beyond any membership territory, and short of any UN-endorsed mandate, meaning without a real international legitimacy. "Humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was never exactly what it appeared... It was a use of imperial power to support a self-determination claim by a national minority" – wrote Michael Ignatieff about the 1990s Balkans events, as fresh and accurate as if reporting was from Sevastopol in spring 2014.

5. This is further burdened by the *imperialism in a hurry* – an inflammable mix of the Lithuanian-Polish past traumas and German 'manifest destiny' of being historically yet again ill-fated; *impatient for quick results* – simply, unable to capitalize on its previous successes.

6. Does the declining big power of a lost ideological grip, demoralized, with a disfranchised, ageing and rarified population, of the primary-commodities export driven, but shrinking economy need to be contained? Hence, what is the origin of anxiety: facts or confrontational nostalgia? The chief American chief Sovietologies grip, ory-comodity driven economy Sovietologist, George Kennan warned about the NATO expansion already in 1998: "I think it is a tragic mistake. Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies". In that very interview, Kennan predicted that the NATO Eastern enlargement will provoke a major crisis in Europe with a hawks than 'arguing' a self-fulfilling prophecy "you see, we always told you that is how the Russian are". Apparently, the Russian red-red line is Georgia and Ukraine. Kremlin kept stressing that calmly, but repeatedly for nearly 20 past years. Eventually, Georgia was territorially and



For Moscow, Kiev is an emotional place – an indispensable bond of historio-civilizational attachment – something that makes and sustains Russia both Christian and European. Putin clearly redlined it: Sudden annexation of Crimea (return to its pre-1954 status) was an unpleasant and humiliating surprise that brought a lot of foreign policy hangover for both the NATO and EU⁷.

Nevertheless, for the Atlantist alarmists (incl. the *Partition studies* participants and those working for the *Hate industry*), military lobbyists and other cold-war mentality ‘deep-state’ structures on all sides, this situation offers a perfect *raison d’être*.

Thus drifting chopped off and away, a failed state beyond rehabilitation, Ukraine itself is a prisoner of this domesticated security drama. Yet again, the false dilemma so tragically imploded within this blue state, of a 50:50 polarized and deterritorialized population, over the question where the country belongs – in space, time and side of history. Conclusively, Eastern Europe is further twisting, while gradually combusted between Ukrainization and Pakistanization. The rest of Europe is already shifting the costs of its own foreign policy journey by ‘fracking’ its households with a considerably (politically) higher energy bills.



politico-economically wrecked as a functioning, viable state before it was allowed to become a Western stronghold in Russia’s backyard. Georgia of that 2008, is an indication enough of how Ukraine – which is even a front-yard for Russia – might end up beyond 2014.

7. Putin’s “project is national, not imperial...to modernize Russia which, like any other state, has security concerns...” – fairly admits former French Minister of Defense Jean-Pierre Chevènement and confesses: “The pursuit of this conflict may turn Ukraine into a lasting source of conflict between the EU and Russia. Through a widely echoed ideological crusade, the US is attempting both to isolate Russia and to tighten its control over the rest of Europe”. /Chevènement, J-P. (2015), *No Need for this Cold War*, Le Monde diplomatique July 2015 (page 18)/

Russia Raises the Stakes



Phd. Victor HVOZD – President Bintel Ukraine

The incident in the Kerch Strait as a manifestation of Moscow's policy in the region

The actions to which Russia has been able to resort to in the Black Sea-Azov region since the beginning of this year indicate that it has moved to a new stage in the implementation of its geopolitical plans, including within the framework of its armed aggression against Ukraine. In fact, it seeks to militarize the region in a large scale in order to achieve several strategic and operational goals through active provocations in the Black and Azov Seas:

- firstly, to qualitatively strengthen its position in the region, which plays a special role in its geopolitical and trade-economic plans. Yes, it is in the Black Sea region that Russia borders directly on NATO and the EU, which makes this area one of the main objects of rivalry. At the same time, through the Black Sea-Azov region are Russia's most convenient naval communications to other regions, including the Middle East, Africa and the Atlantic Ocean;

- secondly, to transfer to itself transport flows in the region and to actually establish a sea blockade of Ukraine. Having achieved this, Moscow will create more favorable conditions for the Russian economy and, at the same time, will significantly slow down Ukraine's economic development;

- thirdly, to guarantee the safety of the new transport and energy corridor that will connect Russia with Southern Europe bypassing the territory of Ukraine. To date, the main element of such a corridor is the “Turkish Stream” pipeline, which Russia is laying on the bottom of the Black Sea in order to replace the southern route of the Ukrainian gas transport system;

- fourthly, to increase the ability of the RF Armed Forces to car-



ry out an offensive operation against Ukraine in the Coastal direction in order to create a land corridor to the Crimea and Trans- Dniester. In particular, this will allow sea-born landings on the Azov and Black Sea coast of Ukraine.

As a result of the attack on Ukraine, such plans have already largely been implemented in the Azov part of the region. Now it is trying to consolidate the achievements to implement these plans to the full.

In the first place, Russia tries to use the new situation that has de facto emerged in the region after the Russian occupation of the Crimea and allows it to control most of the Azov waters. This way it actually turned those waters into Russia's "inland sea".

At the same time, Russia seeks to solve another important task for itself, namely to block the work of Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk. On the one hand, they are the "sea gate" of the Ukrainian metallurgy, as the leading branch of the Ukrainian economy, and on the other hand — the main competitors of Russian ports on the Azov Sea. This issue is of particular importance to Russia in connection with the implementation of the Taman Port development project on the Azov coast of the Krasnodar Territory in the area of the Cape Iron Horn. According to Moscow's plans, this port should become *In the Azov Sea, the Kremlin is purposefully creating another area of tension for Ukraine* the main transship-ment base of commodity flows in the Azov Sea.

Besides, in the Azov Sea, the Kremlin is purposefully creating another area of tension for Ukraine to disperse its attention, efforts and resources, to put moral and psychological pressure on Ukraine's leadership and population, to frighten off investors and to create an additional burden on the Ukrainian economy. According to Russia's plans, all this should affect the results of the presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2019.

Exactly for this purpose, at the beginning of this year, Russia began increasing its military presence in the Sea of Azov. In particular, according to different estimates, today in the Azov waters are concentrated 40 to 60 warships and boats of the Russian Navy and the Border Guard Service of the FSB. Besides, the build-up of land and sea components of the RF Armed Forces in the occupied Crimea and on the territory of Rostov region and the Krasnodar Territory of the Russian Federation does not stop.

The concentration of such forces enabled Moscow to intensify its provocations against Ukraine in the Azov Sea, including the massive detention of Ukrainian and foreign ships that are passing through the Kerch Strait. At the same time, the build-up of the Russian troops in the Azov Sea region has significantly increased the possibility of Russia's combat actions against Ukraine on the Coastal direction.

This situation became critical in nature after the beginning of Ukraine's active efforts to defend its interests in the region. This is evidenced by the armed struggle in the Kerch Strait on 25th November 2018. In fact, it was for the first time since the beginning of Russia's military aggression, that **the RF openly used military force against Ukraine**, which makes the incident significant.

Thus, with the help of deliberate military actions in the Kerch Strait, which are sanctioned at the highest level, Russia has clearly demonstrated the immutability of intentions in pur-

suit of its strategic interests, despite the fact of external pressure. At the same time, it showed its readiness to further sharpen the confrontation with Ukraine and its western partners.

In this way Moscow has raised the stakes in its geopolitical “game” for a place in the modern multi-polar world. All this was confirmed by the statements of the Russian leadership regarding the incident in the Kerch Strait, which can be considered a logical extension of Moscow's course of military struggle against the West. This course was proclaimed by V. Putin in March of this year. In his message to the Federal Assembly of Russia and in his



In fact, it was for the first time since the beginning of Russia's military aggression in 2014, that the RF openly used military force against Ukraine

inaugural speech in May of this year. And now this course is being implemented in practice.

At the same time, another manifestation of the aggression of V. Putin's regime against Ukraine, which also became an open challenge to the West, has led to a fully expected actualization of the entire complex of problems associated with Russia's actions, which once again became the focus of the world community. At this, the condemnation of such actions by most Western countries and international organizations brought to naught all Moscow's attempts to establish relations with the United States and the EU.

And so Russia has lost all possibilities to lift Western sanctions. And even more so, the United States and the EU now have grounds for both prolonging such sanctions against Russia and for introducing new restrictions. To date, this issue has already been discussed in the European Union. In turn, the incident in the Kerch Strait forces the US Congress to adopt a new package of sanctions against Russia over other issues as well, in particular, the use of chemical weapons against a former officer of the Russian GRU, S. Skripal, in the British city of Salisbury, which took place in March 2018. In this regard, quite revealing was US President D. Trump's statement about his possible cancelling a meeting with V. Putin on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Argentina (November 30 – December 1, 2018).

At the same time, Russia's moving to open hostilities against Ukraine is a catalyst for deepening cooperation between our state and the US and NATO in the military sphere. Thus, a number of influential members of the US Congress have already called for the need to increase the volume of military assistance to Ukraine. The work of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, which until then had been blocked by Hungary, has also been restored.

On the whole, the above-mentioned circumstances testify to the difficult situation in which Putin's regime has found itself today. On the one hand, it tries to strengthen Russia's position in the world by increasing the aggressiveness of its policies, and on the other, it is not able to predict the consequences of such steps in violation of the norms of international law and the system of international peace "...Putin's regime is not able to predict the consequences of violation of the norms of international law and the system of international peace and security that was formed after the Second World War. At this, each of these steps only worsens the RF's situation and provokes its leadership to new aggressive actions. And it will do so as long as the international community lets it. This is what is today the main danger for Ukraine as well as for the whole civilized world."



Naval incidents enhance the Russian-Ukrainian tensions

- 1** Three Ukrainian ships – a tugboat and two speedboats start from Odessa to Mariupol
- 2** Moscow blocks the Kerch Strait with a tanker saying that the Ukrainian ships have entered the Russian waters without authorization
- 3** The Russian patrol boats fire on the Ukrainian ships and capture them. Ukraine announces six wounded servicemen; Russia says there are only three.



Moscow accuses Ukraine of a “planned provocation”, but Kiev says it has informed the Russians in advance about the route of the ships

Odessa: The main Ukrainian naval base after the loss of Crimea

Azov Sea: 80% of Ukraine’s exports are by sea



CRIMEEA
Annexed by Russia in 2014.
40,000 Russian troops stationed in Sevastopol: General Headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet

UKRAINE

Area controlled by the pro-Russian separatists

RUSSIA

at least 10 warships and approximately 40 patrol ships have been sent to the Azov Sea in the recent months

■ Ukraine	■ Russia
40 ships and 11,000 active troops	314 ships and 25,000 active troops


The bridge over the Kerch Strait:
The new bridge has reduced the transport of goods to Mariupol by 27% and to Berdiansk by 47% since the beginning of its construction in 2015, causing a loss of up to \$ 40 million per year to Ukraine

Source: Stratfor, AP

*Since September 2018

© GRAPHIC NEWS







Corneliu PIVARIU - Director and Editor-in-Chief of the *Geostrategic Pulse*
President-General Director of INGEPO Consulting

Author of books on strategic intelligence, terrorism and the situation in Iraq, of other studies and articles on the strategic information and the current geopolitical developments. Training on regional security at Harvard University-Kennedy School of Government. Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies—London.



Dumitru CHICAN

Ambassador, University Professor,
Director for the Middle East at the *Geostrategic Pulse*

An entire active career in the Romanian diplomacy, with permanent missions in numerous Arab countries. Other special missions abroad, such as Envoy of the Romanian Chief of State. One of the Romanian best experts in the Arabic language, the Arab culture and world. Author of several works and translations in and from Arabic, published in Romania and abroad. One of his latest books appeared in the UAE and was declared the best editorial issue at the International Book Fair in Sharjah and the best book in 2008.



Dr. Octavian DUMITRESCU
Director for the Black Sea Wider Area at the *Geostrategic Pulse*.



Cornel VAIDA - Director INGEPO Consulting

“GEOSTRATEGIC PULSE” - founded by Corneliu PIVARIU in 2007

Bilingual monthly bulletin published by
INGEPO Consulting - Braşov
www.ingepo.ro; Ph: +4-0268 47 00 70

J08/2898/2006, CUI RO19298677/2006

Director and Editor-in-Chief: Corneliu PIVARIU
- member of IISS- London

Editorial, Considerations: Corneliu PIVARIU

Current Geostrategic Outlook: Mihaiu MĂRGĂRIT, Dr. Octavian DUMITRESCU

Middle East Facts: Corneliu PIVARIU, Dumitru CHICAN, Edmond CHICANI,

Developments in the Black Sea Wider Area: Dr. Dan DUNGACIU, Dr. Octavian DUMITRESCU, Vladimir SOCOR

Economic Horizons: Dr. Dorian VLĂDEANU, Vladimir SOCOR

Intelligence Services and Security Issues: Mihaiu MĂRGĂRIT, Corneliu PIVARIU

Military technology and equipments: Cornel VAIDA

Recommended Readings: Cornel VAIDA

Translation from/in English: Prof. Delia -Maria POPA, prof. Constanţa COSTESCU

Computer Editing: Ionuş PARASCHIV

Printed at: S.C. YOLANS S.R.L. Braşov

ISSN: 1843-701X

Cover: Collage Russian Black Sea Fleet ©sus - sofiaglobe.com; jos sputniknews.com

SUBSCRIPTIONS (one year - 12 issues)

PDF version by e-mail = 1.198,00 RON/ 239,50 Euro/ 299,50 USD

Print edition = 1.255,20 RON/314,00 Euro/ 390,00 USD

The subscription price gives you free access to all the supplementary materials edited (i.e. Alert, Commentary, Supplements and others). Prices include VAT, also shipping taxes and fast courier fees (in Romania) and Par-Avion abroad. Subscriptions include access to www.ingepo.ro website, where you can find all our materials published starting March 2007 (over 11,000 pages) as well as other relevant data and info.

Advertisement - Publicity

Ads and publicity within the bulletin can be inserted in the space available or on separate page(s).

For details and additional info, contact our marketing department at

tel. 0268-470076 or e-mail: office@ingepo.ro.

We hold the right not to publish the requests that we find inappropriate for the profile of our magazine.

This bulletin cannot be copied, rewritten or published without the written consent of INGEPO Consulting. Part of some materials or quotations can be used, provided they are exact, their original title is kept and the source is clearly mentioned.

The opinions expressed in the articles belong to their authors, who assume full responsibility for them, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of INGEPO Consulting.

Partners:



STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
The independent resource on global security

Stockholm
Beijing
Washington



Academia Română
Institutul de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale (ISPRI)



World Security Network
NETWORKING A SAFER WORLD



ifimes
MEDNARODNI INŠTITUT ZA BLIŽNJEVZHODNE IN BALKANSKE ŠTUDIJE
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE-EAST AND BALKAN STUDIES

RIEAS Research Institute for European and American Studies



American Military University
American Public University



AMU **APU**

School of Security & Global Studies

DIPLOMAT
MAGAZINE
By / For Diplomats
www.diplomatmagazine.nl



ISAG
ISTITUTO DI STUDI DI GEOPOLITICA E SCIENZE AUSILIARIE



RIAC
Russian International Affairs Council

Geostrategic Pulse
Is studied at Harvard!



Borysfen Intel

Geostrategic Pulse was accessed recently, almost all continents, in almost 100 countries (in order of hits): Romania, USA, Australia, United Kingdom, Germany, Ukraine, Turkey, India, Bangladesh, Spain, China, Finland, Iran, Syria, Israel, Cameroon, Moldova, Hungary, Chile, Spain, Austria, France, Britain, Cameroon, Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Argentina, Ireland, Serbia, Armenia, Russia, Italy, Greece, Netherland, Qatar, Lebanon, Poland, Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, Vietnam.....
In Romania we are accessed in more than 40 cities

Starting with December 2010 **GEOSTRATEGIC PULSE** are registered in the international **INDEX COPERNICUS JOURNAL MASTERS LIST**