



# GEOSTRATEGIC PULSE

Bilingual-monthly publication of political analysis

*Motto: "Opinions are free, but not mandatory" I. L. Caragiale*



## ROMANIA



# 100 years from the Great Union

**Recommended Reading:**

The Great Union of 1918, Greater  
Romania - Acts and Documents

# Geostrategic Pulse Board

(in alphabetical order)



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(in alphabetical order)



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**CONTENT**

**The genesis of the nation-states – a history which is meant to be forgotten, *prof. univ. dr. Dorian VLĂDEANU* ..... 5**

**Romania’s armed forces, the consolidation of the state and the assertion of the romanian nation, *conf. univ. dr. Constatin CORNEANU* ..... 35**

**“Semper fidelis patriae”: 100 years of romanian diplomacy, *ambasador prof. Dumitru CHICAN* ..... 71**

**The role of the Romanian Orthodox Church (ROC) during the great historical events of the last century ( 1918-2018) and the relation with the state. Premises for the future, *Priest Daniel Alexandru COLȚEA*..... 85**

**The peoples who are not well ruled are doomed to perish slowly, *Academician Ioan Aurel POP*..... 100**

**The defeatism of people, more shameful than the incapacity of the leaders, *dr. Adrian SEVERIN* ..... 103**

**Instead of jumping to conclusions – hopes: at the closed gate of thunderstorms, *Corneliu PIVARIU* ..... 105**

**The Great Union of 1918, Greater Romania - Acts and Documents, author: *prof. univ. dr. Vasile PUȘCAȘ* ..... 111**

## THE GENESIS OF THE NATION-STATES - A HISTORY WHICH IS MEANT TO BE FORGOTTEN

*Prov.univ.dr. Dorian VLĂDEANU*



### 1. Short introductive considerations

100 years have passed since the first world conflagration, since the empires shattered, since the emergence of the germs of the most atrocious dictatorships of the modern and contemporary era, since the appearance of the first maps of the nations of an Europe devastated by centuries of wars, intrigues, colonialism, disreputable alliances and betrayals at the "highest levels", depopulated by a devastating world war and a Spanish flu epidemic that came as a god-sent final warning.

1918 was the year of the international recognition of certain state of affairs which lasted for centuries or even millennia – speakers of the same language, with the same traditions, with the same ancestors, with the same cultural matrix reunited finally under the roof of the same home, under the administration of the same government, at the table or at war with their brethren of the same kin. The nation-states became the most durable sanctuary of the peoples yet the greatest enemy of the greed of the revanchist spirit and the narrow revisionism (it couldn't be otherwise!).

With a time-lag of 2-3 decades, the great majority of the nation-states existing today on Europe's map had their birth certificates issued in the epoch defined by the end of XIXth century and the beginning of the XXth century.

We consider that running a **comparative analysis** of the track-record of the emergence of some of these states can create us a more comprehensive image and a deeper understanding of what happened then and what is wanted today, namely going through the reverse route under the false assumption that a continental build up is incongruous with the spirit of the nation-states, of a nationalism considered today in an artificial and interested way as being obsolete,

an anachronism, a tool for creating never ending conflicts and animosities, by forgetting that under the umbrella

of the nation-states such a cultural diversity appreciated by tens and hundreds of million of people was designed and under the same umbrella the most elaborated scientific concepts and technological achievements were developed.

With or without the umbrella of the nation-states, the conflicts, from simple "diplomatic" catfight to the bloodiest wars have as motivation only in other instances maybe the so much despised nationalism.

The Western Europe, engulfed so many centuries in religious wars, never thought of "dissolving" religion, the faith of so many peoples, in the illusory idea that conflicts would thus have come to an end (yet, who knows, maybe somewhere such a work is under way). Anything and anyone is guilty of misery but the greed and the endemic egotism of one or the other of the power vectors, observable or not.

Without a particular criterion but only due to considerations which, we hope, pertain ultimately to history lessons, teachings that almost no one of the political decision-making people wanted, want and could not acquire, considerations we claim to thrust until we are blue in the face in our children's minds at the school in the hope that maybe some of them will reach the level of great decisions without forgetting peoples' bitterness told in school by teachers with more or less talent, with more or less emotion.

One of the patriarchs of the world history, **Nicolae Iorga**, said several decades ago that "**he who does forget, is worth nothing!**".

Without a particular criterion but in the (illusory) hope that ultimately the political decision-makers will take into account history lessons (yet not so much as they still remember) we se-

lected some references of the history of state building such as Finland, Italy, Romania, Poland, Germany.

From each state's history lessons should be learned and, moreover, in front of the lessons history teaches us daily we must stay as during Sunday mass, thoughtful, respectful (maybe zealously), upright and unwavering. And as during Sunday masses, too, lectures of this sort should be taught and reminded if not all the time yet at least from time to time (who knows, maybe only this way some remembrance will stay in the minds and souls of those ruling the world's fate, if they still have something like that).

## 2. Italy

The collapse of the Napoleonic empire marked a momentum for the Italian state being set up, a momentum coming from two different directions.

a. on the one hand, **Eugène de Beauharnais**, tried for a time, with Austria's agreement, to take over Italy's throne and, on the other hand,

b. **Joachim Murat**, emperor's administrator, summoned the Italian patriots to gather under his command and to establish the Italian state.

We have to remind that the Congress of Vienna (1815) restored Italy to pre-Napoleonic conquest status, namely a crumbled Italy, an Italy of the "regions" and other such administrative divisions without relevance and without political, military and economic force.

**Franz Metternich** declared emphatically: "Italy is nothing more but a geographical expression" (he seemed to forget that a few years ago he didn't dare to blink or to appear before Napoleon).

**Two sort of people** set into motion the necessary edifice for setting up the future Italian state: **the nationalistic intellectuals** and **the Italian patriots** gathered around a prominent figure or another (such as Garibaldi).

**Alessandro Manzoni** wrote one of the most beautiful proto-nationalistic work of all times: *Promessi Sposi* (published in 1827).

One of Italy's most powerful pro-union nucleia was the Carbonari while Vatican was one of the most powerful opponents of the union (headed at the time by Pope Pius IX).

The Carbonari (Charcoal Burners) were a sort of secret society set up in the peninsula's poor south fighting until the end, anywhere and any-time against anyone opposing Italy's union (there were moments when Napoleon III himself was sentenced to death – in 1855 he was close to be assassinated although in his youth he fought alongside the Carbonari).

Legendary figures such as **Giuseppe Mazzini** and **Giuseppe Garibaldi**, alongside Prince **Victor Emmanuel the II** had very important roles in unifying Italy beside the greatest of Giuseppe: Giuseppe Verdi.

Started in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the Carbonari's insurrection (1820-1821) was followed by the Piedmont revolt (1821) which was aimed at unifying Italy under the House of Savoy (it was then that the Italian tricolor of the Cisalpine Republic was adopted). Nevertheless, the revolt was suppressed by the Austrians.

Then came the Modena revolt led by **Ciro Menotti** (1831) supported (orally) by France's King Louis Philippe. The Austrian troops intervened brutally, the revolt was suppressed and Menotti executed.

In 1859, the French troops and the Sardinians led by Patrice Mac Mahon defeated, on June 4th, at the Battle of Magenta, the Austrian troops led by Ferencz Gyulai (apparently, in a certain part of the Hapsburg Empire, women were always fighting more successfully than men...). After some days, (on June 24th), another battle took place (at Solferino) where the Austrians were defeated again and retreated toward Venice.

It was the moment when irreconcilable divergences have come up between the Carbonari and Napoleon III as the latter reached a secret agreement with the Austrians (and that led to a revolt of the Sardinians).

However, after almost four decades of battles (1860), the Kingdom of Italy comprised Piedmont, Sardinia and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

**Garibaldi** conquered Sicily on behalf of Emmanuel II in the so-called "Expedition of the Thousand" and then, marching towards the North reached Cosenza at the end of August (1860), Eboli (near Salerno) on September 5th, then Napoli.

After defeating papal army, **Victor Emmanuel II** became commander of the Italian army and on March 17th, 1861 he was proclaimed King of Italy while ten years later (March 27th, 1871), Rome was declared capital of Italy.

Risorgimento has come to an end. For a short review of the events which might seem rather bowery, we underline once more briefly the callender of the abovementioned events:

**a.** 1820-1821 – the insurrection of the Carbonari in Sicily;

**b.** 1821 – the Piedmont revolt – the leader of the movement, Santorre di Santarosa, intended to chase the Austrians and unify Italy under the House of Savoy;

**c.** 1821 – the revolt for Italy's unifications spreads to the entire Peninsula;

**d.** 1831 – the Modena revolt – suppressed by the Austrians; the Papal States revolts follow, suppressed, in their turn, by the Austrian and Papal armies;

**e.** 1832 – Giuseppe Mazzini founded the "Young Italy" organisation;

**f.** 1848 – the Palermo Revolution (January 12th). On February 10th, Ferdinand II conceded to Naples a constitution and thereafter:

- March 4th: Charles Albert conceded to Piedmont a constitution;

- March 14th: Pope Pius IX conceded to Papal States a constitution;

- March 22nd: Venice proclaims itself Republic.

**g.** 1849 – Charles Albert abdicate in favour of

his son Victor Emmanuel II, and, in the same year, the Austrian troops took over Florence while the young Venice Republic surrendered to the Austrians, too.

**h.** 1850-1854 – Garibaldi was exiled;

**i.** 1859 – France and Piedmont fight Austria and on June 4th they won. On November 10th, Tuscany, Parma and Modena wanted their annexation to Piedmont.

**j.** 1860, March 20th – Piedmont annexed the states of central Italy and gave up Nice and Savoy to the French. In September, Piedmont defeated the Papal States and in October Garibaldi handed over Italy to King Emmanuel II.

**k.** 1861 – Sicily and Naples voted in favour of the unification with Italy;

**l.** 1862 – Garibaldi's expedition on Rome fails as he was stopped by the French allies;

**m.** 1870 – The French withdrew from Rome which was taken over by the Italians;

**n.** 1871 – Rome became the capital of the entire, united Italy.

**The union was a historical dream of all Italians, a dream that came true after almost seven decades of struggle, betrayals, victories, defeats and supreme sacrifices.**

However, the joy of unification was gradually clouded by the dimension of the social and economic problems, by the depth and reach of poverty, by the dull sound of discontentment of a huge mass of impoverished peasants and workers.

The Italian government's inquiries lasted for seven years (until 1877) and revealed a distressing situation. The landowners, the great landlords had massive windfalls yet did not contribute almost at all to Italy's growth.

At the beginning of the XXth century, respectively the period following immediately WWI has exacerbated the already severe social and economic situation since human losses (more than 615,000 military fallen on the battlefields, approximately as many civilians and more than 400,000 invalids and maimed) as well as the lack

of raw materials, endemic corruption, double digit unemployment and the fourfold increase of public debt pushed Italy on the brink of disaster.

Already in a deep crisis, Italy's economy started to react gradually. The **alliance** between the employers' union and the employees' union laid the foundations of the first **corporate structures**.

Corporatism was consequently at its origins a social and political doctrine which tried political institutionalisation of the professional groups and the basic idea was the employees' participation to the management of the enterprises, regulating the professional activities and the respect for the traditions, in other words the corporatism intended to introduce a sort of "harmony" between the employees and the employers as a response to the more and more powerful offensive of the leftist movements and of the Bolshevik tendencies. The joy of the union could not be defeated by the avatars of the politicians of the times to come.

### 3. Germany

The Holy Roman Empire had among its components more than 300 German-speaking political entities yet after the defeat of Russia and Prussia by Napoleon and the Treaty of Jena (1806) , when Napoleon dictated personally the text of the treaty through which the German Emperor was obliged to dissolve the Holy Roman Empire (something that the Germans will never forget).

Under the occupation of the French Empire, the German nationalism grew exponentially (1804-1815) and was ideologically supported by the German philosopher **Johann Fichte**. Waterloo meant the end of French domination beyond Rhine River and, implicitly, of Europe. Reunited at the Vienna Congress (1815), Austria, Russia and England did not pay attention to Prussia's requests as a result of which the great empires established a German Confederation led by Austria through a Federal Legislative Assembly (Bundestag) meeting in Frankfurt am Main. In recognition of Austria's Imperial House, the Hapsburgs, the presidents of that parliament were Austria's kings (it was the only case in his-

tory when the kings were presidents, too!).

The Continental Blockade imposed by Napoleon against the United Kingdom led to an economic decline of the entire Europe and during the Russian campaign, the Germans lost 125,000 soldiers, something that fed the Danish nationalism as well, a reaction which strongly strengthened the Germanic spirit.

Beside the political and military components which acted in the spirit and in support of Germany's unification, in 1818 the Prussian minister of finances, **Hans, Count von Bülow**, conceived the so-called **Zollverein**, a kind of custom union which connected together numerous Prussian territories and territories of Hohenzollern family, leading, on the other hand, to diminishing up to the disappearance of an unhealthy economic competition among the multitude of German mini-states and, on the other hand, new German political entities joined the German Confederation (during more than 30 years, other German states joined the union and that ensured a much more rapid development of some regions such as the Rheinland, Ruhr, Saar).

The economic detente which followed the implementation of the custom union (Zollverein) was remarkable:

- whether in 1816 there were around 3,800 km of roads with hard surface, their length increased in 1852 to 16,600 km;

- the first railroad was 6 km long and was built in 1835 (on the route Nürnberg – Fürth), and worked only during daylight; 3 years later, the length of the railroads was 144 km, there were 462 km five years later (in 1840) and until 1860 the length of the railroads on the territory of the German Confederation reached 11,157 km (more than 11,000 km of railroads were built in 25 years only with the XIXth century technological specific equipment!).

- until 1846 more than 800 vessels sailed on the German rivers Danube, Elba, Wesser and on Lake Konstanz and a wide network of canals was created.

All these efforts for the development of infrastructure came as a materialization of what



**Heinrich von Gagern, Duke of Nassau**, a politician and adept of Germans' unification under the umbrella of one state wrote: "The roads are the veins and arteries of the political body". This ultimately elementary thing was not learned even today on other lines of logitude...

The economic field was closely followed by the cultural field on the path of unification.

**The Brothers Grimm** wrote a huge dictionary, collected numerous popular themes and stories which revealed the similarities and the word stock of the stories of different regions (in support of the arguments of traditions unity among the provinces of the new state).

**August Heinrich Hoffman**, expressed through his writings not only the linguistic unity of the German people and his unity but also the geographic unity (the famous German song Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles). **Alexander Humboldt, Richard Wagner** and many others followed.

The first Germans' festival took place in 1832 at Hambach where more than 30,000 people came to celebrate fraternity, liberty and national unity. **Education and not the barriers** represented, in the Germans' vision, the connecting bridges among the different social and ethnic segments all over the German states.

Yet in Germany, too, as everywhere else in Europe of that period of national renaissance, there were enough difficulties, treasons and domestic struggles. The events which broke but did not defeat Germany's unification efforts which were, on the one hand, related to the fights with the Hapsburg Empire and, on the other hand, came from the sphere of social flurry caused by the great migrations (as a result of industrialization) and also due to the famine brought about by the potato manna (1840).

Nevertheless, the Parliament in Frankfurt provided **Frederik Wilhelm III, King of Prussia**, the title of Kaiser although he initially refused (upon Austria's and Russia's pressures).

The same Parliament succeeded in writing a Constitution so that the entire Confederation had, before the unification, both an emperor and

a constitution, a fact rarely witnessed during the history of the last millenium.

The 1848 failure of unification had as an effect its delay until 1871. Yet until that time, under **Otto von Bismark's** hand and intelligence, the future Germany had to wage a series of difficult fights from where it always ended victorious (until 1918).

Politically, Bismark had the great advantage of not being affiliated to any political party. **His party was united Germany**. He took over part of the liberals' ideas regarding the educational programs, social insurances, the electoral laws yet he implemented a series of untra-conservative measures:

- he permanently applied a program of persecuting the Catholic minorities (up to their repression);

- he promoted a series of anti-social policies (implementing forceful measures against any organized claims of the employees, forbade the Social-Democrat party etc.).

**Bismark set up the bases of modern Realpolitik**. Germany's policies for the next one hundred years were trenchantly expressed in his September 30th, 1862, famous discourse "**Blood and iron**" after becoming Minister President: "**the great issues of the time will not be solved by discourses and decisions of the majority - that was the great 1848 and 1849 mistake, but by iron and blood**".

It was then when the first solid foundations of the new German state were laid and the finishing touches of the Realpolitik which haunts the world even today. And **Bismark continued: "Otherwise, Prussia would be but a bunch of despaired who want to attend the only thing they are good at: to overthrow governments"**.

Let us bring back to memory that Bismark was, starting with 1862, Prussia's prime minister then, starting with 1867, Chancellor of Northern Germany Confederation and, as of 1871, Chancellor of united Germany.

Until 1864, Germany defeated for good the Danish nationalism (in the war in which Prussia

was allied with Austria) and then, in the purest Western style, allied with the Italians, Germany defeated Austria (1866). Austria, helped by... Saxonia (!), was defeated in the one day battle of Königgrätz (although promised to help Germany, France supported in the same Western spirit Austria, an attitude Germany will not forget).

The end of Austria's domination in the German states made the former to move its attention toward the Balkans. Yet too much nationalistic zeal seriously damages in the end ...the political and geopolitical health.

The new Northern German Confederation had already its own constitution, flag, anthem, government and administrative structures. Headed by Bismark, Prussia defeated Austria **but created a very strong anti-Prussian spirit** in the pan-German states (the majority of German states rejected Prussia's policies of force).

**The three basic rules** of Bismark's political doctrine became clear until 1870:

a. By **means of (military) force, a strong state can challenge at any time the old alliances, can violate any treaty at any time, can override any alliances and understandings** concerning the spheres of influence.

b. By **shrewd diplomatic manoeuvres**, a "good" leader can create a conducive environment whereby an opponent state be "invited" to be the first to trigger a conflict or a war determining thereby the states of the defensive alliance to assist the so-called "victim" of a foreign aggression(!).

c. Prussia was the only state of the Confederation and other German states able to protect them all from foreign aggressions or to promote expansionist policies.

In the meantime, the 1868 revolution in the Iberian Peninsula removed from power Queen Isabella II of Spain; the throne was vacant and was taken over in the end by **Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern - Sigmaringen** (encouraged and supported by Bismark as that meant surrounding France by German dynasties). France, through its Foreign Affairs minister Gramont, Duke of Agenor, rejected the offer and delivered

an ultimatum to Germany.

Some awkward manoeuvres of the French ambassador to Berlin followed by some clever Bismark's manoeuvres (the case of the so-called Ems Dispatch) infuriated the French public opinion who began to ask for war (according to rule No.2 of Bismark's policy previously set out), among others for removing the shame of Sadowa (or Königgrätz).

France, which was a former ally, bet on Austria's help and woke up fighting all German states; by applying N.Bonaparte's fighting tactics, **Moltke**, the commander of the German armies defeated severely the French army in some battles (Spicheren, Wörth, Mars la Tour and Gravelotte) so that suddenly the latter started a forced march towards Metz and Paris.

**The French Emperor became prisoner together with the entire French army** (seized in a prisoner makeshift camp, the so-called Trash Camp). The French government broke down, the Emperor Napoleon III abdicated and France proclaimed itself republic.

The new French leadership did not capitulate and that determined the German armies to conquer Paris. And for the humiliation be supreme, and to add injury to insult, the German princes, the generals and the ministers proclaimed **Wilhelm as Emperor of Germany in the Versailles Hall of Mirrors (January 18th, 1871)**.

He was the only emperor dointed in the capital of another state than that of residence in the world's history of last millenium. France lost Alsace and Lorraine, too, and paid war damages equivalent to those imposed by N. Bonaparte to Prussia in 1807, after the Jena and Tilsit peace, and accepted as a "bonus" the German administration of Paris and some parts of Northern France.

**Germany's unification act was thus closed in the most luxurious armed aggression in the famous Versailles Mirror Hall.** The new German Empire had 25 states(of which three were Hanseatic); it is what has been called the "Small Germany Solution" - without Austria.

The component states of the German Empire

were: Prussia (with Berlin as capital), Bavaria (capital München), Saxony (Dresda), Württemberg (Stuttgart); the Ducates Baden (capital Karlsruhe), Hessa (Darmstadt), Saxe-Coburg, Gotha, Brunswick, Anhalt, the Hanseatic Cities of Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck and the imperial territories of Alsace and Lorraine.

Once established, the united Germany moved on to build, in a difficult to understand and to undertake even today, one of the world's most performing economies (on a long run) supported not only financially but also by a **scientific research which kept Germany decades on end ahead of the scientific world.**

Between 1871-1875, 1,000 commercial and industrial companies were established. In 1875, Reich Bank was set up and issued the German currency (the Mark). In 1884, a law forbidding that shares of a company be listed to the Stock Exchange was promoted in order to protect them from speculations. The industrial concentration was a process in full-swing.

Krupp and Thiessen were buying mines, means of transportation, enterprises etc. The first cartel (corporate trust) in the potash industry was set up in 1881. The cartel was producing 50% of Germany's coal (it was the third producer globally).

A very strong system of scientific research was developed in parallel and many companies created their own institutions and labs (such as Bayer concern). The German science reigned supreme worldwide so that even the **Nobel Prize was awarded by committees made up exclusively of German scientists.**

At the beginning of XXth century, the German Empire became the owner of one of world's biggest military and commercial fleet. In the field of electrotechnical engineering and electricity the market was dominated by Siemens and AEG concerns while in the pharmaceutical field Merck and Schering became very powerful competitors globally.

Yet in the meantime, the relations between the Kaiser and Bismark worsened continuously due to Bismark's intolerance towards the leftist par-

ties (especially the Social Democrat Party, the biggest leftist party from the Atlantic to the Urals).

In 1890, the artisan of the construction and unification of the new German Empire retreated from political life after the longest mandate of a prime minister in Europe's political history, without ever being member of a political party.

In brief, Germany's unification had the following synthetical "road map":

1. Setting up the German Confederation made up of 39 states following the Vienna Treaty (1815).

2. The establishment of the Federal Diet (Bundestag) – 1815.

3. The establishment of the "custom union", Zollverein.

4. The unprecedented expansion of the German terrestrial and riverboat infrastructure (1816-1860)

5. The Union Festival (Hambach, 1832) where more than 30,000 Germans participated.

6. In 1849, the Parliament in Frankfurt offered the Kaiser title to Prussia's King, Frederic Wilhelm III.

7. The same parliament drafted (1850) the Constitution of the German Confederation.

8. Otto von Bismark becomes prime minister of Prussia (1862).

9. Until 1864, the German Confederation "solved" for good the issues of Danish nationalism.

10. Leopold of Hohenzollern – Sigmaringen took over the Spanish throne and thus provoked a military and diplomatic conflict between France and Germany.

11. The French-Prussian war (1870-1871) that ended in:

- Germans' victory and the Frankfurt Treaty;
- the end of the second French Empire;
- Napoleon III abdicated;

- the formation of the Third French Republic (September the 4th, 1870);

- the coronation of the Emperor of the German Empire in the Versailles Palace Mirror Hall – January 18th, 1871;

- Losing Alsace and Lorraine provinces;

12. Bismark's withdrawal from the position of Chancellor of the German Empire (1890).

Therefore, Germany cannot exist without Lands and Lands cannot survive without Germany.

#### 4. Finland

The formation process of the Finnish state unfolded during a millenium and started at around 1155, when a first crussade was aimed at Sweden's (led by Erik the Holy) conquering Finland under the pretext of Christianazation.

The Finnish people did not agree either with the invasion or with being Christianised by force, so in 1238 a second Crussade led by Birger Jarl on Finland took place when a bigger part of the territory of the resisting Finnish is conquered and a first bishopric was set up in Turku, which is the oldest Finnish town, founded at 1200.

In 1240, the Prince of Novgorod **Iaroslav**, intervened for liberating the Finnish from the Swedish occupation (even at that time the Russians had the calling of liberators of the peoples for after that to appropriate the countries and the peoples, too).

In the battle on the Neva River, the Swedish are defeated (1240) yet under the command of **Tyrgil Knutsson**, they returned in 1293 in a third expedition when they conquered Karelia and founded the fortress Vüपुरi. It is assessed that it was under the Swedish occupation when Finland came out from primitive society and entered feudalism directly (what for other peoples and nations lasted millennia, it took the Finnish 4-5 generations!).

In 1323, Finland was divided between Sweden and Russia and in 1362 participated at the election of the new king and was thus admitted, in

1397, in **the Kalmar Union** (an union of the Scandinavian states) which included Norway and Sweden (a part of the Finnish territory belonged to the latter).

Yet the fateful year 1495 came when the Russians advanced up to Ostrobothnia and the Danes landed at Turku (where they plundered the cathedral and torched the castle).

In 1523, Sweden leaves the Kalmar Union; King **Gustav-Sava** drove away the occupiers irrespective of their breed (1524) and adopted the Augsburg Confession which would open Martin Luther's path of reform to the Scandinavian countries.

After his death, his son, "Duke of Finland", **Jean III** succeeded him at the throne, the one who will elevate Finland to the rank of "great Duchy". The Swedish adventure of conquering the Baltic countries and Poland would create great discontents in the country (especially the Finnish peasants' revolt known as the Cudgel War).

In 1640, the Queen **Christina of Sweden** laid the foundation of the first university in Finland, at Turku yet starting with the XVIIIth century, Finland witnesses a new and prolonged period of decline, struggles and pain. While **Charles XII of Sweden** fought against Poland, the Czar Peter the Great advances on the Finnish territory (and Charles XII became the prisoner of the Turks)!

**In 1703 the foundations of Sankt Petersburg were laid on a territory which have belonged to Sweden**, following Russia's conquest after the Great Northern War (1700-1721).

In 1710 Vüपुरi citadel is lost and in 1721 all the territories conquered by the Swedes during the crussades were taken over by the Russians.

In 1743, Sweden had to give up yet another part of Finland's territory to the Russian conquerors and Gustav II, in his attempt of reconquering the territories in the 1788 war, suffered a severe defeat.

After the Tilsit Peace (1807), Sweden gave up other Finnish territories to Russia and in 1808-1809 the Great Dutchy of Finland has been proclaimed which managed to maintain an auto-

mous form of governance.

Eventually, the Czar Alexander I raised Finland to the "rank of a nation". Before long, Helsinki was declared Finland's capital (1812).

Mention should be made of the fact that the Dutchy's policy of staying loyal to Russia in the XIXth century helped the Finnish to build their own state.

In 1860, Finland minted its own coin ant that meant a more prominent manifestation of a wider autonomy.

In the second half of the XIXth century, too, the first forms of doctrinary political organisation emerged, namely:

- The Finnish Party – supporter of the rural values, tradition and partisans of the national ideal;

- The Swedish Party – supporter of the connections with the West.

For that matter, the ever expanding development of the relations with the West brought about the appearance of frictions between Russia and Finland as a result of which the latter declared in 1917 its independence.

**For Finland, The First World War had the significance of a liberation war** as it was then when it succeeded in expelling the Soviet troops from the country (in the good Russian tradition, Lenin recognized initially the sovereignty yet he did not withdraw the troops stationed on Finland's territory).

The Second World War found an optimistic country, a pacifist people, unprepared for the coming USSR's attacks, the new organisation of the old empire (yet seemingly more insatiable, devoid of any decency and more perfidious than ever)...

In a pre-emptive move, for maintaining peace on the country's territory, Finland signed an (ultimatum) armistice with the USSR whereby it allowed the setting up of a Russian base on its territory and gave in 10% of the territory (!).

Yet all these happaned after the brave Finnish people led by a resolved government waged a terrifying war against the biggest empire on the

planet.

In 1939, a war broke out between USSR and Finland which will result in hundreds of thousands of dead in a year of fights only. The combatants were:

**a. The Democratic Republic of Finland**, with an army of 180,000 military led by General Carl Gustaf Mannerheim (a general who made his training course in The First World War during the fights of the Carpathians' Curvature and highly appreciated the Romanian soldiers' bravery and spirit of self-sacrifice);

**b. The USSR**, which military units dislodged for the war with Finland numbered 450,000 military led at the begining by Kliment Voroshilov (replaced later at Stalin's order, after the repeated failures on the Finnish front, by Semyon Timoshenko).

Following triggering this aggression, the USSR was excluded from the League of Nations. Finland resisted until March, 1940 when it was obliged to sign the treaty which main requests were, as mentioned before, giving in 10% of the territory (the Russian "tithe"), 20% of its industrial capacity and setting up a Russian base.

The final count of the Soviet-Finnish war was dramatic. On the one hand, Finland registered around 23 thousand dead, 44 thousand wounded and 1,000 prisoners. On the other hand, USSR registered more than 160 thousand dead, 265 thousand wounded and more than 3,000 prisoners.

The treaties signed with the USSR in 1947 and 1948 include, beside the payment of certain war reparations (as if Finland attacked the USSR and not the contrary) the extension of the territorial concessions as well.

Finland gave in a great part of the Finnish Karelia, Salle and Petsamo, including the ports Viborg (Vüपुरi) and Lünahamari; more than 400,000 Finnish fled from the territories given in to the Bolshevik Russia yet at the cost of more than 93,000 military and civilians killed, Finland kept its independence.

Finland is yet another state which managed to preserve its independence fighting the Red re-

gions or the Eastern regions without succeeding in uniting (yet) all the territories rightfully belonging to it.

Summarizing, we have the following rundown of the events leading to the emergence and existence of an unitary and not made whole yet state:

- 1155: Erik the Holy's expedition (crusade) takes place, in theory for christening Finland;

- 1238: Birger Jarl's second crusade takes place after which the first Finland's town Turku and the first bishopric are set up;

- 1240: In their attempt of occupying the mouth of the Neva River, the Swedes attacked Novgorod; they are defeated by Prince Iaroslav; despite victory, he did not advance on Finland's territory;

- 1293: The third crusade takes place led this time by Tyrgil Knutsson which ended in Swedes' conquering Karelia and setting up Vüपुरi fortress;

- 1323: Finland is divided between Russia and Sweden;

- 1397: The "Swedish" part of Finland joins the union of the scandinavian states (the Kalmar Union);

- 1495: Finland is raised to the rank of Great Duchy;

- 1640: Queen Christina of Sweden laid the foundation of the first Finnish university at Turku;

- 1703: The foundations of the imperial town of Sankt Petersburg were laid on a territory which has belonged to Sweden;

- 1710: Vüपुरi Citadel is conquered by the Russian troops;

- 1721: Extensive territories of the "Swedish Finland" are taken over by the Russian Empire;

- 1743: Sweden gives in new Finnish territories to Russia;

- 1788: Gustav II of Sweden declared the so-called Northern War to Russia in order to recover the 1743 given in territories but is defeated;

- 1807: Following the Tilsit Peace (between Napoleon and Alexander I) Sweden cedes new Finnish territories;

- 1808: The Russian Czar proclaims the Great Duchy of Finland as part of the empire;

- 1809: Finland is elevated to the "rank of a nation";

- 1812: Helsinki becomes Finland's capital;

- 1860: Finland mints its own coin and the first two great political groups emerge;

- 1917: Following the Bolsheviks' taking power, more and more frictions between Finland and the Bolshevik Russia appear;

- 1939-1940: The Soviet-Finnish war.

After pursuing this rundown of events, some important ideas have to be noted:

**a.** Establishing the Finnish state was a long process (almost a millennium);

**b.** Before becoming a unitary and independent state, it had its coin and capital;

**c.** Upon the Swedes' arrival in 1155, the population on the Finland's territory was still in the primitive society. Nevertheless, after a few centuries it had an university and became today one of the world's most civilized states;

**d.** Finland still has many of the territories it possessed during its history within the borders of other states and the Russian Federation ranks obviously first in this regard.

## 5. Poland

**Mieszko**, the ruler of Polans chosed to be baptised in 966 and united the western Slavic tribes. He was followed by **Boleslaw The Brave** who became in 1025 the king of Poland.

During Mieszko II rule the young Polish monarchy collapsed (due to internal betrayals and foreign interventions, especially of the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, **Conrad II**).

The monarchy was overthrown by **Cazimir**, Mieszko II's son (helped by the Emperor Henric III of Germany and by the Prince Iaroslav the

Wise of Russia) who recovered some important territories (Masuria, Silesia, Pomerania).

All these details are mentioned for understanding an essential thing: **ever since its birth, Poland had two "godfathers", Germany and Russia.**

Casimir's son **Boleslaus II the Generous**, (known also as the Bold or the Cruel) followed to the throne. He was a great builder of places of religious worship and sought externally to be surrounded by loyal or friendly states something that placed him in conflict with Henry IV, King of the Germans (who had other candidate for Hungary's throne than Bela I, Boleslaus II's uncle) and with the Russian Principalities (in 1069 a military campaign against Kiev took place).

Crowned king of Poland in 1076, he lost Western Pomerania due exactly to the conflicts generated on the East-West axis.

A period of strengthening the kingdom followed in the XIVth century under the Jagiellons dynasty (1386-1572), a period when territories of the former Kievan Rus', then under Lithuanian control, were brought under the control of the crown of the Poland's kings.

Yet during the same period, terrible fights with the Teutons took place and ended in the Peace of Thorn (1410, after the Marienburg battle) and the birth of Prussia Duchy, the hard core of later Germany (Alexander the Good, the ruler of Moldavia, took part at these battles).

Poland continued to fight in the east and south-east with Moscow Principality, with the Turks, the Tartars, with the rulers of medieval Moldavia.

The Polish parliament (Sejm) was established in 1505 so that the political and administrative power was transferred from the king's hand to the hands of the nobility; the beginning of the period known as **Golden Liberty**.

After the beginning of this era in the medieval Poland's policy, slowly yet more and more thoroughly, Poland entered a descending path and into a more and more visible political, military and economic decline.

The apogee of the Polish kingdom was reached

in 1569 when, after the Lublin Agreement, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Union was set up as a federal state and strong enough in a period when Europe was not yet under the Hapsburg and Spanish empires.

The internal conflicts among different parties of the Polish nobility led to speeding up Poland's decline especially in the second half of XVIIth century. After the 1648 Cossacks' revolt (which covered the south and the east of the Union), the Swedish invasion followed.

As a result of the wars with Russia and the Cossacks, Ukraine was divided (its eastern part came to Russia).

Although it participated to Vienna's depressurization (1683), Poland's decline continued with the help of its yesteryear's (and today's) neighbours.

The reign of two kings of the Wettin Saxon dynasty, **Augustus II** and then **Augustus III**, Poland's involvement in the Great Northern War led to the ultimate collapse of the "nobility republic". In the meantime, Poland took over Silesia (from the Hapsburg monarchy).

Attempts of internal reforms were made between 1764 and 1795 and that provoked hostile reactions and military responses from the neighbours. **Stanislav August Poniatowski** ascends Poland's throne in 1764 with the help of Catherine II of Russia and in 1768 the Bar Conference is held or the so-called revolt of a nobility group called "caboodle" against Russia and the Poland's king who was a de facto vassal of the former. The movement was suppressed and was followed by the Union's first partition among Russia, Prussia and the Hapsburg Austria (Poland participated to the latter salvation approximately one century ago).

First Poland's partition "sanctioned" by the Vienna Treaty, while the kingdom was under the Hapsburg, Russian and Prussian troops, was done in a "brotherly" manner so that:

- Prussia took over Warmia, Pomerania, Malbork, Chelmo and some districts of Greater Poland;

- Livonia and the so-called White Russia

(Vitebsk, Podolsk and Mscilav) "reverted" to Russia;

- Austria "ended up" with the biggest part: Galicia, a part of Smaller Poland, Zator and Oswiecim.

After this partition, Poland lost around 30% of its territory and more than 4 million inhabitants.

Later, after the territories were occupied, "the three", namely Russia, Prussia (I wonder from where comes this same-name basis) and Austria demanded the Polish Sejm to ratify and to acknowledge, through a committed agreement, the terrible territorial rape.

The parliamentarians who opposed that were arrested by Russia's representatives and sent to Siberia. The history notes that, in the end, the treaty was signed thanks to some internal "collaborators" (Michael Radziwill, the bishops Mladziejowski, Massalski, Ostrowski and other politicians of the same kind).

On September 18th, 1773, the treaty on giving in the territories was signed by Poland's Sejm. In 1793 (Januray 23rd), Prussia and Russia concluded an agreement whereby they had, on the one hand, to block a series of political reforms in Poland and, on the other hand, to "dispose of" some parts of what remained from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, parts which meant about as much as today's Poland area, namely 250,000 sq km "reverted" to Russia and 58,000 sq km reverted to Prussia.

Specifically, Russia received (better said it appropriated) Kiev Voivodeship, Wroclaw, Podole and Minsk as well as parts of Vilnius, Nowogrodek, Litovsk, Brest and Volhyanian Voivodeships, territories which were organized by Catherine II in to vice-kingdoms: Minsk and Izyaslav.

Prussia appropriated the towns of Gdansk and Thorn, Gniezus Voivodship, Poznan, Sieradz, Kalisz, Plock as well as other parts of Cracow Voivodship, Rawa and Masovia.

And, according the "tradition" the dislodging of territories were approved again by Sejm and Poland lost more than 5 million souls.

What was left was but a buffer state with a puppet king and a Polish army well guarded by the watchful Russian garrisons.

The Sejm's attempt of drawing up a new Constitution ended up again in another Poland's partition and in setting up the so-called Targowice Confederation in which the pro-Russian magnates with Austria's tacit support defeated the pro-Constitution camp and opened at the same time the path to the third Poland's partition.

In 1794, Kosciuszko Uprising broke out and its defeat sealed Poland's third (yet not the last) partition to which took part again Prussia, Austria and Russia (there names of the two empires and the name of the Third Reich have sad terminations).

Russia took another 120,000 sq km, Prussia 55,000 sq km, and Austria 47,000 sq km, in total as much as today's Romania area (242,000 sq km).

Using the terms of the contemporary political dictionary, one may assess that everything that happened to 1764-1793 Poland was practically a "regionalization" process in several stages.

We are quoting from an article of a secret (at the time) document signed by the three of the "partitioning coalition": "Considering the necessity of eliminating whatever could revive the remembrance of the existence of the Kingdom of Poland, now when the nullification of this political body was carried out, **The High Contracting Parties** (sic) agree and pledge to never include in their titles the name or the denomination of the Kingdom of Poland which will be suppressed from now for ever".

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was thus erased for good from Europe's political map and it is erased even today (could it be the result of the perpetuation in time of a "misalliance" – so I wouldn't say differently – among ...The High Contracting Parties?!...).

In 1807, due to a binge of "romance", Napoleon established the Duchy of Warsaw which disappeared after the Vienna Congress (1815), when the Congress Kingdom of Poland was created, a kind of kingdom dominated by Russia. To say it



right, the new Kingdom of Poland was in personal union with the Russian Empire and the king was directly subordinated to the Czar (who ruled de facto the so-called kingdom).

The Polish elites (writers, nobles, politicians) became the revolutionaries of the XIXth century Europe and took part in the uprisings in Prussia, Russia, Austria yet after the crush of the 1831 insurrection, the autonomy of the Congress Kingdom was abolished by the Czarist Russia and the Poles were confronted with:

- deportation;
- their properties confiscated;
- compulsory military service;
- closure of the universities,

And after the 1863 Uprising, the Russification of the Polish secondary schools was enforced (it sounds familiar to those who had to do throughout history with "the darkness of the Eastern light" ...).

Prussia acted similarly on the recently appropriated "dominions" yet paid a greater attention to the schooling which was totally Germanized while Austria was more concessive in the sense that Poles were allowed to have representatives in the Parliament and to set up their own universities (Cracow and Lvov were recognized throughout the Regent Kingdom of Poland – the new name of what remained from erstwhile Poland).

After the November 1830 Uprising, the Polish conservative circles hijacked and betrayed the movement and that led to a full fledged war with the Russian troops which resulted in thousands and thousands of Poles being killed, taken prisoners and deported. It was then when the great Polish exodus towards the West and especially towards the USA started.

The 1846 Cracow Uprising followed and the Cracow Republic was incorporated into the Austrian Empire.

A series of uprisings, insurrections and other movements of the Polish nationalists followed during the entire 1860-1863 period.

After The First World War, really curious, "The High Contracting Parties" turned into "The Defeated Contracting Parties", even if Russia returned home willingly (a process that will never repeat itself).

By the Law of November 5th, 1916, the German Empire and Austro-Hungary proclaimed the re-establishment of a Kingdom of Poland on the territories they conquered from...the Russians (what a "magnanimity"), as political amnesia is the main attribute of the politicians (they all forgot that no long ago they shared the same spoil, it is right under different tables, yet they... shared it together)...

With a strong support from Woodrow Wilson, Poland's independence was proclaimed formally in June, 1918 by the Entente Powers.

**The third Polish Republic** was born practically after the retreat of the German troops from Warsaw and **General Pilsudski** entered the capital (November 10th, 1918).

Yet Poland's avatars were far from over. Between 1919-1921 the Russian-Polish war took place when the Polish troops advanced towards Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus.

In June 1920, the Poles reached Minsk and Kiev but they retreated upon the Bolsheviks' counter-offensive so that the northern front reached again Warsaw's outskirts. General Pilsudski's counter-offensive resulted in the occupation of Vilnius and the deterioration on a long term of the relations with the Russians.

The Peace of Riga (1921) left Minsk, Camenita-Podolia and Berdîhiv to the Russians. The Ukrainians were left without state and felt betrayed by the Poles.

After this apparent revigoration and Poland's being put back on the map, the Polish political, administrative and military leaderships woke up in the presence of a false sense of being again a kind of great power, self-sufficient and which, through the ethnical policies promoted (one third of Poland's population was made up of minorities) had rapidly deteriorated the already tense relations with all the neighbours, with the more distant centers of power (France, the

League of Nations) and also with Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Ukraine.

What happened next to the domestic political life after the appearance of the new Republic? History recorded:

- a fragmented and devoid of stable majorities legislative (there were four big parties and tens of other small political factions);

- corruption became endemical;

- the governments succeeded one another;

- the army cast an evil eye on the politicians.

Consequently, Pilsudski staged a coup and took over the state's leadership (he was supported by the leftist factions, too).

In 1939, Poland was torn apart again between Germany and Russia. We had, therefore, on the one side, 39 Polish divisions poorly equipped, 16 brigades, 4,300 cannons, 880 tanks and 400 planes (that represented troops of 950,000 soldiers and officers) and, on the other side:

- Germany (56 divisions, 4 brigades, 10,000 cannons, 2,700 tanks, 1,300 planes which meant 1,800,000 soldiers and officers) and

- U.S.S.R. (33 divisions, 11 brigades – which meant around 800,000 soldiers and officers) and

- Slovakia (3 divisions – around 50,000 soldiers and officers).

Summarizing, the 950,000 Polish soldiers had to confront on two fronts the 2,650,000 soldiers of the invading armies (to say nothing of the net differences between the German Army's equipment and Poland's); mention should be made that Slovakia was, at that time, a puppet state).

Germany attacked Poland on September 1st, 1939 and the Soviet Russia on September 17th (according to Ribbentrop-Molotov pact).

And so... the Polish Secret Counsel was born. After June 21st, 1941, Germany conquered the part appropriated by the Soviets, too, and after 1944 the Soviets got their hands on the entire Poland and contributed decisively to...its "liberation"!...

After the 1939 war, more than 65,000 Polish soldiers were killed, 450,000 were taken prison-

ers by the Germans and 240,000 by the Soviets.

The end of WWI brought about the establishment of the current Polish state, what better way than under the authority of one of the two Poland's eternal godfathers: Russia (Soviet Russia, that's right, but still Russia) .

## 6. ROMANIA

### 6.1. Fundamental historical coordinates

One of the patriarchs of the national and universal history, **Nicolae Iorga**, underlined, in the spirit of great proclamations through the ages, that: "It is not appropriate that **the 1918 national and political Union** be depicted, even in part, either as a gift coming down over the Romanian people from the confidence and affection of the civilized world or as a fortuitous composition arising from the mistakes of the centuries-old enemies. The union of the Romanians should be always depicted according to the truth, as a natural result of a centuries-old historical preparation during which this people of heroes and martyrs succeeded in defending with amazing assiduity their poverty, their needs and their kin and remained, against all barbarians invasions and the provisional foreign rules, closely linked to the ancestors' soil".

Let us go back for a short while in the epoch of the tormented and bloody antiquity.

For unexplained reasons (but not entirely), a great mystery remains namely why what the history recorded vigorously since millennia through the voices and writings of the most erudite people of that time is not clearly expressed, specifically that there were two empires in the I BC Europe and not one only: **the Roman Empire and the Dacian-Getae empire ruled by the great king Burebista**.

According to Strabo, the Get Burebista (82 – 44 BC), after he became the ruler of his kin "raised them that far through drills, abstention from wine and obeying orders so as in a few years he forged a powerful state, subdued the most part of the neighbouring populations to the Getae and was feared even by the Romans".

According to Jordanes, Burebista began his reign some four years before the death of the Roman dictator Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix and, through his political and military moves, he forged a kingdom which reached to the south of the Danube River (Haemus Mountains), to the west of Tatra Mountains, including the Pannonian plain, to the east to the shores of Pontus Euxinus (the Black Sea) and to the north to the Prypiat River marshes (south-east of Belarus).

Part of this huge territory is the present-day Romania, namely the lands of the free Dacians (the only people of the ancient history who did not know, until the Roman conquest, slavery) and the lands of the Getae (the Dacians of the south of the Carpathians).

This territory (of more than 300,000 sq. km) represented what we would call today the "core" of Burebista's empire, having in history the same role Prussia played for Germany.

Skipping a few centuries, we are in the early Middle Ages considered to have begun once the Roman troops withdrew (270 AD). Several centuries of migrations ensued on a territory stretching eastward to the Black Sea and the Dnieper River, westward to the Pannonian plain (namely on the Tisa River), northward to Marmatia and Dnieber (territories which belong presently to Ukraine) and southward to the Danube. The territory was organised in ten historical regions (duchies, Vivodeships). We do not enter here into the details of some of the historical stages and evolutions yet one should stress that in the XIth century the western area was incorporated into the Kingdom of Hungary (namely Banat, Crisana, Transylvania), the eastern area (from the Dnieper River to the Eastern Carpathians) organised itself in what has been called the Principality of Moldavia (XIVth century), and the south organised itself in the Principality of Wallachia (delineated to the north by the Southern Carpathian range, to the south by the Danube River and to the east by the Black Sea).

We should mention, for everlasting remembrance, that the first great king and founder of Hungary was Saint Stephen **who was originally a Romanian Orthodox from Transylvania**, as

well the fact that **the most famous and important rulers of the Kingdom of Hungary were Romanians: John Hunyadi** (known in the XVth century as John the Get, became regent of Hungary in 1446), **Matthias Corvinus** (John the Get's son, King of Hungary between 1458-1490) and **Nicolaus Olahus**, whose father was one of John the Get's nephews, who became regent of Hungary.

Although all kinds of explanations were presented, the mystery (although it is not too difficult to debunk it yet very difficult to accept) of the unity of the Romanian language in the historical provinces (Transylvania, Moldavia, Wallachia and Dobrudja) remains, despite centuries of interferences with the migratory peoples, despite the efforts of the more or less transient rulers which endeavoured centuries on end to erase the identity of the indigenous Romanian people, an identity which fundamentals were the common language, faith and origin. The three fundamentals made up the multimillenary germ of the union of the Romanians of this side and of the other side of the mountains, germ activated by prominent figures of the history and culture from one or another of the provinces.

The first attempts of political union begun already during **Stephen the Great**, the ruler of Moldavia (1457-1504) followed thereafter by the figure of soldier-cum-martyr of **Michael the Brave** (1593-1601). Let us remind the teaching words of **Nicolae Iorga**: "Since 1600, no Romanian could think of the union without his great personality, without his broadsword or his battle axe risen to the sky of justice, without his face of a pure and exquisite tragic poetry."

After more than two centuries, **the intellectuals and the politicians** who made up the XIXth century elite in the Principality of Wallachia organised, under extremely difficult political and military circumstances, the 1848 Revolution which demanded the all Romanians' union too.

Two of the three principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia united in 1859 under the scepter of the same ruler, **Alexandru Ioan Cuza**.

After the establishment of the Hohenzollern monarchy, Romania moved to a new moderniza-

tion subsequent to the reforms initiated by Al.I.Cuza and continued by **King Carol I** during whose reign the "Smaller" Romania gained its independence (1877).

**Nicolae Iorga** wrote about the Great War that followed: "It was the Romanian people's drama. Our thought goes to those Romanian mere villagers of Transylvania's valleys, of Banat's and Hungary's fertile plains, of the Maramures mountains who, like theirs and ours, of the same blood, from around Bucovina's monasteries, went to spill their blood for the flag which belongs to one or to another yet it is not Romanian nation's one".

Romania, which entered the war in 1916 joining the Entente Powers, suffered, in a first stage, defeat after defeat in front of the German-Bulgarian troops, lost its capital and the Royal Court and the Government retreated to the north-east of the country, to Iasi. It is not now and it is not here the place to analyze the status and the way the Romanian army was equipped during those events. Certain is that the bravery of the soldiers and the inspiration of the commanding officers secured to the Romanian Army the brilliant victories of the summer of 1917 on the Mărăști - Mărășești - Oituz alignment, a summer in which the watchword was "You shall not pass". **The Field Marshall August von Mackensen** (on whose cap a dead head was figured which will become later the SS troops badge), obsessed by glory and self-affirmation sustained one of the most disastrous defeats of his long military career.

The defeat of the Central Powers followed as well as the dismantlement of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Russia withdrew its troops from the front. On November 11th, 2018 Germany capitulated and, after a series of "political and diplomatic oscillations" Romania succeeded in joining the winners' camp.

In a speech delivered in 1917 to the Romanian Parliament, **Nicolae Iorga ordained across the ages**: "There is one single issue today in Romania, all the others are auxiliary ones only: the issue of liberating the national territory, the issue of our victorious revenge. The only issue

which should be immediately solved is that, through our arms and those of our brothers abroad, the right of Romanianhood to impose as masters over any corner of the lands they inhabited."

The achievement of the union cannot be done either manu militari, or with an exalted bunch of mutineers, more or less trained and educated but through the means of the entire nation. There could exist no unity and no union resists in front of the corrosive immorality. Here we have to remind the teaching words of the great historian: "**Moralizing a society can be achieved not by lowering the people of the past to the interests of today but by compelling today's people to raise to the height of the people of the past.**" That is easier said...

Coming back to the battlefields and diplomatic fields, let us note that during some events which will hijack unpredictably the history of Europe and of the world, Russia's leaving the war led to the collapse of the Eastern Front and to the Peace of Bucharest (the spring of 1918). On Romania's side the negotiations are conducted by the Germanophile Al. Marghiloman, accepted by the Central Powers and, without any preceding diplomatic arrangement, the door of the union with Bessarabia was suddenly wide open. The discussions between Chișinău and Bucharest intensified as of March 20th, 2018 when Marghiloman met **Ion Inculeț** (president of the Country's Council), **Daniel Ciugureanu** (president of the Council of Ministers) and **Pantelimon Halippa** (vice-president of the Country's Council), the hard core of the politicians of Bessarabia.

Ion Inculeț (Kerenski's ex-agent) wanted an union with the maintenance of a complete autonomy. On March 26th, 2018 at 10 o'clock, Marghiloman arrived to Chișinău where he did not see any sign of pro-union celebration and noted in his diary: "No will but especially more than Oriental indolence, if such a thing could be." The vote for the union took place nevertheless next day, on March 27th, 1918: 35 abstained, 3 were against and 86 in favor of the union. "All are so moved that they can't speak" Marghiloman noted the next day after his arrival to Chișinău

when he witnessed the state of affairs described above.

In Bukovina, which belonged to Austro-Hungary, the General Congress, (where alongside the Romanians there were Poles and Austrians, too) was convened and voted "the unconditional and eternal union of Bukovina, within the old borders, up to Ceremush, Colaciu and Dniester, with the Kingdom of Romania". It was on November 3rd, 1918.

Probably before speaking of the union of Transylvania and Banat, it would be better to go in a blitz-view through the troubled history of this territory, at least beginning with the XVIIIth century.

Following the wars with the Turks, Bukovina belonged de facto to the Hapsburg Empire since 1774; it belonged de jure to the latter following the agreement between the Turks and the Austrians signed on April 26th/May 7th, 1775 (**the agreement was reached as a result of the ambassador of Austria's buying off some officials of the Sublime Porte**). On February 13th, 1848, a delegation of Bukovinians asked for more autonomy and the creation of a Romanian duchy which the "emperor be entitled Great Duke of the Romanians." They obtained, on March 4th, 1849, the status of autonomy for Bukovina within the Austrian empire.

The Diet of Bukovina's Duchy was established and convened for the first time on April 6th, 1861 when the Romanians formed the majority. The emigration to the USA and the inflow of immigrants encouraged by the Austrian rule made that, in the end, in 1910, the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) represent 38.88%, the Romanians 34.38%, the Germans 21.24%, the Poles around 4.45% and the Hungarians made up the difference.

On August 4th/17th, 1918, a secret treaty was signed by France, Great Britain and Russia, on the one hand, and Romania, on the other hand (the negotiations were initiated by Ionel Brătianu), whereby Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina were promised to Romania. On the other side, the Central Powers concluded at the beginning of the same year, on January 27th/February

9th, in Brest-Litovsk a peace treaty with Russia which was in a revolutionary fever whereby the latter admitted, until setting up final borders, the occupation, administration and exploitation by the Germans and the Austrians of the Baltic countries, of the Russian Poland, Belarus and Ukraine in exchange of partial autonomy for the Slavic populations of certain Germany's and Austria's territories, namely Posnania, Upper Silesia, Galitia and Bukovina. The treaty was not recognized by either Entente Powers or Romania and, at any rate, some months later it was not valid any longer following the Central Powers' defeat.

On November 3rd, 1918, the Romanians and the Ukrainians of the Duchy of Bukovina claimed simultaneously the union of the lands on which they represented the majority with the Kingdom of Romania and, respectively, with the newly proclaimed West-Ukrainian Peoples Republic and the border was to be negotiated since both communities claimed important towns such as Rădăuți, Siret, Cernăuți.

On October 12th/25th, 1918 the Ukrainian Regional Committee was set up at Cernăuți in order to represent Bukovina in the Ukrainian National Rada and on October 19th/November 1st, 1918 the Ukrainian National Rada proclaimed at Lvov (Galitia) the Eastern-Ukraine Peoples Republic. The new state claimed, too, Bukovina's north-western part with the towns of Cernăuți, Siret and Storojineț.

In response, on October 14th/27th, 1918, upon the initiative of two high-profile intellectuals (**Sextil Pușcariu and Iancu Flondor**), a Romanian national meeting titled "Constituent Assembly" was convened in Cernăuți and, chaired by **Dionisie Bejan**, elected a National Council made up of 50 members of all the counties and social strata under the chairmanship of Iancu Flondor (a descendant of old boyar families of Moldavia). One should not forget that, at that time, Bukovina was de jure under the authority of the Austrian governor Joseph Etdorf. On October 24th/November 6th, 1918, the so-called Ukrainian government ordered the taking over, with the help of the Ukrainian militias, of the Administrative Palace in Cernăuți and the representatives of Rada demanded the Austrian gov-

ernor to hand them over the power in the Ukrainian territories of Bukovina as well as in the town of Cernăuți. The governor gave in and signed and Omelian Popowicz became the president of the Ukrainian part of Bukovina.

On October 27th/November 9th, 1918 (three days later), a detachment of 180 Romanian military turned up in Cernăuți under the command of **second lieutenant Ilie Lazăr** who, on his own initiative, offered support to the Romanian provisional authorities (Lazăr's detachment belonged to 8th Hussars Regiment of the Hapsburg imperial army).

**The Romanian National Council of Bukovina** asked the Romanian Government, which was in Iasi, for help yet Marghiloman promised armed support only and not political and diplomatic support. So it was that after two more days (on October 29th/November 11th, 1918), **the 8th Romanian Division** under the command of general **Iacob Zadik** entered Bukovina and occupied Cernăuți "for protecting life, property and freedom of the inhabitants irrespective of their origin and faith against criminal gangs who started their destructive acts" (the Romanian troops entered Cernăuți after the Allies agreed previously on that through a cable dated November 6th, 1918). The Ukrainian troops left Cernăuți and Popowicz abandoned power (they were not ready to sacrifice their lives for a territory which was not and is not their's). **Ilie Lazăr** (of Maramureș) made that the first Romanian flag flutter on the tower of Cernăuți City Hall. On November 15th/28th, the Romanian National Council convened the General Congress of Bukovina under the chairmanship of **Iancu Flondor** who, with the help of the Polish and German minorities voted for the union with Romania (the majority of the Ukrainian representatives and the Bukovinian Jews refused to attend the meeting of the General Congress of Bukovina as they considered it unrepresentative).

The Congress sent a moving cable to King Ferdinand whom they called "King and Lord liberator and care taker of Bukovina". King Ferdinand legalised the union act through the decree No. 3744/18/31 December 1918 published in the Official Gazette No. 219 of December 19th/

January 1st, 1919. I.C. Brătianu referred to Romania's claims on Bukovina in front of the Entente's representatives at the Paris Conference. The peace treaty with Austria was concluded at Saint-Germain en Laye on September 10th, 1919. According to Art. No. 59 of the Treaty in what concerned Bukovina, "Austria renounces, for its part, in favor of Romania, to all rights and titles on the part of the former Duchy of Bukovina" and, according to Art. No. 61, Romania took over the former Empire of Austria's financial burden.

On the other hand, in spite of the hindrances created by the Hungarian authorities, the **Alba Iulia Great National Assembly** chaired by **Pop de Băsești** took place on December 1<sup>st</sup>, 1918, in the presence of 1228 delegates and of tens of thousands of Romanians who came in the dead of the winter from all the corners of the country and **Transylvania's union with Romania was decided. But the Union was not yet recognized by either the Great Powers or by the neighbouring states** (Hungary, Ukraine and Soviet Russia). Due to very great popular pressures, Romania's Army had to occupy Satu Mare, Carei, Salonta, Oradea Mare and continued the offensive up to the Tisa River. **Neither the Western powers were more open in recognizing Greater Romania** and the USA recognized the Union with Bessarabia in 1933 only (and even then in a not too clear wording).

And, again we have to revert to **Nicolae Iorga's** wise words: "Tomorrow, after we decide the fate of the lands we looked at since so long, not with the hungry eyes of the savage conqueror, greedy for other countries but with the brother's endearing eyes looking at the swath of soil his brother toils since two thousand years sweating with blood for when rising up to be slapped in the face by his masters. Can one think it is over? No! **The Romanian issue is part of a world's issue – and we forget that too often.** The union will have to be strengthened through a complex, permanent, profound and longlasting activity since occupying a territory is something, keeping it militarily is quite another thing and to know how to preserve is totally different."

It is a moral duty and a limitless honor to re-

mind some of the epoch-making figures who inscribed Transylvania on the irreversible trajectory of the Union: **Iuliu Maniu, Alexandru Vaida-Voievod, Iuliu Hossu, Emil Hațeganu, Vasile Goldiș, Aurel Vlad, Iosif Jumanca**, all of them patriot intellectuals and politicians who, were they had not the chance of dying before 1945, they died in the terrible dungeons set up in the country by the occupying Soviet Communism.

## 6.2. Romania's economic evolution after the Great Union

The reasons for which this para was not titled "The Centennial of Romania's Economy" will result in a very explicit manner from what it will be briefly presented and analyzed.

The Romanian economic experience of the last century is enormous, unique and full of lessons for a nation whose leaders were not too willing to learn. So the question arises: are we commemorating or celebrating the Centennial of the Romanian economy?

Greater Romania went through history, won over times and stayed Great only to the extent **the statemen were outnumbered and were more powerful than the politicians** and to the extent the economy was or was not developed to bolster the infrastructure of a big country, too. The political but also the economic history of the last century was a succession of upswings full of sacrifices and dramatic crashes whether it was war or it was peace on the European continent **for which the interests of the outside environment cannot represent either the only cause or the only explanation.**

Greater Romania had, after the Great Union, to solve a multitude of problems among which two were extremely pressing:

**a.** Restoring the industrial sectors destroyed by war, which wiped out the destiny of more than a million Romanians, too;

**b.** Integrating territories with different traditions and economic potentials.

After The First World War, the country's finances were disorganised, a quarter of industrial ca-

pacities were still working, food supplies were exhausted, the agriculture was grounded and, moreover, huge compensations had to be paid to Hungary. **It would be helpful to remind some important details about the subject of Romania's reparations and debts after the War.**

Greater Romania's "financial inheritance" after the first world conflagration may be summarized as:

- War reparations
- War debts and
- Romania's floating debt.

The Reparations Commission set up by Allied Powers (Romania was not part of) assessed the losses of human and material capital to more than \$150 billion. The Spa Agreement signed on July 16th, 1920 by the governments of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Japan and Portugal provided that the amounts be received as reparations from Germany be distributed as follows: Great Britain - 20%, France - 52%, Italy - 10%, Belgium - 14%, Japan and Portugal - 0.75% each and Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia and the other states non-signatories of the Agreement - 6,5% (all together, and that meant for Romania 1%, a figure later raised to...1.1%).

The Reparation Commission established on May 1st, 1920, Germany's debt toward the Allies as war reparations: 132 billion gold marks payable within 30 years (therefore, Romania was to receive 1.3-1.4 billion gold marks).

Romania was entitled, too, to cash 1.1% of the war reparations payable by Austria and Hungary so that until 1928 it had to receive 7.2 billion gold marks annually and in 1928 it had to receive 22 billion gold marks. By 1925, Romania received 39 billion gold marks (less than 5% of what it had to receive from Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria).

On the other hand, according to the Saint Germain and Triannon treaties, **Romania had to pay**, for the territories it annexed from the defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire, **230 million gold francs to Austria's and Hungary's benefit and accounts.** The following were added to that

amount:

- a portion applied to Romania from the public debt of the Austro-Hungarian state which amounted to 500 million gold crowns, more than one billion crowns in paper money, more than 35 million gold marks as well as an annuity of 645,000 crowns;

- the value of the Austrian-Hungarian state's goods in Romania transferred to the latter, namely more than 1 billion British Pounds.

Let us not forget the fact that during the war two events with financial burden occurred:

- Romania contracted a debt of more than 2 billion gold lei and

- The loss of the Romanian Treasure – \$4 billion.

Romania's floating debt amounted to around 20 billion lei.

In the mean time, the defeated states Austria and Hungary were granted, in the "purest" "Community" spirit, a moratorium on debt repayments and were practically excepted from any payment of war reparations for 20 years (until 1943) while Romania had to pay wholly and as a matter of urgency the 230 million gold francs as compensation for the territories which joined Greater Romania and the public debt of the former empire of billions of crowns.

Government of Romania protested against the Spa Agreement to no avail. To sum up, **Romania was the only country from the "Allied" group which had the double role of a crediting country toward the defeated states and of a debtor country toward both the winning states but also especially toward the defeated ones.**

By way of conclusion, **the amounts Romania paid to defeated and winning countries were more than 25-30 times bigger than those it received from the defeated countries and the total of net losses was over 35 billion gold lei.** We have, therefore, "solid" experiences in the field of European affairs...and not since yesterday!

With a population of around 16 million inhabitants and an area of 295,049 sq km (from 137,000 sq km before the union), the economy of Greater Romania stabilized relatively quickly (by 1923) yet the process would have not been possible in the absence of pursuing two great strategic directions:

**a. Achieving the greatest agrarian reform in the world at the time** (66% of the landlords' lands were expropriated) to the benefit of more than 1.4 million peasants (among whom, first of all, those called to arms, war widows, landless peasants and peasants possessing less than 5 ha);

**b. The increase of the weight and importance of the Romanian capital** by the legalization, by the liberals, of the exploitation of state goods with severe restrictions imposed to foreign capital.

To that purpose, we quote the words of **Grigore Trancu** who established the Chamber of Work and who was parliamentarian and minister: "Foreign merchants are coming to us, they are doing business worth hundreds of millions and in a short time they leave the country with fantastic fortunes. They pay the state a fixed tax of 200 lei plus a small amount proportionate with the rent".

After the Great Union, Greater Romania's economic potential more than doubled, namely:

- The agricultural area increased from 6.5 to 14.5 million ha;

- Forestry area increased almost three times (from 2.6 to 7.4 million ha);

- Railroad network almost tripled (from 4,200 to more than 11,000 km);

- Certain industries (chemical, electrical engineering) grew even by 400%.

**The Romanian state was massively involved** in importing equipment and raw materials necessary for the country's economic reconstruction and kick-start and directly helped the setting up of many metallurgical and machine building enterprises such as Malaxa and Titan factories in Bucharest, IAR (Planes Manufactur-



ing Enterprise) in Braşov etc, so that in the 1920s Romania registered one of the highest growth rates in the world (5.5% p.a.).

During the inter-war period, too, Romania held a series of leading positions in the world:

- The first place in Europe and 6th worldwide at crude oil output;

- In 1937 it was second worldwide at methane gas extraction;

- It was second in Europe and 5th worldwide at grains crops;

- It was the first in the world at sunflower crops.

During 1938-1939, Romania **secured around 80% of its necessary industrial products domestically** and was manufacturing locomotives, petroleum equipment (the second world manufacturer after the USA), buses, planes etc.

After 1918, accelerated growth were registered in the field of electrical engineering industry (430%), chemical industry (320%), food industry (204%). **A great part of raw materials production moved from the exports field to domestic consumption** having in mind especially that the new provinces had important contributions in what metallurgical, wood processing and construction materials industries were concerned.

So, **for the first time, in 1938-1939, the share of the industry-transport-constructions exceeded the share of agro-forestry** in what concern both the growth of social product and of national income.

Despite these remarkable advances, agriculture remained, until 1939, the most important sector of the economy and the prevailing Romanian exports were:

- raw cereals;
- logs and primarily processed timber;
- crude oil.

The level of poverty, illiteracy and the populations' precarious health condition placed us at the time as well among the "first" European

countries and the development gaps between Romania and Western Europe remained wide and obvious and they stayed like that until today.

### 6.3. The governance and the great corruption in Greater Romania

You cannot be either the friend or the defender of your country if you turn a blind eye to the great weaknesses and the great weak points and do not try, with your specific instruments, to analyze them, to know them as much as possible and to struggle for their removal.

The political figures of the highest rank (not level!) starting with Romania's kings and princes and continuing with prime ministers and parliamentarians had a prominent place in the great inter-war corruption. Here are just some examples:

**a.** Prime minister Vaida Voievod's son himself was employed at SKODA company (arms manufacturer) with a monthly salary of 30,000 lei (more than twice a minister's salary at the time). The arms purchasing contracts had 25% higher prices so that in case of a 5 billion lei contract, the kickback amounted to more than 20 million lei and the detriment to the Romanian state amounted to 900 million lei.

**b.** Fokker affair dealt with supplying the Romanian army fighter planes. In 1924, **prince Carol (the future king Carol II)** was appointed inspector general of the aviation. Taking advantage of his position (today it would be called undue influence), Carol got a 500 million lei loan for buying 150 reconnaissance planes and 60 fighter planes. The tender specification had a clause stating that the planes had to be in service in the fleets of other countries, too, and that the planes had to be new and unused.

Carol proposed the Romanian authorities negotiations with Siskin-Armstrong Company (Great Britain) which offered a plane in a prototype stage which were not even subject to static resistance tests. The committee required to perform all tests in order to purchase the British planes and during the tests, the wings of several

planes broke and major Sănătescu crashed with the plane during a short flight test (the plane broke in the air).

Carol did not terminate the business (100 million lei were paid yet Romania did not receive any plane but all kind of equipment – tents, shipping crates and a lot, a lot of know-how!). Since the army needed the planes urgently, 50 planes were contracted with the Dutch company Fokker. It has been found out that the representative (the lobbyist) who brokered the Fokker deal was the same who brokered the Siskin-Armstrong deal. Justice performed quickly its duty but not in what Carol was concerned as he skipped the hearing (he left to Italy). He returned in 1930 as king and had, therefore, royal immunity.

**c. The Malaxa-Auschnitt deal – Malaxa and Auschnitt** were two competitors and the contest between the two industrial giants of the inter-war period was based on bribe, blackmail and undue influence (things that were mentioned frequently in the press of the time). Malaxa had the production base in Bucharest and Auschnitt în Reșița and the contest concerned the army contracts. Through Elena Lupescu, both corporations offered Carol II 100 million lei (the famous words are well known: "Majesty, the heavy industry is deeply grateful to you and kindly asks you to accept this hundred million as a modest contribution to the works of social assistance of the Palace"). One should not forget the poker games in Sinaia where the two industrialists participated and where there was no place except for one winner. In the end, Auschnitt fell from king's favor and in 1938 was sentenced 6 years yet he was released in 1942 by commutation of sentence into hard labor to the benefit of community – something he performed in his former factories.

**d. The bankruptcy of the Marmorosch Bank**, a bank set up in 1848 which had the name of Banque de Roumanie and was managed by Jacob Marmorosch – yet another example of high level corruption. In 1920 it was the strongest commercial bank in Romania with 25 subsidiaries in the Kingdom and four abroad (Paris, Istanbul, Vienna and New York). In the wake of the

1928-1933 crisis, the bank went bankrupt and was bailed by the strong intervention of the National Bank of Romania. Later, Marmorosch Bank got the lease of salt and tobacco, fields that were previously state monopoly.

**Aristide Blank**, the owner of the bank, who was involved in the political struggle at the top, helped Carol to regain his throne and became the king's economic advisor. The reconstruction of the Royal Palace, bringing in Elena Lupescu and enriching her family were owed to the same banker. The banker's economic offensive continued: the Romanian state sold to him factories and industrial objectives for a penny, the state credit him, too, for buying them and the National Bank lended its help even if it was defrauded with bounced cheques. Apart from the new palaces he built and the habit of serving his guests on solid gold dishware, he moved on to buying the most prominent political figures of the time, including Nicolae Titulescu to whom he offered a loan of 14 million lei. A secret report of the League of Nations showed that Blank's bank had a deficit of 1.8 billion lei and its crash would have meant a national economic catastrophe. For avoiding the collapse the 1929-1933 world crisis could induce, king Carol II forced the National Bank to cover the deficit and the Bucharest Municipality to buy with 500 million lei an Aristide Blank's plot of land in Otopeni. Neither the government escaped the royal pressures and was obliged to lease to the bank the State Company of the Monopole. The appointment of **Mihail Manoilescu** as governor of the National Bank, an economist of European class and a declared foe of Aristide Blank's practices, changed the course of events. In 1931, the Blank's bank deficits reached 3 billion lei. In order to prevent the noisy collapse of the bank, the government proposed turning the bank into a state bank but the governor of the National Bank rejected the proposal so that on October 31st, 1931, Marmorosch, Blank & Co. went bankrupt. The bank was shut in 1948 and Aristide Blank was sentenced to 20 years to rigorous imprisonment. Upon very strong external pressures, he was freed by the communist regime of occupation and left for the West.

It would seem that in any time it was impossible to talk about corruption outside the governance and about governance outside corruption. The quality of a democracy is inextricably bound to the efficiency of the governance and that depends directly on the government stability.

Let us analyze briefly this characteristic for a longer period of time which starts after the Small Union and ends 100 years after the Great Union (namely 2018) and for three defining vectors for any government, i.e. prime minister, minister of Finance and minister of Transportation.

There were 88 prime ministers during 156 years (**1862-2018**) and that indicates a median duration of the mandate of around 1.77 year (approximately 21 months). By structuring this information on distinct time intervals we get a real enough image of the government "stability" taken into account before.

**a. During the 1862-1899 period**, 33 prime ministers paraded and the shortest mandates belonged to names such as:

- Apostol Arsache, prime minister between 08.06-23.06.1862;

- Lascăr Catargiu, prime minister between 11.05-13.07.1866;

- Alexandru C.Golescu, prime minister between 02.02-18.04.1870 and

- Emanoil Florescu, prime minister between 04.04-26.04.1876,

- So that the median duration of a mandate for the said period was 1.15 year.

**b. During the 1900-1945 period** there were 45 prime ministers and the shortest mandates belonged to:

- Constantin Coandă, prime minister between 24.10-29.11.1918;

- Arthur Văitoianu, between 27.09-30.11.1919;

- Take Ionescu, between 17.12.1921-19.01.1922;

- Barbu A.Stirbey, between 04.06-20.06.1927;

- Gheorghe Argeșanu, between 21.09-28.09.1939.

The most durable mandates belonged to some prominent political figures such as Ion I.C. Brătianu (a four year mandate between 19.01.1922 și 29.03.1926) which followed another 4 year mandate (11.12.1914 – 28.01.1918), Gheorghe Tătărescu (04.01.1934 – 28.12.1937, a period in which 4 governments come one after another), Marshall Ion Antonescu (04.09.1940 – 23.08.1944).

**The median life duration of a government was of almost a year.**

**c. The period 1945-1989** which followed witnessed 18 governments; the longest mandate belonged to Ion Gh. Maurer, prime minister of several cabinets between 1961-1974 (February 27th), respectively Constantin Dăscălescu (1982-1989).

**d.** There were 21 governments and 23 prime ministers **between 1990-2018** of which three mandates covered entirely the electoral cycles. If we subtract from the 28 post-revolutionary years the 12 years pertaining to the completed mandates of prime ministers we have 16 years covered by 19 prime ministers i.e. the less than a year mandates were very frequent. After more than a century and a half, of which almost half a century we belonged to the so-called communist camp, it is almost certain that in spite of certain economic and political stage advances, **Romania had and still has behavioral deficiencies in what concern the political responsibility of democratic type.**

If we continue the investigations of this type at the level of two fundamental government or governance, namely the ministry of Finance and the ministry of Transportation, we might find part of the explanations which made Romania be placed economically on the most dishonorable places on the panoply of the European states.

There were 159 ministers of finance **between 1862-2018** (in 157 years) meaning that the average mandate duration of a minister was under

one year.

**a.** There were 60 ministers of finance **between 1862-1900**. There were even mandates of 4-5 days! For instance, the following had the shortest mandates:

- Alexandru Moruzi: 22.01-27.01.1862;
- Grigore Balș: 27.01-01.03.1862;
- Alexandru Catargi: 11.03-24.03.1862.

The only minister covering a longer period was Petre Havragheni: 11.03.1871 – 07.01.1875.

Of the 60 mandates, 36 had a duration of under 100 days, 18 mandates had a duration of more than 100 days but shorter than one year. In other words, 90% of the mandates were of under one year.

**b.** There were 58 ministers **between 1900-1945**; the median duration of a mandate was of 1.3 year. Of the total of 58 mandates, 19 were under 100 days and 24 had a duration between 100-365 days. In this case, 74% of mandated had a duration of up to 100 days. One may mention the ministers with the shortest of mandates:

- Fotin Ionescu: 29.01-27.02.1918 and 24.10-29.10.1918;
- Ioan Popescu: 27.09-06.10.1919;
- Ion Angelescu: 06.10-28.10.1919;
- Mihai Popovici: 23.02-13.03.1920;
- Barbu A.Stirbey: 04.06-06.06.1927;
- Iuliu Maniu: 15.10-26.10.1929;
- Ion Răducanu: 07.06-08.06.1930.

Among the longest mandates we mention:

- Emil Costinescu: 18.07.1907 – 20.12.1910 and 04.01.1914 – 11.12.1916;
- Vintilă Brătianu: 19.01.1922 – 27.03.1926.

It may be concluded that during the periods of "long mandates" legislative reforms and actions with beneficial strategic role for the economy of Greater Romania (or Small Romania) could be promoted.

**c.** There were no short mandates **during 1945-1989**; yet there were the longest man-

dates of the contemporary history:

- Aurel Vijoli: 19.03.1957 – 16.07.1968;
- Florea Dumitrescu: 19.08.1969 – 07.03.1978;

**d.** There were 26 mandates **between 1990-2018** (consequently, the median period of a mandate was of 11 months and a few days, so less than a year). There were two mandates only covering the entire electoral cycle:

- Florin Georgescu: 19.09.1992-11.12.1996;
- Mihai Tănăsescu: 28.12.2000-28.12.2004.

As far as the **Ministry of Transportation** is concerned, statistics shows that there were 144 mandates during 1862-2018, as follow:

**a.** There were 55 ministers **between 1862-1900** and the median duration of a mandate was of almost a year. The shortest mandate belonged to George Vernescu, minister of transportation between 05.01-19.01.1877 and the longest mandate belonged to Constantin Olănescu (1684 days, namely 4 years and 22 days: 21.02.1891 – 03.10.1895).

As far as the duration of the mandates is concerned, statistics show that there were:

- 20 mandates of under 100 days
- 23 mandates of between 100-300 days
- 12 mandates longer than a year.

**b.** There were 48 ministers **during 1900-1944** and the median duration of a mandate was 331 days. The shortest mandate belonged to Nicolau Pompiliu (14.01-24.01.1940), and the longest to Constantin Angelescu (1071 days, i.e. 2 years and 341 days between 04.01.1914-10.12.1916).

If we take into account the duration of a mandate, we have the following situation:

- the number of mandates of under 100 days: 11;
- the number of mandates of up to a year: 20;
- the number of mandates of more than a year: 17.

**c.** The shortest mandate **during 1945-1989** was of 178 days and the longest mandate was of 2529 days (6 years and 339 days – Dumitru Sinulescu). According to the length of mandates, there were 15 ministers in the following order:

- number of mandates under 100 days: none;
- number of mandates between 100 and 365 days: 2;
- number of mandates longer than a year: 13.

The median duration of a mandate was 1210 days (3 years and 137 days).

**d.** There were 26 ministers **between 1990-2018** and the median duration of a mandate was of 357 days. The shortest mandate was of 62 days (Traian Băsescu, 12.12.1996 – 12.02.1997). According to the duration of a mandate we have:

- 4 ministers had mandates of less than 100 days;
- 17 ministers had mandates of less than a year;
- 5 ministers had mandates of more than a year.

It is obvious that the above analyses could be extended to the other ministries. The governmental fragmentation was always associated with the fragmentation and failure of projects and strategies on a long term. It was a heavenly luck the fact that we managed to have achievements such as the Anghel Saligny Bridge, the underground, the electrification of a portion of the railroads, building one of the greatest commercial fleet in the world (360 merchant ships).

Consequently, an objective analysis without left wing or right wing passions of the course the Romanian economy went through during the last 100 years having as temporal landmarks the years 1918, 1938, 1989 and 2018 reveals a series of "leaps" which, curiously, did not boost us forward but rather kept us in place (at the very least). To conclude, we can say that:

**a.** In 1918 as well as in 1989, yet particularly in 2018, the potential economic crises

(more or less stimulated) represented and represent undeniable certainties.

**b.** In 1919, Romania experienced a profound post-war food crisis and food imports were a huge burden at that time for Greater Romania's budget. In 1989, the whole country was experiencing again a food crisis which was this time provoked by food and agro exports.

**c.** The 1923 Constitution replaced the principle laissez faire, laissez passer with state interventionism and "pushed more to the edge" the principle of the inviolable and sacred ownership which was replaced with the "principle of ownership as social function". Short of these reorientations of the fundamental principles of the economic actions, which were exclusively at the mercy of the foreign venture capitals, Greater Romania wouldn't have made the rapid progresses it made during the inter-war period. **Victor Slăvescu**, one of the great Romanian economists, noted in 1929: "Foreign capital to work in the Romanian house, not the Romanian capital in the foreign house. A cooperation capital is always welcome but a capital of colonial exploitation driven by the thought of speculative gains cannot enjoy a friendly reception." All these directions of economic policy favorable above all to Romania dampened abruptly after 1989 and are almost extinct in 2018, a century after Greater Romania's core bases were laid.

**d.** The efforts of accelerated industrialization were continuous even if they took place during opposite political regimes throughout 1918-1989. Romanian people's sacrifices were terrible before and after 1945 while inconscience, irresponsibility and betrayal were the main working tools of the post-1989 politicians.

**e.** If in 1938 Romania secured from its own production 80% of its household and industrial consumption, if in 1989, according to **Martin Armstrong – chairman of Princeton Economics International**, Romania secured almost the entire industrial and household consumption, it was the only country in the world which was not indebted to the international banking institutions, it has reached, in 2018, the stage whereby it imports 80% of food (including

fruits, vegetables and meat although there is domestic production), it has shut, destroyed or razed to the ground under peace conditions, more than 4,000 enterprises (very big, big, small or medium sized), fostered the emigration of more than 4 million souls, the active and laid off labor force by the measures of some politicians who, ironically, are elected and reelected without any rational explanation for this perpetual amnesia of the electoral mass.

All these (as well as as many such "achievements") made Romania be situated in 2018 economically, culturally, educationally and from a health point of view on the last but one place in Europe, a place it was not situated even in 2018.

**Accordingly, are we commemorating or celebrating 100 years of economy in Greater Romania?!...** It is a question which answer of the Romanian people (what's left of them) will always be the opposite of the politicians' answer, at least during the coming 3-4 decades.

And, speaking of Romania's commercial fleet, let us make a brief remember of fish farming in Romania, a sector which has been continuously developed from 1918 until...1989.

On 31.12.1989, statistics showed that 450,000 ha body of water were exploited, 7,600 km of internal rivers and 1,075 km of the Danube River were exploited domestically and the yearly catch was 60,000 to of fish of which 50,000 to fresh fish were marketed (the difference was processed industrially in the specialized factories in Galați, Tulcea, Sulina, Constanța). The same factories were receiving 120,000 to of ocean fish. Romania was exporting 100,000 to yearly and covered, from its own production, around 100,000 to for domestic consumption.

After 1989, the domestic fish consumption increased to 116,000 to but the fisheries bring in only 16,000 to of fish (the difference is imported). The exploited body of water decreased to around 94,000 ha (23% of the exploited area in 1989) and the Romanian ocean fish catching fleet no longer exist.

Moving on to industrial coordinates we remind that in 1989 we manufactured 40,000 tractors,

in 2006 only 3,300 tractors were manufactured and none in 2018 (the tractors works in Brașov as well as the trucks works were razed to the ground).

In 1989, Romania was not exporting one log or lumber and had one of the strongest furniture industries in Europe. In 2018 the export of logs and lumber represents 99% of the wooden material export (the difference is made up of furniture).

And **Martin Armstrong**, too, shows that in 1989 Romania had the biggest export excedent per capita (about as much as Germany has today).

**Are we commemorating or celebrating the centennial of the Romanian economy?!...** From a historical perspective it would seem that the hope of "being what we were and even more than that" translates, after a century, in "we are barely what we were and even less than that..."

From the perspective of the 100 years we can therefore say:

**a.** We were permanently marked by an incapacity of increasing the degree of harnessing the huge resources Romania had and still has.

**b.** The potential given by resources never sustained a fundamental continuous, relentless economic development allowing for a permanent turning of the comparative advantages into competitive advantages.

**c.** Irrespective of the inherent lootings during war and occupation this country experienced throughout its history in general and the last hundred years in particular, the elements of a "model" of development with a certain pattern, no matter of the political and ideological system were felt permanently and systematically. The model has an invariable set of characteristics:

- the tendency of extensive development, with frequent unnatural situations of discontinuing and/or non-finalizing the projects with effects on a long and very long term;

- a great inertia is manifest at the level of manufacturing sectors and, if not of rejection then at least a reluctance to the impact and especially in seeking the ways of implementing the

progress, ironically, at the level of one of the most intelligent peoples of the planet;

- the permanent exports of products with a low degree of manufacturing and of processing on the background of extensive use and frequently against human's and nature's laws of the raw materials, semifabs and nonprocessed products resources (such as cereals, wooden material, etc);

- the increase of discrepancies among the country's historical areas and regions even if there were periods, too, when they seemed to be reduced in a way;

- the political factor's fatal and lethal influence through its intrusion into the country's most minute mechanisms and most elitist institutions without having the minimum of moral and professional qualities for accessing such places;

- the incapacity of defending, on a long term, the country's interests and future generations.

The justifications of the permanent failures coming from the political specter which accuses more veiled or more directly, the Mioritza's "qualities" of the Romanian people (Mioritza – one of the fundamental fatalistic ballads of the Romanians), its belonging to the Christian-Orthodox faith, did not stand and could not stand as they do not have any objective rational support.

No politician can answer a few elementary, simple questions, such as:

- Why a Romanian farmer, who owns 10 ha of land, earns better if he goes to his Spanish colleague and picks strawberries, and the latter has only 4 ha of land?

- Why the Romanian worker exceeds all quotas and is highly sought after in the West while at the sites and works in Romania cannot, with the salary he earns, to pay for his utilities and send his child to school at the same time?

- Why a young engineer with a company bottling and selling drinking water earns 350 euro/month here and his colleague in England, who sells the water with the same price, has a netto

monthly salary of 2000 euro?

- Why the driver of a bus in Bucharest who transports at least three times more citizens a day than his colleague in Berlin earns 10 (ten) times less having in mind that the fuel prices are approximately equal?

The list of questions may continue yet however simple they are there is no 2018 mind of a politician able to give a correct and true response.

There is no globalisation and no integration which could have determined the governments in Italy, Poland, Germany, Finland, countries which genesis were comparatively analyzed, able to "design" so destructive policies for their own countries as it was in Romania's case.

The question: Are we Celebrating or Commemorating the Centennial since Greater Romania was forged? goes unanswered. We are afraid and ashamed, too, to answer it.

## 7. Conclusions

The analyzed examples show absolutely clear that the idea of establishing the nation-states was not specific, let's say, to nations which constituted the administrative conglomerates of an empire or another only, but also to those political entities which were or became big military, economic and geopolitical powers.

Likewise, the efforts exerted by the powers of those times to erase from history or from the collective memory the idea of an autonomous state or kingdom (according to Metternich's expression) run into the struggle of the generations of patriots and intellectuals and were ultimately defeated by the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of souls during the confrontations which lasted for decades.

If it is not impossible, then it is at least an outrageous impiety to come today with affirmations that do not suggest, but claim to prove how detrimental, antiquated and primitive the nationalism is. Let's quote again **Nicolae Iorga**, the father of the Romanians' history: "The integral, material, universal culture as real cause of human progress and as its mathematical sum can fully exist

through the international exchanges which disband borders without violating any of them in fact. Yet civilizations – the patriarch of the universal history continues – without which culture cannot generate itself, develop and maintain, need their particular fireplaces represented by the small states and the forceful selection stops at the limits of humanity.”

Let us retrieve some of the presented ideas concerning the unifications processes of the selected countries without a specific criterium.

The Congress of Vienna (1815) presented and introduced an "Italy of regions" or, according to Metternich: "Italy is nothing more than a geographical expression". We do insist not by chance on this expression. The intellectuals and the patriots started to move the process of unifying Italy against all empires, against all great powers and against all geopolitical combinations the latter were scheming. Started between 1821-1822, the struggle for Italy's unification was to last more than half a century, which was a period full of political events, terrible fights and sacrifices of the nation's martyrs. Garibaldi and Verdi, who headed them, are the names with multiple positive resonances in the universal consciousness.

Yet the joy of union was darkened but not defeated by the terrible poverty and endemic corruption manifest at hard to imagine rates and dimensions (immediately after the union).

**Germany** embarked upon the process of unification at about the same time (1818) and started practically by implementing the said Zollverein yet the process was neither simple nor linear, but, on the contrary.

Perseverance, incorruptibility, hard work and firmness taken up to toughness and even beyond its limits were the coordinates of the activity of the iconic **Bismark, the man who was not a member to any political party and maybe that's why he had the longest mandate of prime minister of the last two centuries** and Germany's greatest project: the union.

Crowning the Kaiser as emperor of Germany in Paris, at the Versailles Palace, remains a historical image of what Germany was, what it is and

what it will be.

**Finland**, the sparsely populated country yet with brave people and leaders had a long period (almost a millennium) of joining together and emerging as a country and the process was speeded up during 1812-1860 (when Finland mints its first coin). Whether Poland was at the crossroad of Germany's and Russia's interests, Finland was permanently at the crossroad of the Nordic states' (Sweden and Norway) interests and Russia's. The 1917 Declaration of Independence from Russia can be considered the birth certificate of the Finnish state. Finnish people's bravery and high-tenacity will last through the ages as fighting examples and trial of strength of a small nation against the world's biggest empire and, even more, determined the exclusion of the latter from the League of Nations (something Stalin ignored but not history); **the history's verdict does not kill you immediately yet sentences you for eternity.**

Finland remains one only of Europe's countries which territories are still under foreign occupation, an unnatural result of of the way the great powers' liking treated permanently the quiet but insubordinated neighbours.

**Poland** is the country "assisted" ever since her birth by the two godfathers, not only her's, but Europe's as well: Germany and Russia. The setting up of the Polish parliament even since the XVIth century marked the beginning of the era called the "Golden Liberty" yet not long after the emergence of the Polish medieval democracy, the germs of what was to determine the decay of the Polish kingdom and unimaginable misery for the Polish people centuries on end appeared, namely corruption, treason and fracturing the political life into tens and hundreds of antagonistic groups and tiny groups. Poland was one of Europe's states which experienced to the full and no less than three times the process of being partitioned among the great powers and empires of the time (Prussia, Russia, Austria), a primitive version of "regionalization" (to use the contemporary political language). The result was the emergence of a puppet state. Poland may represent for any future politician who wants to become a statesman, too, a benchmark



example concerning the tragic consequences of the perpetuation, centuries on end, of the group interests versus the country's and nation's interests for which one "struggles", a benchmark example of what a political class must not do, irrespective of the historical epoch we refer to.

Although it suffered for centuries and, we repeat, it was three times partitioned, after the proclamation of the reestablishment of the Kingdom of Poland (1918), the political fragmentation and treason seized the barely established new state again and the consequences showed up quite rapidly: Poland was partitioned anew by the same "do-gooder" godfathers: the Soviet Russia and the Nazi Germany.

As was the case with Finland and Poland, in case of Romania's emergence, too, the entire process of unification was long, bloody, cumbersome, unfinished and the generations of politicians who came one after another ever since (especially after 1989) did not learn anything from the tough lessons of history. As evidence of this state of affairs is the fact that never during the last hundred years was Romania at so many chapters and for so many decades on end at the bottom of the European states' performances. We are on the first positions in what concern de-industrialisation, emigration, mortality, illiteracy, the prevalence of chronic diseases, poverty level. As far as economic development, scientific research, education, health, average life expectancy, average income, kilometers of highway and the list may go on, are concerned, we are permanently on one of the last three places.

Nevertheless, we are always driven by a media offensive for whatever petty thing, either of a ribbon being cut for the reception of a hospital elevator (the elevator is new, the hospital is not), or the politicians and ministers are lining up for cutting a ribbon at the reception of a downhill stadium or 200 m of highway (which will collapse immediately after the political lofty faces departed).

Somewhere, **Nicolae Iorga** concluded: "Often, the fiercest of rhetoricians is the least ready to do for his country and kin the simplest of sacrifice." How could the great historian be loved by

the political class (irrespective of time and epoch)?

Romania, Italy, Germany, Poland and Finland, too, went through pains and sacrifices we only imagine now we know, through two world wars (as did almost all the world's states). They went through the Cold War and we are now in a generalized war, **each against all and all against each**, which they called, with a synthetic expression which has not to accuse us, the war against terrorism. Let us remember how **Nicolae Iorga** characterized the period of the two world wars when stated that: "despite a well maintained propaganda through which one instills the belief in fighting for high national and humanitarian ideals, the war among the great powers proved the greed of capitals searching for outlets, the neurosis of a rotten bourgeoisie, the delirium of a debauched press without liability, the drooling rabies of the demagogues searching for reputation at the cost of misfortune of hundreds of thousands of widows and orphans, some officers' and diplomats' worked out murder in cold blood in order to get brilliant careers over rivers of blood and tears..., the imperialism as brutal as the drunken's heel crushing the skull of a wounded."

Has anything changed at present? Has the mankind learned anything from the tragedies which happened during the last century? Are we able to change any word out of the great scholar's utterances? Definitely no!

Greater Romania was not a reality born out of fantasies but out of aspirations, struggle and sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Romanians, no matter if they were soldiers, peasants, intellectuals, workers, politicians or children... This foundation is unbreakable as the construction of the unified state in itself.

We conclude these lines with the prophecy of humanity's and the Romanians' history teacher, **Nicolae Iorga**: "And know that your descendants, against all world's powers, under this flag that you raised, unfolded and sanctified in pain and darkness unknown to anyone, will be together, too."

**Many Happy Returns, Greater Romania!**



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## Romania's Armed Forces, the Consolidation of the State and the Assertion of the Romanian Nation

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Romania's Armed Forces have always had an essential role in the development and assertion of the Romanian nation, as part of the democratic and civilized world, so that it can be said that without the Romanian Armed Forces, none of the political and diplomatic endeavors would have been successful. The revival of the military establishment, after a century of dive (1711-1830), represents the beginning of a long process of formation, consolidation, modernization and assertion of the Romanian state and of fulfillment of national aspirations.

### *The burden of great strategic interests*

The geopolitical rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and the Tsarist Empire was to influence the historical development of the Romanian principalities Moldavia and Wallachia all throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. This geopolitical rivalry unrolled against the background of an ample process of national liberation of the peoples oppressed by autocratic empires. Moldavia and Wallachia would become, by the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, part of the "Eastern Issue", while the Great Powers were in a fierce dispute over the inheritance of "the sick man from Bosphorus". In their way to Constantinople, the Habsburg Empire and the Tsarist Empire believed that the Romanian Principalities were just a marching stage and, at the same time, they could also be an object of compensation for the two empires which were fighting against Europe's

"sick man". The Siege of Vienna (1683) by the Ottoman army represented the peak of power for the Constantinople sultan and after that, the Ottoman Empire entered into a process of irreparable decline.

After 1683, the Habsburgs were to engage a sustained political and military action for the liberation of Central and South-Eastern Europe from the Ottoman rule, in the context of Poland's struggle with internal conflicts and its inability to commit into a fight to defend its former political and military space of influence. At the same time, Tsar Peter the Great conceived a policy of modernization of the Russian state through the implementation of European socio-political structures, with the intention of conquering Constantinople, the former capital of Byzantium. The imperial court in St. Petersburg has aimed at a **"political-military program designed to deploy an Ottoman Empire that was so much feared in the past"**<sup>1</sup>, but which was in trouble in the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The Ottoman Empire's decay of power and the anti-Ottoman political and military actions of the Habsburgs and the Russians acted as a catalyst for the emancipation of forces from Moldova and Wallachia. In such a geopolitical context, the Ottoman Empire decided to cancel some attributes of autonomy of the two Romanian states by giving their rule to Greeks from the Phanar district in the capital of the Ottoman Empire.

1. Apostol Stan, **Protectoratul Rusiei asupra Principatelor Române. 1774 - 1856**, (*Russia's Protectorate of the Romanian Principalities*), Saeculum I.O Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999, p. 5.

Moldova and Wallachia had come to “peace” with the Ottoman Empire in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, a “peace” that noted the Ottoman suzerainty over the two Romanian principalities, so that Romanians became vassals of the sultan in Constantinople, though the political and administrative autonomy of the Danubian principalities was preserved. This was done despite the fact that there had been a series of amputations of the original borders of the two states, certain areas being converted into boroughs: Turnu, Giurgiu, Braila, Tighina. Such a political and diplomatic solution allowed the permanent preservation of the Romanian statehood, which would later help the political and state revival of the Romanians in the following centuries. Unlike Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia and Hungary, which were Turkish provinces, the Romanian Principalities have maintained their own political and its administrative identity. The official documents of the Ottoman Empire recognized the intangible Romanian territory and its administration by the locals. We note that a series of Ottoman documents confirm that the Romanian Principalities were a distinct area of the empire itself. **“Under the new circumstances, although the documents given by the Ottoman Empire no longer appeared as *ahidnamels*, a term that means capitulations, Moldova and Wallachia’s autonomy continued to be confirmed as privilege *berats* and *hatisherifs*”<sup>2</sup>**, noted the historian Apostol Stan.

Given that the Russian-Turkish wars, to which the Austrians also participated, took place on the territory of the Romanian Principalities, they were used both as a theater of military clashes and as a source of supply for food and manpower to warring parties. In this context, the diplomatic chancelleries in Iasi and Bucharest become concerned about the Russian vector, alongside the Habsburg one, meant to be a support in asserting a foreign policy of independence of the two Romanian Principalities, especially of Dimitrie Cantemir’s Moldova. Some of the Romanian rulers in Wallachia considered that the Habsburg and the Tsarist Empire were

**“both Christianity and Europeanism, two vigorous powers decided to oppose Islam.”<sup>3</sup>**

In their desire to free the principalities from the Ottoman suzerainty that has become increasingly oppressive and always willing to cancel the smallest margin of political and administrative autonomy of the principalities, the rulers Serban Cantacuzino and Gheorghe Duca have provided important information to the Habsburg concerning the strength of the Ottoman army during the siege of Vienna, thereby contributing to the failure of the effort to conquer Vienna in the campaign of 1683. Constantin Brancoveanu's relations with the Austrians and those of Cantemir with the Russians are parts of the main effort of the Romanian rulers to remove the Ottoman suzerainty and assert a new political-diplomatic status in the international relations. **“Balancing - in terms of sympathy - between Russia and Austria - says historian Apostol Stan - the leaders of Transylvania, Moldavia and the Romanian Country quickly found themselves deceived by the two powers. The Christian flag flown during the Ottoman wars was, in fact, a mask, as both Austria and Russia aimed at territorial expansion. In relation to Romania, Austria, as a Catholic power, was disadvantaged, especially after the beginning of a proselyte campaign among the Romanians in Transylvania, when some of them were forced to become Greek Catholics. Despite the European openness and the religious ties with Rome, the source of our Latin character, the union in 1700 brought the Romanian adversity to the Austrians. The Romanians, leaning on orthodoxy, identified religion with nationality, just like their great princes of previous centuries and, in addition, after the conquest of Transylvania and the Banat, the same empires further reduced the moral and political influence in the Romanian Principalities because of eth territorial annexations: Oltenia between 1718-1739 and especially Bucovina in 1775.”<sup>4</sup>**

The assertion of Czarist Russia at the forefront

2. *Ibidem*, p. 10 - 11.

3. *Ibidem*, p. 11.

4. *Ibidem*, p. 12.

of the political and military developments in South-East Europe would open a tumultuous phase of the Romanian-Russian relations with the most diverse effects, often tragic ones, in the existence of two states and peoples. A process of colonization of the territory east of the Dniester has partially started since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, which originally had a spontaneous, unorganized character, being led by the Ottoman oppression and the financial difficulties existing in the country, the lack of land or as a result of the struggle between parties. Historiography noted that the Romanians would paradoxically have a massive contribution to the establishment of the Russian armed forces and the development of Russian military art and of the military in general. The first massive wave of Romanian population settled in Slobodskaia, Ukraine, in the context of the forced exile of Prince Cantemir, after the Battle of Stănilești (1711). In the southern regions of the Tsarist Empire were established, in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, a number of 244,100 Romanians, which meant they were third place after the Ukrainians and the Russians. In 1707, Tsar Peter I ordered Colonel Apostol Chigheci to form the first regiment of hussars in the history of the Russian army, consisting all of volochs (Romanians from Moldova and Wallachia established across the Dniester), numbering 300 people and being named the "Voloh Horonga". The Hussar regiments would underpin the formation of the regular light cavalry as an independent fighting element of the Russian imperial army<sup>5</sup>. All the above lead to the consideration that the Russian vector was in a more powerful and complex politico-military relationship with the Ro-

manian Principalities, long before the peace of Kuchuk-Kainarji (1774) or when "**tous les esprits**" would come under the Russian influence after 1792. After the Peace from Iasi (9 January 1792), the Czarist Russia would push the state border to the Dniester, thus becoming an important factor in the evolution of the political and diplomatic relations of the Romanian Principalities.

It should be emphasized that during the Phanariot regime in the two main Romanian Principalities, their military power has been shaped according to the interests of the Ottoman Empire, namely: *downsizing, changing the national composition - meaning predominance of foreign elements over the Romanian ones, reducing positions and limiting them to border guarding, counter-smuggling, ensuring internal order and the court service*. Referring to the status of the Romanian Principalities, historian Boicu Leonid wrote: "**Without their independence and having a legal-political status of autonomy that was seriously altered in practice, the Romanian Principalities in the 18<sup>th</sup> century were rather an object and not a subject in the international political relations, aiming at this higher status through its subsidiary political deployments or through foreign particular geopolitical contexts. They have gradually gained ground in the European political consciousness as a distinct ethnic group and individual state organization**"<sup>6</sup>.

In the context of developments in the Romanian Principalities and the defeat of Vladimirescu's Revolution of 1821, the Ottoman Empire rein-

5. The Russian Armed forces included six light cavalry regiments and two horongvs in 1711. At the beginning of the 30s, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, 500 Moldovans led by Vasile Bedreagă affiliated with the Russians, thus completing the troops of the Voloh Horonga. After Constantin Cantemir, the son of Antioh Cantemir, fled from Moldova to Ukraine in 1741, the voloh gained momentum. The creation of the first Moldovan Hussar Regiment on 14 October 1771 materialized in the existence of the Voloh Corps of Constantin Cantemir. The Moldovan Hussar Regiment comprised 1,063 people, Moldovans and Wallachs, wearing white coats and hats, red trousers, blue epaulets and having inscribed Romanian and Russian symbols on the flags of the units. The first flag of the regiment was blue with golden marginal ornaments and the image of a golden mace and a Russian double-headed eagle that had the Moldovan emblem with the ox's head in its claws. The second flag of the regiment had a golden spear on which a double-headed eagle was resting and the Saints Constantin and Elena with crosses in their hands. The opposite side of the flag presented Moldova's emblem. The first commander of the Moldovan Hussar Regiment was Constantin Cantemir. In 1764, the Russian imperial armed forces comprised seven hussar regiments made up exclusively or almost entirely of Romanians: **The Moldovan Regiment, the Yellow Regiment, The Black Regiment, The Bahmut Hussar Regiment, the Spear Elisavetgrad, Dnepr, Donețk (Ekaterinoslav) Regiments and the Serbian Hussar Regiment**. For more details, please see : Anatol Leșcu, **Românii în Armata Imperială Rusă**, (*The Romanians in the Russian Imperial Armed Forces*), Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 6449, 676 p.

6. Leonid Boicu, **Principatele Române în raporturile politice interna ionale. Secolul al XVIII-lea**, (*Romanian Principalities in International Political Relations*), Junimea Publishing House, Iași, p. 116.

stated the local reigns of the Romanian Principalities in July 1822, without withdrawing troops from the Romanian territory. The first Romanian rulers after 1711 were Ionita Sandu Sturdza in Moldavia and Grigore Dimitrie Ghica in Wallachia. The Russian-Ottoman rivalries in terms of the political-diplomatic status of the Romanian Principalities would generate a Russian ultimatum on 5 March 1826, so that the Ottoman Empire would finally accept to negotiate with Tsarist Russia the restoration of the previous state of affairs of the Principalities. The Akkerman Convention of 25 September 1826 between Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire recognized by Article Three the agreements on the privileges of Moldavia and Wallachia. This act strengthened the existence of the two distinct political entities and stipulated immunities and privileges in international agreements. In accordance with the Akkerman Convention, the rulers of the principalities were to be appointed by the General Assembly of the Ottoman Court and confirmed by the Sultan in Istanbul, so that we can say that this gesture is a significant element of strengthening state authority and weakening the Ottoman suzerainty.

The Protecting Power (Tsarist Russia) intervened for mediation only when the Ottoman Empire refused to confirm the appointment of the General Assembly of the Court. The prince could not be changed by the Ottomans without the consent of the Tsarist Russia. However, the Akkerman Convention restored the right of the Romanian Principalities to reform certain branches of domestic administration through rulers and courts. **“The right to deliberate and adopt political and administrative reorganization measures is an attribute of state autonomy, confirmed by the suzerain and protective powers. Obviously, this law was the result of the Russian intervention, which, by satisfying a wish of the reforming landowners, also tried to contribute to the political reorganization of the two states in order to increase its influence”**<sup>7</sup>, wrote historian Apostol Stan. The additional act of the Akkerman Convention

provided the restitution of the recently snatched territories by the Ottoman and included in the provinces Braila, Giurgiu and Turnu. This was the first attempt to annihilate the Turkish provinces and set the border with the Ottoman Empire on the banks of the Danube.

The Ottoman Empire was significantly reducing its military presence on the Romanian territory, Ottoman leaders had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Principalities, nor take any military action against them. The Romanian Principalities were to be exempted from paying tribute for a period of two years and the next toll could not be higher than the one set in 1802. **“Having political and military weight in the relations with Turkey - says historian Apostol Stan - Russia managed to impose its promise to respect more rigorously the provinces, limiting Turkish suzerainty, while also enhancing its influence in Moldova and Wallachia. By officially renewing the right of interference in the internal affairs of the Romanian Principalities, the Russian protectorate was strengthening at the cost of the Ottoman suzerainty”**<sup>8</sup>.

#### ***Attempts to rebuild the strength of the Romanian armed forces***

The issue of a national army was taken into consideration in the context of the difficult relations between the great powers of the time. Prince Constantin Ipsilanti, had considered, in the context of the Russo-Ottoman 1806 – 1812 war, the organization of an army of 20,000 people, but he was able to establish only two regiments of hussars and two regiments of Ulan (Kazakh), each with an effective of 1,200 people. At the same time, a Corps of Volunteers was created, led by Colonel Miloradovich and consisting of a hussar regiment (1,000 people) and 10 battalions of pandur. În 1812, as the Russian-Ottoman rivalry increased, the Russian Admiral Paul V. Ciceagov proposed a project of creating a Romanian national militia with a staff of 20,000 people recruited among villagers. A corps of

7. Apostol Stan, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

8. *Ibidem*, p. 53 - 54.

5,000 pandur would remain in Oltenia, while another 15,000 corps would station in Wallachia. The municipal guards have also been established. The project was not realized, but the need for a reinforced, reorganized national army became a necessity.

The Russo-Turkish war that broke out in April 1828 was to end on 2 September 1829 with the Peace Treaty of Adrianople. Article 5 of the Treaty of Adrianople clearly stated that Moldavia and Wallachia, under capitulation, were under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, Tzarist Russia guaranteeing all the privileges and immunities accorded either by the mentioned "treaties", or by agreements between the two great powers. Article Five expressly stated that Romanian Principalities would enjoy the "free expression of their religion, a perfect safety, a national independent administration and full trade freedom"<sup>9</sup>, as well as the possibility to organize "**a number of national armed guards**"<sup>10</sup>.

The protectorates Turnu, Giurgiu and Braila were liquidated and a boundary on the Danube could be established so as to be respected both by the Christians and the Muslims. The Romanian border pickets were guarding the borderline of the Romanian Principalities. The Ottoman monopole on the trade of the Romanian Principalities was removed and the Danube became a major route for free trade, by which the Romanian Principalities could connect to the Western world. The Russian-Turkish agreement in St. Petersburg on 17 January 1834 stipulated that the Romanian militias and national merchant ships could fly different flags and pavilions. The tribute was set by that agreement to the amount of 6,000 bags, respectively 3,000,000 Turkish piastres. The rulers of the Principalities were to be appointed for life, and not only for seven years, but Tzarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire retained the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the two Romanian provinces when the ruler's policy affected their interests.

On 5 March 1831, the great mandarin Alexan-

dru Ghica submitted for approval to the Wallach Council a „**Soldierly Regulation for the National Militia of the Principality of Wallachia**”, while Hatman Paladi presented the Council a „**Regulation for the National Militia of Moldova**”. The three regiments of Wallachia comprised two infantry battalions (four companies per battalion) and two cavalry squadrons, each infantry battalion with a staff of 586 people, while the cavalry squadron had a strength of 190 people. Infantry represented 76% of the composition of a regiment, while the cavalry meant 24%. On 1 April 1833, the six infantry battalions of Wallachia were used to guard the border: 11 companies on the Danube and five companies in Transylvania and Moldova, at the same time providing the security of the mines. The remaining companies were used for internal order: six companies in Bucharest and two companies in Craiova.

The *Central Administration (Dejurstva or Dejurnia)* was set in 1833 as a primary form of what would later become the *Soldiers' Department (Ministry of War)*. A year later, the *Army Council (Staff of the Army)* was founded in the capital of Moldova, whose head was responsible for „**the good order of the chancellery and surveillance of all militia issues**”. In 1839, the Romanian ruler Alexandru Dumitru Ghica (1834 - 1842) established the „Lords' Council” (Princely Staff) with three sections: 7) *Section I - Personnel*; 2) *Section II - Headquarters (dealing with troop deployments, border guards, correspondence with civil authorities)* and 3) *Section III - Administration (in charge of wages, equipment, maintenance, collection and payments)*. The Army Council was supplemented by a veterinarian, a chaplain and the council's music (a major drum and 36 musicians). The supreme leadership of the Army belonged to the ruler of the country and the executive leadership was entrusted to the hetman in Moldova and the mandarin in Wallachia. In 1849 a consultative body was created, the *Soldiers' Assembly*, which included all the active officers ranked as colonels

9. *Ibidem*, p. 80.

10. Colonel Ph.D. Gheorghe Romanescu, Colonel Ph.D. Gheorghe Tudor, colonel (ret.) Mihai Cucu, Colonel Ioan Popescu, *Istoria Infanteriei Române, (The History of the Romanian Infantry)* Volume I, Scientific and Pedagogical Publishing House, Bucharest, 1985, p. 202.

in the garrison of Bucharest. The Soldiers' Assembly was to meet once a week and discuss the most important military issues.

Despite the limitations that were imposed to the new national military forces by the Organic Regulations, the national army has gradually undergone a process of modernization. The infantry and cavalry units got separated only in 1835 and in 1843 artillery was introduced into the structure of the armed forces. After the Romanian Revolution of 1848 - 1849 the number of units has increased from four to five infantry regiments, while the number of cavalry battalions got to three. The artillery received new pieces and the Danube Flotilla had six boats and a schooner.

In the context of the domestic and international political developments after the Crimean War (1853 - 1856), considering the provisions of Articles 42, 43, 44 and 45 of the *Paris Convention of 7 August 1858*, favorable conditions have been created for the unification of the armies of the two principalities, even before the unification of the two states, namely: **1) a single commander for both armies; 2) a common color for the flags of the two armies; 3) the right to join these armies and 4) the right to use them to defend the borders.** The unification of the two armies was made after 24 January 1859, by creating the General Staff on 12 November 1859 by the High Order no. 83 and then, by uniting the two Ministries of War in the two Principalities. According to the Decree on 14 April 1859, the camp in Floresti - Prahova would include 12,000 soldiers, forming 7 infantry battalions, one border battalion, 15 guns, 6 spearmen squadrons and 7 horsemen squadrons. **The camp in Floresti was the first decisive step towards the assertion of the Romanian military power, military modernization and consolidation.** A French Military Mission was helpful in this process of configuration, restructuring and modernization in the Western sense of the military structures of the new state Romania.

During the reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza (24

January 1859 - 11 February 1866) the number of infantry regiments was increased to seven and a battalion of mountaineers was created, each regiment with two battalions of four companies, totaling effectively 56 infantry companies. At the end of 1864, these regiments were deployed in Iasi, Craiova, Ismail, Bucharest, Galati and Ploiesti. Four territorial divisions were created in 1868 with headquarters deployed in Bucharest, Iasi, Craiova and Galati. Each division included four infantry regiments. In 1872, the regiments were organized into four infantry battalions, out of which three were line battalions (troops) and one officers battalion. Prince Carol I (1866-1914) had an important role in this effort to modernize the Romanian military: **„I always inspect troops and this year I do it more thoroughly than before, because the regulations and reforms that I recommended are being introduced. The state of the army has improved since settling the camp in Furceni and there is another state of mind in the officers' corps”**<sup>11</sup>, wrote Prince Carol I to his father Carol Anton on 18 March 1870.

### *The armed forces - a guarantor of state independence*

In an effort to ensure the modernization, progress and, later, Romania's independence, the political elites of the time were concerned with the consolidation of the armed forces, namely the defense capacity of the Romanian state. The organization of the national defense system was made based on the **“Law for the Organization of the Army”** from 11 June 1868, followed by that of 21 March 1872. A series of structures have been created: the Permanent Army and the Territorial Army (bodies of infantry and guards), supported by militias (embedded all young people who had military service and were no older than 36 years old), the City Guard (for cities) and the troops for the villages, both made up of males between 36 and 50. Article 38 of the Law of 21 March 1872 stipulated that the Territorial Army would include artillery batteries along

11. Dumitru-Dan Crişmaru, **Elita militară românească în timpul lui Carol I (1866 - 1914)**, (*The Romanian Military Elite during Carol I*), Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2017, p.105.



with infantry and cavalry (horsemen) regiments. Given that the available financial resources of the Romanians were limited, the artillery batteries of the Territorial Army was instructed by the category possessing minimal knowledge necessary for instruction, namely the military fire-fighters.

Territorial artillery batteries were created under Decree no. 702 of 28 March 1874, grouped under four territorial divisions that divided Romania. The artillery units of the Territorial Army were equipped with muzzles made of French bronze, caliber 121.3 mm (model 1858) and Belgian ones, caliber 86.5 mm (model 1863), both with muzzle loading. Starting with 1871, the artillery units of the Permanent Army would be equipped with Krupp cannons, with bronze barrels, caliber 78.5 mm (48 parts), followed in 1875 by another 48 Krupp cannons with steel barrels, 87 mm caliber. Lavrov heavy attack cannons (model 1872), 152.4 mm caliber, have been purchased from Russia in 1877.

In light of the new political, diplomatic and military developments in southeastern Europe, namely the anti-ottoman revolts in Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro in the years 1875 - 1876 and due to the involvement of the Austro-Hungarian and Tsarist Empire in these processes, Romania positioned itself, for starters, in a benevolent neutrality specific to Christian nations in the Balkans. The support provided by Romania, more or less discreetly, to the struggle of the peoples in the Balkans (*facilitating the passage of Bulgarian revolutionaries and Russian volunteers across the Danube, sheltering and providing food to thousands of Serb refugees, facilitating the transit of arms from Russia to the Balkan front, offering medical support or sending an ambulance and medical staff in Serbia*) has raised the protest of the Ottoman Empire. In a Note of 20 July 1876 to Romania's diplomatic agents abroad, Mihail Kogalniceanu, the Foreign Minister in office, stated the fact that Romanians could not remain indifferent to the cries of pain coming from the right bank of the Danube and that "the turmoil of the people is growing day by day". He also mentioned that **"the Romanian armed forces are**

**humming under the discipline, being eager to participate in the battle"**.

On 24 September 1876, Romania's Council of Ministers decided to concentrate permanent and territorial troops for training and maneuvers, calling the reserves as well. The expenses of the training were covered by a loan of 200,000 lei divided proportionately to the infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineer troops and non-permanent units of infantry and horsemen. The training of 1876 included a total number of 37,730 people, 120 guns and 7,046 horses. The active divisions with troops for war were created in the fall of 1876, with the objective of consolidating the defense on the Danube and controlling navigation on the river. Given the prospect of a Turkish invasion, the vulnerable sectors have been consolidated on the southern bank of the Danube as well as those of Gruia, Bechet, Turnu Magurele, Giurgiu, Braila, Barbosi and Calafat.

The Romanian-Russian talks on the process of the Russian army's transition through Romania towards the battlefields of the Balkans, in light of the new Russo-Turkish war took place during the day of 29 September 1876 in Livadia, Crimea. On 5 November 1876, the Russian Ambassador to Constantinople, N.P. Ignatiev, would send a confidential letter to Ion Bratianu, the Prime Minister of Romania, mentioning **"the glorious historical role which it (Romania - our note) is to have in the East"**. The report of the Grand Duke Nicholas to Tsar Alexander II, of 26 December 1876, indicated that **"without Romania's real willingness to help us** (the Russians - our note)", it would have been impossible to meet all the necessary conditions for the successful operations of the Russian army against the Turks in the Balkans. **The Russian General Staff would consider, as early as on 23 December 1876, Romania's military cooperation, outlining the possible deployment of the troops and staff at the common border and the possibility of subordinating these forces to Prince Carol I. This was the recognition of the existence and strategic value of the Romanian Armed Forces, in spite of the fact that they have not gone through fire yet.**

The government in Bucharest decided on 31 March 1877 to mobilize the Romanian Armed Forces and the Princely Council gathered on 1 April, being attended by Prince Carol I, the members of the government and other political figures of the time, discussing the immediate prospects of Romania: neutrality or the participation in the Russo-Ottoman war for the independence of the state. Although the leaders of the political opposition have opted for a different formula for obtaining state independence and preserve neutrality, Prince Carol I and the members of the government have opted for the conclusion of the Romanian-Russian Military Convention and military cooperation with Tsarist Russia and the Balkan peoples in the fight for independence. On 4 April 1877, Mihail Kogalniceanu, Romania's Foreign Minister, signed, together with Baron Dmitri F. Stuart, Russia's diplomatic agent and General Consul to Bucharest, the Romanian-Russian political agreement, whose text stipulated the consent for the Russian army's transit on the Romanian territory in its route towards the Balkans. Tsarist Russia committed to respect the political rights of the Romanian state, as reflected in the existing domestic laws and treaties, and to maintain and defend Romania's current integrity.

The decree for the mobilization of the Romanian Armed Forces was signed on 6 April 1877 and, as a consequence, the organizational structure of the mobilized army could be determined: the establishment of Army Corps I (Infantry Divisions I and II) and Army Corps II (Infantry Divisions III and IV). Each division comprised: two infantry brigades, one cavalry brigade, one artillery division including three batteries, one column of ammunition, one engineer company and one ambulance. Each Army Corps reserve included an artillery reserve and a regiment with six batteries. The infantry and cavalry brigades included units of the permanent and territorial armies. In total, 125,000 people were mobilized.

At the end of May 1877, the Operations Army had a strength of 67,576 people (1,540 officers and the like, 60,135 soldiers) grouped in 54 infantry battalions, 48 cavalry squadrons and 24 artillery batteries. The structure of this Army

also included 1,727 firefighters (56 officers and the like, 1,671 soldiers). This strength was supplemented with 31 infantry battalions and four cavalry squadrons (33,000 troops) from the Militia, 16,000 people from the City Guards, seconded by four artillery batteries and the recruits of contingent 1877 (14,000 people) to be called to arms starting 15 July 1877. Out of all the mobilized forces (130,576 people), a strength of 15,300 infantry and horsemen would remain in the country to protect the borders and ensure internal order.

Romania's Chamber of Deputies and the Senate would ratify the Romanian-Russian Political Convention at the meetings on 16 and 17 April 1877, by majority vote, while the Russian troops entered Romania on the evening of 11 April 1877 and the Russian Tsarist Empire declared war to the Ottomans on 12 April 1877. The Russian troops marching to the Balkans would reach the Danube at the end of May 1877. On 26 April 1877, the Turkish artillery from Vidin had bombed Calafat for three hours. Batteries 1, 2 and 6 of the 1<sup>st</sup> Artillery Regiment have fully responded and fired 130 missiles. The Romanian House of Representatives voted a motion on 29 April 1877 and the Senate on 30 April 1877, to approve the political and diplomatic acts of the Government in Bucharest and recognize the existence of a state of war between Romania and the Ottoman Empire.

On 9 May 1877, Mihail Kogalniceanu, Romania's Foreign Minister, was questioned by MP Nicholae Flevea on how the European powers had been informed of the new Romanian-Turkish relation and he said solemnly: **"We are independent; we are an independent nation (...); I have not the slightest doubt and fear to declare to the national representatives that we are a free and independent nation"**. Romania's Chamber of Deputies and the Senate approved the same day the motion that consecrated the independence of Romania in its relations with the Ottoman Empire and called on the government to work for **"its independence (Romanian – our note) to be recognized and guaranteed by the major European powers"**.

The Romanian Army would successfully carry out strategic operations to cover the line of the Danube with the objective of impeding an Ottoman attack north of the river and prevent the concentration of the Imperial Russian Army. *The Times* wrote 23 May 1877 that "By protecting their own border on the Danube, the Romanian troops have done a great service to the Russians in that it prevented the Turks from occupying and fortifying bridgeheads on the north bank of the Danube". The officers and sailors of the River Fleet would admirably carry out the missions they had on the Danube, so that the night of 13<sup>th</sup> to 14<sup>th</sup> May 1877, the torpedo boat *Rândunica* sunk the Ottoman ship *Duba Seifi*, and on 26 October the navy artillery destroyed another Ottoman ship *Podgorica* (one of the ships with the most firepower on the Danube), ship *Socrates* and a barge. On 25 October 1877, the sailors installed the mine barrier from Nedeia, an operation carried out under the command of CPT. Mihail Drăghicescu, in order to protect the bridge from Turnu Magurele during the military operations.

**Romania's War of Independence (1877 - 1878) would represent a new phase of the extensive effort made by the generation of those who had tried by means of the Romanian Revolution of 1848 - 1849, the acts of 5 January and 24 January 1859 and, later, the crowning from 10 May 1866, to give the Romanian nation the role and rightful place among the European nations as well as a new historical destiny marked by modernization, progress and national unity. State independ-**

**ence obtained with arms in hands against the Ottomans at Plevna<sup>12</sup>, Rahova și Vidin, has been a natural and necessary step on the way to the Great Union of 1 December 1918. In those historic moments, the Romanian Armed Forces have been at the forefront of great national and social transformations, the assertion of the Romanian nation and of its will for freedom and independence.** „*The Romanian armed campaign of 1877 - 1878 represented the first assertion of the modern Romanian armed forces in a confrontation of scale, with two great powers of the time as allies and opponents, a confrontation in which the Romanian armed forces and High Headquarters have shown their capabilities and the desire to serve the supreme interests of the country. At the same time, it has been a severe test which revealed many irregularities and errors in the operation of the headquarters, different levels of equipment and training between the permanent army units and the territorial ones, the organization of research, operational planning of the territory etc.*”<sup>13</sup>, said the military historians Ion Giurcă and Maria Georgescu.

### ***The military establishment and the path to the 1918 Great Union***

In the War of State Independence, a total of 10,000 soldiers were registered as having sacrificed themselves (killed, wounded or missing), including 2,111 dead. The percentages - according to branches - indicate the following: infantry - 91.9%, artillery - 3.8%, cavalry - 3.3% and en-

12. While the Russian troops were fighting to conquest Plevna, at the request of the Russian High Command, on 19 July 1877, the Romanian troops began crossing the Danube to support the third attack on Plevna. Since there was a consolidated outpost before Grivița, which impeded the deployment of Romanian and Russian artillery at a favorable distance for direct fire over the positions of the Ottomans, Regiments 13 Infantry and 5 Infantry attacked in the morning of 27 August 1877. The Romanian attack would be supported by a section of Battery I Horsemen from Regiment 3 Artillery, led by Second-Lieutenant Artur Hartel, who would position the troops in the southeast of the outpost and, later, supported by the artillery of Captain Gheorghe Lupașcu who ordered Battery 3 of Regiment 3 Artillery to occupy positions near the men of Second-Lieutenant Artur Hartel. After a quick and accurate raid of the gunners in Battery 3, the outpost was maintained. In the morning of 29 August 1877, Battery 3 of Regiment 3 Artillery succeeded to silence the Ottoman artillery at Grivita no. 1. **Following this military success, the entire Battery 3 of Regiment 3 Artillery was cited by Order no. 53 of 28 August 1877 of the General Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces and Captain Gheorghe Lupașcu was granted the Military Order "Star of Romania with Swords".** The Tsarist Empire decorated the commander of Battery 7 with the military orders "Saint George" and "Saint Anna". The other members of the battery received the four Russian military order crosses "Saint George" and the Romanian medal "Military Virtue". The name of Captain George Lupașcu has entered, for eternity, in the gallery of the few foreign officers who have received the high Russian military order and whose names are found in the "Saint George" Order Room from the Kremlin.

13. Ion Giurcă, Maria Georgescu, **Statul Major General (1859 - 1950). Organizare și atribuții funcționale** (*The General Staff (1859 - 1950). Organization and Responsibilities*), Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 6456, p. 73.

gineers - 1.1. As a prospect, given the fact that the War of Independence had pointed that the combat missions of the armed forces are taken as the missions of the infantry, so that the successes and failures of the infantry are in fact the victories and defeats of the entire military establishment, further steps would be taken to improve the national military establishment.

On 8 June 1882 the *Law on the Organization of the Armed Forces' Headquarters* was issued and it stipulated the division of the country's territory in terms of military organization, establishing four main regions corresponding to the four army corps, located in Bucharest, Craiova, Galati and Iasi. Thus, the Army Corps that existed only temporarily in war-time, turned into a large permanent unit, consisting of two infantry divisions. Each division comprised four regiments of infantry, a line infantry regiment and a battalion of mountaineers, a brigade of horsemen (three regiments), an artillery brigade, an engineer battalion and a train squadron and the staffs and services necessary for the campaign. The *Law on the Organization of the Headquarters* in 1891 has allowed the leveling of the infantry's training after the merger of the two categories of infantry.

In the period preceding World War I (1914 - 1918), the Romanian state leadership focused on the consolidation of the military establishment in all its components. For example, the French Consul in Galati noted in September 1883 that **"The government is giving its full attention to perfecting this branch (navy-our note), which, at one moment, may bring serious services on the Danube"**<sup>14</sup>. In 1893, the same French Consul noted that **"the Romanian flotilla is able to maneuver on the Danube, its superiority remaining undisputable in relation to other neighboring countries."**<sup>15</sup>

Following the discussions at the Crown Council in Sinaia, on 3 August 1914, Romania announced the two belligerent camps (Entente and the Central Powers) that it would adopt a state of neutral expectation and it would defend its borders

in case of aggression. **"Overall, the solution of neutrality was the least risky one and may prove profitable; but for most of its contemporaries, its main flaw was precisely the risk of ultimately not getting anything"**<sup>16</sup>, wrote historian Lucian Boia referring to the clashes between the supporter of the Entente and the supporters of the Germans in August 1914. In the years to come until Romania's entrance in the war, the Prime Minister of Romania, Ion Bratianu, would insist that in order to establish a new order and have peace in Europe it would be necessary that the principle of nationality triumphed in all of the interested European countries and particularly in Romania. In an interview published on 1 June 1915, in the *Journal de Geneve*, the Romanian Prime Minister mentioned that Romania did not ask, in fact, anything than *restitutio*, since the new political-territorial order, which was to follow the war, could not be established without the victory of the principle of nationalities.

In the secret political-diplomatic dialogue initiated with the representatives of the Entente, the political and diplomatic representatives of Romania have aimed at achieving three essential things: **1) recognition of the right to conclude national and state unity; 2) participation to the conflagration as and when decided by the Romanian politicians and 3) equal status at the future peace forum.** In the diplomatic telegrams submitted to the Quai d'Orsay, Count Charles de Saint-Aulaire, the French minister in the Romanian capital, wrote that the will of Ion Bratianu was to give war a national character and rally public unanimity. Sir George Barcalay, the British Ambassador to Bucharest and Colonel Christopher Bidward Thomson, the British military attaché, concluded that Ion Bratianu was a figure of good faith in the negotiations with the Entente and that his requests were national requirements. On 20 May 1915, Ion I.C. Bratianu told Camille Blondel, the new Minister of France in Bucharest that his country's claims **"meet not only the national aspirations**

14. Rear Admiral Ph.D. Aurel Popa, *Forțele Navale Române (7426 - 2010) (Romania' Navy)* in *Document*, no. 8 (94)/6454, p. 6.

15. *Ibidem*.

16. Lucian Boia, *„Germanofilii”. Elita intelectuală românească în anii Primului Război Mondial*, (*"The German Supporters. The Romanian Intellectuals in the First Years of World War I"*), 7rd Edition, Humanitas, Bucharest, 6458, p. 89.

**which Romania has been claiming at all times, but also the need to effectively prevent conflicts between nations, by setting serious and natural borders.”<sup>17</sup>**

Romania's entry into World War I along with the Entente was one of the most important political and military events of 1916, with special implications in the development of the Great War. The moment Kaiser Wilhelm II learned of Romania's entry in the war, while playing scat, **“completely lost temper”<sup>18</sup>** and said that the war was **“definitely lost”<sup>19</sup>**. The German High Command (OHL) was as surprised as the Kaiser, but, General Erich von Falkenhayn, the head of the OHL, has not ignored such a prospect and prepared for it. Romania was trying to exploit the good momentum in order to build national unity, through the unification with Transylvania, Bukovina, the whole Banat to Tisa, which entitled the Ion I.C. Bratianu to declare: **“It is necessary to give up neutrality, but, on the other hand, with an ideal like national unity, we are bound to pursue it since we do not know if such a favorable opportunity would appear again. That is why we can only support the Entente and fight against the Central Powers.”<sup>20</sup>**

Romania's War Strategy in August 1916 committed the Romanian Armed Forces not only to a war on two fronts, but also to an offensive on two fronts. The 369,159 people (65% of all task forces) forming Armies I, II and North had to carry out the provisions of the plan of war (*Hypothesis Z*) and occupy Transylvania. The Romanian Army III with a strength of 142,523 (25% of all task forces) was to reject Bulgarian attacks on Romania and defend the southern border. Of all mobilized forces at the beginning of the war, infantry stood for 80.6%, i.e. 413,839 soldiers.

The campaign of 1916 (August to December) was marked by surprising victories and shame-

ful and demoralizing defeats with a strategic impact. The defeat at Turtucaia (25 August 1916) would decisively influence operations on the Transylvanian front. **“But, looking back, it is clear that the scale of the disaster (from Turtucaia – our note) was caused by the refusal of the GH (General Headquarters – our note) to order a strategic retreat. This decision was based on political considerations, not on military ones, mostly on the impact that Turtucaia had on the morale of the people”<sup>21</sup>**, wrote the American historian Glenn E. Torrey. Despite the heroism of the Great infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineering, railways, communications, medical, river and maritime units and the brilliant tactical maneuvers in the battle for the Carpathian defiles, the maneuver from Flamanda and the battle for Bucharest, the balance was disastrous in December 1916. On 9 February 1917, the Austro-Hungarian military intelligence services reported that only 23,000 Romanian soldiers were on the front line set at the Gates of Moldova. The losses of the Romanian armed forces were shocking: 163,515 people dead, severely injured or missing and 146,600 people captured. Only 194,945 people (i.e. 39% of those mobilized in August 1916) went to the units in Moldova for recovery and reorganization. In addition, the Austro-Hungarian military intelligence services estimated that there was a reserve of 400,000 people apt for mobilization, arming and training. It has to be noted, however, that in order to keep the Romanian front, STAVKA (the Russian General Headquarters) had mobilized a number of 36 infantry divisions (23% of the Russian infantry from the Baltic to the Black Sea) and 11 cavalry divisions (37% of all Russian cavalry from the Baltic to the Black Sea), which amplified Russia's discontent about the privations and sufferings of war. **“Despite our victory over Romania, our overall fighting capacity was reduced”<sup>22</sup>**, said General Ludendorff.

17. Ion Bulei, *Arcul aşteptării 1914-1915-1916*, (*The Arch of Expectation 1914-1915-1916*), Eminescu Publishing House, Bucharest, 1981, p. 197.

18. Glenn E. Torrey, *România în Primul Război Mondial*, (*Romania in World War I*), Meteor Publishing, Bucharest, 6458, p. 8<sup>1</sup>.

19. *Ibidem*.

20. Ion Gh. Duca, *Amintiri politice*, (*Political Memories*), Vol. I, Munich, 5<sup>3</sup> 2 5, p. 6<sup>1</sup> 8.

21. Glenn E. Torrey, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

22. *Ibidem*, p. 185.

In the process of recovery and reorganization of the Romanian Armed Forces (January-July 1917), 15 infantry divisions instead of 23 have been created, each having two infantry brigades, two regiments, with three battalions each. Infantry divisions 1 to 10 had a supplementary mountain troops regiment each with two battalions each. The infantry battalion comprised three gunmen companies and one machine gun company with eight pieces. The gunmen company had two platoons and two sections, eight machine guns and 194 people. At the same time, each infantry division comprised an artillery brigade, two horsemen squadrons, a battalion of pioneers and one detachment of dismounted gendarmerie. Two Armies will be created instead of four, namely the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army (Divisions 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 12) with two Army Corps (II and IV) and the 1<sup>st</sup> Army (Divisions 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15) with four Army Corps (I, III, V and VI). Romania also received large quantities of weapons and ammunition from France: 199 aircraft, 300 vehicles, 220,000 rifles, 4,500 automatic rifles, 2,700 machine guns, 80 caliber 75 mm guns, 85 caliber 120 mm cannons, 1,945,000 artillery shells, 101,500,000 gun cartridges, 1.37 million grenades and 600,000 gas masks. They would contribute to the revival of Romanian Armed Forces for the campaign in the summer of 1917.

The Battle of Marasti (11 to 19 July 1917) would be, as confessed by General Alexandru Averescu Army, Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army, **“the first real victory in the history of the modern Romanian armed forces.”**<sup>23</sup> The fight resulted in 1,469 dead, 3,052 injured and 367 missing. The Battles of Mărășești (24 July-19 August 1917) and Oituz (26 July-22 August 1917) would represent **“our little Verdun”**. On 25 August 1917, General Constantin Prezan, Chief of the Romanian General Staff, issued the battle order to the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Armies in which he noted that certain assessments made to the Russian allies were unfair and offensive to the honor of the Russian armed forces because, as it was known, **“only Corps VII and VIII have had nearly**

**30,000 casualties...proving the military value and sincerity with which they cooperate”**<sup>24</sup>. The statistics on the Battle of Marasesti is highly suggestive from the point of view of what was mentioned by the Chief of Romanian General Staff. The 1<sup>st</sup> Romanian Army's losses included 610 officers and 26,800 soldiers dead, wounded and missing, while the Russian 4<sup>th</sup> Army has accounted for 650 officers and 25,000 soldiers dead, wounded and missing in the Battle of Marasesti. We can conclude that despite the revolutionary ideas that favored the Bolshevization of the Russian army on the Romanian Front, the miserable way in which part of the Russian divisions have carried out their duty on the battlefield, the victory at Mărășești was obtained due to the sacrifice of more than 25,000 Russian soldiers. Without their sacrifice, without their exemplary attitude on the battlefield, the Battle of Marasesti would have been slightly different.

In the general context of the growing revolutionary events in Russia or the Bolshevik coup on 25 October 1917 and later, of Russia's exit from the war (March 1918), Romania had to accept the Peace at Focsani (9 December 1917) and Peace at Bucharest (7 May 1918). The Romanian military establishment went through critical moments related to the demobilization of 300,000 people and to the fact that the Romanian state was thus lacking an instrument of power despite the existence of another 100,000 men under arms.

In this context of developments in the arena of international relations in the spring-autumn of 1918, Romania has managed to regain Bessarabia by the decision of the State Council on 27 March 1918. The Romanian armed forces supported in those moments the provision of security of the Romanian territory between the Prut and Dniester, the personal safety of the members of the State Council in view of the terrorist threats of the Bolsheviks who refused to accept the new reality stemming from the new geopolitical conditions. The Romanian troops were remobilized for war on 10 November 1918 and crossed the Carpathians again to provide the se-

23. *Ibidem*, p. 227.

24. *Ibidem*, p. 253.

curity of the Romanian civilians in Transylvania and Bucovina. The Union Acts of Chernivtsi (28 November 1918) and Alba Iulia (1 December 1918) stand as peaks of effort and sacrifice of the military institution in its pursuit of the reunification.

### **Romania and the armed forces in the turmoil of great geopolitical changes**

Given the major problems that were created at end of World War I and especially the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, Romania would join the collective security policy and would fight in order to implement it on the continent with the illusory hope that it would maintain peace and stability. It would also conclude a series of alliances and create agreements with neighboring countries, aiming to guarantee peace in the region. In the decades after 1918, Romania's military spending would represent only 16% of the state budget as compared to other countries: France (28%), Poland (30%), Hungary (30%), Turkey (37%), Yugoslavia (27%), Russia (28%), Italy (38%), Germany (40%). In 1931, the budget of the Ministry of Defense was reduced by 50%, getting to 14.66% of the state budget. The failure of the Disarmament Conference, the exit of Nazi Germany from the League of Nations, the Anglo-German naval agreement of 18 June 1935, the Italian aggression on Ethiopia and other manifestations of the revisionist and revanchist powers have contributed to the erosion of continental stability, peace and security.

In the morning of 7 March 1936, 54,000 German soldiers would cross the border imposed at Versailles and reoccupy the Rhine area. The great European drama was starting. On 21 September 1938, the Council of Ministers of Czechoslovakia accepted „*painfully and forced by the circumstances and the successive insistence and pressures of the French and British governments*”<sup>25</sup>, the decision made in London on 18 September 1938, which provided the sacrifice

Czechoslovakia. The Munich Agreement (September 29 to 30, 1938) facilitated the seizure of the southern part by Germany and was a heavy shock to Romania. It became clear that in case of war, Britain would not help any of the countries of Central Europe or on the Danube, nor the southeast. France had taken a position similar to Britain.

Following the Munich Agreement and the new dangers threatening territorial integrity, policy-makers and military decision-makers in Bucharest planned and approved during the month of October 1938, the third plan of equipping the Army, spanning over a period of 10 years. The planned defense spending was 70,376,000,000 lei, which represented 41,405,045,093 lei more than the previous plan of 1935, with the main effort directed towards the protection of the western border. The approved money was distributed as follows: Emergency I, the Western Front: 40,916,000,000 lei (58.13%); Emergency II, the Eastern Front: 15,751,000,000 lei (22%); Emergency III, the Southern Front: 13,709,000,000 lei (19%)<sup>26</sup>. At the same time, according to the decisions made by the Superior Council of National Defense, the Romanian General Staff ordered the construction of fortifications on the western border. Ample combat dispositions have been simultaneously made, stretching for hundreds of square kilometers, including the following works: 134,115 km obstacle trenches; 159,475 km infantry obstacle network; 33,113 km obstacle network; 165,515 km signals network; 29,900 km communication networks; 115,700 km air signals, which included the territory of Arad, Bihor, Satu-Mare until Maramures Mountains. The armament was automatic and mostly Czech-made: 7.92 mm ZB machine guns for the fortifications; 7.92 mm ZB sub-machine guns, cannons and mortars of different calibers. The border fortifications from Tisa were meant to defend the country's security against the German-Hungarian aggression. On 5 January 1939, the Armed Forces Secret Intelligence Service submitted the Romanian General

25. Viorica Moisuc, **Premisele izolării politice a României 1918-1940**, (*The Context of Romania's Political Isolation 1918-1940*), Humanitas, Bucharest, 1991, p. 109.

26. See: Vasile T. Ciubăncan, *Apărarea frontierei de vest a României, deziderat național. Adeziuni clujene interbelice(II)*, (*Defending Romania's Western Border, a National Desire. Inter-war Adhesions from Cluj*), in **Acta Musei Napocensis**, XIX, 1982, p. 206.

Staff a summary report (15 pages) regarding *"The German expansion in south-eastern Europe towards the discharge of the Danube"*. The German political and military leaders considered, in the context of the new political situation after Munich, that the expansion towards the south-eastern Europe was the easiest and most favorable.

At the dawn on 15 March 1939, during a snow-storm, approximately 200,000 German troops have crossed the new German-Czech border. At 09:00 hours, the first German motorized elements entered the outskirts of Prague. Europe's new geopolitical configuration led the government of Armand Calinescu to call out several contingents of reservists to supplement the defense of the western border. Prior to these events, the *Law for the creation of military zones and necessary defense measures* came into force on 16 December 1938. Three categories of areas were set: 1) fortifications; 2) areas of military interest and 3) borders. Title IV of the Law provided special measures for aviation and the navy. Given that risk factors were evolving rapidly, the need for a *"direct and immediate"* information flow, reflecting the situation on the field, led Dumitru Popescu, the Chief of the Romanian General Staff, order on 20 March 1939, increased action for information tracking of the terrorist and saboteur elements and organizations, and their annihilation before developing action and prosecution.

Following the report issued by the Secret Service on 5 January 1939, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff ordered that a "survey" would be carried out in the European capitals by LT. COL. Gheorghe Petrescu - tactical attaché of the Ministry of National Defense and General Staff at the Secret Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces - so that he would *"personally examine on the spot the hypotheses on the consequences of these events, with the help - on one hand - of our diplomatic representatives and military personnel accredited to the respective countries and - on the other hand - by making direct*

*contact with the secret services of the respective armies"*<sup>27</sup>. The report submitted by Lieutenant Colonel Gheorghe Petrescu on 21 March 1939 after the visits to Warsaw, Prague, Berlin, London and Paris was not encouraging in terms of future developments in international relations and the prospect of strengthening Romania's defense capacity in order to provide its security. *"I think that if the warning given in time by the "S" Service on Germany's aggressive intentions were taken into account - said Lieutenant Colonel Petrescu - in early spring, with an effort of troops and a better understanding of the situation, giving up too much scrupulosity for something known as excellent, we currently would have had in the country all the infantry material that would have perfectly equipped our army. (...) What is clear is the great willingness of the Czechs to arm us and give us as much of their war equipment"*<sup>28</sup>.

After the outbreak of World War II on 1 September 1939, Romania declared its neutrality (6 September 1939), but events were to succeed quickly, surprising Europe and sometimes even the protagonists of the drama. At the request of King Carol II, Ion Gigurtu went to Berlin to inform the German Government of Romania's desire of neutrality. The military measures adopted by Romania's neighbors, especially the Soviet government, were part of the talks with Marshal Goering. He told the Romanian royal envoy that *"as long as the Reich will be in friendly relations with the Soviets, we should not fear Russia"*<sup>29</sup>. Given the seriousness of the situation and the possibility of its rapid deterioration, the Romanian General Staff has taken steps to strengthen the Eastern border. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Romanian Army was created by Operational Directive No. 6 of 10 September 1939, with a mission to prevent the Soviet units crossing the Dniester and delay their advance westward, in case of a more important attack. Also, another mission of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army was that in its withdrawal southward it would block the crossings west of the Carpathians, in order to prevent the entry of the German forces in Bessa-

27. Cristian Troncotă, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

28. *Ibidem*, p. 265.

29. AMAE, fond 71, Germany, vol. 78, f. 97 - 99 (A report of I. Gigurtu's trip to Germany)



rabia, for fear of a simultaneous German-Soviet attack against Romania<sup>30</sup>.

In the context of the developments in international relations after 23 August 1939 and 1 September 1939, Romania's political and military leadership has decided, ever since the month of May 1940, to resist at all costs on the Dniester "without thought of retreat". The proposal submitted by the commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> Romanian Army to develop a series of studies and organize exercises for a possible withdrawal under pressure of the enemy from the East was dismissed so as "not to induce doubt in the hearts of commanders who had to fight at the Dniester"<sup>31</sup>. On 10 April 1940, the 4<sup>th</sup> Romanian Army Command submitted to the higher echelon (1<sup>st</sup> Army Group) a study entitled "The Crossing of the 0<sup>th</sup> Army from Bessarabia over the Prut, under the pressure of the enemy, counting on available forces"<sup>32</sup>. The request to immediately supplement the crossings over the Prut, considering a possible withdrawal, was made by the 1<sup>st</sup> Army Group on 17 April 1940, which asked the General Staff to adopt the necessary measures. Nothing was done, in spite of the steps taken by the General Staff and the Ministry of Public Works.

On 18 April 1940, the 1<sup>st</sup> Army Group ordered the 4<sup>th</sup> Army to carry out reconnaissance in order to set bridgeheads east of the Prut so as to help the troops in case of a possible withdrawal. The order was carried out promptly. On 25 May 1940, the command of the 4<sup>th</sup> Romanian Army gathered at Tecuci, the commanders of the subordinate structures to inform them on how to withdraw the subordinated army units in case the Soviets exerted pressures on them. The Commander of the Engineers of the 4<sup>th</sup> Army was ordered to begin repairing the existing

bridges and prepare floating bridges. The commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> Army would prepare a plan of action in case of aggression from the Western border. The plan would refer to the evacuation of the territories in two phases: the period of political tension and the mobilization period.

In May 1940, the political and military authorities in Bucharest were preparing plans for the evacuation of the territories claimed by the Soviets, coded "Tudor-1940"<sup>33</sup> and "Mircea-1940"<sup>34</sup>. Both plans stipulated that "in principle, the military and administrative establishments leave their territory only when operational troops are about to entirely evict"<sup>35</sup>. In order to provide loyalty "the families of the respective state officials would evacuate in time"<sup>36</sup> and the operational troops were required "to inform, in time, these establishments on the withdrawal and provide the necessary means of transport"<sup>37</sup>. The "Tudor-1940" and "Mircea-1940" plans would be completed 1 June 1940. The developments in Bessarabia prevented the completion and implementation of these evacuation plans.

During the day of 25 June 1940, Section II of the General Staff warned the higher echelons that *the Soviet aggression against Romania is becoming more likely*, since the air activity of the Soviets at the border was looking like a real aggression. Based on the information reports received from the units at the eastern border, the aerial reconnaissance and other information, the Romanian General Staff confirmed, shortly after the midnight of 24 to 25 June 1940, the order given to the 1<sup>st</sup> Army Group to carry out reconnaissance flights at dawn along the length of the Dniester, without crossing the border. The Chief of Staff, GEN. Florea Tenescu personally ordered the commanders of the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Romanian Armies to immediately organize for defense, with

30. AMR, fond MStM, File no. 143, f. 162 – 165 (Note of the General Staff on the creation of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army)

31. AMR, fond 5.418, File no. 1.833, f. 4.

32. *Ibidem*, f. 1.

33. The plan refers to the evacuation via railway during the times of political tensions. The transport plans were marked in green and they were based on the train schedules at peace.

34. Evacuation was carried out on railway during the mobilization and the transport plans were marked in red. The train schedule at war was taken into account when making these plans.

35. Mihai Pelin, *Legendă și adevăr*, (Legend and Truth), Edart Publishing House, Bucharest, 5<sup>33</sup> 8, p. 69.

36. Locotenent Colonel Ph.D. Octavian Ungureanu, *Evacuarea*, (The Evacuation), Academy of High Military Studies Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999, p. 18.

37. *Ibidem*.

all troops included in the plans of operations. *General Nicolae Ciuperca, the Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> Army requested clarifications by the Hugues telegraph network: "immediately" means "two or three hours" or "simply now"?* General Tenescu ordered: two-three hours. The headquarters in Roman, Bacau and Tecuci were informed that by the order of the Minister of National Defense the pontoon units, tanks and heavy artillery under the direct subordination of the High General Command are to be moved eastward.

In the evening of 26 June 1940, at 22:00 hours, at the Kremlin, Molotov handed Minister Gheorghe Davidescu the ultimatum note to the disposal of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Along with the reading of the Soviet ultimatum by Molotov at 22:00, the Soviet General Staff issued Operations Order no. 001, which was to be put into practice on 28 June 1940 by the troops who would invade Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in case Romania did not accept the Soviet ultimatum. At 03:00, General Vasile Atanasiu, commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army Corps in Chisinau received the telegraphic order no. 10,367, signed by General Ion Ilcuş, Minister of National Defense. The order was clear: maneuver immediately and be ready for action today, June 27, at dawn. Order no. 21, 035 of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army on all Romanian troops from Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina maneuvering for defense was issued at 03:15. The telephone or telegraph offices in Bessarabia were placed under military guard. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Army reported to Bucharest at 03:58 that the order to maneuver into defensive positions had been communicated to all major subordinate units.

After 04:00 hours, in the morning of 27 June 1940, by using nine low-capacity boats, the Soviet troops crossed the Dniester in the village of Corman. The picket guards and the cavalry platoon in the area withdrew after heavy fighting and occupied a new battle position. At 05:30 the troops of the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division were ready for battle. Until 07:50, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army Corps order was received by all subordinate units and they maneuvered to occupy fighting positions. At the end of the operation, the question "**Dniester operation carried out?**" the answer was "**Dniester**

**Complete!"** In the evening of 28 June 1940, the Romanian General Staff ordered by telegraphic order no. 6,006, the withdrawal of their troops from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The General Staff sent the Romanian 4<sup>th</sup> Army Order 6,008/c, which outlined an overall plan for the withdrawal of the Romanian troops from most of Bessarabia. The rush was to put its mark on the execution of the withdrawal and an entire series of large units and elements would be ignored by the messages that feverishly crossed the wires and telegraph and telephone networks of the armed forces. General Nicolae Ciuperca issued Order no. 84, which announced all soldiers of the 4<sup>th</sup> Army that the decision to surrender Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina did not change their military honor and urged them to strictly comply with all the orders.

On 3 July 1940, the Anglo-French guarantees were denounced by a press release of the Romanian Government. Romania was joining the Axis, but it was too late as the Romanian-Hungarian negotiations began at Turnu-Severin on 16 August. In the run-up to the Vienna Dictate, the military factors reported that the Romanian army was fully ready to defend Transylvania. According to the operational versions of the General Staff, of the total of 33 infantry and cavalry divisions, 4<sup>1/2</sup> divisions were to defend the western border, 13 infantry divisions and a cavalry division had the mission to stop through a defensive battle the Hungarian attack and launch counter-offensive helped by six infantry divisions, all battle chariots and heavy artillery reserves of the High Command. The East and South fronts were assigned 13 infantry divisions and 3<sup>1/2</sup> cavalry divisions with a mission to delay the advance of the Soviet and Bulgarian troops and close the defile of the Carpathians.

The plan of the operations issued by the General Staff - Operations Department on 29 August 1940, maintained the original operational plan (23 August 1940) and assigned the decision to the political factor. The acceptance of the "Vienna Arbitration", adopted by four of the five military representatives (Deputy Rear Admiral Nicholas Pais, General David Popescu, Adjutant General George Mihail, Chief of Staff, and Adju-

tant General Ernest Baliff) in the Crown Council of 30 August 1940, "appears as a hardly justifiable inconsistency"<sup>38</sup>.

Following the events in Vienna as well as the geopolitical and geostrategic changes, a serious state crisis occurred in Romania on 4 September 1940. On 6 September 1940, at 06:00, King Carol II called General Ion Antonescu to inform him that he gave up the throne in favor of his son Michael, giving full powers to the state prime-minister, who assumed the title of "Leader of state". General Ion Antonescu never ratified and never recognized the Vienna Arbitration Act, just like his predecessor, King Carol II. No official recognition in the "Official Gazette" was published in this regard.

The leader of the state and the Romanian Army Command have been systematically informed of the developments in the German-Soviet relations, the strategic position of the Soviet troops in Bessarabia and Bukovina etc., information absolutely necessary in making political-military decisions, the campaign plan and operational directives in view of the campaign that was to begin. Based on the information flow of the ISS and the Abwehr about the strategic intentions, the Führer accepted the involvement of the German Military Mission in the operations plans of the Romanian Army, so in case of a Soviet attack, the Romanian Army was to occupy positions of defense on the Prut. In the perspective of events on the eastern border, the Romanian General Staff ordered that eight infantry divisions, three cavalry brigades and two mixed brigades to be deployed in winter (1940-1941) mostly in Moldova, in a long stationary formation, with the ability to cope with an attack from the east. The 13<sup>th</sup> German Motor Division would support the Romanian Armed Forces and the 16<sup>th</sup> Armored Division would remain in reserve.

On 18 December 1940, Hitler signed Directive no. 21 (Plan "Barbarossa"), which took into account Romania's active participation in the war against the USSR. The task of the Romanian troops was to cover the German southern flank and work together with the German forces ad-

vancing in Moldova. In such a context, the reorganization plan of the Romanian Armed Forces after 6 September 1940 was based on the surveys of General Ion Antonescu in 1934, when he was Chief of General Staff and on the experiences of the 1939-1940 campaign. On 6 September 1940, the Romanian military forces comprised 1,014,315 soldiers (officers, NCOs and soldiers), and in early December, when the reorganization operation officially ended there were 377,957 soldiers under arms. On 16 October 1940, the Ministry of Air and Marine and the Ministry of Army's Procurement were abolished and one ministry was created, the Ministry of National Defense, with four secretaries of state: Army, Air, Navy and Army's Procurement.

In order to continue military modernization and adaptation to the novelties of modern warfare, a decision was made on 25 September 1940 for the General Staff be relieved of the administrative burdens and handle the operative and strategic preparation of the army, the plans of operations, the officers and soldiers' training. In order to achieve a unity of doctrine within the armed forces, two staffs have been set up: Aeronautics and Navy, subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff. The chiefs of staff of these structures were part of the General Staff and provided the tactical-operative preparation of the two categories of armed forces. The General Staff continued to include the following departments: Organization-Mobilization, Intelligence, Operations, Procurement, Training, Transport. The German and Italian military presence imposed the transformation of Section 7 - Higher Military Education into Section 7 - Allied Army Links.

After the arrival of the German military mission in Romania (12 October 1940), training centers have been established for each branch, in order to train instructors and subunit commanders up to the level of a battalion, in accordance to the German procedures. Three large infantry units (5, 6 and 13 Infantry) and the Armored Division were trained jointly with German units, being considered "model divisions". German councilors have been deployed at the Superior War

38. Cornel Grad, *Al doilea arbitraj de la Viena*, (The Second Arbitration in Vienna), European Institute Publisher, Iași, 1998, p. 65.

School in order to lecture, perform and present tactical and demonstrative exercises.

The program for the reorganization of the Romanian armed forces, established by General Ion Antonescu stipulated: 7) *lowering the framework of peace and mobilization to the demographic and material resources left after the territorial losses, adaptation of the organizational structures to financial resources of the state*; 2) *equipping the large units with modern combat means (armored tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, motor, etc.)*; 3) *elimination of all headquarters that could not be used at war*; 4) *creation of large homogeneous units which would have good mobility in the tactical field*; 5) *improving the staff and troops training program according to the German doctrine etc.*

The financial resources allocated to the reorganization and enhancement of the armed forces' capabilities in September - May 1941 amounted to 20.504.999.906 lei, of which 13.225.289.954 lei were allocated for endowment. In the spring of 1941, the mobilization potential of Romania was of about 2.2 million people, representing 32.9% of the male population and 16.2% of the total population. The 1941 mobilization plan, in force on 22 June, stipulated that the total number of military troops amounted to 1,139,604, of which 39,476 officers, 57,002 NCOs and 1,043,126 troopers. The mobilization plans of the armed forces included: the General Headquarters, three army headquarters, 11 army corps commands, 214 operative formations, 24 operative services, 41 headquarters, units and lower formations.

The structures of the combat units were reorganized in the fall of 1940. The regiment was again organized into three battalions, different from the previous four battalions; the armament company accompanying the regiment, which was converted in 1939 into a company of heavy weapons with a platoon of mortars and a platoon of cannons has turned into a machine gun company in 1941; the battle group was set in the winter 1940-1941 to have 10 people and the platoon had 4 groups, while the company consisted of three platoons and a group of launch-

ers. The reconnaissance companies of the regiments have been strengthened with mortars and sub-machine guns. Despite the efforts to modernize, the artillery regiments would still keep too many 75 mm caliber pieces, uncompetitive compared with the 100 mm and 155 mm howitzers. Moreover, despite all the motor measures, there were still few mobile and armored forces. Trains and motorized supply columns represented true rarities; most columns were still using horses. **These efforts show that the fundamental approach of the Romanian military leadership consisted in improving the firepower of the Large Units and their transformation into real mobile and maneuvering forces. The reorganization of the armed forces also imposed the restructuring of the headquarters.**

In February 1941, after a series of discussions with the experts from the German Military Mission and several conferences with the heads of departments of the General Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Air, Navy and Procurement, General Ion Antonescu decided the establishment of the Great General Headquarters at war, divided into: Echelon I (with the leadership of the military operations) and Echelon II. The organization of the Navy after 6 September 1940 has met some modifications in the idea of strengthening the defense of the seacoast, in cooperation with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Corps deployed in Dobrogea. In view of the threats coming from the East, a coherent defense system was created in the Black Sea and the sea-coast, in which the Navy operated in the first line with all available means, while the in-depth operations were carried out by large units of the land forces. In terms of military, the country has been divided, since March 1941, into border areas, areas of fortifications and areas of military interest (such as the areas of Resita, Muntenia, Dobrogea, Siret, Iasi, Targu Neamt).

While being in Munich, on 12 June 1941, General Ion Antonescu was officially informed about the future German attack against the Soviet Union and he was asked to approve the Romanian troops' participation in the new military campaign of the Wehrmacht. General Ion Antonescu agreed with the Romanian troops' participating

in Operation "Barbarossa". The General Romanian Staff considered that, generally, the Soviet deployment of troops and ships corresponded to the phase immediately preceding the military operations, which required the Romanian side "to take measures and be ready at all times"<sup>39</sup>. **The Romanian government's option to participate in the forthcoming German offensive proved to be the only choice, considering the numerous border incidents with the Soviets, the national interest related to the recovery of what had been lost in June 1940 and the prospects of a new Soviet invasion, or what the Russian historiography after 1989 defined as "the Soviet preemptive strike", aka the operation "Storm" (invasion of Western Europe from 6 July 1941). Under these circumstances, we can say that Romania was in June 1941, in an extreme situation that endangered, vitally and ultimately, the full restoration of the national state.**

Romania would enter on 22 June 1941 into a "clash of continents, civilizations, races, world economic reserves"<sup>40</sup>, hoping that the future peace would be an essentially historical solution, in perspective and with a sustainable organization, which can balance races and continents, an economic system of organization, domination and distribution of the raw materials, a system of political and regional organization that would create new functions and new bodies so that people should be able to save their lives.

**The crossing of the Prut on 22 June 1941 was a matter of national dignity, which has been wounded by the events of 26 to 28 June 1940. The crossing of the Dniester aimed, beyond the issue of the coalition war, at the settlement of the "Russian problem" and of the immediate military needs, at the removal of a huge geopolitical danger: the Great**

**Ukraine, eager to revive with the support of the third Reich.**

Because of the battle of Stalingrad, the winter of 1942-1943 would become a true winter of pain and hatred and any understanding of the role and place of Romania in solving the "Russian problem" has become impossible. The tactics of the domestic political opposition of Iuliu Maniu has generated the impossible in terms of finding a unanimously accepted solution, since our historical destiny has already pushed us into the vortex of historical dissensions between the Great Powers. The "discrete" games of the allied intelligence and the war propaganda of the United Nations have confused the Romanian public opinion and the policy makers in the state, thus preventing a political consensus for the future and the choice of a solutions that would provide dignified and fair national salvation. **The failure in solving "the Russian problem", the revival of the "spheres of interest" policies and the ability of the Soviet political leaders in particular would determine a series of political and economic concessions of the Western Allies in Central and Eastern Europe, approved in Yalta and Potsdam.**

Marshal Ion Antonescu's ambitions to achieve a "23 August" of his own derived from a certain conception of the honor and dignity of a soldier, a head of state and a nation, and from an understanding of the geopolitics of places. The passage of time has shown that the way in which you stay in the collective consciousness of humanity, positively or negatively, influences your future relationships and friendships. The act on 23 August 1944 would confirm, to the fullest, that in Romania, as noted by the political scientist Petre Ionascu, the coups "were always followed by great calamities for the country"<sup>41</sup>, and that "the inconsistency of an attitude or of a bat-

39. General Antonescu was asked on 5 March 1941 by Marshall Göring to send 20 divisions in an anti-Soviet operation, which explains why the leader of the state was not surprised by Hitler's disclosures on 12 June 1941 in Munich. Considering the personality and political and military experience of Ion Antonescu, it is difficult to believe that he was surprised by the request made by Göring. All the information analyses regarding the disposition of the Soviet Army indicated that an extreme development was about to follow, which would change the existing balance of forces in the international relations. The information about the meeting on 5 March 1941 has been provided by historian Cristian Scarlat (Apud Florin Constantiniu, *Carnet de Istoric*, in **CNM**, nr. 223, 11-17 December 1995, p.7).

40. The speech of Mihai Antonescu at the government on 6 March 1943 (*Stenogramele de la mănăstire*, in **România Liberă**, 10 February 1998, p. 1).

tle has never been appreciated or admired by friends or enemies"<sup>42</sup>.

In the process of Romania's Sovietization and communization, especially after 6 March 1945, the government implemented Law no. 293 on 18 August 1947, which proposed more than 100 Romanian armed forces generals for reserve, a process that would take place in stages. Under this law, from September 1947 to March 1948, 83 generals, 1,991 officers, 1,547 NCOs and 253 WOs had to retire, a total of 3,874 military personnel who "proved hostile to the policy of the party and of the democrat government". In the period 1945-1947, 32,368 military personnel have become reservists, of which 12,003 officers, 17,948 NCOs and 2,417 WOs, which means that at least two thirds of the military personnel existing on 9 May 1945 was removed from the army, mostly based on political criteria. **We can conclude that the Romanian armed forces were transformed, in less than three years, into a docile instrument of the new political power in Romania, easily to handle in the future political actions of the Romanian Communist Party. The Romanian Armed Forces would thus pay a price extremely high during the Stalinist decade for the crime of having done its duty towards the national ideals and towards Romania as a free and independent state.**

Kremlin's strategic plans for Europe involved Romania after 23 August 1944 by: 7) using it as an advanced Soviet military base; 2) using the economy, especially oil and food resources as potential sources for strengthening the Soviet potential; 3) using the Romanian government as a marionette to control the most important segment of the Danube, thereby managing to control a main transport route in southern Europe; 4) using the military force as an addition to the armed forces of the Soviet Union.

### **Reorganization following the Soviet model**

Against the background of the process of Sovietization and communization of the Romanian society, Romania was divided on 1 July 1947 into four military regions, following the Soviet model, as it follows: Military Region 1 (Timisoara), Military Region 2 (Bucharest), Region Military 3 (Cluj) and Military Region 4 (Iasi). In 1953, there were only two regions left: Military Region 2 (Bucharest) and Military Region 3 (Cluj), some of the tasks of the military regions being taken over by the army corps created in 1952. On 1 May 1960, the other two military regions were abolished and they were replaced by large operational units: 3<sup>rd</sup> Army headquartered in Cluj and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army headquartered in Bucharest. Starting with 1951<sup>43</sup>, much of the Romanian material and financial resources have been consumed for the imports of weapons, combat equipment and ammunition from the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, for the construction of fortifications on the border with Yugoslavia and in the southern Romanian coast of the Black Sea, as well as various for other various imports of machines and equipment necessary for the national defense industry.

Following the decisive conference in Moscow on 9 January 1951, the Romanian armed forces had to adopt the following organizational structure: three military regions headquarters; four Army Corps headquarters; ten infantry divisions (six with 8,600 soldiers each and four divisions with 4,000 troops each); two divisions of mountain troops; two cavalry brigades; a rupture artillery division, equipped with 152 mm caliber mortars and howitzers; four heavy artillery brigades (cal. 122 mm howitzers and guns); three antitank artillery brigades; two divisions of R-2 reactive missile launchers, which were imported from Czechoslovakia; five anti-aircraft artillery

41. Petre Ionașcu, *Valoarea actului de la 23 august 1944*, (The Value of the Act on 23 August 1944, in **Mareșalul Antonescu în fața istoriei**, vol. II, Iași, 1990, p. 452.

42. *Ibidem*.

43. In an informative note on the assessment of the Romanian armed forces' capabilities, the Soviets noted on 1 May 1951: "Following the weak military and political preparation of the units and large units, the existence of numerous reluctant officers, the low level of discipline and the weak technical level, the mobilization and combat capability, it remains at the same low level as before". (Apud N. V. Vasileva, *Războiul Rece și formarea blocurilor militare (The Cold War and the Formation of Military Blocks)*, in **Document. Buletinul Arhivelor Militare Române**, year VIII, no. 4 (30)/2005, p. 29).

divisions and eight independent antiaircraft artillery regiments equipped with guns manufactured in the USSR and Hungary; two operative antiaircraft artillery divisions; a corps of tanks, organized in regiments; a division and two T34-76 tank brigades; a regiment of T34-85 tanks and ISU 152 heavy auto-tanks; a mechanized division; a reactive fighter aircraft division equipped with 90 MiG-15; two divisions of jets equipped with classical La-9; a division assault aviation that would receive from the Soviet Union 30 Il-10 planes; a bomber division consisting of 62 Tu-2 planes; four independent aviation regiments (with six Tu-6 reconnaissance and bomber aircraft, three Li-2 transport aircraft, Po-2 and "Fieseler" Fi-156 "Storch" aircraft, Heinkel-114 hydroplanes, a regiment of paratroopers; four regiments of pioneer, four regiments pontoon, a railway brigade and four signal regiments. The Soviet General Staff decided to send the Romanian Navy six torpedo boats, six armored ships, two destroyers, two small submarines, three coastal artillery batteries (130 mm 12 guns) and a demagnetization station.

The basic large tactical unit of the military organization was still the infantry division, whose structure gradually included subunits (units) of tanks and auto-tanks, which increased the possibilities to maneuver. In the context of intensifying the process of equipping the armed forces with motorized means of combat and transport, the classical infantry units started a transformation process into joint mechanized units, with lower numbers of infantry troops in favor of infantry and tanks<sup>44</sup>. The cavalry troops were to disappear in 1954 from the structure of the armed forces. The mountain troops disappeared as well. On 14 April 1961, the last large unit of mountain troops (2<sup>nd</sup> Mountain Troops Division

in Brasov) was disbanded. It was reestablished on 14 October 1964. In March 1960, the border guards were transferred from the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) to the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MAF) and the Border Guards Headquarters was created, having the responsibilities of a central headquarters.

The Romanian infantry troops were equipped with the following types of arms: 1) AKM submachine guns, caliber 7.62 mm, manufactured in Romania under Soviet license 2) ZPU-2 antiaircraft guns, caliber 14.5 mm, of Soviet origin then ZPU-4 and 3) RPG-2 and RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers, caliber 40 mm. In 1955 Romania started to manufacture SR-132 and SR-134 trucks, from the series "Carpathians" and "Bucegi" and also the IMS terrain vehicles, which would boost the modernization of the Romanian armed forces. In 1960 and 1961, the infantry was equipped with the amphibious armored personnel carrier (APC). Also, considering the support of the new Soviet ally and the defense system based on the existence of Soviet nuclear missiles, it was considered that the classical artillery was no longer useful on the battlefield. The Artillery Training Center was disbanded in 1961, but it would be restated with the Mixed Land Forces Training Center in Sibiu in 1962. From June 1962 to April 1970, the artillery training was carried out at the land Forces Training Center in Fagaras. Operational-tactical missiles of Soviet manufacture entered the endowment of our armed forces in 1961 and tactical missiles were received in 1962. On 29 May 1962, the Training Center of the Armed Forces Artillery Headquarters in Ploiesti was created.

On 12 September 1956, the State's Air Defense Command was created, following the merger of the Military Air Force Command (CFAM) with

44. The organizational structure of the Romanian armed forces in mid 1959 was the following: 95<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division Oradea), 76<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Dej), 86<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Lugoj), 63<sup>rd</sup> I Infantry Division (Craiova), 28<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Slatina), 41<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division (Buzău), 84<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Călărași), 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Roman), 13<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Bacău), 2<sup>nd</sup> Mountain Troops Division (Braşov), 1<sup>st</sup> Mechanized Division "Tudor Vladimirescu-Debreţin" (Bucharest), 9<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division (Basarabi), 10<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division (Iaşi), 18<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division (Timişoara). In October 1954, the 47<sup>th</sup> Armored Corps was disbanded as well as the tank brigades existing until then. During the reorganization process, the 37<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division "Tudor Vladimirescu-Debreţin" was created as well as tank regiments and battalions. On 1 October 1954, the Romanian armed forces possessed 360 Soviet T34-85 tanks and only 12 T-5 tanks (Germany), 39 T-5 cannons (Germany), 7 T-3-75 auto-tanks (Germany), 5 T-4-150 auto-tanks (Germany), 5 T-3 tractors (Germany), 15 "Renault" tracked vehicles (France), "Praga" tractors (Czechoslovakia). After 1955, the armed forces received T-54 tanks with vertical stabilizer and in 1959 the armored vehicles entered a modernization phase. From 1961 to 1963, armored vehicles and T55-100 tanks have been purchased from the USSR.

the Territorial Air Defense Military Command (CFAM). As of 17 June 1957, the Territorial Air Defense Military Command became the State's Air Defense Command, which subordinated: the Air Forces, Air Defense units, anti-aircraft missile troops (established in 1959) and the early warning troops (created on 20 March 1958).

On 26 May 1951, a train arrived from the USSR at the Ianca station (Brăila), carrying six IAK-23 fighter jets and one IAK-17 UTI training aircraft. The parts of the planes were transported in containers, being the first 3 jets of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Jet Division (the future 97<sup>th</sup> Jet Aircraft). From May to September 1951, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division Jet Aircraft has received 56 IAKs in order to equip the 11<sup>th</sup>, 12<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> regiments. The first 62 MiG-15 fighters were brought in 1952 for the 66<sup>th</sup> Fighter Division, which subordinated the 208<sup>th</sup> Jet Regiment in Otopeni and the 158<sup>th</sup> Jet Regiment in Craiova. In the following years, Romania would import from the USSR different training planes, fighters and bombers IAK-23, MIG-15, MIG-17, MIG-19 and then MIG-21, reconnaissance aircraft IL-28, transport aircraft AN-2, AN-24 and radar stations P-2, P-8, P-12, P-15, P-20, P-30, SIP 35, radio altimeters PRV-10 and 11, means for artillery fire etc.

The Romanian authorities would also start political, diplomatic and economic dialogue with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in order to conclude military agreements on the massive import of arms, ammunition and combat equipment from these countries. For example, Poland would deliver 30,000 SKS rifles (model 1945, cal. 7.62 mm, manufactured under Soviet license in Poland) and a quantity of artillery ammunition for the Soviet M-30 howitzers (model 1938, cal. 122 mm) and the anti-aircraft guns in the Romanian Armed Forces. Romania imported from Hungary radios, SZ-60 anti-aircraft guns (cal. 57 mm, model 1950), 60,000 SKS carbines and 400,000 artillery ammunition (from 616,000 requested) for the divisional Soviet D-44 cannon (cal. 85 mm, model 1944) and the T 34-85, as well as AAS-60 cannons (produced in Hungary under Soviet license under the name of SZ-60 and remotely guided by the fire control system PUAZO-6). Czechoslovakia also offered to

sell 5,000 SG-43 guns or SGMT "Goriunov" (cal. 7.62 mm), T 34-85 tanks and S-102 fighter planes.

In 1956, the air defense units were equipped with the new KS-19 Soviet anti-aircraft cannons (cal. 100 mm) and KS-30 (cal.130 mm) which replaced the old Western and European models "Bofors" (cal. 20, 25 and 40 mm), "Vickers" (cal. 75 mm) and "Krupp" (cal. 88 mm), which were gradually phased out in 1958-1959. In 1959, the Soviet air defense missile system "Dvina" was purchased. From 1960 to 1965, 6,157 million lei were allocated for the purchase of some "Volkhov" SA-75 anti-aircraft missile systems, 104 MiG-21 and F-13, which would replace the MiG-15 in 4 aviation regiments. Two large air defense units were set up in the years 1965 - 1966: the 16<sup>th</sup> Air Defense Division (headquartered in Ploiesti) and the 34<sup>th</sup> Air Defense Division (headquartered in Giarmata), each including a radio-technical brigade. A cooperation plan on the monitoring of the air space was signed in 1963 between the Air Defense Headquarters of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact.

In June 1951, the Soviet Union would retribute the second batch of ships (the first group consisting of destroyers "Marasesti" and "Maraști", the gunboats "Ghiculescu" and "Stihi", the torpedo ships "Zborul" and "Zmeul" and the submarine "Delfinul", the latter having been returned on 12 October 1945, followed by the training ship "Mircea" on 27 May 1946, the submarine "Rechinul", the destroyers "Regina Maria" and "Regele Ferdinand" and 5 monitors on the Danube. The five ships of the Danube would allow the creation of the Danube Flotilla, which in 1959 was named the Fluvial Brigade. The group of ships would operate until May 1951 under the Military Navy Command. In 1955, the battalions comprising the ships and the Navy Defense were subordinated to the Military Navy Command. In the coming years (1955-1960), new types of warships were being built in the Romanian yards: dredgers at the yards at Galati and Braila, road dredgers in the yards at Galați and fluvial dredgers in the yard at Oltenița. Torpedoes, submarine hunters and missile speed boats have



also been purchased from the USSR. In 1962, the 42<sup>nd</sup> Navy Division was created as a successor of the traditions of the Sea Division, which was equipped with dredgers, minelayers, special purpose ships, coastal artillery, cover ships etc.

### ***The renationalization of the Armed Forces***

In the general situation created by the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Romania in the summer of 1958, the armed forces began a renationalization process. Changes occurred at the level of the organization, training, military education, endowment, military symbols etc. In 1959, the four academies of higher military education merged and the result was the General Military Academy: the Staff Military Academy, the Military-Political Academy, the Cover Military Academy and the Technical Military Academy. By Decree no. 381 of 1 October 1959 of the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of RPR, the day of 25 October was set as the day of the Romanian Armed Forces. In July 1959, the NCO Corps was re-established again, after having been abolished on 14 July 1950. NCO military schools are being founded (combat, technical and services) with two-year programs, alongside the WO military schools with three-year programs.

On 7 December 1961, the Superior Military School for Officers "Nicolae Balcescu" in Sibiu was founded by the Decree no. 836 of the Council of Ministers, with the mission to prepare young officers to command gunmen platoons, border guards, security, artillery, engineering, communications, logistics, finance and firefighters. Military schools for arms would be created in the following years: the Superior Military School for Artillery Officers (1970), the Superior Military School for Communications Officers and the Superior Military School for Engineering Officers (1975) with four-year educational programs.

The two-year military service for all types of

arms was introduced in November 1961, except the navy where it lasted three years. Afterwards, since November 1964, the active military service was a year and four months, except the navy and border guards, where it was two years. In 1956 the old military regulations, copied from the Soviet ones, started to be replaced by general and combat regulations that somehow illustrated the Romanian military thinking. **"1960 represents a new stage of these changes that aimed at removing some of the Soviet models imposed on the country's military organization from 1945 to 1950. (...) In terms of organizational structures, the system of military regions introduced by legislation in 1947 and imported from the Soviets was dropped. Large army operational units have been created, achieving an increased coefficient in the mobility of troops and greater flexibility in leadership. It must be said that such a measure was part of the Romanian military traditions because the armies existed at wartime only as operational structures, while at peace there were army corps operating as a mixed structure, both in operations and planning. In terms of the military structures we also need to mention that infantry divisions have been turned into mechanized divisions, which generated a fundamental change in the Army, which increased their technical nature"**<sup>45</sup>, says the military historian Colonel (ret.) Ph.D. Petre Otu.

The Political Bureau of the CC of PMR of 31 March 1960 decided to downsize the Army and the Interior<sup>46</sup>, allowing the communist authorities to trigger a vibrant campaign **"that needed to show, in the concept of the originators, the stability of the regime and its peaceful, non-aggressive vocation"**<sup>47</sup>. The criteria for the selection, training and promotion of future military personnel were changed, so that the most important ones were **"the devotion to the regime at the expense of the professional training, culture and level of competence"**<sup>48</sup>. At its meeting on 20 April 1960, the Political Bureau

45. Petre Otu, *Armata și partidul, de la „dezgheț” la „explozie”. O relație dificilă*, (The Armed Forces and the Party, from Thawing to „Explosion”. A Difficult Relation) in **Dosarele Istoriei, (History Files)** Year VI, no. 9 (57), 2001, p. 39.

46. 2,512 COs, 112 NCOs and 1,100 civilians were made reserves.

47. Petre Otu, **op. cit.**, p. 39.

of the CC of PMR adopted a new **Statute of the Officers** that brought new provisions in line with the needs imposed by the modernization of the armed forces, the new training and equipment. The new status extended by one year the promotion in rank to major-lieutenants, captains, majors and lieutenant colonels and also established that promotions would take place once a year by the order of the Minister of National Defense. Another requirement was that candidates who wanted to pursue military education needed to have completed high school and had to have a high school diploma. Promotion to the rank of major and colonel was done by examination and grading of officers was made each year and not two or three years, as before. The Ministry of the Armed Forces (MAF) was granted the right to withdraw military ranks up to soldier **"for acts incompatible with the quality of officer."**<sup>49</sup>

The political control over the armed forces would be permanent, despite some changes in form, but not in substance. On 5 October 1948 the Political Superior Directorate of the Army (DSPA) was created, in accordance with the existing model in the Red Army and Nicolae Ceausescu would lead this important political structure of leadership and control of the armed forces from 18 March 1950 to 19 April 1954. The PMR influence – through the DSPA - has become omnipresent in all the structures of the armed forces. In the domestic political context after the *PMR Declaration of April 7520*, on 27 June 1964, the Army General Leontin Sălăjan proposed the CC of PMR the abolition of DSPA and the establishment of the Higher Political Council of the Armed Forces (CPSA). In early July 1964, the CC of PMR approved the composition of the CPSA (31 members) and the composition

of the Bureau of the CPSA. **"CPSA has preserved most goals and objectives of DSPA. The newly elected party committees or offices of the organizations have taken on the responsibilities of the political deputies of the heads of central departments in the ministry, the commanders of arms and faculty leaders at the General Military Academy, their positions being abolished. The regiments which had independent battalions have been enriched with party bureaus and basic organizations have been created at the command of the units and of the battalions. There were also promoted a number of changes in order to develop the military patriotic spirit, and since 1969 there have been efforts to substantiate and enforce the people's war doctrine for the defense of the country"**<sup>50</sup>, wrote historian Petre Opreș.

The suppression of the "Prague Spring" (21 August 1968) by the USSR and the members of the Warsaw Pact (OTV) has imposed a new behavior for Romania in international relations and in the relations with the armed forces as a factor of power in the state ruled by Nicolae Ceausescu and the PCR. The political leadership of socialist Romania adopted measures to keep control of the Romanian armed forces, as it follows 1) *the decision that Romania would not participate with troops in the military exercises carried on the territory of other countries*; 2) *the organization of command and map field exercises on the national territory without the troops of the OTV allies*<sup>51</sup>; 3) *interdiction for foreign troops or aircraft to transit the Romanian territory and air space without the approval of the Romanian military and political authorities*; 4) *closure of the educational programs for officers and generals in Soviet military academies*<sup>52</sup>. Remembering that period in the

48. *Ibidem*.

49. *Ibidem*, p. 40.

50. **România 1945 - 1989. Enciclopedia Regimului Comunist. Instituții de Partid, de Stat, Obștești și Cooperatiste** (*Romania 1945-1989. The Encyclopedia of the Communist Regime. Institutions of the Party, State, Cities and Cooperatives*) (coordinator Dan Cătănuș), Publisher: The National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism/ Romanian Academy, Bucharest, 2012, p. 265.

51. In accordance with the general concept of the military exercises carried out by Romania in the 70s and 80s, activities planned by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Unified Armed Forces Command (CFAU) once every two years, the Romanian generals and officers had to issue the strategic and tactical-operational situations that were to be used during the military exercises on the map, as well as the methodology of these exercises. The Romanian representatives would then present the CFAU the general concept of the exercises in order to achieve cooperation with the two army commands, the Soviet and Bulgarian one, which constituted a "Group of Armies" ("Fronts", according to the Soviet/Russian terminology), whose command comprised Romanian officers and generals.

history of Romanian Armed Forces, Colonel General (ret.) Constantin Olteanu, former Minister of National Defense (29 March 1980 – 16 December 1985) says: **“In 1949 - 1965, for example, 467 Romanian generals and officers studied in military academies, attended military schools and training courses in the Soviet Union. As compared to earlier years, the number of people sent to study in the USSR was decreasing until stoppage after 1965. Unfortunately, over time, there have been errors in this issue. Thus, by the Declaration of the Plenary of the CC in April 1964, officers and generals who have studied in the USSR had a certain priority in occupying important positions (...) As it is known, the majority of these people have proven professional competence, effectively contributing**

**to the modernization of the Romanian armed forces. (...) More attention would have been needed in the appointments of officers and generals who had been studied abroad alongside with those who had been studied in the country in order to achieve a natural composition, free of animosity and suspicion.”**<sup>53</sup>

It was also decided that all command exercises<sup>54</sup> **would be based** – says the military historian Colonel (ret.) Ph.D. Petre Otu – **on a scenario with a non-nominal enemy and the annual directive of the Unified Armed Forces’ commander was considered a recommendation”**<sup>55</sup>, the large Romanian units being subordinated to the national military command<sup>56</sup>. In the 70s, the Romanian military authorities have ful-

52. In a document issued on 18 July 1995 by the MoD for Senator Șerban Săndulescu (PNȚcd), a member of the *Parliamentary Commission for the Investigation of the Events in December 1989*, it was mentioned that the first Romanian officers left for the USSR to study in 1948, the first graduates were in 1950 and the last ones in 1967. **In total, 1,858 officers of the Romanian armed forces have graduated military academies and schools or training courses (specialized courses) in the USSR.** 816 officers have graduated military academies with a duration of 2 to 7 years, as it follows: 7) 727 at general command and staff military academies (the “K. E. Vorosilov” Higher Military Academy and the “Mihail B. Frunze” Military Academy );2) 348 at military academies for the arms (artillery, armor, engineers, signals, transportation, chemistry and radiolocation);3) 257 at technical military academies;4) 33 at the Support and Supply Academy; 5) 17 at the „V. I. Lenin” Military-Political Academy. **There were also 348 other officers who have graduated military schools with a duration of 1-3 years with various military specialities and 704 officers who have graduated command, staff, services and medical assistance training courses.** When this document was issued, 1,827 of these officers were no longer working in the MoD, being eliminated from the military reserves, which means they had no military commitment. **“The other 41 officers, aged between 51 and 60, occupy command, staff, technical, educational and research positions, being assessed in their annual professional evaluation forms as being mainly very good officers”** (Apud Șerban Săndulescu, *Decembrie '89. Lovitura de stat a confiscat Revoluția Română*, (December '89. The Coup Has Confiscated the Romanian Revolution), Publisher: Omega Press, Bucharest, 1996, p. 157). The Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior said that the analyses indicate that in 1948-1968 no officers of the Ministry of the Interior attended academic studies or higher studies in the USSR. However, there were 1,000 employees of the Ministry of the Interior who had attended training courses (specialized courses) in civilian or military educational institutions from the USSR. None of them was active anymore in 1995. For the training model of the Romanian intelligence officers in Moscow, see: *the memoirs of Colonels (ret.) Nuț Alexandru (a student in Moscow from 1 September 1961 – 1 August 1963)*, Ștefan Dumitru (1961 – 1963) and Ion Toboșaru (October 1962 – May 1963), in *Periscop*, Year VI, no. 8 (68), October – December 2013, p. 13 – 18.

53. Constantin Olteanu, **O viață de om. Dialog cu jurnalistul Dan Constantin**, (A Lifetime. Dialog with Journalist Dan Constantin), Publisher: Niculescu, Bucharest, 2012, p. 46.

54. In 1980-1988, the military representatives of socialist Romania have attended several joint operational and strategic military exercises of the Warsaw Treaty, as well as several national military exercises, as it follows: **SCUT-80 (WAFFEN-BRUDERSCHAFT - 80)** in RDG (8 - 12 September 1980); **TOMIS-81** (Mangalia North, 6 - 11 March 1981); **VEST-81** (in Bielorusia, 4-12 September 1981); **SCUT-82** (Bulgaria, 25 September - 1 October 1982); a joint operational and strategic exercise on the map (Bucharest, 15-25 February 1983); a joint operational and strategic exercise on the map **CALLATIS-83** (Mangalia North, 4 - 9 April 1983); **DACIA-83** (headquarters national strategic exercise Bucharest, 27 June - 5 July 1983); **SOIUZ-84** (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, the south-west regions of the USSR and the Black Sea on 12 - 20 March 1984); **SCUT-84** (Czechoslovakia, 5-15 September 1984); a joint strategic and operational exercise on the map and on the field (Bulgaria, 4-15 April 1985); a joint operational and strategic exercise on the map, **TOMIS-85** (Mangalia Nord, 8-13 April 1985); the exercise **GRANITUL-85**, with real-marked air targets (Romania, 11 - 20 July 1985); **CARPAȚI-85** (Romania, September 1985); **NEPTUN-86** (Mangalia Nord, 12 February – 15 April 1986); a joint operational and strategic exercise on the map and on the field, **BALCAN-86** (Bulgaria, 25 May - 1 June 1986); a joint operational and strategic exercise on the map, **OLIMP-87** (Mangalia Nord, 4 - 12 April 1987); **OLIMP-88** (Bucharest, 18-26 April 1988); a joint operational and strategic exercise on the map and on the field, **BALCAN-88** (Bulgaria, 30 May – 4 June 1988), **DACIA-88** (Cernavoda, Fetești-Bordușani, Vlădeni, Câmpulung-Muscel, Cincu firing range; 15 August – 10 September 1988, a national demonstrative exercise).

55. Petre Otu, **op. cit.**, p. 41.

56. On 3 May 1966, Army General M. I. Kazakov, Chief of Staff of the Unified Armed Forces Command of the Warsaw Treaty spoke with Generals Leontin Sălăjan and Ion Gheorghe about the subordination of the Unified Armed Forces Command to the USSR Ministry of Defense. In a report sent to Nicolae Ceausescu on 9 May 1966, General Leontin Sălăjan mentioned the fact that General M. I. Kazakov *“spoke about the discharge of the Supreme Commander from the position of deputy of the USSR Minister of Defense, considering that*

filled their obligations under the provisions of the OTV (participation at the Romanian military exercises organized by Bucharest in agreement with CFAU), since Nicolae Ceausescu said: **"Romania is member of the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, we have an obligation to act to strengthen cooperation with the armies of the socialist states members of the Warsaw Pact, take the appropriate actions to achieve joint training<sup>57</sup> and always be prepared to fulfill our commitments."**<sup>58</sup>

In accordance with the principles of foreign policy set out in the early 70s, Nicolae Ceausescu asked the military and civilian specialists to issue a Romanian military doctrine, as well as an adequate legal framework. On 14 March 1969 the **Defense Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania<sup>59</sup>** was set up in order to **"examine, coordinate and solve the key issues in the field**

**of national defense and state security, both in peacetime and in wartime."**<sup>60</sup> The Defense Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania subordinated the CC of the RCP and the Grand National Assembly. In the interval between the sessions of the Grand National Assembly, the **Defense Council<sup>61</sup>** was responsible for all the activity in the State Council of Socialist Republic of Romania. In accordance with **Decree no. 444/1972 on the organization and functioning of the Ministry of National Defense (MND)**, the name of Ministry of the Armed Forces<sup>62</sup> is given up and it is stipulated that the MoD would work under the leadership and guidance of PCR, it would also carry out the orders of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and it would fulfill the objectives established on the basis of the decisions the Defense Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania. **Law no.14 on 28 December 1972 on the organization of the National De-**

*if he were the deputy of the minister, he would rely on the armed forces of the USSR and if comrade Sălăjan wanted missiles, then [Marshal Andrei A.] Greciko could take missiles from the Soviet armed forces in order to give them to Romania" (Apud Petre Opreș, **România în Organizația Tratatului de la Varșovia. 1955 - 1991**, (Romania in the Organization of the Warsaw Treaty. 7511-1991), Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, p. 91). At the same time, General Kazakov said that "if Marshal Andrei A. Greciko were not the deputy of the Soviet minister of defense, it would be necessary an agreement with the Soviet Ministry of Defense, he would have to go there and ask" (**Ibidem**). The removal of Marshal Andrei A. Greciko from the position of Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces would bring benefits in terms of independence, but "there would be also disadvantages in terms of equipment and the time necessary to solve problems" (**Ibidem**). On 17 March 1969, the heads of the delegations attending the reunion of the Consultative Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact Organization held in Budapest adopted a series of highly important documents for the organization, namely: **The Status of the Committee of the Ministers of Defense of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, The Status of the Unified Armed Forces and of the Unified Headquarters of the Warsaw Treaty Organization Members, The Status of the Military Council of the Unified Armed Forces and the Status of the Unified Air Defense System of the Members of the Warsaw Treaty. The Status of the Unified Armed Forces and of the Unified Headquarters of the Warsaw Treaty Organization Members** stipulates that the ministers of the WTO can no longer be automatically considered deputies of the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, which was also the deputy of the Soviet Minister of Defense. The troops of the other WTO members that were meant to attend common operations of the Unified Armed Forces were no longer subordinated directly to the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces and have remained under the direct leadership of the military national commands.*

57. „Under the 1956 stipulations, which did not include consultations with the deputies (the representatives of the allied armies) for analysis and resolution to problems, the commander-in-chief has usually made decisions on his own, following the recommendations of the Soviet government, without consulting the governments of the allied states (or at least its deputies). Moreover, he ordered the increase of the combat capabilities of the Romanian armed forces during the Berlin crisis (August 1961) and the Caribbean crisis (October 1962). By issuing these orders, said General Leontin Sălăjan, the Romanian Minister of the Armed Forces, the Soviet government not only disrespected the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty, but also showed the tendency to subordinate the other countries to the Soviet Union so that they were committed to a war without having their governments decide on this issue”, say the authors (Constantin Olteanu, Alesandru Duțu, Constantin Antip) of the volume **România și Tratatul de la Varșovia. Istoric. Mărturie. Documente. Cronologie**, (Romania and the Warsaw Treaty. History. Testimonies. Documents. Cronology), Pro Historia Publishing House, Bucharest, 6449, p. 86. During the discussions between the chiefs of staff of the Warsaw Treaty Organization members, which were to be held in Moscow on 4-9 February 1966, the first signs appeared about the leading role of the USSR within the alliance.

58. Nicolae Ceaușescu, **România pe drumul construirii societății socialiste multilateral dezvoltate**, (Romania on the Path of Building a Multilateral Socialist Society) vol. 64, Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1981, p. 520.

59. See: Law no. 1 of 70 March 7525 on the creation, organization and functioning of the Defense Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania, in the Official Bulletin, Part I, no 32 of 14 March 1969.

60. **România 1945 - 1989. Enciclopedia...**, p. 150.

61. For details on its organization and functioning see: **Ibidem**, p. 151 - 152.

62. **"The Command of the Armed Forces - said Nicolae Ceaușescu - cannot belong to any foreign element; it represents a sovereign characteristic of the party's leadership and of our state"** (Apud Nicolae Ceaușescu, **România pe drumul desăvârșirii construcției socialiste**, (Romania on the Path of Completing its Socialist Structure) vol. 7, Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1969, p. 366).

**fense of the Socialist Republic of Romania**<sup>63</sup> was also issued, as well as **the concept of homeland defense led by the entire nation**<sup>64</sup>.

Referring to this concept that would represent the fundamental strategic option<sup>65</sup> of socialist Romania's military, Lieutenant-General Gheorghe Logofătu wrote in 1987 that it *"synthesizes the type of war that our country would have to take in order to reject any armed aggression that might occur against it"*<sup>66</sup>, *its social-political essence, character and strategic concept*<sup>67</sup>. At the same time, the development of the Romanian defense industry<sup>68</sup> would be – in 1965-1989 – a very important objective on the agenda of the Communist Party General Secretary.

During the meeting of the CC held at the Palace Hall in Bucharest, from 22 to 25 April 1968, Ni-

colae Ceausescu would announce the enhancement of efforts to produce in Romania some categories of weapons and combat equipment to equip the Romanian armed forces. On 26 April 1968, Nicolae Ceausescu declared before the party in Bucharest: **"As you could learn, the Central Committee plenum decided to take further steps to ensure that our armed forces have modern combat equipment. In this regard, measures have been established to produce in our country a greater share of defense equipment, importing especially the combat equipment<sup>69</sup> whose production in the country is not economically justified and can not be achieved at a satisfactory level."**<sup>70</sup>

In the context of very tense relations with the USSR and its allies of the OTV and the provisions

63. The law was published in the Official Bulletin of the SRR no 160 on 29 December 1972.

64. Lieutenant-General Gheorghe Logofătu considered that the people's defense war of the country represents *"the decided military, economic, political, ideological and diplomatic response given to any aggressor that would attack the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Socialist Republic of Romania, in which all human, material and spiritual resources will be engaged until the victory"* (Apud Lieutenant-General Gheorghe Logofătu, *Aspecte strategice ale războiului popular de apărare (Strategic Aspects of the People's Defense War)*, in **Studii de strategie militară**, coordinator Lieutenant-General Nicolae Eftimescu, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1987, p. 103).

65. **"Our strategic objective is to defend the country and we do not aim to go beyond its borders, so there is no other strategy than defending the Romanian territory from becoming the victim of any imperialist enforced policy"** said Nicolae Ceausescu în 1977 (Nicolae Ceausescu, **România pe drumul construirii societății socialiste...**, (Romania on the Path of Completing its Socialist Structure) vol. 13, Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1977, p. 452).

66. **"A future war for Romania will be a war defending the revolutionary conquests, it will be a war against any attack in order to defend the integrity and independence of the country and the whole nation will be part of this war!"** said Nicolae Ceausescu on 17 December 1985 during one of the sessions of the party meetings for the command of the armed forces.

(Idem, **Cuvântare la convocarea-bilanț a activului de bază, de comandă și de partid din armată, 17 December 1985**, Political Publisher, Bucharest, 1986, p. 10).

67. Lieutenant-General Gheorghe Logofătu, **op. cit.**, p. 101.

68. Such a decision was made after the analyses conducted in several years (1965-1967), after the analyses of the Romanian expert and the analysis of information officially provided by the representatives of Yugoslavia. On 25 March 1965, in Bucharest, General Leontin Sălăjan, Minister of the Armed Forces, met General Ivan Gosnjak, the State Secretary for National Defense of the Federative Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and member of the delegation that attended the funerals of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. On this occasion, the Romanian Minister of the Armed Forces wanted to get information on the endowment of the Yugoslav armed forces. After the exchange of information, General Leontin Sălăjan agreed with the observations and suggestions of the Yugoslav State Secretary and told him that **"it would be good for certain categories of military equipment to be purchased from other countries, the monopoly of one single country in the production of armament is not good and externalization contributes to the improvement of quality and possibilities of purchase"** (Apud Petre Opreș, **România în Organizația Tratatului de la Varșovia...**, (Romania in the Warsaw Treaty Organization...), p. 192).

69. At the reunion of the Permanent Presidium of the PCR's CC held on 8 February 1971, a decision was made regarding the **"reduction of the military equipment imports stipulated in the endowment program of the armed forces for 1971-1975 with 601,7 million lei in currency at the Ministry of the Armed Forces, Ministry of the Interior, the State Security Council and the special units belonging to the Ministry of Industrial Construction of Machines and the Ministry of the Chemical Industry"** (Apud **Ibidem**, p. 193). The document entitled *"Annex to the Plan of measures concerning the promotion of Socialist Republic of Romania of cooperation within the "Complex program of strengthening and continuing cooperation and development of socialist economic integration of the CAER member countries"* set at the end of 1971 and approved in the meeting of the Permanent Presidium of the PCR's CC on 17 January 1972, according to which by March 1972, the minister of Industrial Construction of Machines, the president of the Planning State Committee and the minister of Exterior Commerce needed to report to the party leadership about the cooperation proposals with the USSR in the production of certain types of ammunition, armament and tank and aviation parts, as well as about the cooperation with the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the DRG, Poland and Hungary for the construction of utility aircraft and transport aircraft.

70. Nicolae Ceausescu, **România pe drumul desăvârșirii...**, (Romania on its Path to Completeness...) vol. 3, p. 183-184.

of the doctrine of war to defend the country by the whole people, Nicolae Ceausescu started to build and organize "*popular combat and training formations for the defense of the country*", namely: Patriotic Guards, Civil Defense Formations<sup>71</sup> and the preparation of the youth for homeland defense. By Decree no. 442 of the National Assembly of 20 November 1959, the Workers Guards were established as armed formations designed to provide both the defense of enterprises and support to the state structures in defending public order against **"counterrevolutionary elements that would try to strike against the gains of the people."**<sup>72</sup>

The Workers Guards had a Central Headquarters and staffs within the regional, district and municipal parties and, in some enterprises and local party elements, there have been workers guards organized in platoons, companies and battalions. In 1959, the workers guards had a strength of 37,000 fighters and in the subsequent years the numbers have reached 46,000-47,000 fighters. The Ministry of the Armed Forces provided the guards with ammunition, equipment and combat equipment as well as the specialists required for the military training of the fighters in the workers' guards. On 22 January 1960, the Political Bureau of the CC of PCR decided to subordinate the Workers Guards' central command to the Ministry of the Interior with **"all other tasks resulting from the change, so that the party could provide further political control and guidance of all members"**<sup>73</sup>. According to Decision no. 501 of 24 April 1961 of the Political Bureau of the CC of PMR, the strength of the Workers Guards was reduced from 46,636 to 23,000 fighters on 1 June 1961. On 15 January 1962, the workers' guards were

abolished entirely in the context of the substantial reductions in Romania's military spending.

In the context of the events on the night of 20 to 21 August 1968 in Czechoslovakia, Nicolae Ceausescu said at the emergency meeting of the CC of the Communist Party held in the morning of 21 August 1968: **"I think that in this situation it would be good to think the reinstatement of the workers guards as armed units of the working class to defend the revolutionary gains of our people (...) and create patriotic guards in the country as well"**<sup>74</sup>. The proposal was immediately supported by Petre Lupu, Mihai Dalea and Manea Manescu, and the members of the CC decided the following: **"the re-establishment of the armed patriotic guards composed of workers, peasants and intellectuals (...) to ensure the peaceful work of the Romanian people and the national independence and sovereignty of the country"**<sup>75</sup>. The county political committees have started organizing the Patriotic Guards in enterprises, institution and in villages.

The first detachments of the Patriotic Guards marched on 23 August 1968, on the National Day of Romania. The Decree no. 765 establishing the Patriotic Guards was promulgated on 4 September 1968<sup>76</sup> and Law no. 14/28 December 1972 stipulated that these Patriotic Guards are *"armed units of the working people in towns and villages, established to strengthen the defense capacity of the country"*<sup>77</sup>, so that *"together with the armed forces, they would actively participate in the defense of the revolutionary conquests of the people, of its peaceful work, of the sovereignty and security of the country and the defense of towns and villages, enterprises, institutions and other socialist establishments."*<sup>78</sup> The Patriotic Guards<sup>79</sup> worked

71. For details, see: **România 1945 - 1989. Enciclopedia...**, (Romania 1945-1989. Enciclopedia...) p. 8<sup>1</sup> - 49.

72. **Ibidem**, p. 291.

73. **Ibidem**.

74. **Ibidem**, p. 292.

75. **Ibidem**.

76. The Decree was published in the Official Bulletin of the Socialist Republic of Romania no. 116 on 5 September 1968 and it was followed by *Law no 95 of 79 November 1968 for the approval of Decree no 321/7524 regarding the establishment, organization and functioning of the patriotic guards*, published in the Official Bulletin of SRR no 150 on 16 November 1968.

77. **România 1945 - 1989. Enciclopedia...**, (Romania 1945-1989. Enciclopedia...)p. 6<sup>3</sup> 7.

78. **Ibidem**.

79. The Patriotic Guards comprised men up to the age of 60 and women up to the age of 55. Students also had to carry out military training with the Patriotic Guards. The structure of the Patriotic Guards was similar to the structure of the armed forces, there were

under the direct leadership of the PCR's CC, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the local party representatives<sup>80</sup>. By *Decree no. 35 of 31 December 1989 on the subordination of the Patriotic Guards and the training of the youth for defense*, the Patriotic Guards were subordinated to the MoD. The Patriotic Guards represented an instrument of power that Nicolae Ceaușescu tried to use in order to suppress the opposition manifestations against him and his political regime.

### ***The subordination of the military establishment***

Beyond the desire to strengthen the military establishment, having in mind the fear of a Soviet invasion meant to overthrow him, Nicolae Ceaușescu tried to wholly subordinate the military institution<sup>81</sup>. **“As for the armed forces and their leadership, it has been too much to chew for V. Patilinet and a wall almost impossible to demolish for N.Ceausescu. Generals Ionita, Ion Gheorghe, Vasile Ionel, Militaru, Niculescu and others had formed a strong**

**barrier, impossible to surpass for the measures or indications liable to harm the interests of the army and reduce its combat capability. Nicolae Ceausescu did not have the courage to face the army leadership for years and he was forced to accept their stand in a number of situations. The Military Intelligence Directorate was the Trojan Horse and, according to the Soviet model, it was part of the Ministry of the Interior<sup>82</sup>, says Major-General (ret.) Ionel Gal.**

Based on the reports issued by the 4<sup>th</sup> Military Counter-Intelligence Division, Nicolae Ceaușescu was aware of the spirit of the armed forces, the combat readiness, military order and discipline and the loyalty of senior leaders of the MoD. As generals Ion Ionita and Ion Gheorghe were asserting themselves politically in terms of decisions on the military, Nicolae Ceaușescu launched and speculated the concept of strengthening the leadership of the national economy with soldiers so that very many generals were sent to senior positions<sup>83</sup> in the national economy. At the same time, the idea of using numerous militaries from the Ministry of Na-

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rifle subunits (organized into battalions, companies, platoons and groups), arms subunits (organized on batteries and platoons) and support subunits (organized in platoons and groups). Starting with 1976, the structure of the Patriotic Guards also included the Brigade as a Large tactical Unit. The commanders of the Patriotic Guards subunits were appointed by party committees in enterprises and institutions and the deputy political commanders of the subunits were selected by the party. In 1989, socialist Romania had at peace, patriotic guards with a staff of about 1.5 million people whose training was conducted and coordinated by 1,064 military personnel from MoD. See: Laurentiu-Cristian Dumitru, *Doctrina Militară a României Comuniste (7524 - 1989). Perspectivă istorică și abordare conceptuală (The Military Doctrine of Communist Romania (1968-1989). Historical Perspective and Conceptual Approach)* in **Iluzii, teamă, trădare și terorism internațional-1940. Omagiu Profesorului Ioan Scurtu**, (coordinators: Gh. Buzatu, Marusia Cirstea, Horia Dumitrescu, Cristina Păiușan-Nuică), vol. II, Demiurg Publishing House, Iași, 2010, p. 394-402.

80. The first secretaries of the party Committees in counties, cities and sectors of Bucharest were the commanders of the Patriotic Guards. The status of the Communist Party stipulated the party leadership of the Patriotic Guards at all levels. The Patriotic Guards Staff functioned along with the CC of the Communist Party and it employed people from the MoD and the Ministry of the Interior. For further information about the activity of the Patriotic Guards, see Constantin Olteanu, **O viață de om...**, (*A Lifetime...*) p. 177 - 188.

81. **“Special mention needs to be made about the workers that N.C. appointed to lead the military institutions of the state. Emil Bodnăraș significantly influenced the popular army. The military virtues of the man are unknown (he is said to have been the first in class), but his elegant severity of a medieval knight, opposed to the narrow local vulgarity, could only impose education to his high rank staff collaborators. (...) However, starting with Sălăjan, the workers criterion in choosing the leaders of the military has become a permanent one. The next leader, promoted by Ceausescu, was Ionitã, a worker in a factory and a militant of the youth. (...) I do not know what the generals and the soldiers have seen in Ionitã, but the civilians saw him as a brutal and rude proud turner, who did not make the slightest effort to correct his behavior. Which were his dreams? To conquer power in Romania under the protection of Brejnev, whom he might have been similar with since they were build from the same material?”** wrote Dumitru Popescu, former member of CPEx, referring to the leaders of the MoD (Apud Dumitru Popescu, **Cronos autodevorându-se...Angoasa putrefacției. Memorii**, (*Cronos...The Fear of Decay. Memoirs*), Volume IV, Curtea Veche Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p. 176 - 178).

82. Ionel Gal, **Ra iune și represiune în Ministerul de Interne. 1965 - 1989**, (*Reason and Repression at the Ministry of Interior. 1965-1989*), Volume I, Domino Publishing House, Iași, 2001, p. 248.

83. In June 1976, General Ion Ionitã was changed from the position of Minister of Defense and he was appointed Deputy Prime-Minister responsible for the coordination of the Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Health, State Committee for Water, Danube-the Black Sea Canal, Civilian Aviation and Civilian Navy. General Ion Gheorghe was sent to consolidate the Commission for the coordination of the popular councils' activity.

tional Defense into the national economy would help Nicolae Ceausescu in his desire to fully subordinate the leadership of the military establishment. On 16 December 1978, during the meeting with the party and the armed forces, Nicolae Ceausescu said: **"I do not want to end the activities in this direction; it would be difficult to enumerate all the factories, building sites, irrigation sites, works at the canal Danube-The Black Sea, where these military troops are working. This activity of the military is an important factor not only economically, but also politically, because it represents an important economic factor, as well as a political one, because it determines a stronger unity between the army and the people, a deeper understanding by all soldiers of the fact that everything we do for the development of our country - to which they have brought their active contribution both when working as civilians, and when working as military - must be defended."**<sup>84</sup>

In the activity report presented at the 12<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Communist Party on 19 November 1979, Nicolae Ceausescu would support the need to reduce military spending by at least 10% by 1985. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces considered that 50% of the amounts collected could be allocated for social needs in each country and 50% to support developing countries. **"The data published at the time on Romania's military spending in 1965-1981 reveals that the relationship between defense spending and the annual budget has increased slightly and then decreased: 5.1% in 1965,**

**5.4% in 1970 4.3% in 1974, 4.1% in 1975, 3.8% in 1978 and 3.2% in 1980 and 1981. At the same time, the effective military spending increased from 4.735 billion lei (in 1965) to 7.067 billion lei (1970), 8.58 billion lei (1974), 9.71 billion lei (1975) and 12 billion (1978), so that it would decrease to 10.39 billion lei (1980) and 10.40 billion in 1981. About 60% of the budget was for equipment, weapons, munitions"**<sup>85</sup>, concludes historian Petre Opris. Reflecting on the realities concerning the armed forces of the socialist Romania Major-General (ret.) Ionel Gal wrote: **"For these (human and material sacrifices made in the national economy - our note) and for many other achievements, Nicolae Ceausescu appreciated the armed forces and gave them a lot of credit, he attended all its annual analyses and balances as well as the great military exercises and celebrations. Nicolae Ceausescu considered the armed forces to be a stone shield, the armed forearm of the people, the most faithful and loyal institution to the totalitarian regime. Many figures of the armed forces have been promoted, whenever necessary, to other positions in other sectors: in Security, in the Ministry of Interior, in economy, sports, science, engineering etc."**<sup>86</sup>

The Department of Military Affairs and Justice of the Communist Party's CC has become, in those years, an invaluable aid in the relationship between Nicolae Ceausescu and the institutions of force of socialist Romania<sup>87</sup>. The materials submitted by these institutions of Nicolae Ceausescu to the Department provided that **"the**

84. Nicolae Ceaușescu, *Apărarea națională a Republicii Socialiste România. Culegere de texte*, (The National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania), Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1983, p. 429 - 430.

85. Petre Opris, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

86. Ionel Gal, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

87. "Until 1964, the department was, under different names, an annex of the Ministry of the Interior, its role being to inform and connect, although it was led by the secretary of the CC responsible for organization, namely Nicolae Ceausescu. (...) The years that followed, which consolidated political and executive power of the country's President and Commander of the Armed Forces, have gradually lead to the reduction of the department's role and responsibilities in exerting control. Its role has been downsized to the «control of the work» and any type of diversion from it was considered immixture or exposure of the operational activity", said Major-General (ret.) Ionel Gal (*Ibidem*, p.283). Major-General (ret.) Ionel Gal considers that former Secretary of the Communist Party's CC, Ion Coman, was to blame for the fact that the annual balance meetings would be turned into the units and formations of the Security, Militia, into manifestations praising the personality of the Supreme Commander. **"Although it was easily notable that the Security was exceeding its responsibilities, that there were dissensions between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense and that there was a sort of dualism of power between the Secretary of State (head of Security) and the Minister of the Interior, Ion Coman did not have the courage to approach and get involved into these issues. He often had a negative role, being a person that lacked voice and firmness in the servitude relation of the security and the presidential couple and in the technical and operational surveillance of all the people in the party's leadership"** (*Ibidem*, p. 284).



**head of the state was not presented a material with different opinions, thus avoiding placing him in the position of arbitrator.”<sup>88</sup> The Department of Military Affairs and Justice was deeply involved in the preparations made for the mobilization and engagement of the “people” into the war, participating in the “organization of patriotic guards, the selection of people, the supply with equipment, the initiation of basic training, weapons handling”<sup>89</sup>, as well as in the “identification of all those presenting themselves as Russophile – says Major-General (ret.) Ionel Gal - those who have been married in the USSR or those having other types of obligations assumed during the years of study in Moscow.”<sup>90</sup>**

On 16 May 1975, the Minister of National Defense, Army General Ion Ionita, would submit to the head of state a secret report no. M02495, which set out an analysis of the Superior Political Council of the Army concerning the personnel of the MoD who had relatives abroad or had relations with foreigners: 410 military personnel, including 321 officers, 17 warrant officers, 72 NCOs, 10 students from the military schools and 203 civilian employees<sup>91</sup>. **“Most of those who fit the category of “relatives abroad” or “connections with foreigners” were often innocent. Life, through its unpredictable turns, has placed them in such a position, being the outcast of the regime, even if their education and behavior did not justify such treatment. (...) In this case, their career was locked and the military life became problematic. However, the regime found a solution to this problem as well: the transfer to the national economy, “on the socialist construction sites”<sup>92</sup>,**

wrote military historian Colonel (ret.) Ph.D. Petre Otu. The military professionals educated in the USSR and married to Soviet women were usually transferred to other relatively equivalent positions, a measure explained to the Soviets by the **“rotation of the military personnel”**.

Nicolae Ceausescu would order Major General Constantin Olteanu in 1978 that the personnel files of the generals be taken out of the CC's Staff Department and be brought to the Department of Military Affairs and Justice. The proposals for the appointment or dismissal of generals from the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Interior were to be discussed by a small group of people<sup>93</sup>. **“The biggest difficulty in what concerned the military personnel came from Elena Ceausescu because she was not familiar with the terminology, echelons, positions or specific fields of activity. (...) In the case of proposals for promotion, she sometimes made comments like <<If we make him a general, will he be smarter?>> or, when promoting a general from one rank to another <<Let him be, his current rank is enough for him!>> or she opposed the promotion and blocked it, banning us from getting to Nicolae Ceausescu with the proposals which she rejected”<sup>94</sup>,** says former Minister of National Defense, Constantin Olteanu.

Referring to the relationship between Nicolae Ceausescu and the military, the political analyst Anneli Ute Gabanyi mentioned that the West had information about the problems in the Romanian armed forces in the 70s - 80s. **“The officers that retired early or were transferred to the civilian economy”<sup>95</sup> in 1978, 1983, 1984**

88. Constantin Olteanu, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

89. Ionel Gal, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

90. *Ibidem*.

91. The structure of the positions held by these people was the following: 117 people in leadership, 16 in the party structure, 42 doctors, 42 engineers and 133 in various technical services of the MoD. At the same time, according to the statistics of CPSA, 73 people were working in headquarters, 42 in large units, 162 in units of the MoD, 26 in various research centers, 98 in military educational institutions and 222 in various other sectors. See: Petre Otu, *Militarii, rudele în străinătate și relațiile cu străinii, (Military Personnel, their Relatives Abroad and the Relations with the Foreigners)*, in *Magazin Istoric*, Year XLV, New series, no. 9 (534), September 2011, p. 66 – 69.

92. *Ibidem*, p. 69.

93. The members of the Officers' Committee that were attending the discussions: Elena Ceaușescu, Emil Bobu, Constantin Olteanu, Tudor Postelnicu and Constantin Radu, the head of the Officers' Department of the Communist Party's CC

94. Constantin Olteanu, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

95. The newspaper *Scântea* of 18 December 1985 wrote about the fact that when being questioned by the generals discontented about their transfer to national economy about the time when they would be repositioned, Nicolae Ceausescu said: **„We hope that**

and 1985 created a potential of protest that adhered to the elites occupying positions adverse to Ceausescu in the party and the security. Only after the change, details have been made public about the various plans and coup attempts that were threatening the position held by Ceausescu. In order to fight the resistance of some of the military personnel, he initiated measures of "de-professionalization" of the armed forces"<sup>96</sup>, says political analyst Anneli Ute Gabanyi.

Analysts at *Radio Free Europe* said in January 1983 that shortly before Nicolae Ceausescu's birthday (26 January) propaganda began to speak about the Romanian party and state leader as being a military figure. The magazine *Contemporanul* printed on 26 January 1983 a photo of Ceausescu wearing the uniform of a Major General delivering a speech on 9 May 1950, while *Romania Literara*<sup>97</sup> printed a painting of Mihai Mustăța showing Nicolae Ceaușescu saluting the flag in front of a group of armed soldiers. "A strong pro-Ceausescu campaign was triggered before the National Conference of the PCR in December last year, when meetings and film projections have been organized <<in all military units and institutions>>, extolling the achievements of Ceausescu era and the <<indestructible link between the army and the people>>. The festivities in military units and the cultural associations of the army continued on the eve of the celebrations related to the 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the republic, such as the festival "We have a flag, we have a country, we have a commander in chief", which was reported by *Scântea*"<sup>98</sup>, said the analysts at Radio Free Europe in Febru-

ary 1983.

Several important events took place in November and December 1982: sessions the theme of Nicolae Ceausescu's role in shaping Romania's national military doctrine<sup>99</sup>, a meeting of the staff leaders of the Patriotic Guards<sup>100</sup>, a meeting with the generals and officers of the MoD and DSS that have been promoted<sup>101</sup>, a meeting of the Party leaders and command of the DSS<sup>102</sup>, a meeting of the Party and command of the Ministry of the Interior<sup>103</sup>, a plenary of the Superior Political Council of the Armed Forces<sup>104</sup>, a meeting of Political Council of the General Staff with the Party for the celebration of Nicolae Ceausescu's birthday, held at the Ministry of Defense and attended by the higher officers from Bucharest garrison<sup>105</sup>. Despite these events, the Western media (*the BBC, The Times and Süddeutsche Zeitung*) wrote on <sup>1</sup> February 1983 about the existence of rumors about a failed military coup against Nicolae Ceausescu that would have taken place at the end of January 1983. "At the beginning of 1983, at a moment when after the death of Brezhnev, the Romanian leadership was under increasing pressure from Moscow, some serious accusations made by commanders against Ceausescu's defense policy could be heard even in the presence of the head of state and party"<sup>106</sup>, wrote Anneli Ute Gabanyi. Walter Bacon Jr. mentioned the discontent of the Romanian armed forces in a study about socialist Romania: "The armed forces' alleged conspiracies against Ceausescu are not only symptoms of discontent of the elite, but also signs of a general illness of the Romanians that had to carry the burden created by the regime's inability to react to the economic crisis."<sup>107</sup>

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their return will not be necessary because we provide peace without making use of weapons" (Apud Anneli Ute Gabanyi, *Revoluția neterminată*, (*The Unconcluded Revolution*), Publisher: Romanian Cultural Foundation, Bucharest, 1999, p. 73).

96. *Ibidem*, p. 70 – 71.

97. No. 4 of 26 January 1983.

98. Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Anneli Ute Gabanyi, *Cultul lui Ceaușescu*, (*Ceausescu's Cult*), Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 6447, p. 46 – 47.

99. See: *Scântea*, 8 December 1982.

100. *Ibidem*, 26 December 1982.

101. *Ibidem*, 30 December 1982.

102. *Ibidem*, 12 January 1983.

103. *Ibidem*, 14 January 1983.

104. *Ibidem*, 18 January 1983.

105. *Ibidem*, 22 January 1983.

106. Anneli Ute Gabanyi, *Revoluția...*, (*The Unconcluded Revolution*), p. 15 – 72.

107. *Ibidem*, p. 72.

The 15<sup>th</sup> Division of STASI reported on 8 November 1984, based on the information obtained from a German speaking Romanian that was visiting GDR, that **“in 1982/1983 there has been an attempted coup against the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania”**<sup>108</sup>, being **“planned, organized and carried out by significant members of the Romanian armed forces”**<sup>109</sup>. STASI was informed that the coup in Bucharest has failed due to **“the intervention of the special forces (army and security), most of the participants having been <<annihilated>>”**<sup>110</sup>. STASI analysts considered that **“the reason for this attempted coup was the influence the leaders of the state and party had on the country’s military and security policies”**<sup>111</sup>. STASI officers mentioned the fact that the population of socialist Romania was discontent about the fact that the entire power was in the hands of **“Ceausescu’s clan”** so that **“after thwarting the attempted putsch, numerous parts of the population, in particular the Hungarian and German minorities, showed a lot of sympathy for the people involved in the putsch, because people believed that the restructuring of the government might lead to the increase of efficiency in the national economy.”**<sup>112</sup>

The STASI inform was inaccurate, but a military coup was in preparation in the autumn of 1984, being organized by a group of generals and civilians, some of them educated in the

USSR and having affinity to its values, in search of a solution to get rid of **“Ceausescu clan”**. The initiator of the military plot was Colonel-General (ret.) Nicolae Militaru<sup>113</sup>, former Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Industrial Construction (5 June 1978 – 8 February 1984) and former Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army in Bucharest (8 July 1969 – 5 June 1978). Former Minister of National Defense, General (ret.) Constantin Olteanu offered indications of the extremely close relationship between the commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army in Bucharest, Colonel-General Nicolae Militaru, and the military representatives of the USSR in Romania. Given that at the end of 1974 (November) a lot of staff changes were occurring in the central structures of the Ministry of Defense, Nicolae Militaru had a conversation with Major General Constantin Olteanu, proposing him to take lead of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army since he was to take command of the General Staff. **“I sincerely informed him that the Minister of Defense had submitted a report in which he proposed three generals for the position of chief of General Staff, but his name was not there. Maybe, I said to overcome the moment, the Minister of Defense had submitted another proposal directly to Supreme Commander, bypassing our department. General Militaru cut in and said: //The Soviet attaché told me that I was to be appointed Chief of the General Staff. He even congratulated me!>>I was surprised by what General Militaru said. I did**

108. Stejărel Olaru, Georg Herbstritt, **STASI și Securitatea**, (*STASI and Security*), Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 6449, p. 7<sup>1</sup>4 – 371.

109. Ibidem, p. 371.

110. Ibidem.

111. Ibidem.

112. Ibidem.

113. Nicolae Militaru was born on 10 November 1925 in the village Bălești (Gorj County) and died on 27 December 1996 in Bucharest. This general of the Romanian armed forces attended the “Mihail V. Frunze” Military Academy in Moscow in 1952-1956 and after being promoted to lieutenant-colonel, he became the Chief of Staff of the 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division “Stefan cel Mare” in Iasi, then Commander of the Great Unit and of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mechanized Division in Craiova, then Chief of Staff of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army in Cluj-Napoca (1961 – 1965). On 17 June 1965 he became the Commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army, a position that he maintained until 8 July 1969, when he was appointed Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army in Bucharest. He was promoted to Colonel-General on 19 August 1974 and stayed on the same position until 5 June 1978. As for the name “Lepadat”, historians Petre Opris and Gavril Preda have published (in the volume *Romania in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Documents. 1954-1961*, Vol.I, INST, Bucharest, 644<sup>2</sup>, p.749-306) a document that had appeared on 4 March 1961, namely the protocol of the Political Bureau of the CC in which 14 colonels were being promoted to major-generals, Lepadatu N. Militaru (Infantry) including. The future opponent of Nicolae Ceausescu signed the military documents with the name “Militaru Nicolae Lepădat.” See: Iulia Andrei Crăciun, *Cariera generalului Militaru: întâi Academia, apoi liceul*, (*The Career of General Militaru: The Academy First, then the Highschool*), in **Adevărul**, 5<sup>o</sup> March 6454, [adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/cariera-generalului-militaru-intai-academia-apoi-liceul-1\\_50ad57037c42d5a6639347f4/index.html](http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/cariera-generalului-militaru-intai-academia-apoi-liceul-1_50ad57037c42d5a6639347f4/index.html) (retrieved on 06.09.2018, at 17.15). Constantin Olteanu mentioned in his memoirs that Nicolae Militaru was in the attention of the **“military counterintelligence elements, which had the approval of questioning him for his pro-Soviet attitude, his file having various conspiracy names”** (Apud Constantin Olteanu, **op. cit.**, p. 123).

not ask if the Soviet military attaché has directly conveyed the information or through a third person. If what he told me were true, it means that the name of General Militaru has been mentioned in certain circles and later got to the Soviets. It means that, at the time, it was not clear that the appointment of General Ion Coman as Chief of General Staff, even if it was a slight step back, Nicolae Ceausescu sought to interrupt the series of generals educated in the Soviet Union who had occupied this position"<sup>114</sup>, wrote Constantin Olteanu in his memoirs.

During the balance-meeting at the Military Academy in June 1973, Ceausescu asked Minister Ion Ionita for a Chief of Staff of the Patriotic Guards. The Minister of National Defense proposed Nicolae Militaru, but Ceausescu designated General Vasile Milea, former chief of staff of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army during the command of Nicolae Militaru, the commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army at the time. The former chief of the 4<sup>th</sup> Military Counter-intelligence Directorate, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Vasile Gheorghe, said about Nicolae Militaru in an interview with journalist Angela Băcescu in March 1991 that: **"It is true that based on the discontent caused by his removal from the armed forces, particularly in the recent years, General Nicolae Militaru assumed a position of hostility. There is no substance in his allegations on the connections he had with other generals and other classes of officers. Actually, these connections are limited to several reserves that were also discontented with the administrative measures taken against them. Two active generals have immediately reported to the Ministry of National Defense that General Militaru was trying to involve them in "actions against military or-**

**der". These two generals are General Gheorghe Gomoiu and General Constantin Popa, to whom General Militaru promised positions in case he would take command"**<sup>115</sup> wrote Constantin Olteanu in his memoirs.

One first case of gathering political and military intelligence in favor of the USSR was that of Lieutenant-General Ioan Șerb, which became the example most often used in the memoirs of former Romanian security officers as an example of a happy ending in the fight with the KGB & GRU. In September 1971, Lieutenant-General Ioan Șerb was caught red-handed by the officers of the 4<sup>th</sup> Military Counter-Intelligence Directorate of the DSS and he was arrested. He was downgraded and turned into a reserve on 30 September 1971 and later sentenced to seven years in prison<sup>116</sup> by a military court of law for having unlawfully detained at his home, several military documents, among which there were two maps with notes and for having divulged state secrets to the Soviet Union. At the hearing on 17 January 1972, the members of the Permanent Presidium of the PCR's CC agreed that *"Șerb Ion would be prosecuted for illegal possession of documents and disclosure of state secrets."*<sup>117</sup>

### *The end of an era, the beginning of a new era*

In December 1989, the Romanian Army went through a difficult situation because of the leadership of the party and state and due to a number of external factors that were trying to force a certain course of events in Romania. On 9 December 1989, the MoD and the Army Intelligence Directorate (DIA) were informed that Hungary **"acts for the internationalization of the issue of Transylvania, as well as for the political and economic isolation"**<sup>118</sup> of Romania

114. *Ibidem*, p. 109.

115. Angela Băcescu, **România 1989. Din nou în calea năvălirilor barbare**, (Romania 1989. Once Again in the Way of Barbarian Invasions), Zalmoxis Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1994, p. 106 - 107.

116. He was imprisoned only four years.

117. See: Lt. col. (ret) Ph.D. Petre Opreș, *Biografia unui spion sovietic – generalul Ion Șerb*, (The Biography of a Soviet Spy – General Ion Șerb), in **Revista Art-Emis**, Sunday, 1 December 2013, <http://www.art-emis.ro/istorie/1977-biografia-unui-spion-sovietic-generalul-ion-serb.html> (retrieved on 05.10.2018, at 18.15). The first pieces of information on this case were published in the American journal *Time*, on 28 February 1972. The west-German journal *Der Spiegel*, published exactly a week before that an article with the title *"Gestorben"* ("Deceased") containing a series of information about the career of General Ioan Șerb and his current situation. The west-German journalists noted that Ioan Șerb was accused in December 1971 that he was part of an espionage network led by Colonel Musatov, the former USSR attaché in Romania and that he was shot in January 1971.

“while triggering some demonstrations of the Hungarian population in Transylvania, Hungary intending to cause incidents at the border”<sup>119</sup> with Romania, “which would escalate into a military conflict between the two countries, so that it would afterwards ask for the intervention of other countries of the Warsaw Treaty, particularly the USSR, with the aim of a so-called «reconciliation of the parties».”<sup>120</sup> The DIA management informed the MoD that in order to achieve this project, Hungary was to be supported by Austria and other western countries and that the USSR was to be informed of this issue.

DIA’s monitoring of the movements of troops of the Warsaw Treaty member countries highlighted the following: 7) from 2 to 4 June 1989 a joint exercise was organized by Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the USSR involving the activation of important command and troops elements, but it did not pose any major threat; 2) from 14 to 28 October 1989, the Soviet troops in Hungary (102<sup>nd</sup> Division and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army Corps, along with air defense troops, totaling about 13,000 troops) organized an exercise in the district Budapest - Tokay; 3) in October-November 1989, three exercises would be organized in the north-east of the USSR with important troops: the 656<sup>th</sup> Soviet Mechanized Division in northern Bukovina from 4 to 17 October, followed by the 118<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division in the south of Bessarabia on 15 and 16 October and then the 33<sup>rd</sup> Guard Mechanized Division in the region Balti from 2 to 4 November; 4) the deployment of navy exercises in the Black Sea: south of Snake Island, south of Yalta, west of Sukhumi and South of Shabla, in the waters east of Bulgaria; 5) the exercises **Balkan 89** (June 1989) and **Marita 89** (August 1989), both with a southerly direction towards Greece. Despite the fact that “none of the activities mentioned – as told by Vice Admiral (ret.) Stefan Dinu, head of the DIA in December 1989 – was a serious threat for our country”<sup>121</sup>, DIA would

establish a permanent surveillance service of the radio-military networks of our neighbors.

All the Hungarian, Bulgarian and Soviet troop movements were factors meant to exert pressure on Ceausescu’s regime which had to be “encouraged” to accept the implementation of internal reforms, the *perestroika* and *glasnost* model, and also to support an attitude of hostility, rebellion against the communist regime in Bucharest. At the same time, the Romanian armed forces were given a signal since they were considered to be nationalistic and loyal to Nicolae Ceausescu and to the Ministry of Interior (Militia and Security) on the reevaluation of the reason for which the security forces of the Romanian state could be involved in supporting and strengthening the Ceausescu regime.

From 16 to 22 December 1989, the Romanian armed forces were called to defend at all costs a political regime that was becoming anachronistic in the context of the international and regional developments and changes in the security environment. Starting with 22 December 1989, the Romanian armed forces entered a new historical phase marked by the fall of the communist regime and the consolidation of the new democratic regime set with the declaration of the National Salvation Front Council in the evening of 22 December 1989.

The visit of Colonel-General Vasile Ionel, the Chief of General Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces, at the NATO Headquarters on 13 December 1990 was an indication of the new political and strategic orientation of Romania and of its armed forces. In the context of a painful reform of the Romanian armed forces after 1989, the Romanian troops participated at the consolidation of confidence in Romania and its ability to provide regional security, not only to benefit from it. The participation of the Romanian troops in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the missions in Afghanistan (since 2002) and Iraq (since 2003) have allowed an increase in

118. Sergiu Nicolaescu, **Cartea Revoluției Române. Decembrie 1989**, (*The Book of the Romanian Revolution. December 1989*), Ion Cristoiu Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p. 22.

119. *Ibidem*.

120. *Ibidem*, p. 23.

121. Vice-Admiral (ret.) Ștefan Dinu, **Condamnat la discreție**, (*Sentenced to Discretion*), Neverland Publishing House, Bucharest, 644<sup>3</sup>, p. 229.

interoperability with the Euro-Atlantic military and security structures as well as strengthening confidence in the professionalism of the MoD structures and favored, at the same time, integration in NATO (2004) and the EU (2007).

**The Romanian armed forces proved to be an instrument of power and security of the Romanian state, a support of the Romanian national being and identity in historical times influenced by geopolitical games generated by desire for power.**

#### *Ambassador prof. Dumitru CHICAN*

“The 1918 Great Union has been and remains the most sublime page of the Romanian history. Its greatness lies in the fact that the accomplish-



#### **Ph.D. Constantin CORNEANU**

He is Founder and Chairman of the Board of Directors at the “Gheorghe I. Bratianu” European Association of Geopolitical and Strategic Studies (EAGSS) since September 2009. Prior to the establishment of EAGSS, he was councilor at the Romanian Government Office for the Management of Relations with the Republic of Moldova (2004-2007) and journalist at the Press Trust of the Ministry of National Defense in the TV “Pro-Patria” and “Military Observatory” editorial offices. He has over two-decade experience in the analysis of international relations, his expertise including foreign affairs and security policies, particularly in the former Soviet world, as well as the relations between the Republic of Moldova and Romania. He has a doctoral degree in history, obtained in 2003 with a thesis on Romania’s geopolitics during the Second World War. He graduated the National Defense College (1998) and the Faculty of History (1994) at the University of Bucharest. He published the volumes: “*Sub povara marilor decizii*” (*Under the Burden of Great Decisions*) (First edition, Scripta Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007 and the second edition at Cetatea de Scaun Publishing House, Târgoviște, 2013), “*Victorie însângerată. Decembrie 1989*” (*Red Victory. December 1989*) (Cetatea de Scaun Publishing House, Târgoviște, 2014), as well as numerous scientific articles published in the following magazines: “*Europa XXI*”, “*Revista de Istorie Militară*”, “*Document*” (*Buletinul Arhivelor Militare Române*), “*Dosarele Istoriei*”, “*Istorie și Civilizație*”, “*Historia*”, “*Lumea Magazin*”. He was nominated for the Great Award of the Romanian Press Club for a 2000 talk-show with the production: “*The Balkans in Flames*”. He is co-editor of the volume “*Prăbușirea Imperiului Sovietic. „Lecții” în retrospectivă*” (*The Fall of the Soviet Empire. “Lessons” in Retrospective*), (Cetatea de Scaun Publishing House, Târgoviște, 2012). From 1 March 2010 to 10 August 2015 he worked as researcher for the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 and member of the Scientific Council of this institution. He published numerous studies, articles and editorials on the December 1989 Romanian Revolution as a researcher and Editorial Director of “*Caietele Revoluției*” (*The Notebooks of the Revolution*), (2012). He is member of the Romanian Military Club for Euro-Atlantic Reflection. He is currently Deputy Director-General of the Institute of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (since 17 August 2018).



## “SEMPER FIDELIS PATRIAE”: 100 YEARS OF ROMANIAN DIPLOMACY

ment of the national unity is not the work of any politician, of any government, of any party; it is the historic exploit of the entire Romanian nation bursting out from the depths of the consciousness of the kin's unity, a momentum mastered by eminent politicians in order to guide it with remarkable political intelligence toward the desired goal”.

*Acad. prof. Florin CONSTANTINIU*

### 1. An argument


Starting with 1990, namely with the dramatic and fundamental change of political regime in Romania and the country's taking the course toward coming back to the concert of the European free nations and to the international community, the 1st of December became the national day of the Romanian people, marking thus the most important moment of the entire modern Romanian history – the achievement and consecration of the state and national unity accomplished on 1st of December 1918. From that moment, which marked the passage of the Romanian nation from a historical stage of survival to the stage of plenary self-assertion of the will and energies of a people reunited within their natural borders, Greater Romania is one century old. It is a moment of deserved celebration and, at the same time, of a retrospective look and legitimate questions for the entire Romanian nation: what did this centuries old crossroad meant for their destiny and what did the Romanian people themselves did for giving an identitarian value to the 1st of December 1918 unionist exploit. Without doubt, the answers are as

many as they are diverse. We have to start from the truth that any fundamental upheaval in the history of a people cannot be conceived without bringing into the light the international context and especially the manner in which the foreign policy of the respective people brought its contribution through the diplomacy tools to the achievement of the respective exploit. The following lines are dedicated to this contribution and to the Romanian diplomacy evolution during the last 100 years.

### 2. The beginnings of modernisation. Alexandru Ioan Cuza

The exploit of the Great Union proclaimed on December 1st, 1918 through which the Romanian provinces, long time separated due to the vicissitudes of a longstanding and, most of the times, unjust history, was not, first of all, an event brought about by an international and regional contributory conjecture but was the coronation, through the Romanian people's will, of a centuries-old dream knocked off for the first time in 1600, when Voivode Michael the Brave achieved a temporary form of national proto-unity when he entered, under his own flag Alba Iulia, the capital of Transylvania, at the time under foreign imperial occupation and the flame

of the identitarian national unity has remained kindled in the individual and community conscience intimacy as of belonging to "Romanianhood" which was to be expressed successively and intensified by the 1848 revolutionaries' spirit and partially achieved through the 1859 union between Moldavia and Wallachia provinces under the scepter of the first indigenous ruler, Alexandru Ioan Cuza. His name stays, in the Romanian people's historical



**Vasile Alexandri**  
*The first minister of Foreign  
Affairs of the Romanian united  
State  
(1859 – 1862)*

chronicle and memory as symbol of one of the most enlightened prince and reformer of the society and its institutions which, adapted to the time imperatives, function even today. And one of the priority fields for state's and society's modernisation and for their insertion into the great concert of the world's nations was Romania's diplomacy and foreign affairs policy, especially through institutionalising them on July, 27th, 1862, when the state's ruler Cuza issued the Ruler's Decree No. 168 for setting up the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The moment is important as it crowned a centuries-old history of a diplomatic activity carried out even during the Middle Ages by the princes of the two great provinces Wallachia and Moldavia – a diplomacy practiced with the traditional tools of the time, simple and dynamic – marking, at the same time, the will of renewal, of connecting the Romanian kin to the great values of the global civilization and policies.

### **3. The diplomacy and foreign policy since the "Smaller Union" to the First World War (1859-1914)**

The 1859 Union Exploit which consecrated the birth of the modern Romanian national state made possible the groundwork and the implementation of a foreign policy having as object and fundamental mission the defense and the promotion abroad the interests of the new state, especially under the circumstances when, from a formal point of view, the two Romanian principalities were still under the Ottoman Empire sovereignty, a situation whereby the political and diplomatic elites of the time had in mind and mobilised their energies for achieving full emancipation, a process where the country's statesmen got aware and constantly endeavoured to use the role and the importance of the international political and military context. In addition, after 1858 Paris Treaty, which ended Crimea War, the issue of the Romanian unification became an interesting subject of consideration for the entire European community. Under that circumstances, the Romanian diplomacy and foreign policy, far from being deceived by the tributes coming from

the West, had the merit of understanding that, beyond the latter rhetorical sympathies, there were interests and projects which were related either to the competition among the great powers of the time or embodied interests which concerned directly the new Romanian state. France was thus supporting the idea of bringing in at Romania's helm a foreign prince from an European dynasty, not only for expanding and consolidating its influence at the Danube mouth, but also for the reason that its rival, the Hapsburg Empire, was facing domestically the independencists' discontents and claims of the Hungarian nation for which the 1848 revolutionaries fought to no avail. Emperor Napoleon III devised even a plan of Romania's involvement and transfer, beyond the Carpathians, toward the revolutionaries, of arms and ammunitions for a possible Hungarian revolution against the Hapsburg's Crown. The Romanian side had the prudence of rejecting this offer that could have attracted retaliation from Vienna, a situation the young Romanian state certainly didn't need. There were European powers, too, which due to their own reasons, did not see favorably the union of the Romanian principalities and even opposed it explicitly. Great Britain and especially Russia offered telling examples to that sense. Beyond these considerations of the great European powers and boosted by the desire of accomplishing the emancipation and also of acquiring an international statute, the political class in Bucharest accepted the French proposal materialized in bringing Carol de Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen to the throne after Cuza's removal in 1866. Alongside the new prince, the Romanian politicians, on top of their political orientations, looked for ways and means in order to support at the European level the desire and ideals of independence. A diplomatic corps was build up and made up especially of prominent personalities who, through prestige and personal and family contacts in the European political and diplomatic circles could make easily heard the Romanians' grievances and expectations. Such demarches were facilitated by a new Russian-Ottoman war breaking out in 1877 to which Romania took an active part and at the end of which the Berlin Peace Congress ratified, on July 13th, 1878, the



Peace Treaty whereby **Romania's state independence was recognized and proclaimed**. By law voted in the parliament, Romania's diplomatic representations were raised to the rank of Legations with competences of diplomatic, economic and juridical representation and the diplomatic staff were made of Envoys Extraordinary, ministers plenipotentiary, secretaries of Legation and attaches.

Romania's foreign policy after joining the Triple Alliance in 1883, until the breaking out of the First World War in 1914, was built on the principles agreed upon with the European partners in the framework of the Triple Alliance and backed by a professional diplomatic corps who actively supported the decision-makers in Bucharest in the process of putting into practice and upholding the Romanian state's and society's general interests.

#### 4. The First World War (1914 -1918)

Romania's participation to **the First World War** covers the period between July 28th, 1914 and October 28th – November 10th, 1918, a time interval whereby Romania's belligerent status moved successively from a combatant country one, to a state in an armistice status, to a non-combatant country and, once more, combatant country at the end of the war. Upon triggering the hostilities, Romania was caught into the power and influences games of the international system of relations whereby it was, on the one hand, an object of rivalries among the neighbouring empires with annexing plans for different parts of its territory and, on the other hand, the Romanian state had in view the creation of appropriate conditions for achieving its own objective of uniting in a single state all Romanian historical provinces.

Militarily speaking, Romania went out without glory from the second Balkan War with serious deficiencies in what regard the organisation of the structure command, troops training and , above all, a very poorly equipped army from all points of view.

In August 1916, Romania was addressed an

ultimatum from the Entente Powers asking it to decide if accept "now or never" to take part in the war, following which Romania became, on August 27th, 1916, a belligerent party on the Entente's side in spite of the military situation on all fronts of war. After a series of tactical victories in Transylvania against the Austro-Hungarian armies, the Romanian army suffered a series of dramatic defeats which forced the authorities of the state to take refuge to Moldova allowing the enemy to occupy two thirds of the national territory, Bucharest, the capital, included.

Under a new military command and with a substantial assistance from the French Military Mission led by General Berthelot in the 1916 winter and the 1917 spring, the national army was re-organized and additionally equipped and succeeded that in the 1917 summer get several victories against the Central Powers in the famous battles of Mărăști, Mărășești and Oituz. The evolutions on the eastern front did not significantly improve which made that after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace, between Russia and the Central Powers, Romania asked an armistice in the spring of 1918. King Ferdinand's unrelenting refusal of signing the armistice document made possible resuming the hostilities during the last two days of the war something that secured the belligerent status for the country at the Paris Peace Conference.

#### 5. The exploit of the Great Union (the 1st of December, 1918)

Whether during the troubled XIXth century the Romanian people paid, through their army the blood sacrifice for asserting their will of unity, independence and an active identity within the great family of the international community, the 1st of December, 1918 exploit was the moment when, for the first time after the establishment of the unitary state, in 1859, the people themselves in the country and in all the Romanian provinces torn apart from the country's body participated directly to the achievement and accomplishment of the Great Union so that there are history validated bases in order to say that



*Romania during World War*

the achievement of the unified Romania was not, fundamentally, either the result of an armed conflict or a gesture of goodwill of one of the world's great powers, since the exploit of the December 1st, 1918 of the Great Union but the great historical turning point through which the centuries-old dream of unity "Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia", expressed three centuries before by Michael the Brave, became true under the sky of the same city Alba Iulia where, on the 1st of December, 1918, the accomplishment for the eternity of the Unity of the Romanian kin within their historical borders was to be proclaimed. The chronology of events is as simple as it is expressive.

On February 6th, 1918 Bessarabia was the first Romanian province which proclaimed its independence from the Czarist Empire and on 9th of April the Country's Council adopted the Resolution of the union with Romania.

On November 28th, 1918, a second event of the

process of national reunification of the Romanian people took place when the General Congress of Bukovina made up of the representatives of the Romanians and of the nationalities of the province unanimously decided "the unconditional union and for all eternity of Bukovina, within its old borders, with the Kingdom of Romania".

In autumn 1918, on the background of the Central Powers defeat and of Austro-Hungary collapse, the national movement in Transylvania spread so that on October 12th, 1918 the declaration on "the decision of the Romanian nation in Transylvania of becoming a free nation". Under the heading "Declaration of national self-determination", the document requested, on behalf of the 3.5 million Romanians living between the provinces of Transylvania and Maramureş to the north, Crişana and Banat to the west, the right of self-determination in the spirit of eternal justice and based on the principle of the free will of nations. Under such circumstances, on the 1st

of December, 1918, in the presence of the 1,223 delegates and supported by numerous citizens who came from all Romanian provinces, the **National Assembly** met in the Casino building in Alba Iulia and decided from the very beginning that "The National Assembly of all Romanians of Transylvania, Banat and Țara Ungurească, gathered through their entitled representatives hereby declare the union with Romania of the said Romanians and of the territories they inhabit".

Transylvania's Union with Romania completed the process of building up the Romanian national state. At the time, Greater Romania's completed area was 295,049 sq km with a population of 16.5 million inhabitants.

## 6. The consequences of the Great Union Romania's foreign policy in the inter-war period (1919-1940)

The 1st of December, 1918 Great Union took place at a time when the international climate resent accutely the effects of the war which just came to an end. In the immediate neighborhood of the new reunited Romanian state, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the collapse of the Czarist Empire made that the military Romanian factor move on a secondary plan and bring again, to the forefront, the diplomatic factor. Romania did not have any longer the energy and



The United Romania and its administrative provinces

the capacity of continuing the fight on the armed front and that made it reject the validity of Treaty concluded with the Entente on August 17th, 1917 and which compelled Romania to not conclude a separate peace and to sign, on May 7th, 1918, the Bucharest Peace Treaty which meant de facto and de jure the end of Romania's participation to the First World War. The intense, intelligent and argued work carried out in that period by the Romanian diplomacy made it possible that the great post-war powers – France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan – recognize, through bilateral treaties, both the union of the Romanian provinces with the country and the existence of Romania as a unitary, national and independent state. The United States of America was to proceed in a similar manner in 1933 by including Bessarabia's emigration quota into the quota set aside for Romania. During all this period and particularly in the 1920s, the main concern of the Romanian foreign policy and diplomacy was manifest through three fundamental coordinates: strengthening the relations with France and Great Britain and, where possible, with Italy; setting up of an own system of alliances for preventing and counteracting possible foreign revisionist actions and intentions; an active participation to the League of Nations, perceived as a defense shield of the small and medium states, as was Romania's case, against expansionist and hegemony plans of some of the inter-war world's great powers. And such a concern proved its utility especially under the circumstances of January 30<sup>th</sup>, 1933, when the Nazi revisionism propelled Adolf Hitler and his ideology to power. The authorities in Berlin, who counted on the importance of the economic and commercial relations, announced, in May, 1933, that they are not ready any longer to carry out economic relations with those countries which promoted an unfavorable policy towards the Third Reich. Despite German pressures, Romania remained loyal to its traditional alliances with France and Great Britain and, moreover, after the Soviet Union became member of the League of Nations, the Romanian state backed the conclusion of May, the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1935 French-Soviet treaty and of May 16<sup>th</sup>, 1935 Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty while the eminent Romanian diplomat Nicolae

Titulescu initiated negotiation for concluding a Romanian-Soviet mutual assistance treaty. Unfortunately, all Romania's initiatives were foiled as of March, 1936, when Nazi Germany announced the process of Romania's re-arming with all the threats to France and its allies resulting from it. Due to certain internal frictions among the Francophile and Germanophile politicians, Nicolae Titulescu was dismissed and that brought to an end an important stage of the inter-war Romanian policies and diplomacy. Externally, Romania went through a more anguishing isolation period as on August 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1939 the German-Soviet non-aggression agreement, known as "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" was announced, whereby, among other things, Germany agreed with Russia's occupation of Bessarabia.

The historical developments of that period are well-known and were in general profoundly detrimental to Romania: the Soviet ultimatum resulting from the additional secret protocol to Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact whereby part of Romania's territory – Bessarabia, Bukovina and Herța of the country's north-east were ceded to Soviet Russia, the German-Italian Second Vienna Award of August 1940 whereby Romania ceded to Hungary a territory of 43,492 sq. km. of Transylvania with a population of 2.6 million inhabitants of whom 50.2% Romanians, 37% Hungarians and 2.8% Germans and the 7<sup>th</sup> of September, 1940 Romanian-Bulgarian Treaty whereby Romania ceded to Bulgaria the south of Dobruja known as the Cadrilater, developments which would culminate with Romania's entering the Second World War on 22<sup>nd</sup> of June 1941.

## **7. The Second World War.**

### **From Stalinisation to post-Stalinism**

**(1941 – 1965)**

After General Ion Antonescu became "Leader of the state" and King Carol II was compelled to abdicate, on 6<sup>th</sup> of September, 1940, the Romanian



*Romania – the 1940 territorial abductions*

foreign policy and diplomacy were directed on the road of total integration into the Axis political and diplomatic system, an orientation strengthened on 12th of June, 1941 at Munich when General Ion Antonescu committed to Hitler on behalf of the Romanian people to take part into the Eastern war and to stay to the end alongside the German Reich's army. Under the circumstances, Great Britain declared war on Romania on 5th of September, 1941 and, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour American military base, America did the same. The first American aerial attack on the oil-rich Romanian regions south of the Carpathians took place on 12th of June, 1942.. Faced with the detrimental developments on the anti-Soviet battlefield, the vice-prime minister and minister of Foreign Af-

fairs Mihai Antonescu initiated at the end of 1942 the first, unsuccessful, attempts for arranging a Romania's getting out of the war. The Romanian diplomats on assignment abroad received, too, instructions to test the opportunities of establishing direct diplomatic contacts with the United States' and Great Britain's representatives. The minister himself had, too, a meeting with Benito Mussolini in order to establish contacts with the Anglo-Saxon West, an idea "Il Duce" agreed but did not finalise as he was removed from power on 25th of July, 1943. Several series of Romanian-Russian contacts in Stockholm and Cairo shaped the possibility of an armistice which conditions, set by Moscow in enslaving terms, made King Mihai I and the opposition in Bucharest reject the signing and



*The Palace of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of XXth century*

asked Marshall Antonescu to start "serious" negotiations with the Russian side in order to agree a ceasefire treaty, a request rejected in his turn, too, by Ion Antonescu. Under such circumstances, the king ordered the arrest of the "leader", of minister Mihai Antonescu and exiting the war with the Soviet Union. The maximalist terms imposed by the Soviets and their brutal treatment marked practically the beginning of Romania's enslavement by Moscow and a first step to that direction was imposing, on 6th of March, 1945 a government led by dr. Petru Groza who was actually controlled by the Romanian Workers' (Communist) Party which, in its turn, was a puppet of Josef Vissarionovich Stalin's Moscow. By the end of 1947, Romania would rapidly become a satellite state of USSR. King Mihai forced abdication on 30th of December, 1947 will mean the disappearance of the traditional values of the Romanian democracy - political pluralism and the constitutional monarchy - replaced by the Soviet type socialism and Romania's forced stalinisation that became a "peoples' republic".

The Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assis-

tance Treaty signed with USSR on 4th of February, 1949, valid for 20 years, provided for the Romanian government the obligation of consulting the Soviet government on all governance issues, including Romania's foreign policy and international relations. A severe diplomatic isolation was imposed except for the relations with the "brotherly states" while the contacts with the western states ceased almost completely. This subservience reached paroxysmal stages of mimicry in the context of the schism between USSR and the Yugoslav Federation when Bucharest became, within the socialist bloc, the center of a staunch campaign against Josif Broz Tito and his governance principles.

A change of attitude was experienced after Stalin's death, on 5th of March, 1953, which started in Moscow and was promptly followed by the European satellite states. Within less than a year, Romania, led by the head of the party and state, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, resumed diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and concluded several agreements and arrangements of collaboration and cooperation, a normalisation that enabled resuming the relations between Bucha-

rest and some Western capitals, including towards re-establishing political and diplomatic relations.

It was on this background that the 1956 Hungarian Uprising broke out and was brutally suppressed by the Russian tanks. It was also the moment when, worried that the Hungarian episode could repeat itself at any time in Romania, as well, the leadership in Bucharest moved towards a gradual distancing and a marginalisation of the leverages of influence USSR had in Romania. In 1957, in his position of minister of Foreign Affairs, Grigore Preoteasa informed the government about the party leadership decision of pulling the diplomatic apparatus out of inertia. "The question, he said, of ending the fear of getting in touch with different reactionary Western circles and of isolating ourselves by discussing with the Communist parties of those countries only came up". Red Army's withdrawal from Romania in 1958 or Bucharest's tough criticism of the "Valev Plan" whereby Moscow tried to subordinate the Romanian economy were some of the factors encouraging this beginning of opening towards the West and of distancing from Moscow. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej conveyed to the Administration in Washington the message that "the Romanian people has its own foreign policy based on the principles of equality and sovereignty", the minister of Foreign Affairs Corneliu Manescu was invited in 1962 to pay a visit to the USA while other Western states, France and Great Britain in particular, expressed publicly the desire of establishing dynamic and multilateral relations with Romania.

The manifestations of Romania's foreign policy preceding the 1960s were subordinated to a major objective which defined it and granted it consistency and coherence. The People's Republic of Romania's political leading circles focused on the strategies of the country's economic independence as prerequisite for a real political independence both within the Communist bloc and in the relations with the Western world. In this respect, the leadership in Bucharest denounces discursively the "deviations" of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from the Leninist dogmatic and try, at the same time, to

update the Marxism-Leninism for offering a personal and original interpretation of some novel concepts such as "one's own path to socialism" and "peaceful coexistence". During this period, no less redundant is, the assimilation of the "nationalism" concept into the regime's morphology and ideological texture which meant in fact a major "heresy" as far as the Marxist theory was concerned as it ruled that the proletarian internationalism will win in the end the struggle with the national separations and thus contribute to the "globalisation" of the "class-conscious" of the "united" workers of the entire world.

This ideological inheritance will be transferred, after the end of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej "period" to Nicolae Ceaușescu who will make from these ideas a support for his ambitions of becoming not only a supreme political leader domestically but also a leader of international dimension.



**Ana Pauker (Hanna Rabinsohn)**  
*The first minister of Foreign Affairs of  
Communist Romania  
1947 - 1952*

Mention should be made that, through its actions of promoting its own and independent foreign policy, Romania did not pursue breaking with but distancing itself from Moscow, something expressed by the fact that it remained member of the Warsaw Pact and of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecom).

## **8. The Romanian diplomacy at the "highest level"**

**(1965 - 1989)**

There are two fundamental features characterizing Romania's foreign policy and diplomacy during the period stretching from Gheorghiu-Dej's death and Nicolae Ceaușescu's reaching the top of the power pyramid and the historical events of 1989. It is, first of all, about the unprecedented dynamics of Romania's relations abroad and, secondly, about the individualization and the personalized poaching of the practice of diplomacy and of the diplomatic relations by the then Romania's new leader. Speaking of Romania's dynamics and foreign activism, we have in mind especially its "quantitative" and numeric side which materialised diplomatically in the sharp increase of the number of the states Romania established diplomatic relations with, from 67 in August, 1965 to 138 in 1985, with the expansion of competencies and of the interest of promoting economic and technological cooperation and the commercial exchanges in the entire Romania's diplomatic and international relations. The second coordinate which customized the practice of foreign relations is given by Nicolae Ceaușescu's poaching and monopolising the sector by promoting the novel concept of "diplomacy at the highest level", a concept spontaneously generated by the leader's very morphology. Appointed in 1965 as secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party, raised in 1967 to the rank of president of the State Council and in 1974 to the rank of President of Romania, Nicolae Ceaușescu's profile went through a trajectory of sharp increase of the feeling of absolute power and of the desire of imposing himself domestically as the Romanian people's providential man and, externally, as a politician

of planetary dimension and resonance. And that ascending spiral was doubled by a feeling of absolute superiority and, consequently, of suspicion toward the state's key-institutions among which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was indeed included. In its essence, Nicolae Ceaușescu's conception manifested through two fundamental "institutions", namely: the said "high level diplomacy" with the direct involvement of the head of state and having as tools the official visits and tours to the partner countries, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the "personal envoys institution" conveying written and oral messages to the head of states, governments and organisations and the results of such missions were made only partially known to the sectoral institutions in the form of "imposed suggestions" that were received as personal initiatives of the leader's reasoning. Under such circumstances, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was overshadowed and saw its role severely and detrimentally diminished. Yet we must now admit that such unjustified "debasement" was fully compensated by a body of professional diplomats faithful to the importance of their work either in the Central of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or in the country's diplomatic missions abroad, people without whose training, integrity and patriotism no "diplomacy at the highest level" would have been really possible and useful.

Nicolae Ceaușescu's doctrine did not bring in fundamentally new theoretical and ideatic elements as it was built on the tradition of the older principles of international law of the full equality of rights, the mutual observance of the independence and sovereignty, the mutual benefit and the noninterference into the domestic affairs of the other countries and peoples. Starting from these prerequisites, Romania's foreign policy sought with consistency the great issues of the contemporary period and of foreshadowing future among which one may find questions such as wiping out underdevelopment, disarmament, peacefully solving the disputes and conflicts among states a.s.o. Whether during the years of Nicolae Ceaușescu's reaching the state leadership Romania was rather looked at suspiciously as a maverick and unsure member of the



Soviet bloc, the following years brought a change of substance of this image, a transformation brought about exactly from Romania's solid foreign policy actions.

Contrary to Soviet pressures, in 1967 the government in Bucharest established diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and Franco's Spain.

The same year and following the Israeli-Arab war, Romania rejected the order sent by Moscow to satellite countries of breaking the relations with Israel. Moreover, Romania's diplomatic representation in Israel was raised from the rank of Legation to embassy with a resident ambassador. So, for a long time, Romania was to remain the only credible channel of communications between Israel and the Arab world. Its direct contribution to the achievement of the first peace treaty between the one signed in 1979 by Israel and Egypt or the recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1972, two years before the Arab states did it themselves, discussing, in Bucharest, for the first time, what was to be the Oslo Agreement signed in 1993 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the achievement, in 1978, as a result of the mediation carried out by Romania of the first steps towards conciliation and unity between Hafez Al-Assad's Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq (a failed attempt due to causes pertaining to the Arab counterparts) are as many stages and moments imposing and acknowledging the peaceful and friendly vocation of the Romanian diplomacy and foreign relations, an image which was enhanced in August 1968 in what concern Romania's position with regard to the military invasion of Czechoslovakia by the other states of the Warsaw Pact. As an appreciation reaction, the American president Richard Nixon visited Romania. Yet a more detailed inventory of Romania's political and diplomatic contact with the outside world of all continents are not discussed here as they are rather the privilege of historyographers.

1968 remained in the history of the post-Stalinist period as moment of asserting the Romanian Communism independentism following

Czechoslovakia's invasion. After the said episode, neither the doctrinary practice nor the behavioral manifestations of Nicolae Ceaușescu would remain the same. The Romanian leader exhausted the road toward the statute of "hero" and had before him the path toward "genius", idol and "most beloved of Earthlings".

It is worth mentioning the fact that Romania manifested a constant interest and was actively involved in the negotiations process for the establishment of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and there were many important contributions of the Romanian diplomacy to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

Yet the 1980s will open a stage of antithesis of what has been the previous stage and that not due to reasons attributable to the sphere of the Romanian diplomacy *per se* but to causes eminently extrinsic to it. The regime in Bucharest and Nicolae Ceaușescu would slide more and more on the counter-productive slope of individualist and autarchic approaches, of looking down at if not contemptuously to the realities of the international life and, directly, of the Romanian state's duties and obligations as member of the international community and of the imperatives imposed under this statute. The more and more degraded domestic situation left increasingly its negative footprint on the foreign policy which was weakened and even compromised in the context of international relations.

As from 1982, Nicolae Ceaușescu made the obsessive idea of accelerated and total reimbursement of the state's foreign debt central to Romania's domestic policy and international relations, a fact that had a devastating impact on the domestic social climate and severely degraded the standard of living of the population, accompanied by an accentuated ignorance or the limitation to hardly bearable degrees of the human rights and liberties. All these generated, in their turn, the country's isolation and marginalisation in its relations with the other states and international organisations. Consequently, this period of the Romanian foreign affairs was practically a sequence of failures and stagnation

**THE FALL OF COMMUNISM 1989 – 1991**

*The European geographic area covered by the 1989-1990 events*

of the international relations. The visit paid by the new reformist leader in Kremlin Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 to Bucharest conveyed a strong signal and revealed the true conservative, unrealistic and outdated in what concern the imperatives of the time facet of the regime in Bucharest, a derailed regime, stuck to the exhausted paradigms of the totalitarian ideology yet equally anchored to the ideological utopias and to the slogans which, decades on end covered and polished Romania's grayish realities.

When in 1989 the government in Warsaw was formed by a non-Communist prime minister, Nicolae Ceaușescu, increasingly cut off the realities gave up his talking semantics and his nationalistic cliches for suggesting to the "brotherly parties" a meeting for discussing the situation in Poland and found the time for a "new deputation of peace and cooperation" to Iran where the December 1989 events, which were to radically

change Romania's destiny and future options, surprised him. It was the final act of the "diplomacy at the highest level".

## **9. From totalitarianism to democracy.**

### **Romania's foreign policy after 1989**

The collapse of the European Communist system in 1989-1990 was not a phenomenon unleashed all of a sudden but covered the entire Communist system starting with the former Soviet Union and encompassed all the six satellite states. For the analysts of the time and those connected to the developments of the international situation, the events that unfolded almost 30 years ago were, one can say, expected to the extent that the question, more or less uttered, which was on everyone's lips and in everyone's thoughts was not if a radical upheaval will take place but when.

What characterized Romania in the context of the events of 22nd of December 1989 and the following days was the fact they were the most brutal and blood-tainted of the entire European Communist area reflecting the radical, repressive and irreducible character of the regime in Bucharest.

Its disappearance meant not only the beginning of a new path towards recovery and finding back the national identity of the Romanian people but also entering a new stage of upheld endeavours yet full of difficulties for placing again the new Romanian state and nation within the great family of human community. The first steps in that sense were directed towards the West in general and towards the European environment to which Romania belongs inherently. "Romania's entering Europe" is not, as it has been said sometimes after December 1989, a gratuitous obsession and the European idea is much older in the Romanian national conscience, was cultivated by the 1848 revolutionaries and declared, when the Romanian National State was born, in 1918, its creed. The very achievement of this centuries-old ideal was possible through a harmonious and impetuous co-existence and common action between **nationalism** as existential and indentitarian foundation and **Europeanism** as perspective for prosperity and self-assertion in the contemporaneity.

As it was the case domestically with all the other political, economic, social, cultural and creative segments, the Romanian foreign policy and diplomacy had to engage, after the abrupt turning point of 1989, in a decisive period of revival, of maturation and adaptation to the new systems of international relations, a process which was not always devoid of convulsions, awkwardness, errors and hesitations. From this standpoint, one may state that today's Romanian diplomacy was as encouraged by the orientation of the political classes towards certain directions of development as it was undermined by the uncertainties, functioning shortcomings of the state institutions and the struggles for power carried out by the forces and parties on the domestic political chessboard as some of them

were in training and struggling for an as better as possible position in the social environment and the others, the so-called "hystorical parties", were trying to rediscover and assimilate their own doctrines, values and principles which were forgotten for half a century either due to the lack of forms of implementing them or due to total ban they were subject to by the former Communist regime. Or, this revival process had to overcome hurdles and problems, to understand the imperatives of contemporaneity and to approach them through the prism of the new defining interests of the Romanian nation. Reluctancy, the mutual lack of trust to the benefit of counter-productive suspicions affected and continue to encumber the normality of Romania's entire domestic and international policy. So it came that during the 28 years passed from departing Communism and trully entering the international community Romania had no less than 25 prime ministers of whom 8 ad-interim and 21 ministers of Foreign Affairs of whom 3 ad-interim.

Yet it must be underlined that beyond the weaknesses and uncertainties of a transitory epoch towards democracy and towards the constructive insertion into the great family of the contemporary world, the Romanian diplomacy that departed the hyperbolic Communist "golden era" succeeded in setting and promoting with worth mentioning results the great coordinates of action and vital objectives of edifying its new identity at the crossroad of two centuries and two millennia, which were:

- The unanimous choice for Romania's self-assertion as an active, dignified member and potent security and peace supplier in the international relations.
- The sustained action for reshaping the relations with the West, meaning especially the European Union, the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance and extending solid and credible bridges towards the European integration and joining, with equal rights and duties the political and political-military structures of the Euro-Atlantic space.
- Promoting a good-neighbourhood policy

based on the principles, values and ideals of liberal democracy, of common peace and security.

- Encouraging and supporting the regional security and stability by forging alliances in Europe's close neighbourhood and in the Black Sea's basin.

- Supporting Republic of Moldova's consolidation based on the idea of community and unity of history, language, culture and identical Romanian values.

A deserved acknowledgement of the credibility and dynamism of the Romanian foreign policy and diplomacy was not late in materializing when, on the 29th of March, 2004 Romania became a NATO member and fully joined the European Union on the 1st of January, 2007. And, a fact full of symbolic charge is that the Romanian Centennial celebration takes place the year preceding Bucharest's taking over, in 2019, the rotating presidency of the European Union.

Backed by a diplomatic corps dynamic, highly professional and attached to the ideals of peace,

stability and the country's prosperity, the Romanian foreign policy proves to be a precious and active factor of fulfilling Romania's and Romanian nation's great modern ideals.

Deeply rooted in the Romanian people's history which it served faithfully and with dedication over the centuries and directly linked to all crucial moments of the modern history of its fatherland, the Romanian diplomacy has thorough reasons of being proud this year when the united and sovereign Romania celebrates its Centennial of its becoming a bound national, free-standing state among the world's nations – a steadfast diplomacy placed under the motto it trusts and never deviated from – "Semper Fidelis Patrie", Always Loyal to the Fatherland.

***Priest Daniel Alexandru COLȚEA***

2018, the Centennial year, when we celebrate one hundred years of territorial, political and administrative, spiritual, cultural and linguistic





## The role of the Romanian Orthodox Church (ROC) during the great historical events of the last century (1918-2018) and the relation with the state. Premises for the future.

unity made possible through the 1918 Union exploit offers us a good opportunity of historical introspection, of commemoration, of bringing again the history to the forefront for understanding how this great Romanian kin's desideratum came true and especially who were the main actors or artisans of the Great Union.

As the title suggests, my demarche intends to bring to the prime-time of our society the Church of our kin, ROC, in order to restore it to the history's table and, at the same time, to re-assesses the role it played when the Great Union was achieved as well as the role it had as a factor of spiritual and social cohesion of the Romanian nation during the rocky-ride century passed since 1918, a century whereby the Church followed and accompanied the Romanian kin's destiny. The desire of pointing out the Church's involvement in the kin's historical destiny comes especially on the background of the Romanian society's secularization when the Church is pushed to the fringes as its meaning is no longer understood and, why not to say it, the Church is searching for its identity. The re-assertion of its role is important especially as the Church was taken out of the history textbooks re-written during the Communist period.

For those wondering what role history itself still has, why it should be studied, why are we bringing forward things long time ago passed I would answer that the history's role is, besides helping us not to repeat the mistakes of the past, as it is, as the historian Nicolae Iorga called "the tribunal where the nations and peoples are judged", and a mean of understanding how and why we are today yet especially of helping us to

make predictions about the future based on our past choices.

ROC and its history cannot be separated from the history of the Romanian people. The Ecumenic Patriarch Bartholomew I recalls in one of his speeches the miracle of the Romanian people and emphasises that once it emerged on the stage of the European history, it had crystallized state and religious formations: *"it is a wonder and an untold admiration the fact that almost one thousand years since the martyrdom of Saint Sava of Buzău (†372), after innumerable adventures and persecutions, it preserved its Orthodox faith and the Latin language. It is about a real miracle of the history. Taking into account the present dimension of Romania's Church, we are unable to explain how this great Orthodox people came out suddenly from the darkness of history in the XIVth century for assuring the entire mankind that it survived as an unitary people although unknown for centuries on end. As a new Ulysses returned to Ithaca, evading traps and dangers, the Romanian people returned to the light of history avoiding the cultural alienation and its assimilation by other foreign peoples. Maybe the secret of this wonder lies in this people's strong and unflinching faith."*<sup>1</sup>

Prior to addressing the theme, I suggest a clear definition of the term Church.

Christian theology may offer a multitude of answers according to its different stages of existence and evolution (apostolic, patristic, scholastic, modern and contemporary), to the diversity of its confessions (Orthodox, Roman-Catholic, Protestant, neo-Protestant). The theological branch dealing with the study of this issue is called Ecclesiology, a term deriving from the first denomination under which the first community of Christ's disciples emerged on the

1. From the speech delivered by Constantinople's Ecumenic Patriarch Bartholomew, on 22nd of October, 1995 at the Patriarchal Cathedral of Bucharest, on the occasion of the visit for celebrating 110 years of Autocephaly and 70 years of Patriarchate of ROC, source Basilica.ro

stage of history, namely Ekklesia, and that is the first definition of Church in any of the world's dictionaries. Therefore, Church is: "the summoning of the congregation in order to perform the public cult; the Christian community as a whole, seen as body of Christ, whose head is Christ Himself."<sup>2</sup> For the Orthodox theology, Church is a divine-human mystery, a God's union with the human.

As the topic of this article is the study of the institutional and organic relation between ROC and the Romanian state, by the term Church we define the juridical institution, taking into account its spiritual dimension.

### **The Orthodox Church and the 1918 Great Union**

In order to understand the current realities and to make predictions for the future, the analysis of the facts of the past is needed and for understanding and analyzing facts of the more recent history, we have logically to appeal to a more distant history. So, for he who wants to analyze and understand the Church's role in the events of the Great Union, he must examine, before all and understand that both the political and administrative structures and the Church evolved in parallel and were permanently in a interdependence relation.

We must understand that 1918 and the exploit of the Great Union represents the apotheosis of centuries-old efforts, the crowning of a sacrifice of our ancestors inhabiting their historical provinces.

During our history, the Romanians did not have a political and territorial unity yet they had a linguistic, spiritual and cultural unity and all these contributed to the achievement of the 1959 Union of the Romanian Principalities and thereafter to the 1918 Great Union. The spiritual unity manifested through a relentless exchange of populations, peasants, shepherds, merchants, monks, priests, copyists, church painters who

traveled from a country to another crossing the Carpathian passes, bearing the same Romanian soul, the same faith, the same language. It is known that numerous villages together with their churches south and east of the Carpathins Curvature and up to Dobrudja were the "founder's" work of the Transylvanian shepherds and peasants. In their turn, several Moldavian and Wallachian voyevods founded numerous churches and monasteries in Transylvania, too, such as the metropolitan cathedral and residence in Alba Iulia founded by Michael the Brave, Matei Basarab's Turnu Roșu-Sibiu church, Constantin Brancoveanu's churches Făgăraș, Ocna Sibiului and Sâmbăta de Sus monastery, the Vad and Feleac churches founded by the Moldavian voyevods<sup>3</sup>.

Another extremely important factor which has to be mentioned and which contributed to forging the conscience of Romanian and Orthodox unity in the Romanian historical provinces were the religious books distributed to the territories inhabited by Romanians. Mention should be made of 1643 Varlaam's Book Preachings with more than 400 copies sent to Transylvania which was republished at Alba Iulia in 1699 ("Chiriadromion"), with the help of the martyr voyevode Constantin Brâncoveanu and of Antim Ivireanul and which will be thereafter continuously republished in Bucharest and Râmnic. The idea of unity appears as well in the works of some scholars of the three principalities such as: Grigore Ureche, Miron Costin, Dimitrie Cantemir, Constantin Stolnicul Cantacuzino, Inochentie Micu, Samuil Micu, Gheorghe Șincai and Petru Maior<sup>4</sup>.

### **The 1859 Union of the Romanian Principalities – an open path towards the 1918 Great Union**

In the XIXth century, the unity conscience

2. Felicia Dumas, *Dicționar bilingv de termeni religioși ortodocși: român-francez*, Editura Doxologia, Iași, 6454, p. 18

3. Cf. Pr. Acad. Prof. Dr. Mircea Păcurariu on the 159th anniversary of the Union of the Romanian Principalities. Source: <http://www.mitropolia-ardealului.ro>

4. Idem

emerges in a more clear way in the public space of the Romanian territories and the idea of unity was provided in the Organic Regulations of the two Principalities, Art. 371 (Wallachia) and Art 425 (Moldavia). An additional contribution to the definition of the unitary national conscience was brought by the 1848 Revolutions as well as by the representatives and the ideological advocates of these movements, personalities of the epoch such as Nicolae Bălcescu, Ion Heliade Rădulescu, C. A. Rosetti, Dimitrie Bolintineanu, Mihail Kogălniceanu, Costache Negri, August Treboniu Laurian, Aron Pumnul, Aaron Florian and others. Mention should be made indeed that the Union of the Principalities was made also possible due to certain European geopolitical conjectures such as the Crimea War (1853-1856) and the Paris Peace which followed and which put on the table of the seven great European powers the issue of the Danubian Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia. Some extremely positive measures were to be applied following the Paris negotiations for the Romanian principalities such as: a) setting up in Buchares of an "European Commission" with the representatives of the seven powers for dealing with the Principalities and make proposals in order to reorganise them; b) Convening "Diwans or Ad-hoc Assemblies" in both Principalities for making proposals for their organisation according to the Romanian's wishes". These positive and appropriate decisions led to setting up unionist committees meant to secure the victory of the unionist camp in the Ad-hoc Assemblies<sup>5</sup>.

During all these excitements and struggles for the Union, the clergy joined the unionist party. The head of the Moldavian Church, Sofronie Miclescu was amongst the most prominent supporters of the Union. On his advice, the Archimandrite Neofit Scriban – then professor at Socola Seminary and future bishop – wrote a paper under the title *The Union and the Non-union of the Principalities*, whereby he presented the church's benefits. This first book, which was contested by the anti-unionist conservatives, was followed by a second one under the title

*Profitability of the Union of the Romanian Principalities*, both initially published in Zimbrul newspaper. During the summer of 1857, the elections for the Ad-hoc Diwan were organised but witnessing the abuses and forgeries committed by the political leadership headed by Caimacam (deputy ruler) Nicolae Vogoride, Mythropolite Sofronie and numerous priests and fathers superior with voting right boycotted the elections. For instance, of the 138 priests and egumens in Iasi, 120 abstained. In spite of that, the anti-unionists won the 1857 elections yet strong protests followed both from the Church, represented by Mythropolite Sofronie Miclescu, and especially from the representatives of the powers in favor of the union of the two principalities: France, Russia, Sardinia, Prussia so the Ottoman Empire was compelled to cancel and repeat the elections<sup>6</sup>.

On the occasion of the new elections which were carried out legally, the clergy elected the worthiest representatives of the Ad-hoc Diwan. The rightful members of the Church's hierarchy were: Mythropolite Sofronie Miclescu, who was charged to lead the works of the Diwan, bishop Nectarie Hermeziu Sotiriupoleos, deputy of the bishop of Roman and bishop Ghenadie Șendrea Tripoleos, the deputy of the bishop of Huși. Besides the three rightful members, two other deputies were elected among the fathers superior of the independent monasteries, namely bishop Filaret Scriban of Socola and Calinic Miclescu of Slatina, as well as three deputies from the dioceses residence-towns: bishop Neofit Scriban of Iasi, bishop Melchisedec Ștefănescu of Huși and priest Dimitrie Matcaș of Roman. The rest of the clergy had no right to take part in the elections<sup>7</sup>.

The Diwan works opened on 22nd of September, 1857. The clergy was represented in the elective assembly which elected Alexandru Ioan Cuza as ruler by mitropolite Sofronie, its chairman. It was Mythropolite Sofronie who declared Colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza as ruler<sup>8</sup>.

In Wallachia, the works of the Ad-hoc Assembly opened on 30th of September 1857. 28 big land-

5. <http://basilica.ro/pr-acad-mircea-pacurariu-biserica-si-unirea-principatelor-text-integral/>

6. Cf. <http://ziarullumina.ro/biserica-ortodoxa-romana-si-unirea-principatelor-49162.html>

7. Idem

owners, 14 landowners, 20 townspeople, 15 peasants and 10 representatives of the clergy were elected for the elective assembly.

Mythropolite Nifon and his three deputies were members of the Elective Assembly of Wallachia. He presided the meeting of 24th of January, 1859 when Alexandru Ioan Cuza was proclaimed ruler. A delegation of the Assembly headed by Bishop Climent went to Iasi and presented Alexandru Ioan Cuza the document regarding his election as ruler of Wallachia.

The servants of the Church will have the same patriotic attitude during the 1877-1878 Independence War and especially during the First World War which ended with the memorable exploit of the Union of all Romanians on the 1st of December, 1918.

During the First World War, when the Kingdom of Romania was neutral, until 27th of August, 1916, Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia and their Romanian population were engaged in the Great War from its very beginning in 1914. On 4th of May, 1915 the young politician Nicolae Titulescu summarized, in a speech delivered in Ploiești, the thought of every Romanian about Transylvania's sore absence from Romania: *"From today's circumstances, Romania must come out united and great. Romania cannot be complete without Transylvania. Romania cannot be great without sacrifice! Transylvania is the cradle which protected its childhood, is the school which forged its kin, is the charm which supported its life. Transylvania is the spark igniting energy, it is the mutilation which calls for revenge, it is the hypocrisy calling for punishment, it is the stranglement calling for freedom! Transylvania is the Romanianhood in distress, is the strength which takes off the enemy, is life calling for life! We need Transylvania! We cannot live without! We will know to take it and especially to deserve it!"*<sup>9</sup>

The church was present and helped the accom-

plishment of the major events of the history of the Romanian kin. Believers and priests participated to Gheorghe Doja revolts (1514) or to Horea, Cloșca and Crișan upheavals (1784), to Tudor Vladimirescu's Revolution (1821), to the 1848 Revolution, to the movement for the Union of Principalities (1859), to the Independence War (1877). Thus, the presence of the hierarchs, councillors, priests, theologians and believers at the 1918 events was something natural in accomplishing history desiderata.

The Union could take place due to a favourable international geopolitical context, too, as Romania joined the winning camp, although according to Lucian Boia, Romania lost the war in the most disastrous manner and was threatened with its very extinction and lost important territories (the Bucharest Peace of May, 1918)<sup>10</sup>, while Austro-Hungary was among the great losers. The national liberation movements triggered a chain reaction: Prague and Cracow (28th of October, 1918), Zagreb (29th of October, 1918), in Austria (30th of October, 1918) and Hungary (31st of October, 1918). During all this time, the Transylvanian Romanians organised a Romanian Central National Council (the 3rd of November, 1918), headquartered in Arad, strengthened by a series of national, county and communal councils which were to prepare locally the Union. On 27th of March, 1918, Bessarabia voted the union with Romania. On 27th of October, a National Romanian Council was set up in Bukovina and the need of the union with Romania was stressed, which will materialize on 28th of November, 1918 at Cernăuți.

On 12th of October, the National Committee met in Oradea and adopted a resolution declaring that the Transylvanian Romanians no longer recognized the imperial parliament and government, and that entitled them to self-determination. Alexandru Vaida-Voievod, one of the signatories, read the document on 18th of October, from the rostrum of the Parliament in

8. Cf. Pr. Acad. Prof. Dr. Mircea Păcurariu la împlinirea a 159 de ani de la Unirea Principatelor Române. Sursa: <http://www.mitropolia-ardealului.ro>

9. Nicolae Titulescu, *Pledoarii pentru pace*, ediție îngrijită de George G. Potra și Constantin I. Turcu; studiu introductiv de George G. Potra, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 1996, pp. 91-95

10. Lucian Boia, *În jurul Marii Uniri de la 7574: Națiuni, frontiere, minorități*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2017, p. 5



Budapest.

The unionist idea enjoyed the support of the Romanian publications in Transylvania, too, especially the press outlets belonging to the Orthodox Church of Transylvania. We mention here "Telegraful român" (Sibiu), "Biserica și Școala" (Arad), "Unirea" (Blaj) and "Foaia diecezană" (Caransebeș). On the 30th of October, 1918, the bishop of Arad Ioan I. Papp asked the Romanian bishops, both Orthodox and Greek-Catholic, to state their opinions concerning the Romanian Central National Committee. The first opinion was sent on the 1st of November by Bishop of Caransebeș Miron Cristea to the Romanian National Committee whereby he mentioned the right of each people of freely taking their fate in their hands. In a joint letter signed by all Orthodox and Greek-Catholic bishops of Transylvania on 21st of November, the Romanian National Committee was recognized as the leading forum of the national liberation struggle and committed themselves to do "everything in their power to accomplish our national aspirations".

Professor Nicolae Bălan of the "Andreiana" Theological Academy of Sibiu and future Mythropolite of Transylvania (1920-1955) was, in November, 1918, a member of the delegation sent by the National Councils of Sibiu and Arad for getting in touch with Romania's political leaders. On 14th of November, Nicolae Bălan arrived to Iasi where the members of the Romanian government took refuge. There, he got in touch with different personalities of the time as well as with the diplomatic representatives of France, Great Britain and the United States of America and informed them about the situation in Transylvania. He sent from Iasi a letter to Vasile Goldiș, the secretary of the Bishopric of Arad and the author of the text concerning the assembly of Alba Iulia, whereby he suggested the immediate reunion of a national assembly, preferably at Alba Iulia, to proclaim Transylvania's joining the Kingdom of Romania.

### The Great National Assembly of Alba Iulia

The Romanian Central National Committee of Arad met on 20th of November and set the historical date of the 1st of December and Alba Iulia as date and place for convening the Great National Assembly.

The Romanian Church was represented on the 1st of December, 1918 at Alba Iulia by all the five Transylvania's active bishops. Numerous groups of believers led by their priests carried placards with slogans such as: "*Long Live Romania*", "*We Want The Union*" or "*The Union With Romania*".

The Bureau of the National Assembly elected three chairmans of whom two were bishops, namely Ioan I. Papp of Arad and Dimitrie Radu of Oradea. The third chairman, the octogenarian Gheorghe Pop de Băsești ended his speech with the words of Simeon the Just in the Holy Scripture: "*Oh, Lord, release now thy slave as his eyes saw the redemption. As of now, I can die happy since I saw the great ideal accomplished*"<sup>11</sup>.

The 212 member Great National Council with legislative competencies was set up immediately after the declaration and among them there were bishops, theology professors, archpriests and priests. The next day, the deputies of the Great National Council met in the court hall under the chairmanship of the bishop Miron Cristea and elected an executive forum called the Dirigent Council headquartered in Sibiu.

On 14th of December, approximately two weeks after the Great Assembly of Alba Iulia, a delegation of the Great National Council led by bishop Miron Cristea went to Bucharest and handed over to King Ferdinand I the document concerning Transylvania's Union with Romania. King Ferdinand issued, on 24th of December, the decree sanctioning Transylvania's union as well as Bessarabia's Bukovina's with Romania.

In order to understand the outstanding dimension of the great event in Alba Iulia and especially the feeling of joy among the Romanian population in Transylvania, we quote the first-page title of a newspaper: "*We have Got Resurrected!*".

11. Cf. <http://basilica.ro/biserica-si-marea-unire/>

In our concern of not desecrating this holy chapter of the Romanian people's history, we tried to describe as briefly as we could the main events surrounding the Great Union which led to the achievement of this desideratum and the role of the Romanian Church as it goes without saying that the topic could and can be approached in volumes.

### **The Orthodox Church and its relation with the state since the Great Union until the Communism was imposed: 1918-1948**

The 1st of December 1918 Union exploit that led to the establishment of the Romanian unitary State meant a series of transformations within the Church. For example, the education was among the other attributions of the church as the latter made up for the lack of a state of the Romanian population, a state which belonged at the time to the secular power.

On 4th of February, 1925, the Holy Synode decided to set up the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchy and the primate Mythropolite was raised to the rank of Patriarch. On 1st of November, 1925, the investiture and the enthroning of the first patriarch, Miron Cristea, (1925-1939) took place.

During this period dominated by ideological, cultural and philosophical disputes, the religious side was analyzed in the inter-war Romanian culture from many perspectives, either of the ethnical "soul" (whether the Romanian soul has "mystical" predisposition), or the political project (religion as form of augmenting the political conscience), or through the prism of tradition and history. These approaches shaped the attitude towards religious cults existing in Romania through charting possible behavioral courses for them. As the weight of the Orthodox Church within the Romanian society was much bigger than that of the other cults, it goes without saying that the majority of debates during the inter-war period concerning the role and meaning of

the religion and Church in the society referred to it. A Church considered in general obsolete, "petrified" by the Romanian modern elites had to offer answers from its own autonomous position to a society in full transition. One of mankind's most important issues at the beginning of the XXth century was the social justice and the Christian sects sought to offer their own answer to this issue, different from the one currently offered by the socialist type thought. The social Christianity, developed initially in the Catholic environment, represents one of the most solid approaches in the field, something that was rapidly assimilated and adapted by the representatives of ROC, who offered well articulated answers in this respect<sup>12</sup>. During the inter-war period, the relation between Orthodoxy and nationalism, as it was understood in the XIXth century, witnessed a significant shift. The fact that the Romanians were by tradition Orthodox was perfectly obvious yet the role of the Church begun to be seen as a historical stage only and that its functions were to be taken over by the political factors<sup>13</sup>. The Church had, under the new historical circumstances, to be "content" with defending the spirituality of life on this Earth and to preach the eternal Christian truths and, exactly through this moral role, to implicitly yet essentially contribute to the healthy development of the society and of the nation<sup>14</sup>. The religious cults in Romania were to play a particular important role in the life of the united Romania spiritually, nationally and socially yet all these had to relate to public institutions, ultimately to the state.

As far as the relation State-Church after 1918 is concerned, there were two great directions: one of Church's autonomy and the other of being subordinated to the state. It was, on the one hand, the model of the Transylvanian Orthodox Church, an institution which was, in 1918, well structured and connected to the congregation needs and offered the necessary energy and, on the other hand, the Orthodox Church in the Kingdom which, based on the ideas of the French

12. Lect. Dr. George Enache, "Biserică – societate – națiune – stat în România interbelică. Explorări în orizont liberal", Revista Teologică, nr.2/2010, p.177

13. Romulus Căndea, „Biserica Ortodoxă și tradiția națională”, în Probleme actuale în Biserică și Stat, București, 1935, pp. 76-78

14. Nicolae Popescu Prahova, Creștinism și națiune. Patrie și religii, București, 1941, pp. 30-42

Revolution, was marginalized during Cuza's rule and, in a way, was impoverished by the secularization of the monasteries' properties. The accomplishment of Greater Romania and the establishment of the Romanian Patriarchy after the unification of all the Orthodox churches of the historical provinces under the leadership of a single Synode brought the hope that things will improve. Unfortunately, the politicians of the time, who were afraid of state decentralization and of any subsidiarity, wished to maintain the Church to the statute it had in the Old Kingdom, and the representatives of the Transylvanian Orthodox Church protested against this state of affairs. The parliamentary debates of 1925<sup>15</sup> imposed to the recently unified ROC (according to Art. 22 of the 1923 Constitution) a statute which discursively wanted to be a synthesis between the way of the church organisation in the Old Kingdom and the way it was organised in Transylvania. It seemed that an ideal compromise was reached between a democratic state and a church organised on liberal-constitutional principles. In fact, an unfortunate mixture resulted which did not allow the Church to develop into a powerful and autonomous institution. First of all, there was no reference to autonomy in the law and the statute and the state took care to leave room to its interference in two essential issues: the election of the hierarchs and the management of the financial funds<sup>16</sup>. A dangerous precedent was created in the relation between the Orthodox Church and state which will lead during the entire inter-war period to a weakening and, at the same time, to a conditioning and subordination of the Church to the state, particularly during the totalitarian period. The interference of the political power in the Church's life is best illustrated by the removal or the appointment of a bishop. Among the removed bishops we mention: bishop of Râmnic, Vartolomeu Stănescu, Mythropolite of Bessarabia, Gurie Grosu, Mythropolite of Bukovina, Visarion Puiu or the elected bishop of Bălți, Benedict Ghiuș. On the background of Ro-

mania's inter-war political instability, political constructions based on more or less totalitarian ideologies, rightist in their greatest majority, begun to emerge. They contested the old establishment and the liberal-democratic principles on which the Great Union was based and propagated in their public discourse ideas from the Christian panoply, especially the Christian Orthodox one, to use the image capital of ROC, and tried to attract the latter on their side. On this background of contesting democracy, a political and ideological current of totalitarian type with strong Christian and anti-Semitic nuances emerged in Romania (in the context of the great ideological mutations on the European space – fascism, Nazism etc. - ). On the Romanian stage, the current was represented by the National Christian Party (Goga și Cuza), a party without great popularity (it enjoyed certain success in Moldova only) and by the Legionary Movement, a political group with revolutionary and messianic character. The legionaries' assuming Christianity materialized in building Orthodox shrines at crossroad, churches and other activities with religious character. The Romanian people, religious in their majority, looked favourably at the legionaries' initiatives and many priests, unhappy with the attitude of the traditional parties towards the Church, helped the teams of young workers considering that this way they supported the spread of religion. The authorities took those manifestations for political propaganda (and that was true, from a certain point of view) and tried, on the other hand, to limit the legionaries' activities related to the religious field and, on the other hand, to limit the clergy's involvement in the political life. The confusion between the religious and political fields became the object of intense debates of the public opinion, especially after a lot of priests attended, at the beginning of 1937, the funeral of the legionaries heroes Moța and Marin, something widely publicised and a journalistic inquiry was undertaken on the issue by Gândul newspaper. The then authorities tried to

15. Mention should be made that the organization statute of ROC was adopted by the Parliament and not by a Church's congress, as it was the case with Șagauș statute

16. Lect. Dr. George Enache, "Biserică – societate – națiune – stat în România interbelică. Explorări în orizont liberal", Revista Teologica, nr.2/2010, p.186

compel the ROC Synode to take punitive actions against those priests. It was not for the first time when containing the influence of the Legionary Movement via the Church was attempted through the Synode. In some cases, such as the 1937 events, the Synode rejected the government claims while, in other cases, it obeyed them and stirred the legionaries' fury who placed on the enemy list the names of hierarchs starting with Patriarch Miron Cristea. Consequently, the hierarchs, part of the old establishment in their majority, closed the ranks around the "old" political elites headed by the "messianic" King Carol II. Carol II, who considered himself a messianic king, a saviour and revolutionary for the Romanian people, when saw the popularity of the Legionary Movement intended to take control of it. Yet Codreanu's refusal brought the two, as it is usually known in history, in the position of enemies.

The fear of a possible collaboration between the Legionary Movement and the Church made Carol II pay a greater importance to the Church, at least at the level of his political discourse during the regime he put in place in February, 1938. Carol II seized the issue of the religion's and Church's increase of their role in the society and, considering himself a sort of voyevode of medieval times, a restorer of the symphony between state and Church, the one who took in fact the ecclesiastic institution out of the policianism's influence, and melt them all in a bizzare synthesis with totalitarian ideas<sup>17</sup>. Due to these considerations and also for showing more clearly that ROC is beside the King, Carol II appointed Patriarch Miron Cristea prime minister, a situation which generated violent contestations as far as the Orthodox hierarchy was concerned, especially from some of the legionaries, having in mind especially that during that period an important number priests, simpatheisers of the Iron Guard, were arrested and deported<sup>18</sup>. The offi-

cial Orthodox publications rallied, too, to the official discourse and promoted the King's image and the need of all Romanians' uniting around him with exaggerated accents sometimes. After the collapse of the Carlist totalitarian regime with its horrendous political and territorial effects for Romania and for the Romanians, (Northern Transylvania was occupied by Horthy's troops after the 1940 Vienna Second Award) , the Legionary Movement, although weakened by the loss of its leader Corneliu Zelea Codreanu (killed on 30th of November, 1938 after being sentenced to 10 years of hard labor for treason) and, at the same time, eager for revenge and "revolution" took power<sup>19</sup>. The revolutionary project will differentiate between the legionaries and their governing partner, Ion Antonescu, who replaced Carol II as defender and guarant of the old structures. It was certain that the legionary "revolution" was to be first of all a "spiritual revolution", a fact proved by the Iron Guard's actions immediately after 6th of September, 1940. The main legionary idea was the need of conciliation of all Romanians with God, with their ancestors and their own past so that the future be a favorable one. It was not by chance that the legionaries assumed in the government the portfolio of Ministry of National Education, Cults and Arts. For one month, the temporary director of the Cults Directorate was George Racoveanu, an ardent legionary. He remained among the staff of the Directorate even after professor Liviu Stan of Sibiu, one of the intimates of Mytropolite Nicolae Bălan, was appointed "permanent" director. The management of the Cults Directorate was completed by priests Ștefan Palaghiță and Ilie Imbrescu, old legionary militants<sup>20</sup>. Their task was to put in order the relations between state and church in the new context of the national-legionary state. To conclude this vast chapter, we may say that the clergy's reaction was exceedingly diverse in

17. On the nature of Carol II's regime, see Academia Română, *Istoria Românilor*, volumul VIII, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2003, p. 391-421.

18. Most of them to Sadaclia camp (details: Adrian Nicolae Petcu, *Despre situația juridică a preoților legionari în perioada 1938-1943*, *Analele Universității Dunărea de Jos Galați - seria 19 - Istorie*, tom IV, 2005, p. 277-302).

19. On the Iron Guard during royal dictatorship see Ilarion Țiu, *Mișcarea Legionară după Corneliu Codreanu. Dictatura Regală (februarie 1938-septembrie 1940). Mecanismele schimbului de generație*, Editura Vremea, București, 2007, 229 p.

20. On the activity of this group with the Cults , see more details in Adrian N. Petcu, „Slujitorii altarului și Mișcarea Legionară. Studiu de caz: Preotul Ilie Imbrescu”, în *Partidul, Securitatea și Cultele, 1945-1989*, p. 51-71

front of this challenge, a fact making impossible a detrimental generalization of the Orthodoxy = legionarism sort. The majority of the "legionary" priests were marginal, critics of a hierarchical establishment built gradually by the "Old Regime" with a liberal undertone. The bishopric, closely linked to the old political elite, contemplated anxiously the revolutionary legionary project which questioned the entire order of the Romanian society. This is why some of them preferred to come closer to the National Christian Party which used a rather XIXth century conservative discourse, including in what concerned anti-Semitism. Assuming a "totalitarian" agenda by some of the bishops took place as well in the context whereby the entire ruling elite, headed by King Carol II, turned towards a totalitarianism of conjecture. It is in the same spirit that one may point out the preference for Marshall Antonescu in comparison with the Legionary Movement. For the rest, the great majority of priests sympathised with the "historical" parties (especially the National Liberal Party and the National Peasants Party) as that was the way they could integrate into the leading elites of the time. They were, nevertheless, less prominent than the legionary priests who "earned" distinction by their "revolutionary" tendencies and by the reprisal waves which hit them, and those blows represented, at least for some of them, the chance of really meeting Christ<sup>21</sup>.

Despite the political, economic and spiritual instability characterizing Greater Romania united after 1918, ROC, which was affected by those transformations and was further searching for an identity, will be vulnerable in front of Communism.

### Church and state during Communism

In order to tackle directly this topic, we say that the Communist movement represented not only a political movement but presented itself as a new religion, or utopia, with Manicheist roots whereby a struggle is being waged be-

tween the proletariat, expressing the Good, and the bourgeoisie, an expression of the absolute Evil, a clenching which, after the triumph of the Good, peace will be instituted and Paradise with its new inhabitants, the New Humans, emerges.

On Greater Romania's territory, the Communist movement was not among the political forces that could have been taken into account. From the Social Democrat Party, the maximalist (Bolshevik) wing will break free and will sign the affiliation to the Third International (Comintern), in 1921, and thus the Romanian Communist Party was born. The manner in which this political formation acted, both before and during the Second World War, proved it obeyed unconditionally the central in Moscow. It received from there precise instructions which were implemented illegally so that the Romanian Communist Party, or the Communist Party of Romania, was more than a political group, it was an espionage agency. The party was outlawed in 1924 after realising the true nature of the Communist movement in Romania. Moscow continued to direct the movement and appoint its leaders. The hope and the look full of admiration of the Romanian Communists was towards Moscow. Inside the party, struggles which have begun then will never cease...

After it changed sides on 23rd August, 1945, Romania joined the powers which were to win the war. Although the move in itself was considered by some historians of having shortened the war by 6 months, Romania did not benefit of the winning powers statute and later was compelled to cede Bessarabia, Bukovina and the Cadrilater and, together with other states of Central and Eastern Europe, was transferred beyond the USSR's Iron Curtain (Winston Churchill acknowledged that in his speech of 5th of March, 1946, a date considered to be the beginning of the Cold War).

As far as the Securitate activity on ROC was strictly concerned, we notice that pressures were continuously exerted on the main institutions of the Church by all possible means

21. Lector Dr. George Enache- Biserică, societate, națiune, stat în România interbelică Biserica Ortodoxă Română și „ispita totalitară” de dreapta în Revista Teologică, 2012, p.300

(espionage, surveillance, bugging). The objective of the Communist party as it result from C.N.S.A.S. documented studies, was the creation of a strictly obedient Church. During the first years of the Communist regime, when the party was still searching for collaborators, it had to compromise and accepted in high clergy positions persons without a clear Communist attitude, particularly in a period when many Orthodox prelates considered that the Communist system was a temporary phenomenon<sup>22</sup>. They were permanently suspected of moving away from the party policy and, consequently, the target was to appoint as sure as possible persons in the hierarchy. The most eloquent case, mentioned in the documents, is the attempt of replacing Patriarch Iustinian Marina, who became inconvenient due to his attitudes, by Mythropolit Justin Moisescu of Moldova and Suceava, considered by some priests a "political instructor", a plan which could have been the Securitate smoke screen. At least during the 1950s - 1960s, when the old hierarchs were still on their positions, they were permanently suspected of intending to move away from the Communists. Ever since 1945, a thorough clearance of the hierarchs and of the potential applicants for bishopric who could be convenient to the Communist power was carried out. A report was presented on 26th of May, 1946 by the state authorities to the meeting of the permanent Synode of ROC concerning the retirement of certain hierarchs due to health condition or due to the fact that they were not "suitable for the new needs imposed by the new pace of life"<sup>23</sup>. There were rumors circulated especially by the emigration that some reticent hierarchs (bishop Grigore Leu<sup>24</sup> or Mythropolit Irineu Mihălcescu) would have been assassinated by the repressive institution. The main criticism brought to the Orthodox Church after 1990 was that it was obedient to the Communist re-

gime which, in my opinion, is not true as it resulted from the spying notes on the hierarchs and priests as well as the Securitate had many attempts to compromise both the Church and the hierarchs with the desire of controlling and submitting it. The entire Orthodox hierarchy, beginning with the Patriarch, had spying files with very minute details. The Securitate collected all possible information which could have compromised some hierarchs. There is almost no spying file on hierarchs without notes concerning their moral attitude. Most of the times, the information was not corroborated and, in spite of its obstination, the Securitate had to give up the trail, a clear enough, we think, proof that the information was not true. An important landmark in ROC historiography is 1948, when the Greek-Catholic Church was disbanded by Decree No. 358/1948 issued by the High Presidium of the Great National Assembly on 1st of December, 1948. According to the document, the existence of the Greek-Catholic cult was suspended and all its assets were expropriated to the benefit of the Orthodox Church. Although accused of orchestrating the move, the Orthodox hierarchs manifested certain reticences for such a forceful act which did not solve anything spiritually on a durable, long term, while the documents and spying notes of the time show that it was a political move in accordance with the USSR model. During that period when the Communist regime settled, numerous priests, theology students and devout Christian Orthodox were among the 3 million persons detained in the 44 penitentiaries and 72 labor camps or among the 800,000 deceased. Among those detained, we may emphasize the personality of Father Dumitru Stăniloae, of the future Mytropolite of Transylvania, Antonie Plămădeală or the future Mytropolite of Cluj, Batolomeu Valeriu Anania. By Decree No. 410 of 1959, ROC was deeply devastated by the

22. see the statement (1949-1959) given by informer "Salcâm" (Acacia) on the opinion of the deputy bishop of Lower Danube: "(...) Bishop Antim Nica, preaches us that (the) today's regime is transient, the faith will triumph, the Communists are the country's traitors and that we, the priests, must be on duty. The Anglo-Americans will save us from the Communist chaos" (Ibidem, dos. nr. 701, vol. II, f. 329, 346) or upon the receipt of the assets of the former Bishopric of Huși, disbanded by the Communist power on 28th of February, 1949, when bishop Grigorie Leu believed that: "after the Eastern, changes will take place in the country and abroad, that will make ceding the patrimony superfluous" (Ibidem, f. 171) apud. <http://Historia.ro>

23. N. Hurjui, *Episcopul Grigorie Leu. Omul și fapta* (teză de doctorat susținută la Facultatea de Teologie Ortodoxă, Universitatea București), București, 1999, p. 249

24. L. Grigorescu, *Politica de laicizare a slujitorilor Bisericii și a credincioșilor*, în *Analele Sighet*, vol. VII, București, Fundația Academia Civică, 2000, p. 103

fact that one of its resistance pillars, the monasticism, was hit. *Articole 3 of Decree 076, stipulated: "Monasticism may operate only in the authorized monasteries of the legally recognized cults. The operation authorization is issued by the Cults Department. The graduates of the clergy training schools may join monasticism no matter the age if they rendered the military service. Other persons may be admitted to monasticism if they reached the age of 55 for the men and 50 for the women, if they give up the salary or the state pension, if they are not married and have no liabilities already established by the Family Code. In cases when the exercise of the cult requests, the Cults Department might authorize certain hermits to hold church positions and to receive the due salary."* The new decisions inflicted deep pain to Romanian monasticism: 92 monasteries were disbanded, closed or used for social purposes (there were 242 Orthodox monasteries in January and only 194 remained in October while in March, 1960 there were only 132 left); in their turn, around 4,700 monks were laid off (in January the monasteries had more than 6,000 inhabitants and after the application of the new rules there remained almost 1,500 only). Many of the laid off monks were arrested, forced to behave like laypersons and were forbidden both to dress the monk's garb and to follow the monk's customs; those sentenced to hard labor were confined to house arrest. The old monks were chased away from monasteries due to "lack of literacy" and were confronted with great difficulties. When they were chased away from monasteries, the underage monks were compelled to live with their family while the adults were persuasively urged to get married and work in the factories for the "prosperity of the country"<sup>25</sup>.

This blow to church was due especially that after 1957, the Securitate changed course in what Church was concerned and considered it a danger per se, a threat to the regime as a whole, and not an isolated threat as it was considered before. The course change came as the result of the Securitate's learning in the meantime that the National Resistance Movement against Communism<sup>26</sup> received material and moral support from different monasteries, most of the time with the tacit approval of the hierarchs. Mention should be made of Patriarch Marina's efforts during that time of reintegrating the priests freed from prisons.

Against the opinion which took hold that ROC isolated itself from the other cults and collaborated with the Communist state for eliminating other cults, the Securitate files bear witness of certain attempts of creating an united movement of the Christian cults against the Communist state and the researches carried out so far revealed three such projects: 1. The collaboration among different Orthodox hierarchs with the International Ecumenical Movement and with the Norwegian Protestant Church through Pastor Richard Wurmbrand; 2. The one proposed by Visarion Puiu<sup>27</sup> and the legionaries residing in the Vatican<sup>28</sup>; 3. Benedict Ghiuș's project of cooperation between the Orthodox and Catholics. Obviously, none of these projects materialized yet their presence proves us the hierarchy's and the ROC clerics' opening to finding common solutions with the other religious cults. Mention should be made of the clever diplomacy practiced by ROC and Patriarch Nicodim Munteanu and, later, by Iustinian Marina, through which it succeeded to defend itself from the Rus-

25. Cf. <https://www.crestinortodox.ro/editoriale/decretul-410-anul-1959-125720.html>

26. For more details see: Radu Ciuceanu, Octavian Roske, Cristian Troncota, *Începuturile mișcării de rezistență în România: Vol. II, iunie-noiembrie 1946*, Institutul Național pentru studierea totalitarismului, București, 6445

27. Visarion Puiu was the head of the Romanian Orthodox Mission in Transnistria, with the rank of Mytropolite of Odessa, between 1st of December, 1942 – 1st of December 1943. He had the chance of being sent in August 1944 with a delegation of the Patriarchy to Croatia for attending the enthroning of a hierarch. The events of 23rd August, 1944 prevented him to return to the country. That saved him from the death sentence pronounced by the People's Tribunal on 21st of February, 1946 for his activity in Transnistria. After wandering he settled in Lonato, near Brescia (Italy). From Securitate's documents it resulted he was in a project retracing an older, XIXth century idea, reiterated during the inter-war period namely of the entire Romanian people embracing Catholicism. The idea was based on the premise of the Latinity of the Romanian people which should be Catholic and not Orthodox, which is the privilege of the Slavs.

28. It is about Alexandru Gregorian, former director of <<Sfarmă Piatră>> newspaper, Vintilă Horia, a poet and writer, former director of <<Meșterul Manole>> magazine, press attache with the Romanian consulate in Vienna and later librarian at the Vatican

sian Church's tendencies of canonical seizing ROC, supported by the Soviet state's political interests, but also by the ego of the Slavic hierarchy<sup>29</sup>, and succeeded, at the same time, to not isolate from the West.

Another critical moment in the Church-state relation during Communism was Ceaușescu's re-systematization project, when around 40,000 dwellings, administrative edifices, art and culture monuments, monasteries and churches were demolished. The plan started after the 1977 earthquake and 20 churches and monasteries were wiped out in Bucharest only.

We tried to outline the most conclusive data and events underlining the Church position in its relation with the state, irrespective of the multitude of political forms the latter adopted during the century that passed since the Great Union. As far as the relation with the Communist state is strictly concerned, it was an antagonistic one from the very beginning as the bases of the Communist state were the Marxist-Leninist philosophy or the scientific materialism which precluded any form of religion, as the Communist state wanted to use the church in its plan of seizing the people without destroying too much of the social paradigm they were accustomed to and where the church had its place. Therefore the state used the Church as a puppet only and wanted a Church devoid of any substance for using it in the relationship with the religious members of the society. In terms of a miracle, Church succeeded in resisting under this domination considered demonic so that after the events of December, 1989, Church had a rather well articulated administration, a good theological schooling and a well-trained clergy. In spiritual terms, the Communist persecution enhanced the faith and the Christian conscience while many who perished in the Communist camps are considered today holy martyrs, although the Church did not do anything in this respect. As was the case with all political leaderships after 1918 and even those before, the Communist regime, too,

wanted to subdue the Church and to use it for its own interests. Church fulfilled its millennial vocation of preaching Christ's Gospel for the salvation of believers with no involvement in the social life, a fact that helped it to live on in history and to resist even the Communist persecution.

During the events of December 1989, the Orthodox Church stood alongside its people. Some Orthodox clerics such as priest Constantin Galeriu and monk Daniel Ciobotea (patriarchal counsellor), currently the Patriarch, were near Intercontinental Hotel. Patriarch Teoctist Arăpașu, together with Mythropolite of Banat – Nicolae Corneanu – announced on the Free Romanian Television ROC's adherence to the Council of the Front of National Salvation (CFSN) on 23rd December, 1989.

On 24th of December, the Holy Synode went public and conveyed ROC adherence to the CFSN Statement and implicitly its solidarity with «the cause of freedom and democracy».

### **The Orthodox Church and its relation with the state: 1990- until today**

At the extraordinary meeting of 3-4 of January, 1990, the Holy Synode of ROC "denounced the former dictatorship and freely and sincerely reaffirms, by word and deed, its adherence to the National Salvation Front program of spiritual renaissance and of resuming the country's social life"<sup>30</sup>. During the first three months of 1990, a lot of criticism concerning the relation between the cults and the state was brought to the public opinion and the collaborationism between ROC and the Communists state was especially emphasized. Tens of intellectuals and journalists "attacked" the Orthodox hierarchy and blamed their servitude to the Communist dictatorship and accused them of collaborationism (including with the Securitate), of turning the Church into a tool of disseminating of the atheistic theories. There were "contesters" even among the clerics,

29. It seemed that the annihilation of the Romanian Patriarchy was sought after as well as the dependency of the Romanian Mythropolies on the Russian Patriarchy (cf. Cr. Păiușan, *Politica Patriarhilor României și „colaboraționismul” cu organele statului, în Analele Sighet*, vol. VII, p. 111-113) apud. <https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/cateva-referinte-si-indicii-despre-biserica-ortodoxa-romana-si-securitatea-in-perioada-regimului-comunist>

30. *Vestitorul Ortodoxiei Românești*, nr. 2/1990



in the circles close to Patriarchy. A Reflection Group for the Renewal of the Church made up of, among others, the Archimandrite Bartolomeu V. Anania, the protosyngelos (under Archimandrite) lecturer Dr. Daniel Ciobotea (again, the current Patriarch), Iustin Marchiș, a monk with the rank of priest, priests Toader Crâșmariu, Dumitru Stăniloiaie and Constantin Galeriu, fine artists Sorin Dumitrescu and Horia Bernea and the PhD theologian Theodor Bakonsky, was set up on 9th of January, 1990. The group tried to *"renew the life of the Orthodox Church at all levels"*<sup>31</sup>, and, among others, *"to correctly interpret and assess the increasing and manifest desire of clerics and of believers for changing and renewing the Church's life"*, as well as to initiate and bring about a dialogue with the current church's leadership so that the Church comes out of the spiritual deadlock it was in<sup>32</sup>.

A first dialogue of the Group with «His All-Happiness» Teoctist and the mythropolitans members of the Permanent Synode took place on 10th of January, 1990, and the latter *"expressed their interest and appreciation concerning the Group's initiatives and concerns"* as well as *"their conviction on the necessity of changes and immediate renewal at all levels, including the hierarchy"*<sup>33</sup>.

There was a quite controversial episode during that period whereby on 18th of January, 1990, during a meeting of the Holy Synode, His All-Happiness Teoctist announced his retirement due to health condition. The Church was headed after that by a group made up of Mythropolitane of Transylvania – Antonie, Oltenia – Nestor and Banat – Nicolae and of bishops Timotei of Arad and Roman Ialomițeanul. The situation lasted until 4th of April, the same year, when Patriarch Teoctist resumed his duties after his health condition improved and upon the requests of the Holy Synode.

From the very beginning, one of the Church's main concerns was the education and the

Church asked for inserting the religion hour into curricula, something that was possible through launching a draft initiative for which the Church collected 1.12 million signatures and the project was validated by the Constitutional Court in 1997 only.

The Church was concerned as well of the issue of the Romanian brothers beyond the River Prut and, on 19th of December, 1992, the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia in Chișinău has been reactivated upon the request of a great numbers of prelates and believers of those territories and the first Mythropolitane was Petru Păduraru, who initiated a relatively ample movement of the emancipation of the Orthodox Church of Bessarabia from the Patriarchy in Moscow ever since 1989, when he was bishop of Bălți and was persecuted by the Russophile Mythropolitane Vladimir (backed by the Russian Orthodox Church and the pro-Moscow authorities in Chișinău).

In both the 1991 and 2003 constitutions, the autonomy of the Orthodox Church, and not only, is recognized while the 2006 constitution recognizes the positive role it plays in the society.

After 2007 only the Church joined the social and charitable work and is now considered one of the important philanthropic bodies of Romania. A report of the National Church Council, published on 14th February, 2018, shows that ROC spent 110,782,632 lei (more than 24 million euro) for social and philanthropic works to the benefit of 93,555 persons of the 779 social centers of the Church<sup>34</sup>.

After 1990, as it was the case during the inter-war period and especially during Communism, ROC faced an increasingly secularized society, disinterested in religious matters, while ROC was searching for an identity and tried to create an as coherent and as articulated message. IMAS opinion polls show a drastic decrease of the population trust in ROC, from 90% in the 1990s to 50% in 2017, and this would be explained by

31. Negruț, Paul, Biserica și Statul. O interogație asupra modelului simfoniei bizantine, Oradea, Editura Institutului Biblic „Emanuel”, 2000.

32. Vestitorul Ortodoxiei Românești, nr. 2/1990

33. Ibidem

34. Informații preluate de la : <https://www.activenews.ro/stiri-social/>

our presence of about 11 years in the European community space and by our rallying to the European trend, whereby Church represents already a marginal institution.

One month ago, the Romanian society was confronted and is still confronted with a great social disturbance as a result of the referendum organized for the redefinition of the family and for modifying Art. 41 of the Constitution, namely using the terms of man and woman instead of spouses. The referendum was organized by the Coalition for the Family and the Church was actively involved, due to the issue debated, namely marriage and family. The said referendum splitted the Romanian society which was already splitted politically and socially. It was not validated as it did not reach the threshold of the minimum presence at the polls of 30%. The people's lack of interest underlines the degree of secularization of the Romanian society. I think this failure must be a lesson for the Church so that in the future it does not get involved in social issues of a political nature. In my position of priest and theologian, I do not think the "strength" of the Church resides in the approximate 3.7 million voices which voted Yes at the referendum, but in its supporters representing around 50% of the population, as many of those who did not go to polls were not against the Church yet they were not correctly informed or, better said, they were misinformed by means of mass-media and social media.

### Prospect for the future

Although it passed with distinction all the historical tests and even came out strengthened from the encounter with Communism, ROC is, in its institutional position, confronted today with a vigorous identity crisis while a real abyss is being created between its message and its results at the level of the society, a society called Christian yet increasingly immoral. More than ever before, the Church is invited to find its role in today's society at times when it is more and more "pushed" from the society's "table", more and more marginalized in accordance with the European model. It must find its role and must

be consistent in carrying out its role. What will it be in the future? It is difficult to give a coherent answer if one thinks it is very difficult to anticipate the future or make predictions based on today's knowledge, especially when the world we are living in has a thundering evolution and, paradoxically, the more the science advances, the more uncertain the future is. Something is certain. The Church found a niche where it can advance, namely the social assistance, as part of the evangelical message, without abandoning its priestly and sacrosanct role, which is the Church's very essence. Face to face with the society's rampant development, with science and technology, the Church should not become a hindrance, but use these data to further acquainting people with God. For the future, Christianity in general and ROC in particular, could become a true defender of man, more exactly of the person, for in a world where the population grows exponentially with the technological development, the group or, better said, the group's interest takes precedence over the personal interest and the person. The Church may help people find their identity in a world where each of us becomes more and more anonymous and more devoid of utility. In order to perform, the Church will have to cleanse the clergy and especially the theological schools. For the coming period, the Church could use not new methods but the one used in the past by Saint Andrei Şaguna, the Mythropolite of Transylvania, or by Mythropolite Nicolae Bălan, namely to support and create Romanian elites in all possible fields so that a strong voice in the society emerges, an elite who can update easier to their compeers the Church's teachings. In an open letter addressed to His All-Happiness Daniel by Iosif Ton, criticizing ROC, an interesting idea emerges about the possible role of ROC in Europe's spiritual revival: *"Several prophecies have been circulating during the last ten years within the neo-Protestant circles in Romania, according to which a great spiritual transition will occur in our country which will spread towards Western Europe and will result in a return to God of the so secularized and alienated from God peoples of the European countries. As I know very well the power of these cults, who numbers around 500,000 people only, I wondered if*

they have the potential of such a gigantic action to generate a spiritual revival of the West. Then, the thought occurred to me: What if God wants the Romanian Orthodox Church be the tool of converting the lost peoples of Western Europe?!"<sup>35</sup> Although rather trivial, this neo-Protestant prophecy would not be impossible to fulfill if we think how well represented the Romanian people and ROC are in the Western European space. More than that, Father Dumitru Stăniloae's book "In the Beginning There was Love" had a great success in the Western Protestant circles who promoted the Orthodox theological thinking by translating it in French, English and German as well. Also, His All-Happiness Daniel, Patriarch of our Church and disciple of Father Stăniloae, has a saying in the world's Orthodoxy and asserted himself during the pan-Orthodox Synode in Crete in 2016. All these premises may lead to outlining an important role of ROC in the European spirituality, and not only.

This article tried to present the most relevant

historical facts in what the relation between the Orthodox Church and state during the key-moments of the history of last century was concerned. The history role of this century is to analyze the chain of events which led us here and to realise the way the thoughts and dreams of our kin crystallized and to us, those of today, the possibility of thinking and dreaming differently.



35. text preluat de la : [Iosifon.ro/blog/scrisoare-deschisa-adresata-preafericitului-daniel-patriarhul-bisericii-ortodoxe-romane\\_2017\\_04\\_05\\_blog](http://Iosifon.ro/blog/scrisoare-deschisa-adresata-preafericitului-daniel-patriarhul-bisericii-ortodoxe-romane_2017_04_05_blog)

## “THE PEOPLES WHO ARE NOT WELL RULED ARE DOOMED TO PERISH SLOWLY”

**Prof. Univ. Dr. Ioan-Aurel POP,  
President of the Romanian Academy**

*Professor Ioan-Aurel Pop, the President of the Romanian Academy, is a Romanian scholar who loves his country and especially its values and who is aware of its shortcomings. He is the Romanian who speaks with sorrow about treasons and sales off's that we were and are still subject to and who understands profoundly the Romanian kin's depths and potentials.*

*He is extremely precisely X-raying the Romanian nation's situation a Centennial after the Great Union. We are not anymore united among us and we do not trust anymore our kin and that not only due to the globalisation induced by new media technologies, as especially the one induced from outside and from the inside struggles that have been waged for our becoming a "soft mixture", easily to shape by those who would have wanted the Romanians perish from this Earth.*

**He is as vocal as possible person when he says:**

Apparently, the Centennial finds us well, for we exist in a country almost as stretched as Great Britain; for we are EU and NATO members, i.e. we are part of an exclusive club and not of the "communist bloc" as was the case three decades ago; for we live, we breathe and travel (at least part of us) while other kins disappeared from the world, melted into other peoples etc. The ancestors of 100 years ago and before lived an apotheosis of the union and had the conscience they were forging a new Romania for all eternity. We are quite bored and feel we have a right to everything without too much efforts.

The Romans, from whom we are descended, at least in part, had a saying: *Nihil homini natura sine magno labore dat*, meaning "Nature does not give anything to man without great perseverance".

A country and a nation are not made once and



for all, but they are built and whitewashed continuously. Perhaps we are more united than a century ago yet often only through bombastic declarations, forgetting about the day-to-day union, about the daily good we have to do in the name of the union, about faith, truth and justice.

Many of us, instead of doing good here, with us, professionally and through relentless struggle, go to other meridians and devote their experience in service to other "unions" and to other "homelands".

To conclude, the Centennial does not find us settled and pleased and either the country intact, as the enlightened leaders of 1918 left it...

### **"The peoples' identity - a very powerful reality today"**

For millennia, humans live alongside Danube and in the Carpathians, alongside Olt and Mureş Rivers, alongside Siret and Nistru Rivers, and those humans even if they wandered constantly, they never left this land uninhabited and not well-off.

Since more than a thousand years, the Romanians were, alongside others, among the hard-workers of the field of these places. It is not superfluous to learn their origins, the mystery of the spoken language, their beliefs, their longings and wailing, weddings and requiems, transi-

tions and celebrations.

This way, we will better understand, perhaps, why "the blue lake in the woods" is ladden with "yellow water lillies" or how in 1500 the architects succeeded in erecting that marvel of Argeş Monastery for all eternity, in the popular belief through Ana's and Master Manole's sacrifice or how does a grown-up man such as Ion of Glanetaşului worships and kisses the wet ground and takes out his cap as one does during the prayer before the icon.

All humans, from everywhere and at any time, make similar gestures yet the halo accompanying the aforementioned things comes in sight only to this people and only on this land, a sign that the Romanians and Romania have their sort of being. The century passed since the Great Union is a good opportunity of making the others, too, friends, unfriendlies or indifferents see us, know us and understand us with our identity of Romanians.

Simply put, the Romanian identity is the way of feeling Romanian and this feeling comes through language, faith, origin, name, tradition, custom, garb, land and sky etc. We need national identity in order to belong somewhere.

At some peoples, nationality is confused to citizenship but you cannot enjoy anything in this world if you don't have national identity.

All peoples relate to their identity and some of them even do it in a ostentatious way and draw your attention that they do exist, that they do have a message to the world, that they are not leaving themselves to chance. The Americans praise themselves many times that they are universalists, not nationalists. It is enough yet to see certain manifestations of the day-to-day life to convince yourself otherwise.

Thus, slogans of the sort Buy only American! are being circulated, at schools one speaks daily of the "founding fathers", all holidays are American, from Columbus Day to Thanksgiving etc. The Poles define themselves by Church and Chopin, the Serbs by the sacrifice at Kossovopole (1389), the Italians by Risorgimento etc.

I have always met foreign intellectuals who

were speaking of their own identity, who criticized the other's "nationalism" but I never met Poles, Hungarians, Americans, French or Germans criticizing themselves the way Romanians do. Otherwise, the peoples' identity is today a very powerful reality even when that is denied or it is not openly recognized.

### **"To deny your country means to deny your own self"**

"The global village" McLuhan wrote about brought us closer but, at the same time estranged us from one another. We are concomitantly closer neighbours yet more alien, closer and yet farther away... We go to see relatives and friends in Australia or America yet we do not see the stairway neighbours and do not speak to our faculty colleagues. Or we speak to them but online, through Facebook! The Romanians are caught into this vortex, too.

My generation, who lived in other times, too, tries to reawaken certain customs, certain traditional values but bump into a hard wall. If, for instance, I try to explain to the teenagers and youngsters the mystery of the silent field work, with the sickle and scythe of the peasants of the yesteryear, the villages round dances, "doina" (an elegiac song of the Romanian folk lyrics) and brokenheartedness, wedding for three days and requiem etc. I realize that there is no way they understand all these. The reasons are obviously related to globalisation, to the acceleration of the Planet's pace, to modernisation.

But there are more profound reasons, too. My generation, even if it was not completely rural, had still the chance to smell the wet ground, to feel the hay freshly scythed, to see the sweat of physical work flowing under the scorching sun or under wind and blizzard.

In addition, it had another chance, namely of sharing all the universal experience through solid reading and through outstanding teachers devoted to school and nation. The trouble is that even the e-books or the electronic books are not fully read. Therefore, if we do not take action we

risk becoming all uniform, with unsolicited, empty minds, ready for getting manipulated tools by malefic forces which control communication and have the power to direct us the way they want.

Unfortunately, we are often encountered with an attitude of rejection towards the country, especially when it comes about civilization. Is there any justification for this attitude? The attitude I am speaking about is the result of the same manipulation. The solid link with the country, the feeling of belonging to family, to community, to nation and to the faith of the country's people is dangerous for the globalists for it makes people profound, critical, circumspect, loyal. The Romanians are an open, welcoming people who willingly let themselves tangled in this orchestrated, limitless "openness".

On the other hand, we went through more than four decades of communism which was demonized with good reason and made us feel guilty, degraded, victims etc. To say nothing about the fact that we were not quite well off in the past, here, as a "Latin enclave at the doors of the Oriente", haunted by enemies, robbed by vain kingdoms and empires, always crippled by people and territories. Our country was not actually ours as the others had taken it away from us a long time ago and we got it rebuilt with great difficulty. As we were not in line with the great powers, nor did we taste the elite's sentiment, we let ourselves easily deceived and get disgusted of ourselves. To deny your country means

to deny your own self because what is the country without the people, without the Romanians?

While we don't have anything better to do but to scold Romania so efficiently as no other enemy from outside has ever succeeded in doing it! Of course, we are sometimes seized with remorse and longing for it, our parents and grandparents who turned to dust seem to reproach us, the icons on the walls of the "house which no longer exists" or on the iconostasis of the church are chidding us yet we get back on track quickly and do nothing to redress the situation.

On the contrary, instead of our carrying the cross and insisting of telling the foreigners who we are and why Romanian is the language we are speaking, why we express our belief in God by singing carols and why we make hay singing "doina", we are stating that we are anything else but Romanians and we keep on living like that. There are other much more downtrodden kins, much more humiliated by the fate but they don't deny their identity, origin, tradition.

**Adrian SEVERIN, Ph.D.**



## The Defeatism of People, More Shameful than the Incapacity of the Leaders

Commissioner Timmermans' aberrations only confirm the correctness of the measures taken in Bucharest for reclaiming justice and protecting the constitutional order.

Over the years, the Euro-Atlantic hegemony has created underground power structures in Romania that have paralyzed and infested the Romanian national state. It is therefore natural that when Romania's immune system reacted and produced antibodies, the parasites would howl and writhe. It is also equally normal that their writhing would raise our suffering for a while.

If medication increases our fever, it is a good sign. The body responds to the treatment. The logical consequence is continuing the treatment, not abandoning it.

The reaction of many Romanians to these developments, to the virulent response of the foreigners unto the outbreaks of sovereignty of the Romanian leaders is disconcerting. "Disaster!"- they yell. The EU is mad at us! The US Ambassador has admonished for it! Farewell Schengen! Farewell Euro! Farewell American bases! Farewell strategic partnership! Farewell European funds! We will continue to have the CVM! We will lose the right to vote in the Council of the EU!

The battle has not even started and we are already accepting defeat.

The CVM stooped existing legally in 2010. It must be denounced. If they do not like it, let them sue us.

Refusing admission to Schengen is an abuse. We should sue them.

We are still unprepared for the Euro-zone. By the time we are ready, there will probably be another Commission and possibly a new Treaty.

The partnership is based on the coincidence or interdependence of the strategic objectives. Fail-



ing that, independent of our will, we have no partnership. We may have a protectorate, at the most.

The EU is or should be a federation of nation states. We are the EU; or, at least, we are the EU too. If this is not true and only "they" or "the others" are the EU, then there is no reason to continue there, we no longer need the EU. We would not expect "them" to work for us.

"The others" have their interests. We have ours. If these interests are not common or congruent, and if, for this reason or for any other reason, we cannot manage them in common, then there is no reason to stay together. For, in such conditions, "together" means "below".

Do we really not see that the objective of the current profiteer protagonists of the current German Europe is a multi-speed EU in which Romania would be considered a colony? Do we really not understand that so-called "parallel state" in Romania has been created or adopted to be actually the only exercised power on the Romanian territory; either by allowing the sovereign state to officially exist only as papier-mâché or eliminating it altogether?

Law theorists say that two states cannot coexist at the same time on a territory, just like two swords cannot fit the same sheath. This is true.

The same applies to Romania. Romania is one country. It is a country that has been captured by an occult power controlled from abroad. That

power is constantly tightening – hour by hour, day by day and year by year – the knot around the neck of the nation until it becomes unable to react.

Any attempt of the Romanian government to escape, to get out of this situation, triggers retaliation. And, when we feel the knot tightening around our necks, we prefer to surrender instead of fighting back against the aggressor, hoping that in this way we would be spared.

"No sword cuts off the bowed head!" It may be true, but there are no guarantees. One thing is certain: "with submission, the chain hunches".

Do we accept being a colony in order to escape the CVM????!!

Do we accept being a colony so we could travel without a passport into the empire????!!

The euro is a sword for the dominant member states and a chain for the dominated ones. Entering the Euro-zone as a colony means giving up the ability to defend against the economic hegemony of the EU players by using the exchange rate of the national currency. We cannot have a monetary union without an economic union and the economic union between a metropolis and a colony is impossible. The colony sells cheap crude oil and buys back expensive gasoline. It sells cheap wood and buys expensive furniture. It sells cheap meat and buys expensive sausages. It sells cheap wheat and buys expensive bread etc. This is not a union, this is an expansion.

What is the purpose of the foreign military forces on the territory of a colony? They defend the metropolis, but not the colony. The colony is only the battleground. The colony has masters, but not allies.

We should not confuse a federation of nation states with an empire, a transnational democracy with a globalist oligarchy and partnership with vassal-

age. Therefore, what is the case here? Romania has defined its national interests in the European and Euro-Atlantic context after 1990. As such, when defending its national interests, Romania also defends the European interests. When fighting the Euro-bureaucrats, it does not fight the United States of Europe, but the Holy Roman Empire of German origin.

Nevertheless, the Romanian government is primarily obliged to defend the interests of the Romanians and then the interests of Europe. And the Romanian people are primarily required to fight for its freedom, dignity and prosperity. This is an even higher obligation when there are other people threatening them.

We should better fight than complain. Even if we could lose a few battles, we would not lose the war, because, unlike our opponents, besides the possibly slack swords, we have justice on our side. And the sword supported by justice becomes invincible.

Even if we lose the war, we will preserve our honor. It will act as the source of the new luck of the Romanians.

This is the message that we must give today to the Romanian leaders. The incapacity of the leaders is less harmful than the defeat of the people. Their shyness is less dangerous than the cowardice of the crowd. Their weakness is less hopeless than the people's tendency to surrender.

Romania is not a country that can continue without a fight. This has been confirmed today by one of the least expected people: Premier Viorica Dăncilă.

*Moto: "The light is on for those who see, not for the blind".*

*Mihai Eminescu – Romanian poet*

**Corneliu PIVARIU**





## Instead of jumping to conclusions - hopes: at the...closed gate of thunderstorms...

The title is inspired by the one of the books published by a lesser known Romanian writer, Eusebiu Camilar – *The Door of Thunderstorms*, published in 1957, whereby the author presents episodes of Romania's history, a country for centuries on end at the point where the interests of great empires such as the Russian, the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian ones. The empires, as they were in the feudal or the beginning of capitalism epoch vanished yet the diverging geopolitical interests continued to manifest themselves in Romania's area until now and will further exist in the foreseeable future.

I have pondered for a long time whether to publish or not these lines having in mind especially the articles signed in this issue by great personalities of the contemporary life in Romania. The fact that, prior to the celebration of the Centennial of the Great Union, I served for almost 50 years Romania's active life and that during that time I had the chance of consulting dialogues with great Romanian and international personalities made me think I have the moral and civic duty of telling, to those who want to read in a different way than the commonplace paradigms, some opinions at this great Romanian Kin's identitarian and national anniversary.

The 1918 Great Union was a "stellar moment" for Romania, achieved by Romanian visionary and patriotic politicians with international support yet above all with the blood sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Romanian soldiers, anonymous in their sacrifice yet eminent by sacrificing their life on the sanctuary of immortality as a kin. It was a strictly national objective, not directed against anyone of the world's family of nations.

In fact, Romania paid in blood, probably more than other nations, its achievements of unity and independence and the strategic mistakes of



the political class of the different historical periods of the 100 years as well.

After 1918, two essential moments marked in a dramatic way Romania's contemporary history: The Second World War (where Romania lost around 800 thousand people, military and civilian) while the end of this universal scourge marked the fall into the then USSR arch of influence (with the acceptance – it should be said and reiterated – of the other Moscow's allies during the war) – and the socialist political orientation. The second moment is represented by December 1989 events when, on the background of Nicolae Ceaușescu's and the Communist Party's removal from power, the orientation towards a democratic society and free market has been resumed, going into a transition period which even the dead's spirits and the aspirations of those who remained to achieve it would have wanted to be very short yet proved to be longer than we wished. The greatest achievements of the almost 30 year post-December period are Romania's joining NATO (29th of March, 2004) and the European Union (1st of January, 2007).

During the almost 50 years of communist dictatorship, some hundreds of thousands more Romanians perished (the exact figure is difficult to quantify), great part of the intellectual elite, generals, valuable politicians who could not survive a terror regime set up in 44 penitentiaries, 72 forced labour camps, 63 deportation centers, compulsory domiciles, 10 psychiatric hospices with political real cause. We can ask ourselves if Soljenitsin's gulag was more terrifying than the gulags set up during communism in a space called Romania.

After The Second World War, Romania could not come back to its territorial configuration consecrated by the Great Union and, moreover,



the Kremlin leadership took care that, through arbitrary drawing up the frontiers (and in 1952 by imposing the establishment of the Hungarian Autonomous Region, which changed the name in Mureș Autonomous Hungarian Region in 1960 and was abolished in 1968 only by the administrative territorial division into counties) to leave several possibilities of using the neighbours' and minorities' possible discontents and aspirations – especially of the Hungarian one – for achieving its political designs in Romania and in the area.

During the socialist period we notice two important moments: the withdrawal of the Soviet troops (June-July, 1958), while they remained in the other socialist countries until 1990; the 1968 moment – the invasion of Czechoslovakia, when Romania was the only socialist country that did not take part in , followed by an independent policy from Moscow, by the development of relations with democratic Western countries and by a pervasive economic development (with **great** sacrifices and hardships for the population) promoted by Nicolae Ceaușescu.

After December 1989 events, when some outside forces sought including Romania's dismemberment – something that succeeded later on in cases of former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia – we went through the Târgu Mureș events of March, 1990, another plot of tearing Transylvania away and of manipulating, through a part of international media, the reality of those events. In fact, a feature of the almost last 30 years is represented by the action of our Hungarian nationals to gain territorial autonomy on ethnic criteria, backed almost continuously by Budapest although, according to Brussels' assess-

ments, the rights the Hungarian minority enjoys in Romania **exceed** those **applied** in the European states and, even more, the ethnical Romanian citizens in the areas with Hungarian prevailing population are subject to numerous discriminations. When Hungary further acts and prepares actions for condemning the Treaty of Trianon, a treacherous declaration in favor of the Transylvanian Hungarians' "cultural and territorial autonomy" was signed on 12th of October, 2018 in Cluj Napoca and the actions aimed at Romania's dismemberment, especially by creating an independent Transylvania, will go on, as the separatist options gain ground in the European Union and Brussels proves unable to articulate a real management of the Union.

The evolution of the Romanian political class after 1989 was badly influenced by the socialist past and, thereafter, by the political evolutions in Europe and in the USA. I think it would be wrong not to mention the influence Moscow still exerts in Romania with persuasion in many fields of the political, economic and social life. Unfortunately, most of the valuable intellectuals avoided and further avoid to directly involve in the political life and that resulted in a political class which, in general, is not able to meet the population's expectations and desired evolutions. The most eloquent example is represented by the four president who could not stand above times, each of them due to different reasons: the first – as a result of the socialist-communist education he received especially in Moscow; the second – an university professor (lecturer) who declared himself defeated by the former Securitate; the third – conditional on his training as long-

haul commercial navy officer and with a political instinct that kept him in power for two mandates and who knew how to maneuver abroad for gaining support; the fourth – a mayor of a provincial town unexperienced with real politics.

In Romania indeed, a semi-presidential state, the president has no decision-making competences of first importance, especially in the economic field, he cannot either fire the prime minister or dissolve the parliament (except under particular conditions), precisely for avoiding the emergence of a new dictatorship. Yet that does not mean the president cannot be a factor for congealing the people's aspirations and to create, within the political class, a consensus for Romania's future durable development. It is exactly this kind of project which is absent now.

The separation of powers is affected by the struggle of the four powers although there are numerous cases when the magistrates' powers (judges and prosecutors – the latter being included amongst the magistrates according to a model which is not to be found in other European Union's countries) is used by forces and interests which are not beneficial to the Romanian state in achieving its specific objectives, sometimes under the pretext of fighting corruption (predominantly the domestic one, without touching any of the great corporations). Some thousands judges and prosecutors enjoy a special status in the society as a result of the importance of their work and dispose of a power they believe that many do not realize yet they have. In 2018 only a law on the magistrate's accountability was issued at a time when judgments of the European Court of Human Rights against Romania placed that latter on the first place as number of condemnations per capita or on the third place after Turkey and Russia (with much bigger populations). The much touted Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification on justice set up by the EU is used more as a Brussels' political instrument (or by some countries) against Romania and not for the initially declared purpose.

The citizen still does not get enough respect

and state, instead of being the citizen's servant, has still the mentality of being above him.

The current situation in Romania is due first of all to us: some of us remained **with a prejudicial obstinacy** in the Byzantine reflex of "complaining to the Sublime (High) Porte" which was replaced by obsequious low-bow to Moscow's, Brussels', Washington's Portes or **to other great European capitals**. The forest could have not been cut if the axe had not the handle carved from the very wood of the forest, a proverb says, or we still have enough traitors, some of them in rather important positions, including abroad, of whom the magistrates have not yet the courage of dealing with.

After 1990, unhappy with the general situation in the country and seeking a better life, more than 4 million Romanians left the country for the EU, USA, Canada and other countries and in their greatest majority they are physicians, professors, engineers, researchers, technicians and highly qualified workers. It is the biggest contemporary population exodus from a country after the one provoked by civil war in Syria. The danger of this situation was not correctly interpreted by the political class either. Let alone taking effective measures to prevent the weakening of the national being of the people!

The situation of the education is more than alarming. We had 24 ministers of Education during the last 28 years, most of them concerned about changing the law of education. According to public data, 42% of the under 15 pupils are functional (workable) illiterates. The relatively recent step of granting 6% of the GDP to education must be followed by decisive measures so that education become a top national priority.

Romania – a country able to easily secure food for a population of 90 million people - has imported during the first ten months of 2018 only food products from the EU worth 5 billion euro.

The situation of the development of infrastructure, roads, railways, energy is deplorable. During the almost 30 years since the fall of communism we were not able to build a highway crossing the Carpathians and our country is the laggard in Central and Eastern Europe with 783

km of highways. Romania has the same number of kilometers of railroads – approximately 11,000 km – as it had 100 years ago (in 1989 we had 24,000 km), and the average circulation speed for the passenger trains is 45km/h. In exchange, we are well placed in what the Internet speed is concerned, on the fifth place worldwide.

The post 1989 period is characterized economically by the foreign capital's taking over the sub-soil resources, the public utilities and banks, as the Romanian capital was not supported for dealing with the situation. In a recently published article, an Ernst&Young research is quoted whereby the takeovers (mergers and acquisitions) in the economies of the former socialist countries are analysed and clasified in three categories, takeovers by foreign capital, takeovers where the buyer and the selled are indigenou and takeovers from abroad which finds out that Romania is on the first place in what takeovers by the foreign capital are concerned, 67% and by far on the last place in what takeovers from abroad are concerned, with 3% only. No country in the region witnessed such a discrepancy, of more than 22 times, between what the indigenous capital ceded to foreign capital on its own markets and what it managed to take over

from the foreign capital on the latter markets. The foreign capital externalizes to their origin countries pre-tax profits of at least 35-40 billion euro yearly.

So that's Romania's real end-result in brief at the anniversary of the Centennial of the Great Union. We could be proud of the achievements of the past yet at the same time we must be aware of the current problems and think of the future with solutions adapted to both the actual situation and into perspective.

The current international situation is a complex one and important changes are taking place in the international order at a time when Romania, consumed with petty domestic disputes, is quite inexistent. No one but us will act for our sake except strictly within specific interests. The abovementioned gate of thunderstorms of the Middle Ages must be shut and an oasis of stability and prospetity must be created in order to attract investors. Romania may have the future it deserves if it wants to act in this regard. Another 30-40 years will be probably needed for that.



## The Târgu Jiu "Heroe's Path" monumental ensemble



The Endless Column (The Column of the Never Ending Sacrifice)



The Chairs Lane and The Table of Silence (The Table of the Kin's Apostles)

[www.nedelciu.ro](http://www.nedelciu.ro)



The Gate of the Kiss (The Monument of the Kin's Completion)



## The Great Union of 1918, Greater Romania

### Acts and Documents

By Vasile PUȘCAȘ

Publishing House: Studia - 2018

Vasile Pușcaș (64 years) was, during 2000-2004, Romania's Chief-Negotiator in the country's relation with the EU and, under his coordination, all negotiations chapters of the accession process to the EU have been closed in December 2004. Based on the results Vasile Pușcaș's team obtained, Romania became, on 1st of January, 2007, a member state of the European Union. Following the negotiations, Romania got the greatest number of transitional periods (50) for preparing its accession versus all the other candidate states of the fifth expansion wave. Poland got 48 transitional periods, Malta 47 and Hungary 35. Romania obtained, as well, a 500 euro per capita financing during the first two years from the accession while Poland obtained 480 euro per capita.

During 1992-1994, Vasile Pușcaș negotiated the USA's regranting the most favored nation clause to Romania during a political sensitive period. Graduate of "History and Social Sciences" section of Babeș-Bolyai University (UBB) of Cluj-Napoca in 1979, Vasile Pușcaș climbed all the steps of an academic career from t.A to professor (1995). He is "ad personam Jean Monnet Chair", a title granted by the European Commission and reserved to a selected number of highly qualified professors and researchers in the field of Studies and European Integration. Pușcaș inaugurated, in Romania, in February 1990, the course of European integration which became a compulsory discipline in all history, international relations and European studies faculties. He laid the foundation of the school of political sciences in Cluj, on an American model, and in 1995 was the first dean of the newly established Faculty of Political and Administrative Sciences of UBB. He inaugurated the timetable of a Masters Programme of the Management of International Affairs field and, as of 2000, he is the head of PhD in International Relations with the Faculty of History and Philosophy at UBB as well as at the International University Institute of Eu-

ropean Studies (IUIES) of Gorizia-Trieste (Italy). Between 2002 and 2008, he was Director of the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy (Bucharest).

Nicu Dragoș, Director of Studia Publishing House wrote in the acknowledgements: "The volume *The Great Union of 1918, Greater Romania - Acts and Documents* presents an account of the accomplishment of the process of Romania's modern nation-state establishment through combining the interpretative narrative with presenting historical documents reconstituting the historiography of the facts, atmosphere and the relevance of the 1918 decisions (**The Union of Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania with The Old Kingdom of Romania**) which led to what was called then **Greater Romania**".

The book contains, besides acts and documents, solid arguments pertaining to the past and to would-be Romania combined with the present and the author emphasizes the intelligence and ability of the Romanian politicians of the beginning of XXth century, their political orientations and their way of acting as true statesmen.

The author joins the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama who showed, more than 15 years ago, that the contemporary political ans state's leaders should dedicate an important part of their meditation and plitical action to rethinking the state's form and functions in the framework of the XXIst century International System.

The volume tackles the logic of the historical process, the evolution of the Romanian national idea and action before 1918, the fact that the Great Union was not the termination point of a historical process but a moment, a very important one of the history of the modernity of the nation-state Romania.

I further quote from the acknowledgements: "By presenting the history of the modernity of the nation-state, the first chapter of the book integrates the process of accomplishing the Romanian nation-state (1918) within the history of

the proces of the European society modernity. For better understanding the set-out phenomenon, the author plays a historical sketch of the evolution of the principle of nationality since the 1648 Westphalian system (state sovereignty) was set up until the beginning of XXth century. A parallel has been drawn between the dynasic principle and the principle of nationality in the building up and governance of the European states by specifying the features of the national and democratic revolutions in the Europe of the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries. A particular attention has been paid to the way the principle of nationality and the ideal of the nation-state operated in Central and South-East Europe during the abovementioned period, with reference to the characteristics and policies of the Hapsburg, Ottoman and Czarist empires. The manner in which the ideal of the nation-state manifested in the area inhabited by the Romanian nation until the First World War was pointed out in the same context. The historical evolution analysis of the respective phenomenon in the Romanian Principalities/Romania, Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia offers to the reader the perspective of the synchronicity of the national values and of the local/regional specificity and that leads to a profound knowledge of the stages and manners that brought about the mobilisation of the Romanian elites in 1918 for the achievement of the Great Union.

The experience of one century ago, when the nation-state Romania was achieved and accomplished, as it was the case with the other nation-states of Central and South-Eastern Europe, could be and must be a behavioral textbook for Romania's present and future leaders yet also for the leaders of the regional, international and transnational organisations."

The purpose of the book, the author says, is that of remembering the facts and the people who made Greater

Romania possible through the decisions and actions they made and to show to the modern-day people that the historiographical discourse has to start from the fundamental historical sources.

Professor Vasile Pușcaș "dedicates this book the the Great Union's Generation as he considers that today national political models are needed for guiding the senses of Romania's nation-state during the XXIst century and for the centuries to come. We believe that the main Romanian leaders who acted for the achievement of the Great Union in 1918 can offer a behavioral model for serving the public good and the nation."

**Overview: Cornel VAIDA**

VASILE PUȘCAȘ



MAREA UNIRE  
1918  
ROMÂNIA MARE  
ACTE ȘI DOCUMENTE





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