

GEOSTRATEGIC PULSE

Motto: "Opinions are free, but not mandatory" I.L. Caragiale



The Transatlantic Link - Current and Future Significance.

Contribution to the European Security

Syria, from the "Peace Spring" to Sochi, via Adana

The Security Dimension of the Turkey-EU Relations

Brexit, Ideological or Geopolitical Phenomenon? British Euro-scepticism

as Seen from the Ideological Reconfiguration of the European Union

**Hormuz: from "Eye for an Eye and Tooth for a Tooth"
to "Oil for Oil and Security for Security"**

I. EDITORIAL


3 Europe, Where To?

- **Constantin IACOBIȚĂ**



Reconfiguration of the European Union

- **Alexis CHAPELAN**



34 EU's Efforts to Combat Terrorism and the Phenomenon of Radicalization in Prisons. Structural and Conceptual Challenges.

- **Vladimir-Adrian COSTEA**

II. EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

4 The Transatlantic Link – Current and Future Significance. *Contribution to the European Security*

- **Gheorghe SAVU**



22 (Re)defining and Designing the Internal and External Borders of the European Union

- **Vladimir-Adrian COSTEA**



IV. MIDDLE EAST

42 The Right or the Wrong Way. „The Deal of the Century”, Where To?

- **Munir SALAMEH**



45 Two Years without the Caliphate. Is There Any "Daesh" Left?

- **Dumitru CHICAN**

III. EUROPEAN UNION

9 Let's Not Neglect the European Idea

- **Dumitru CHICAN**



29 The Security Dimension of the Turkey-EU Relations

- **Uğur GÜNGÖR**



48 Hormuz: from "Eye for an Eye and Tooth for a Tooth" to "Oil for Oil and Security for Security"

- **Dinu COSTESCU**

52 "Syria, from "Peace Spring" to Sochi, via Adana

- **Dumitru CHICAN**

12 Brexit, Ideological or Geopolitical Phenomenon? British Euro-scepticism as Seen from the Ideological

32 The European Union and Migration. Perspectives and Challenges

- **Dinu COSTESCU**

55 The Russian Federation: Four Years of Syrian War

- **Dumitru CHICAN**

Motto: "Opinions are free, but not mandatory"—I.L. Caragiale

EDITORIAL

EUROPE, WHERE TO?

Constantin IACOBÎĂ



Europe is going through a period of confusion and political instability, under the pressure of a combination of external and internal factors (from both communitary and national perspectives) with significant negative potential and unpredictable evolution.

To a great extent, this has been reflected by the recent elections both in a number of EU member states and for the European Parliament, as well as by the challenging process to set up and operationalize the new European Commission.

Great Britain leaving the EU continues to consume energy and time on both sides of the English Channel. To make the situation even more complicated, the Kingdom in its turn faces the prospects of a possible separation of Scotland through a referendum actively promoted by Scottish nationalists.

And, with a history older than that of Brexit but connected to it, separatism goes through a revival in the south of the continent as well.

EU-Russia relations remain difficult and exposed to two sets of strong, opposing conditionalities – a solution to the Ukraine-Russia conflict, on one hand, and the growing energy dependency of a number of EU member states on Russia, on the other hand.

Internal challenges such as the „multi-speed Europe”, nationalism and Brexit, or external ones such as migration and Russia are trailed by a challenge less taken into account before Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential elections, and largely pointless – namely that to the Transatlantic relationship. This relation is subject to tensions stemming from what threatens to become a USA-EU trade war similar to that between America and China, from diverging approaches and positions on Iran or more recently Syria, and so on.

The main beneficiary of the evolution briefly and partially presented above is the Russian Federation. In Europe, Russia has been expanding and consolidating its energy supply infrastructure, while in the Middle East it is emerging as the player eager to replace the USA. The most recent and eloquent illustration of the above is the case of Syria, where the Turkish offensive conducted against the Kurds just south of the Syro-Turkish border in the context of the US troops withdrawal was stopped by a rather symbolic Russian military presence. And, not by chance, the Russian military intervention was accompanied by the re-deployment of the Assad regime forces in the Kurdish area previously protected by the USA. Russia thus reasserts its role as designer of the future of Syria, as well as that of regional „mediator”.

Great Britain leaving the EU (either on January 31st 2020 or on a different date) and the upcoming NATO summit in London (3-4 December 2019) bring back on stage two major themes relevant for the future of the EU and the Transatlantic relationship.

Great Britain’s separation is expected, among other things, to significantly weaken the EU’s standing in an international arena dominated by the competition among a pool of great powers soon to be joined by the Kingdom itself.

As for the NATO summit, its agenda will most likely include the recurring and difficult to solve matters regarding the size of the national defense budgets (2% of GDP), the national contributions to the Alliance, and the Allied unity and solidarity.

The true test will prove to be, though, the NATO-EU relationship, given the growing „appetite” of the European Allies for strategic autonomy and the expected Great Britain leaving the EU.

The above re-emphasize the scale and complexity of the challenges that the allies face within EU, NATO and as far as the Transatlantic relationship.

EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY



The Transatlantic Link - Current and Future Significance

Part 3, Contribution to the European Security¹

**Associate Professor CEng PhD
Gheorghe SAVU²**

The significance of the transatlantic link in the architecture of the European security has been, over the years, a subject for debate for both the member states and the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. As in most cases, when important aspects regarding European defence and security are debated at the level of the European Union, opinions differ - from completely supporting the transatlantic link, to ensuring European security by its member states alone, by means of the Common Security and Defence Policy. These debates are the more relevant nowadays, when the European Union is more determined than ever in its evolution to build a security and defence profile that depicts the institution as guarantor of European security.

While many EU member states leaders have expressed the necessity to develop European defence capabilities so that Europe can ensure its own security, the reality is totally different, as proven by the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy³: *"The EU will therefore deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in complementarity, synergy, and full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of the two. In this context, the EU needs to be strengthened as a security community: European*

*security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to, and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO. A more credible European defence is essential also for the sake of a healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States. ... On the broader security agenda, the US will continue to be our core partner. The EU will deepen cooperation with the US and Canada on crisis management, counter-terrorism, cyber, migration, energy and climate action."*¹

So, the most important document adopted in the past years by the European on security and defence undoubtedly states the current and future significance of the transatlantic link not only as far as defending Europe, but also ensuring its security. As the Global Strategy stipulates, and even though EU-NATO's main fields of cooperation are crises management, counter-terrorism, hybrid threats and cyber defence, the other aspects of security are not excluded. Based on these clear stipulations of the Global Strategy, it is obvious that Brussels is aware of the fact that both the European defence and security are highly dependent on the cooperation between the EU and NATO, thus on the transatlantic link.

The issue of transatlantic cooperation (the relationships between the EU and NATO, and between the EU and North America) from the perspective of European defence was extensively examined by the author in the first

1. As mentioned in the previous article - The Transatlantic Link - Current and Future Significance Part 1 – Challenges and Opportunities (Geostrategic Pulse, no. 274/May-June 2019) and Part 2 - NATO's Role in European Defence (Geostrategic Pulse, No. 275/July-August 2019), in this third part the author continues his view on the Transatlantic Link, focusing on its role in European security, especially from the perspective of the European Union.

2. The author served in the Romanian Armed Forces until his retirement, in 2017. Retired General Gheorghe Savu was the Chief of the Romanian Military Intelligence Directorate and the Director General of the Defence Intelligence General Directorate. Between 2012-2017, he served as Minister Counsellor in the Romanian Permanent Representation to the European Union and as Romanian Military Representative to NATO and EU. Since 2017 he has been an associate professor at the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, at the National Defence University "Carol I", and at the National Intelligence Academy. He teaches Euro-Atlantic Security, Strategic Leadership, Defence Diplomacy, European Union Policy and Decision-Making.


3. Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/17304/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en

two articles. This article focuses on the significance of the transatlantic link from the perspective of European security, in the context of the dynamics and complexity of the international security environment and of the evolutions registered at the level of the European Union - from the same perspective. (Picture no. 1)

The European Union is aware of the fact that its internal security cannot be ensured without NATO's defence capabilities, and NATO's military potential depends on the USA and Canada. So, in Brussels, it is hard to imagine the possibility of developing military and security capabilities that will lead to EU becoming totally independent from NATO and, by extent, the USA. This is neither realistic nor acceptable for the 22 common member states that would face the risk of duplicating their capabilities necessary to ful-

fil the responsibilities as EU and NATO members. This is why both the 2016 Global Strategy and the documents adopted afterwards at the level of the European Council and the Council of European Union highlight the necessity of cooperation with NATO and the USA on European defence and security, in complementarity and full respect of the decisional autonomy of the parties.

Practically, by adopting a broad and inclusive approach, the European Union manages to satisfy, in an acceptable manner, the interests of all its member states, whether large or small. Large EU states (France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands etc.) that are NATO member states as well enjoy the EU decisional autonomy on security and defence. The other states that are part of both organizations benefit from not having to duplicate their defence capabilities and from



Picture no. 1, the Euro-Atlantic Area⁴

4. Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/17304/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en

preserving their decision-making autonomy over matters of security and defence that are of interest to the Union, but in which NATO doesn't want to get involved. These states are lobbying permanently for cooperation between the EU and NATO on defence planning and development of military capabilities.

Just out of the need to preserve decisional autonomy and promote its security and defence interests in areas and fields where NATO doesn't show any interest, the EU has launched – through its Global Strategy implementation plans - a complex process of building military capabilities complementary to those of the Alliance. Looking at the way the funds destined for European defence and security are spent by comparison to the USA, the EU estimates that, depending on the intensity of European cooperation, it can save 25-100 billion Euro by eliminating fragmentation and inefficiency. (Picture no. 2)

The adoption of the Global Strategy has set up a complex process of analysis at the level of the EU and its member states that led to strengthening the mechanisms of the Treaty of


Lisbon and to the creation of new ones through the various Council's Conclusions. Thus, the European Union has embarked on a road to better coordination the planning of development of military capabilities destined to the defence and security of Europe. Among these mechanisms, the most important are:

- **Permanent Structured Cooperation - PESCO** which, although included in the Treaty of Lisbon, is implemented for the first time. It lays out the necessary framework for the 25 member states that signed the PESCO arrangements to cooperate on 34 specific projects in fields such as military training and exercising, European Medical Command, joint capabilities, cyber-defence, hybrid threats etc.

- **Coordinated Annual Review on Defence - CARD**, which: allows the member states to inform each other, in a formal setup, on national plans regarding defence expenditures; enables them to identify gaps and duplications, as well as savings by means of cooperation. Moreover, the common military research and development will be financed by the EU, from the **European Defence Fund - EDF** which will amount to 13 bil-



THE COST OF CURRENT FRAGMENTATION AND INEFFICIENCIES



* Number of types of weapon systems for selected weapon systems categories
Source: NATO, International Institute for Strategic Studies, SIPRI, Munich Security Report 2017

Picture no. 2, the Cost of Current Fragmentation and Inefficiencies at the Level of the EU⁵

5. Source: https://ec.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/47517/implementing-global-strategy-eu-delivers-security-and-defence_en

lion Euro in the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027.

The recent evolutions at the level of the European Union, as far as the defence industry is concerned, are considered a serious challenge to the transatlantic link, the Europeans having to assume a greater responsibility in matters of European defence and security. If such initiatives existed in the past at the level of the EU, but were never materialized in cooperation programs, today things are different. Starting with 2014, the security situation at EU borders and even domestically has changed dramatically. The rules of international law were severely violated when the Russian Federation annexed Crimea. Russia's actions in Eastern Ukraine led to increased instability at the eastern border of the EU, and many European countries see Russia as a destabilising factor and a threat to their sovereignty. The unity of NATO and the EU is exposed to Moscow's attempts to undermine it using means and techniques specific to hybrid warfare. Just like terrorism, cyber warfare represents a more and more powerful threat from both state and non-state actors. Consequently, Europe feels the urgent need to develop military capabilities to defend its interests, should the USA and implicitly NATO choose not to get involved.

One should also consider the fact that Brussels is undergoing radical changes regarding the way European institutions get involved in security and defence matters. If these fields have traditionally been considered to fall under the responsibility of the European Council and of the Council of European Union, starting with 2017 the European Commission is involved by allocating funds for military research and technology. Taking into account that the Commission has significant authority on allocating funds and spending the EU budget, it is expected the EDF to be implemented according to the decisions taken by the member states.

Moreover, the Europeans have become relatively sceptical about the USA involvement in European defence and security after the declarations of President Donald Trump regarding Washington's transatlantic commitment, as emphasized on the occasion of the NATO Summit in

2018. Surely, economic concerns are being voiced on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, especially by the USA, Great Britain, and the EU states with small defence industries that fear that larger EU countries will further consolidate their defence industries, with a negative effect on free and fair competition.

Economic considerations are elements to be taken into consideration, without a doubt. However, the author believes that Europe must increase its defence investments just like the USA demanded on many occasions, starting with the NATO Summit in 2014. This is practically the role of the EDF managed by the Commission. By investing in common military research and development, the EU member states will develop modern military capabilities at lower costs than when investing only at national level. This will reduce the dependency of some states from Russian military equipment and will increase European interoperability.

One might believe that the US interests are severely affected by the EU's new initiatives on research, development and acquisition of European military capabilities. The author believes this will only happen on a short term. More important to Washington should be reaching its strategic objectives on long term, as far as European contribution to the defence and security of Europe. Taking into account that at this moment the US military exports to EU states represent 11% of all exports, out of which one third goes to the UK, the impact on the US military industry is not as high as one might expect. This impact can be reduced by setting certain conditions for the subsidiaries of US companies in EU to participate in EDF financed projects, while European companies will have access to US technology.

Intensifying the cooperation between NATO and the EU as far as the development of complementary and interoperable military capabilities is concerned should be a priority for all involved parties. To this end, both the EU member states and the USA must cooperate to develop military capabilities. To most European states that are members to both NATO and EU, is in their interest to see that the development of military capabilities within EU contribute to NATO's capabil-

ity requirements, and the other way around. In order to achieve this, complementarity and interoperability are mandatory, and a guarantee for the development of a single set of forces at national level. This generates a conflict of interests between the largest European producers of military equipment and the other EU member states that need to be settled at the level of the European Council. Smaller states want to have access to the European military research and development while preserving their decisional freedom as far as the military equipment suppliers, whether European or North American. (Picture no. 3)



Picture no. 3, the meeting between the US President, Donald Trump, President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, May 2017⁶

Practically, when implementing projects financed through the EDF one should also take into account the capability gaps identified by the NATO Defence Planning Process - NDPP. This is why the European Defence Agency - EDA should be more connected to the NDPP and encourage the EU member states to lobby within PESCO primarily for the development of capabilities that lack within both organizations. Basically the NATO-EU cooperation on the development of military capabilities should be broadened from a military level to a political strategic one. In such a situation, the EDF could contribute to finding solutions to the security interests of both Europe and the US and would give more substance to the relationship between NATO and the EU, as

well as to the transatlantic link.

The US and European security and defence strategic objectives are not in contradiction with each other, and their complementarity can also be improved through a closer cooperation in the development of military capabilities. This is obvious for everyone. It remains to be seen how the national interests of the larger EU countries and those of the US - as far as the defence industry is concerned - can be harmonized with those of the smaller EU states and even with the Union's general interest to ensuring European peace and security.

* *
*

The author believes that an increase in the European military cooperation will have as main consequence more efficiency in the military expenditures of the EU member states, especially with regard to modernising combat capabilities and reducing duplication in the fields of research, development, acquisition and operation of combat equipment. Full transparency towards the member states and inclusiveness will allow the UE to increase the European contribution to the distribution of the trans-Atlantic effort to ensure the security and defence of Europe. Europe will become more capable to act within the Allied framework or autonomously in areas of common strategic interests, both at an operational and strategic level.

By adhering to the principle of a *single set of forces* assumed by all the states that belong to both NATO and the EU, and by ensuring a fruitful NATO-EU cooperation in the field of defence planning, the 22 NATO and EU member states can deploy their forces in both NATO and EU operations. Thus, the EU's strategic autonomy can develop in complementarity with that of NATO and contribute to a more balanced distribution of the security and defence responsibilities of the countries on both sides of the Atlantic. This can only lead to the strengthening of the transatlantic link.

6. <https://www.esjnews.com/eu-military-defence-fund>

EUROPEAN UNION



Let's Not Neglect the "European Idea"

**Ambassador Professor Dumitru
CHICAN**

With a history equally rich and intensely, almost obsessively evoked in the discourse regarding European unity, our title phrase has a simple yet valuable meaning. It basically refers to the European Union and to all declaratory, legal or pragmatic actions that are adequately and rigorously taken so that this "union" is protected from trivialities, rendered efficient, and perceived in an equal and unbiased manner by all the parties that willingly joined it - the European citizens and the countries they belong to. What people often keep on forgetting is the fact that this unity is in its entirety a system of "specific" values that we like to proudly call European. These values express themselves in a universal framework and yet stand out, due to their "European" nature that is unique and distinctive.



The system of values making the basis on which the European unity has been built is "European". It is perceived as such due to the fact that, from a historical point of view, it originates from the European history and consciousness, and, perhaps to an even greater extent, due to the fact that it has been tested and it manifested itself as European. One of the results these processes have produced is the actual birth of the European Union, to which this system of values is one of the key binding factors

that makes the "European idea" work and endure.

After all, how should we understand the structure of this European system of values? Without naming any, since they are well known, we will provide a simple answer by stating that all the values the Europeans claim as their own, as far as their identity is concerned, are a *summa* of concepts and practices. They have been the beacon of the evolution of this continent for centuries, and, most of all, they have helped overcome the major obstacles it faced - including the two world wars which started in Europe, not elsewhere. The practices we are referring to would include: the codification of human rights and freedoms, social equality, the development and promotion of the rule of law and of a social structure where no one is above the law, democracy in all its forms of manifestation, prosperity for all and everyone's contribution to its achievement, the use of dialogue instead of force in the resolution of conflicts, solidarity as a pillar or as a weapon against segregation, xenophobia, and racism in all their forms, and the list could go on.

In the context of globalization and the new challenges and confrontations that Europe has to face in the second decade of the 21st century, one may notice and should acknowledge the appearance of certain rifts that tend to deepen. We are speaking about recognizing and defining the European system of values on one hand, and believing, using and abiding by it on the other.

In this respect we are mostly referring to a growing tendency that manifests itself on a social and political level - especially among the political elites - towards a more and more obvious denunciation and criticism of those values, whether taken separately or as a whole. We are referring to an idealistic going back "to the roots" and to the values and reminiscences of our national identities. We are equally referring to "controlled democracy" or "liberal

democracy". The driving power of these tendencies is, sadly, generated by selfish mercantile electoral reasons, and not by some patriotic or identity impulses. They give birth to harmful populism and to nihilistic and extremist attitudes, in total contradiction to the concept of the "European idea" and the construction of a unity that functions through solidarity and diversity.

There are many arguments that support the idea that the becoming and fulfilment of the European Union coincides, during these modern times, with the history of the process of institutionalized unification of the continent. It is good to highlight this idea especially in a time when, this fall, the same union faces, for the first time, what could be just the beginning of an institutional and judicial separation that the imaginary public called "Brexit". Tired of either a warring past or the heavy burdens imposed for decades, the European population sought healing in the ideal of unity. This diversity can be seen on a national/state level as well as on a regional and provincial one and, just like the European history, is a product of history in all its forms of manifestation.

What kind of conceptual value does the famous slogan of "two-speed Europe" have when "Brexit" is a reality and the unionist rhetoric is broken by the threat of other possible exits bearing the names of other member states?

Undoubtedly, the process of evolution is never linear, in harmony and convincing. However today, 26 years after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and only ten years since the Treaty of Lisbon was adopted, there are many Europeans - and we are not talking about the political elites but about mere "European" citizens - who discover that the people living on this continent still discriminate - and quite obsessively - between Western and Eastern Europe. This division in a Europe dominated by the elitist Schengen is characterized by what is complained to be a sluggish, or total lack of communication between a Centre that gives orders and a periphery which is meant to always execute them. There are also a lot of "Europeans" worried by the safety of their

employments or by the difference in the quality of goods, depending on where they are on the map of the united Europe...

In the first half of this year, Romania held the rotational presidency of the European Union that started under the tunes of Beethoven's "Ode to Joy", and ended in the solemn rhythms of the music inherited from the Romanian composer George Enescu. The track record of this presidency are far more honourable, as it was the result of a unique experience and sustained efforts that only ignorant or spiteful people can disagree with. Setting up the budget of the European Union in the period following the year 2020, guaranteeing the functioning of the European Single Market, improving digitalization and domestic security, countering terrorism, managing the challenges of migration, real institutional cooperation, the motivational discourse regarding European security, Europe as a global actor or a Europe of common values are only some of the issues and challenges that are worth taking into account in the future. Romania alone could not have done more than the associated European free wills.

And yet Europe hasn't reached perfection, or the limits of the operational and ethical parameters codified by its founding treaties. This is a serious disregard to the European project, as long as the basic system of values of the European idea won't provide a different perspective to the citizens that feel cast aside or even forgotten, Europeans that keep on seeing the European unity as an artificial community, in comparison with the enduring and common values offered by their national identity. Such a perception feeds, at least for the societies in Central and Eastern Europe, the sense that to Western Europe this system of values is all about the rhetoric of the treaties and bureaucracy, while, in reality, it follows a double standard strategy that considers Central and Eastern European citizens more as a lesser category whose fundamental duties lie with strictly following the "rules" set by the Brussels decision-making elites.

What can be done?

It is true that, in order to counter the

challenges that the European project is facing, a real and honest return to the system of values making the essence and nobility of the European unity in all its diversity and entirety. However, at the risk of repeating the same clichés and stereotypes, we believe that from this perspective there are two things we should do immediately and decisively - admit and accept the existence of flaws and take explicit action at the level of the community in order to make things right again. So, we should permanently pay the utmost and closest attention to the pan-European policies regarding culture and education. They should become the encouraging tools to spreading the belief that the set of cultural, spiritual and moral values needs the equal and clear commitment of all European societies and their citizens, especially when it comes to the emerging young generations. It is imperative that the European education and teaching systems should position and mould themselves more decisively towards fighting against the influential superficiality that the mass and social media promote. If the structural plan provides solutions - still promoting equality - the effort shifts from concept to form. As far as education is concerned, the European Union is still fighting conflicts at the level of consciences and beliefs - secular not religious.

Since a new-born is European anywhere on this continent we must decide what chances to develop and identify we give to the new citizen. We need a European teaching and educational discourse to be promoted in elementary and high schools. At the same time, we should reject the idea that an European education has the

potential to undermine the historical identity, and in order to be convincing the European education should not prohibit the ideals of the "other Europe". This prohibition will fade very fast in the physical, sanitary and professional framework of the school. It goes without saying that improving education is firstly the countries' responsibility, however, an institutional European Union can encourage and facilitate national efforts.

The European values face threats and challenges coming from both within and the outside of the European Union. And their stand-out against existing or emerging counter-patterns must firstly reveal the deep causes of anti-European actions.


It is a fact that the European idea is not free of weaknesses and imperfections, and the way we deal with them should consist in proving that the European project has the ability to self-improve and remain a means to accomplishing and strengthening the harmony and balance between reality, equality, and social justice on one hand, and democracy and security in the West, Centre, and East of an Europe with a universal vocation for values and morality.



Advertising

Advertising is available.

For details and terms please contact us at office@pulsulgeostrategic.ro.



Brexit, Ideological or Geopolitical Phenomenon? British Euro-scepticism as Seen from the Ideological Reconfiguration of the European Union

*Alexis CHAPELAN*¹

Abstract

Brexit signifies more than the technical complexities of the United Kingdom withdrawing from the European Union²: it is an ideological phenomenon, constructed both from within and outside the UK. The present article sets out to map some of the main evolutions possible for Britain and the EU in the context of the Brexit crisis that seems to enter its final stage as the 31st deadline looms ahead. The analysis focuses also on the morphology of the British political landscape, which experienced some turbulence that propelled observers to question its stability. By anchoring the Brexit crisis into a national intellectual history, and exposing the different strands of British Euro-scepticism, we also set out to shed some light on the forces that drive this race forward. The review of potential developments highlights the chasm between the expectations of the many groups and political sensibilities that Brexit momentarily federated, albeit without offering any substantial formula for a real, long-term political cooperation.

Key words: euroscepticism, Brexit, European Union, populism

Brexit was, for doubters, the end of the integration enthusiasm and of the desire to have an "ever closer Union" that, for the past six decades, has been both the engine and the emotional horizon of the European construction process.

We intend to propose a few ways of understanding the post-Brexit scenarios in a European and British political landscape that will change considerably following the crisis generated by the vote on June 23, 2016. The first part of the present paper will focus on a series of international opinions regarding the way in which the Brexit aftermath will affect the pillars of the Eu-

ropean Union that have been subjected to pressures from both populism and the readjustment of the balance of global powers in favour of other emerging actors, such as China and India. The local failure – in a highly visible member state that is a model of democracy – of the European project has generated an undeniable crisis of continental conscience that goes way beyond the Brussels technical debates regarding the restructuring of European institutions, the rewriting of European treaties, and the reform of Brussels' bureaucracy. The basis of the European identity narrative enshrined by European treaties as "an ever closer Union" was called back into question, thus marking the end of a cycle of the European construction.

In the second part of the paper we intend to analyse more thoroughly Great Britain's political landscape, where Brexit has sparked an apparent partisan realignment without precedent in the post war history of Westminster's parties, which casts uncertainty not only over the international role of the United Kingdom but also over the structure of its domestic political landscape.

How Can We Understand Brexit? A Sample of Specialized Literature

It is difficult to cover all the literature that has been dedicated to Brexit. Social sciences must carefully find a way through the minefield of the present political situation. However, understanding the complexity of Brexit requires a few essential readings that may be either primary sources – product of political and intellectual rivalries that have defined the campaign and the negotiation process for a new Great Britain – or

1. Alexis CHAPELAN is a grad student at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest. He has a master's degree from Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes de Sciences Sociales. The subject of his thesis is Ultra-conservative Christian Europe. His fields of interest are related to the far-right policy, populism and Conservative Europe. His doctoral thesis, coordinated by professor, PHD Florin Turcanu, deals with the cultural wars and contemporary populism (chapelan.alexis@fspub.unibuc.ro).

2. Solemn Declaration on European Union. European Council, Stuttgart, 19 June 1983. Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 6/1983. pp. 24-29

theoretical sources that aim for a global understanding of the causes of the separation. Whether the effort is academic or partisan, these works offer a multidimensional perspective on events but also on the clash of ideas. And the list goes on.

The first work, previously referred to, is interesting as it offers a continental perspective, French to be precise. Jaques Julliard's book, titled *Allons-nous sortir de l'Histoire*³ dedicates to Europe tens of pages of harsh, razor-sharp lines. Although the subject of the book isn't Brexit, but the inner demons of Macron's France, the spectre of the geopolitical aftermath of Great Britain leaving the EU haunts its pages. Julliard sees Brexit as a great opportunity and, looking back at Great Britain's road packed with "opt-outs" within the European community, he sees the country as a toxic presence and an obstacle to any ambitious advancement of the Union's project. The author's suggested solution (with an obvious Crypto-Gaullist influence) is to rebuild a strong European bloc revolving around France and Germany that can be later joined by countries historically faithful to the European project, such as the Benelux countries. With an eye on the Czech Republic, Poland, or Hungary, Julliard is very tough on the Eastern European bloc as well, considering that the expansion of the EU in the '90's and the 2000's has been a mistake that is to blame for the current fragility of the European structures. Brexit was the threshold of the so called "post Maastricht blues" syndrome – a civic demobilization that translated into disbelief and loss of affection in the EU, accompanied by a moral breakdown and a search for the sense of purpose, in order to revive the European narrative. Julliard appears as one of the thinkers of the post-Maastricht Europe, including in some of the more sombre aspects regarding the redefinition of a European identity that threatens to revive obsolete dichotomies.

Brexit has been approached too many times from a strictly geopolitical or geo-economic perspective. Denis McShane's book called *Brexit: How Britain Left Europe*⁴ examines its ideologi-

cal causes by thoroughly restoring the intellectual genealogy of the Euro-scepticism in both the Labour Party and in the Conservative Party. It is a complex work that highlights the maturity of the anti-European movement that has led to the vote on the 23rd June 2016 and explores the way great political figures of the 20th century have approached the delicate issue of European integration and British exceptionalism. From Winston Churchill to Margret Thatcher, from Edward Heath to Tony Blair or James Cameron, McShane offers a vast perspective on the pro or anti-European discourses that have infused the British post-war political culture. The author insists on the conservative revival in the '80's, convinced that this moment holds the key to understanding the present. The evolutions of the European agenda are systematically connected to the domestic transformations of the British society: thus, the structural reforms conducted by Jaques Delors' *Commissionare* weighed against the liberalization initiated by Margaret Thatcher and the violent conflict that opposed the British Government to syndicates. The originality of McShane's undertaking resides not only in the restoration of political and strategic treats, but also in the contrasting ideologies that have drawn the defining lines of the *Leave* campaign. We can allow ourselves, though, to regret the absence of a more consistent chapter on the populist nature of some parties, such as UKIP, that have taken advantage of the Euro-scepticism to migrate from the periphery of the political system to its very core, as far as to challenging the Conservative Party on matters such as migration, security, and the multiculturalism of the British society. Despite this shortcoming, the book is still an essential read and an excellent starting point to understanding Brexit in its complexity.

To the reader interested in UKIP's discourse, an undisputable player of the *Leave* campaign, we recommend the article written by Andrea Pareschi and Alessandro Albertini, entitled *Immigration, Elites and the European Union. The Framing of Populism in the Discourse of Farage's UKIP*⁵. Amassing significant critical

3. Jacques Julliard, *Allons-nous sortir de l'Histoire*, Flammarion, Paris, 2019.

4. Denis McShane, *Brexit: How Britain Left Europe*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2016.

5. Andrea Pareschi & Alessandro Albertini, *Immigration, Elites and the European Union. The Framing of Populism in the Discourse of Farage's UKIP*, *Comunicazione politica: Quadri mestrale dell'Associazione Italiana di Comunicazione Politica*, no. 2/2019.

narratives dedicated to the contemporary populist phenomenon, the authors draw up, based on a general theoretical pattern, a scheme that clarifies the various dimensions of UKIP's populist discourse. The anti-European dimension and the anti-establishment rhetoric are the basis of UKIP's populist actions; however, the article prides itself on emphasizing the complexity of the contrast between the two notions – centre versus periphery – that are the reason for Farage's European phobia. UKIP doesn't hesitate to take advantage of the resentment against the "centre", but this discourse stops at the borders of the United Kingdom.

The literature on UKIP and its anti-European populism can be seconded by two more articles that, while preceding the 2016 referendum, provide some relevant insights that have been validated by the post referendum course of events.

Strategic Euro-sceptics and Polite Xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament Elections⁶ is a study on the mechanisms of European elections. The three authors – Robert Ford, Matthew Goodwin, and David Cutts highlight the resources needed to aggregate a populist vote by combining a far right nucleus (regularly deserters from radical parties such as the British National Party) and a wider area of voters less political, who had either been politically inactive, or supporters of traditional parties. The conclusions validate the theory regarding the fragility of the foundation of protest votes, a theory that has been recently demonstrated by the changing makeup of the UKIP and Brexit Party votes depending on type of elections (European or parliamentary).

To better understand the characteristics of British populism, as opposed to the neo-fascist nationalism of the traditional far right, Anders Widfeldt's article called **The Populist Beauty and**

the Fascist Beast. Comparing the Support Bases of UKIP and the BNP⁷ is an excellent starting point.

A more international perspective on Brexit and its potential outcomes can be found in the collective work **Brexit Beckons: Thinking Ahead by Leading Economists**⁸. Concise yet dense, the authors, 19 British and European economists, cover multiple aspects of the phenomenon, including the deep causes of the *Leave* vote, and the social and economic implications of the United Kingdom leaving the EU. The authors are somewhat predictable focusing on the economic and commercial dimensions of the matter; however, the book is infused with an acute sense of interaction between ideologies – how the population sees the economic realities that are governed by a sense of logic that has very often nothing to do with economy – and economy. The book has other strong points such as the two contributions dedicated to Scotland and Northern Ireland. Even if not ready yet to offer clear answers, the Scottish economist Ian Wooton knows how to ask pertinent questions and how to restore the balance between the main arguments of the debate on Scottish independence that will probably dominate the country's domestic agenda, should there be a *no-deal*. John Fitzgerald and Patrick Honohan focus on the future of Irish economy, currently one of the most globalised economies on the planet (according to the KOF Globalization Index, Ireland is in second place following the Netherlands), as opposed to the economic turbulences registered in the region. The authors highlight both the possible opportunities (the relocation of large companies that wish to keep their privileged access to the European market) and the potentially destabilising effects (the logistic problems caused by the transit of goods through English ports or the energy vulnerability), insisting on the symbolic risks of a physical border between

6. Robert Ford, Matthew Goodwin & David Cutts, "Strategic Eurosceptics and Polite Xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament elections", *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 1, Issue 2, March 2012.

7. Anders Widfeldt, *The Populist Beauty and the Fascist Beast. Comparing the Support Bases of UKIP and the BNP*, EPOP 2013 Conference, Lancaster University, 13-15 September.

8. Richard E. Baldwin (ed.), *Brexit Beckons: Thinking Ahead by Leading Economists*, CEPR Press, London, 2016

the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.

Published by Jamie Morgan and Heikki Potomaki, *Brexit and the Political Economy of Fragmentation*⁹ is a very thorough analysis of Brexit; it is also the most daring multidisciplinary endeavour. The book's 15 chapters have a political (foreign and domestic), geopolitical, economic, and sociological approach that make a very valuable compendium. To the "neophyte" looking for a deep immersion into the matter, *Brexit and the Political Economy of Fragmentation* is perfectly completed by another Routledge publication – *The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Brexit*¹⁰ whose publishers are Patrick Diamond, Peter Nedergaard, and Ben Rosamond.

The last book on the list is the one written by the conservative MP Daniel Hannan, a fervent supporter of Brexit. Therefore, one should not see *What Next: How to Get the Best from Brexit*¹¹ as an impartial scientific research; on the contrary, it as the *credo* of a fervent Euro-sceptic. Hanna's writing, where he argues in favour of a Singapore model, is an effective digest on conservative Euro-scepticism and a necessary incursion in the minds of those who contributed to the success of the *Leave* campaign.

Brexit and the European Community

For the optimistic, Brexit is rather a clarification, a return to the continental origins of a political phenomenon that is not based on an economic doctrine, but on a sense of moral belonging to a whole. In his book *Allons-nous sortir de l'Histoire (Will We Fall Out of History?)*, Jaques Julliard suggests a reorientation of the European project around France and Germany, a multi-speed Europe that won't be afraid to move on with the risk of leaving behind partners who cannot be, politically and culturally, enrolled¹². Great Britain joining the EU in 1973 became the symbol of the rupture in the name of

a European *Realpolitik* that has been guided by economic interests and by the concept of "Europe First" as ratified by the Treaty of Rome. Great Britain leaving (the EU) is, of course, to supporters of this community project, a radical challenge to the concept of a united Europe as shaped by the Maastricht Treaty. The pre-Maastricht Europe was based on a precise European philosophy, symbolically built as a cultural and ideological area different from both the popular democracies in the East and the Anglo-Saxon "Far West". The veto of the French president Charles de Gaulle on the admission of the United Kingdom, allegedly an USA agent, or Trojan horse, reflects this approach of rejecting the Atlantic orientation as it would damage the European nature of the project¹³. While strongly challenged, this paradigm dominated the process of European construction in the 60's: the first enlargement took place in 1973, after almost two decades of geographical freeze of the European Economic Community. Guilty of not being European enough, Great Britain could not embrace the project from the start. George Pompidou's mandate, following the resignation of De Gaulle in 1969 meant the change of the ideological core of the European project, change that made possible the integration of Great Britain and the states in the Eastern bloc in the redesigned ensemble¹⁴. The European Union was, as a political construction, an innovation built on the abandonment of the post war utopia of a homogenous *Mittleurope* in favour of the adoption of a more inclusive legal and economic consensus. A growing legislative production has put the new European identity into a legal framework. Otherness has been given a legal meaning – democratic deficit and an economic one – structural frailty, but it hasn't been given the symbolic meaning of a deficit of Europeanism. A fundamental change had occurred. Great Britain's EU integration showed the start of a new crucial step in European

9. Jamie Morgan & Heikki Potomaki, *Brexit and the Political Economy of Fragmentation*, Routledge, London, 2017

10. Patrick Diamond, Peter Nedergaard & Ben Rosamond *The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Brexit*, Routledge, London, 2018.

11. Daniel Hannan, *What Next: How to Get the Best from Brexit*, Head of Zeus, London, 2016

12. Cf. Jacques Julliard.

13. Jean Luc Sauron, *A Curse on European institutions*, Polirom Publishing, Bucharest, 2010, pp. 49-52.

14. Cf. Eric Bussière & Émilie Willaert, *Un projet pour l'Europe : Georges Pompidou et la construction européenne*, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2010

development and was both the sign and cause of the reconfiguration of the collective project. Brexit can mean the end of the Maastricht ideology (that was actually launched in the 1970's, and was institutionalised progressively through the Single European Act, as well as the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties) and the impact it can have on the future of the EU is, of course, huge. The evolution of the European Union after Brexit must be monitored carefully especially in the Eastern European states, that have the specific feature of being historically part of the EU but not part of the West – the source of the original European project. Indeed, the EU's Eastern expansion is essentially the product of the Maastricht cycle and of the "ever-changing" European concept it has promoted.

Brexit – Product of a British National History? Great Britain's Euro-sceptic Traditions

From the perspective of the European Union, Brexit is the paroxysm of a long and complex crisis. With the global economy under recession and uncertainty, the Euro-zone crisis highlighted many of the institutional and policy shortcomings of the European project¹⁵. The Greek and the migration crises have been the ideological fuel for the Euro-sceptic wave that swept our continent. A superficial analysis of the situation in Great Britain seems to firmly place Brexit in this line. However, even though the discourse of the *Leave* campaign is impossible to separate from the symbolic and rhetorical matrix of the populist movement on the continent, too little importance has been given to external factors. We believe Brexit isn't a mere geopolitical event, but the product of an intellectual British history that produced a unique Euro-sceptic combination. The fact that the referendum took place in Great Britain and not Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic isn't accidental; nor can the absence of a general

domino effect be explained by the strategic caution and economic pragmatism of the governments (populist or not) on the continent alone.

What makes the British Euro-sceptic tradition particular is its fragmentation. We can refer to three different anti-European feelings that have grown separately, while feeding from antagonistic political philosophies.

Left Labour against the European Community

Chronologically speaking, the first is placed to the left of the post war Labourism. In the 1970's, following domestic disputes and economic difficulties that have forced Great Britain to ask the help of the International Monetary Fund, the Labourites activated a revival of nationalism and protectionism, strongly denouncing the effects of globalization on workers¹⁶. Washington and Brussels became the compass points of the symbolic geography of capitalism and international ultra-liberalism. In this context, the EEC joining is presented as a serious threat to a British social model characterized by the power of the syndicates and the welfare state. The economic argument is seconded by a political one: joining the EEC would subordinate the British Parliament to the Court of Justice of the European Union, thus threatening the British democracy built on parliamentary sovereignty. The Labour MP, Michael Foot didn't hesitate to declare that recognising a superior court of justice was the same as setting the Palace of Westminster on fire, a comparison to the Nazi Reichstag fire in 1933¹⁷. Eventually, Great Britain joined the EEC in 1973, under a conservative government. Over the next decade, and benefitting from the support of the vast majority of syndicates – in 1975 only 7 of 46 voted for the integration in the EEC¹⁸ – the Labour Party kept on promoting the idea of a referendum for leaving the European structures, considering them the toxic product of the neo-liberal utopia of a free-trade world,

15. HeikkiPotomäki, "Will the EU Disintegrate? What Does the Likely Possibility of Disintegration Tell About the Future of the World?", in Jamie Morgan & Heikki Potomaki.

16. Denis McShane.

17. Ibid., p. 52-53.

18. Christakis Georgiou, "British Capitalism and European Unification, from Ottawa to the Brexit Referendum", Historical Materialism, 2017, vol. 25, issue 1, pp. 94

fundamentally incompatible with their aspirations to a more egalitarian society. The Labour Party turned its back on Euro-scepticism along with Blair and Brown's ideologically driven *aggiornamento*¹⁹. However, the election of Jeremy Corbyn in 2015 (one of the Labour MPs that firmly opposes Great Britain's membership to the EU) proves the way the old guard, hostile to Blair's policy, is still a dynamic ideological power; the surprisingly weak mobilization of the Labour Party in the *Remain* campaign can be associated with the underground reactivation – through Jeremy Corbyn – of the British left Euro-scepticism²⁰.

The Conservatives Learn to Detest Europe

In the meantime, the consensus reached by the Conservative Party on the necessity to integrate Great Britain in the European market had worn out. As the European structures were producing a more and more consistent and compelling communitarian *acquis* in various domains, the Conservatives rose against the new regulations in the name of *laissez-faire*. Up until the '80's, the British conservatism was ideologically close to the French and German right; economy to them meant a moderate liberalism that still recognised a paternal role for the state. The years of the Thatcher government meant a departure of the Conservative Party from this pattern that ensured a strategic and intellectual synergy with the other right-wing parties on the continent; at the same time, the socialist Jaques Delors, President of the European Commission (1985-1995), changed the Commission into a perfect instrument of market regulation in key areas such as: environment protection, consumer protection, health, and competitiveness²¹. Delors' social and democratic agenda estranged the British conservatives for a long time. The neo-liberal matrix of the Euro-sceptic narrative, based on Brussels' image as a Leviathan suffocating the economic freedom was a very original undertaking that can hardly be found in other anti-European continental

traditions; in time it became associated with a sort of British "exceptionalism" that frequently used to express the idea of a deep political and ideological incompatibility between Great Britain and continental Europe. The fact is that, following the 1990's, the Conservative Party became the most Euro-sceptic political party in Europe.

The Europhobic Populism

The British Euro-scepticism cannot be reduced to a mere confrontation between left-wing anti-capitalism and right-wing neo-liberalism, monopolised by the two largest parties in Westminster. The Euro-scepticism has become a key component of a third heterodox tradition, strongly anti-system and built to stand against the Labour-Conservative alternation. The populist sensitivity of some parties such as the UKIP (founded by Nigel Farage in 1993), or the latest Brexit Party (whose leader is also Farage, who left the UKIP following the success of the *Leave* campaign) has been shaped by disparate intellectual ideas. The nationalist far-right (promoted by the National Front and the British National Party, active between the 1990's and the 2000's) was, of course, one of the sources of inspiration, especially as far as the discourse against migration is concerned. However, even though key figures in the UKIP have stood out due to their racist and anti-Semitic comments, these do not make a central component of the anti-European populism. Its main incubator seems to actually be the post-Thatcher conservatism itself. The biographies of the promoters of this political trend confirm their affiliation: Nigel Farage, Paul Nuttall, Douglas Carswell or Mark Reckless were all members of the Conservative Party. On an economic and financial level, the UKIP seems to follow the same liberal-conservative doctrine: the leitmotifs of the anti-European populist discourse are reducing the fiscal burden and freeing from the over-protective European leash. Populism is, by nature, an ideological

19. Denis McShane

20. Andrew Gamble, "The Corbyn Insurgency", *British Politics Review*, volume 13, no. 4, fall 2018, p. 3-5.

21. Denis McShane

“patchwork”, and the UKIP and Brexit Party are mirror images of the revival of this populist protectionism after the year 2000²²; the focus on social services that receive a strong nationalist symbolic and affective meaning (e.g. the National Health Service), seconded by a strong anti-elitist rhetoric define the new narrative paradigm of the populist Euroscepticism. So, the third tradition is a heterodox synthesis of the left and right-wing tropes (sometimes far-right) that work independently though given the amazing political fuel made up by the anti-establishment resentment directed against both Brussels “experts” and Westminster elites guilty of the compromise negotiated with the EU²³. What binds this synthesis is the myth of the British exceptionalism. More than the populist movements on the continent (Euro-sceptical, but with stronger narratives), the British populism basis was made of a centre-periphery discourse (the centre being Brussels, of course) overlapping the anti-establishment rhetoric typical to populism.

The Resilience of the Westminster Model under Scrutiny

Brexit was the product of a fortuitous confluence of composite electorate from rural areas and from the disadvantaged industrialized areas (the electoral geography of the *Leave* option being largely reflected by the dichotomy observed on the continent between the urban areas connected to the flows of globalization and the industrialised “hinterland”)²⁴. However, the structural frailty of the Euro-sceptic ideological formula in Great Britain is obvious: what the uncontainable impetus of the *Leave* vote produced, namely the synergy of the three sensitivities based on a minimalistic agenda and on a short term strategic objective, was the key to the current blockage. This alliance took place only at the level of the voters, never at the level of the politicians or that of the Westminster

elites. At the present moment, once the effect of the universal suffrage was gone, we witness the recurrence of those fractures that the dichotomy for/against the EU has only artificially concealed. A post-Brexit agreement seems impossible since Brexit is an incoherent political project that lacks ideological coherence or substance.

On a domestic level, this ideological configuration supports the current two-party system. The debates around Brexit have polarised the society to the extreme, and the European elections in May 2019 have established a vaguely “four-sided” system: the dichotomy between Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party and the Liberal Democratic Party – highly in favour of the EU (two parties that have gathered 50% of the votes) overlapped the traditional confrontation between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party – the two largest ruling parties that have gathered only 20% of the votes, by far the worst score in their entire existence²⁵. The earthquake of the European elections seemed to show the dissolution of the secular two-party system in Britain and, on a higher note, the disintegration of the left/right original axis. A scenario similar to the French one seemed justified and isn’t completely out of the picture. However, Boris Johnson becoming prime minister changed the scene completely, mobilising again a large part of the pro-Brexit conservative voters, who during the European elections had voted against Theresa May’s moderate policy. The last polls confirm this trend: as early elections seem more and more plausible, Johnson’s hard policy is supported by those who wish to leave the EU right away (with or without a deal). Farage’s formidable electoral pedestal, which made possible the resounding victory in May, seems more fragile than ever. As of June, the Conservatives led by a politically exhausted Theresa May could only hope – in case of early Parliamentary elections– for a

22. CasMudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist”, *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 39, Issue 4 (2004), pp.541-563

23. Andrea Pareschi & Alessandro Albertini

24. EU referendum: The Result in Maps and Charts, *BBC News*, 24th of June 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36616028>, accessed 1st October 2019.

25. The UK’s European Elections 2019, *BBC News*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/crjeqkdevvvt/the-uks-european-elections-2019>, accessed 2nd October 2019

score of 21%, as the Brexit Party was credited with 22%; at this time, polls show that they can get over 30% (32%), while the Brexit Party is down to 12%²⁶. This data is, after all explicable: Johnson's party favours populist anti-European political narratives, one of which is the elite's plot against Brexit, so he promises a firm and swift resolution to the Brexit crisis. Johnson's political creed is a strong and effective mixture between populism (Johnson's charisma, far superior to Farage's enables him to play effortlessly the part of a "Trump/Maverick"), a clear anti-European ideology, as well as the promise of an institutional stability and continuity that the Brexit Party cannot ensure and that cannot be overlooked by a part of the conservative electorate.

Even more surprising is the fact that on the eve of a possible early election the Labour Party too seems revived, although Jeremy Corbyn is far less credible as leader of the *Remain* campaign. The dynamic Liberal Democratic Party positioned itself, during the European elections in May, as the moving power behind the demand of the pro-European voters for a second referendum. With 19.6% of the votes, it had a considerable head start on the Labour Party (13.6%). The pro-European political offer was very divided – the Greens getting the fourth place with 11.8% of the votes²⁷. An average of the polls conducted in September shows, in exchange, a very different picture: the Labour Party takes back the second place, following the Conservative Party with 25% of the votes. Their lead over the Liberal Democrats (19%) is over 6%.²⁸

So, if the European elections in May were a quake that questioned the very survival of Britain's traditional two-party system and its two historical parties, the new political situation clarifies these circumstances considerably. The fight between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party remains the fundamental backbone of the British political life, despite the turbulences generated by the Brexit crisis. The

Conservative Party in particular reasserts its domination over the right-wing parties, due to the populism of the new prime minister. The Labour Party will likely have greater difficulties, so the liberal democrats will remain a credible option for the party's centre. Just as Johnson made use of the Trump effect to overcome his competitor, a Macron effect could play against the left-wing Corbyn, thus alienating the Blair wing of the Labourites. For now, though, the eventuality of an early election would probably reconfirm the British two-party system. Let's not forget that the chapter of the European elections is governed, both at the level of the electoral mechanism (through the exact distribution of European votes) and at the level of the psychological behaviour of the voters (European elections are often seen as "low-stake", more of a protest vote than a strategic one) by a logic which is different from that of the parliamentary elections.

The State City of Singapore, a Model for Post-Brexit Development

Even if the Brexit didn't permanently dismantle the structure of the British two-party system, that doesn't mean that the survival of the two largest parties provides a viable solution to the future of the country or delivers the right ideological solution for the post-Brexit horizon. The truth is that the existence of a consensual post-Brexit doctrine even within the *Leave* camp seems impossible, given the many different ideologies that make it up. This can mainly be seen when summarizing the post-Brexit scenarios on Great Britain's new international status. No other pattern of development illustrates the separation of the three ideological concepts of the anti-European bloc more clearly than the one that looks to the "Asian Tigers" as a possible source of inspiration to redesigning Great Britain's economic relationship with the rest of the world.

Given the latest evolutions in the British domestic politics, the main objective of the new

26. Poll Averages, Stats for Lefties, <https://statsforlefties.blogspot.com/p/monthly-polling-averages.html>, accessed 2nd October 2019.

27. The UK's European Elections 2019, BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/crjeqkdevvvt/the-uks-european-elections-2019>, accessed 2nd October 2019.

28. Poll Averages, Stats for Lefties, <https://statsforlefties.blogspot.com/p/monthly-polling-averages.html>, accessed 2nd October 2019.

government is to leave the EU on the 31st October 2019, even without an agreement. Starting from this and the EU's refusal to resume the negotiations on the Brexit deal, a *no-deal* seems more plausible. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland leaving the European Union without a deal means going back to the multiple trade agreements governed by the World Trade Organization. A total, violent rupture involved by a withdrawal without a deal was, a few months ago, the radical solution for some British officials such as the populist Nigel Farage; now, it is a political project "adopted" by the conservative establishment. This revival isn't due to the new prime minister exclusively. The Conservative Party sees in the economic freedom offered by a *no-deal* only the opportunity of the complete renovation of the British economy and trade. The Euro-sceptic tradition prevalent amongst conservatives is clearly rooted in Thatcherism. In this mind-set, the British exceptionalism (a narrative common to the three Euro-sceptic traditions) works through a voluntary liberal policy consistent with the "great global trade nation" spirit of Great Britain that will see a total separation from the interventionist continental agenda against which – ever since the middle of the '80's – the conservative Euro-scepticism was built. The development scenario that summarizes this new Thatcher liberal utopia is tauntingly called *Singapore on Thames*:²⁹ the implementation of a concept similar to that of Singapore or Hong Kong, with a minimum set of rules and a drastically lowered fiscal burden (Singapore has the lowest corporate taxes in the world). State intervention, especially as far as social support, will also be more involved. Described by the conservative MP Owen Paterson as a winning formula "low-tax, low-spend, low-regulation"³⁰, the Singapore model is very attractive to many of the key members of the Conservative Party. In case of a *no-deal* (such

a scenario is of course unimaginable in the case of a deal that ensures a common commercial framework with the EU), this scenario offers a voluntarism perspective of the revival of the British Empire trade history, a spirit branded in the anti-European narrative, which is nothing more than a narrative of the British uniqueness and "exceptionalism".

However, this model cannot be accepted by the left, to whom the British "exceptionalism" is set in the very model of social welfare originating from the Beveridgian welfare state born after the 2nd World War. Similarly, protectionism and the view against the European multicultural and globalization formula stemming from the populist formations (especially UKIP and Brexit Party) are incompatible with the model of an open, ultraliberal economy. If the Singapore model can be adopted as an economic model, it cannot be replicated at the political level unless Britain forsakes the Westminster democracy: the magnetism of the Asian city-state is not only based on the promise of an advantageous fiscal regime, but also on the promise of political stability ensured by a technocratic, non-democratic, pro-business government. Separating the economic model from the political one is truly a proof of immaturity of the conservative elites, but beyond this it shows the ideological singularity of each of the three traditions: they all wrongly believe they have a monopoly on the anti-European concept. Brexit is not a monolithic though. Johnson's voluntarism will probably translate into exiting the EU; no matter how the exit will take place, though – with or without a deal (more difficult in case of a *no-deal*), the United Kingdom post-Brexit risks to become, on medium term, a space that cannot be governed and more polarised than ever.

29. Jeevan Vasagar, "Singapore-on-Thames? This Is no Vision for post-Brexit Britain", The Guardian, 24th of November 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/24/singapore-on-thames-post-brexit-britain-wealthy-city-state>, accessed 3 October 2019.

30. Owen Paterson, "Don't Listen to the Terrified Europeans. The Singapore Model is our Brexit Opportunity", The Telegraph, 21st of November 2017, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/20/dont-listen-terrified-europeans-singapore-model-brexit-opportunity/>, accessed 3 October 2019.

Bibliography

BALDWIN, Richard (ed.), *Brexit Beckons: Thinking Ahead by Leading Economists*, CEPR Press, London, 2016

BUSSIÈRE, Eric & WILLAERT, Émilie, *Un projet pour l'Europe : Georges Pompidou et la construction européenne*, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2010.

CUTTS, David, GOODWIN, Matthew & FORD, Robert, "Strategic Eurosceptics and polite xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament elections", *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 5, Issue 6, March 2012.

DIAMOND, Patrick, NEDERGAARD, Peter & ROSAMOND, Ben, *The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Brexit*, Routledge, London, 2018.

GAMBLE, Andrew, "The Corbyn Insurgency", *British Politics Review*, volume 57, no. 8, fall 2018.

GEORGIU, Kristakis, "British Capitalism and European Unification, from Ottawa to the Brexit Referendum", *Historical Materialism*, 2017, vol. 25, issue 1.

HANNAN, Daniel, *What Next: How to Get the Best from Brexit*, Head of Zeus, London, 2016.

JUILLARD, Jacques *Allons-nous sortir de l'Histoire*, Flammarion, Paris, 2019.

MCSHANE, Denis, *Brexit: How Britain Left Europe*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2016.

MORGAN, Jamie & POTOMAKI, Heikki, *Brexit and the Political Economy of Fragmentation*, Routledge, London, 2017.

MUDEDE, Cas, "The Populist Zeitgeist", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 39, Issue 4 (2004).

PARESCI, Andrea & ALBERTINI, Alessandro, "Immigration, Elites and the European Union. The Framing of Populism in the Discourse of Farage's UKIP", *Comunicazione politica: Quadri mestrals dell'Associazione Italiana di Comunicazione Politica*, no. 6/2018.

SAURON, Jean Luc, *a Course on European Institutions*, Polirom Publishing, Bucharest, 2010.

Solemn Declaration on European Union. European Council, Stuttgart, 19 June 1983. Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 6/1983.

WIDFELDT, Andres, *The Populist Beauty and the Fascist Beast. Comparing the Support Bases of UKIP and the BNP*, EPOP 2013 Conference, Lancaster University, 13-15 September.

Media and online sources

BBC News

The Telegraph

The Guardian

Stats for Lefties

Your Ad here



(Re)defining and Designing the Internal and External Borders of the European Union

Vladimir - Adrian COSTEA¹ Conceptualizing and (Re)shaping the EU Borders

Abstract

In this article, we highlight the main vulnerabilities to security and cooperation at the level of the European Union, referring to the stages of (re)defining and delimiting the internal and external borders of the European Union. Our objective is to identify the EU's main steps regarding the management of internal and external borders, in the context of the migration crisis and the delimitation of the external border of the EU after the production of Brexit. Our analysis highlights the main steps and improvements that have contributed to achieving a security, freedom and justice environment within the Union, but which still needs support from the Member States in order to become stronger.

Keywords: borders, migration crisis, Brexit, European Union.

Introduction

Referring to the challenges to the unity and security of the EU over the past years, this article discusses the efforts to (re)define the internal and external borders of the European Union by trying to highlight the impact of migration and refugee flow, as well as that of the Brexit negotiations. Connecting the EU's efforts in (re)defining and designing its internal and external borders to the management of social, economic and political crises helps us identify and understand the main vulnerabilities that hinder the cooperation between the countries of the European Union.

Our approach also means to identify the EU's main courses of action regarding the process to eliminate internal border control and institutionalise the control of its external borders.

The aspiration of a world „without borders”² evoked for the past three decades by the supporters of globalization has been challenged by the complex and uneven practices to regulating and militarizing the borders. The Brexit and Donald Trump coming to the White House produced significant changes on the way the borders³ are defined and demarcated.⁴ Referring to the decision taken by the United Kingdom to leave the EU, Gilmartin, Burke Wood and O'Callaghan discovered two major changes, as follows: 1) the anxieties generated by the 310 mile land border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland were brought back to the forefront and 2) the regulations regarding the external borders of EU were unlocked⁵. The redesign of the borders between the United Kingdom and the EU gives them an alternate meaning, the main characteristic being “the wider reconfiguration of borders within EU”⁶. The lack of a consensus on borders constitutes the founding of a “border thinking [...], when the imaginary of the modern global system is flawed”.⁷ Destabilising the governing patterns of understanding what borders are leaves room for a new way to redefine them.⁸

“Sovereign security sites and mobile meeting places”⁹, the borders help marking territories and enforcing regulations on inclusion and exclusion of multiple forms of mobility, categorized according to the level of threat.¹⁰ Minca and Rijke have seen that more focus on borders has in fact encouraged the rhetoric based on walls building,¹¹ a trend explained by Wendy Brown¹² as “a sign of lack of state authority, rather than a show of strength”.¹³ The architecture of the borders has been reshaped due to globalization and to the development of new digital and communication technologies.¹⁴

Within the European community, borders

initially had two major dimensions – economic and security – based on which the international flow of capital, goods and services was structured, and the main EU reform policies have sought to facilitate access to the national markets of the member states and to protect them.¹⁵ The EU border transformations were simultaneously based on eliminating internal border controls and institutionalising control of its external borders (national borders as well).¹⁶ The concept of a supranational external EU border substantially attenuates the role of national border, due to the ambivalent nature of EU policies (implementation of the Schengen acquis, border control and monitoring by specialized EU agencies, implementation of the European asylum and neighbourhood policies).¹⁷

“Fortress Europe”¹⁸ serves “as a barrier, a bridge and a symbol of identity simultaneously”.¹⁹ “The paradox of EU borders”²⁰ is represented by their mobility²¹ and their diversity,²² positioned somewhere between the “de-bordering” and “re-bordering” attempts.²³ Analysing the EU borders from the perspective of their functions, Etienne Balibar identified the following different attributes: over-determination, polysemy, omnipresence and heterogeneity.²⁴ A cultural and geographical entity, the European Union is described by William Wallace with reference to the ambiguity of the expansion process that doesn’t define clearly the EU’s external borders.²⁵ The migration crisis has further enhanced “Europe’s image as a fortress” that secures its borders against irregular and unwanted migrants, the EU’s presence being exerted not only at the external borders of its member states, but also in border areas (known as stable buffer zones).²⁶ At a domestic level, through the *Schengen Agreement* the EU has created an internal security zone for all the members of the *Agreement*, removing internal border control, while “the external borders of all Schengen members have become a matter of common interest”.²⁷ The EU’s stages of enlargement have deeply changed the external borders,²⁸ while the adoption of the *Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985* and the

Dublin II Regulation (that has replaced the 1990 *Dublin Convention*) targeted to support the creation of an area of freedom, security, and justice²⁹ that gives the EU an identity of its own (economic, social and political).³⁰ The borders of the EU don’t only represent the sum of all external borders belonging to the member countries situated at the periphery of the Union (geographically speaking) but also a set of regulations and actions that imply the adoption and implementation of a common approach from all member states.³¹

The Management of the Internal and External Borders of the EU

The EU’s actions regarding the becoming and consolidation of the Schengen area (a unique area without internal border control) and the implementation of common standards regarding the external border control, have generally served when the flow of migrants increased and when the EU’s security has been put at risk. The moment the EU’s external borders were established coincides with the beginning of its involvement in internal and foreign common security issues, the EU’s role being defined with the signing of the *Maastricht Treaty*, in 1993.³² The Common External and Security Policy (CESP, the EU’s second pillar) and the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA, the EU’s third pillar) have regulated, following the *Maastricht Treaty*, the EU’s policies and steps to “offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, where the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border control, asylum, immigration, as well as crime prevention and fighting” (art.3, paragraph 2, TUE).³³

The first form of common management of the external border takes shape after the signing of the *Schengen Agreement*,³⁴ supplemented five years later by the Schengen Convention.³⁵ The Schengen acquis, incorporated into the European Union law by the *Amsterdam Treaty* has five main categories of measures, with the Schengen Borders Code³⁶ as main instrument seeking the uniform implementation of

regulations. The Schengen Information System gives EU authorities access to an information sharing system that contains over 80 million alerts on missing or wanted persons and objects.³⁷ In 2017 it was consulted by authorities over 5 billion times and generated “over 240,000 positive results regarding alerts from other countries (issued by other countries)”,³⁸ thus bringing an important contribution to security within the Schengen area.³⁹ The reform in 2018 added new categories of alerts to the system,⁴⁰ SIS being replaced by three regulations regarding the police and judicial cooperation on criminal matters,⁴¹ border control⁴² and the return of illegally staying third-country nationals.⁴³

Another instrument that the EU countries have access to is the Internal Security Fund – the Borders and Visa component – that deals with task assignment and covers the funds allocated by the member countries for the control of the borders that are also EU’s external borders.⁴⁴ To ensure a high security level inside the Union, and to facilitate legitimate travel the EU has set up the Fund with 3.8 billion Euros for the period 2014-2020.⁴⁵ The adoption in November 2017 of the regulation that establishes the Exit/Entry System (EES)⁴⁶ has contributed to a more expedited border registration and control of third-country nationals.⁴⁷ The online operation of the EES strengthened internal security, intensified the fight against terrorism, reduced the amount of time needed for border control, enabled the automatic control of the duration of authorised stay for every traveller, and offered national authorities access to travellers’ data.⁴⁸

The expansion of the field of application of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) activities is a major step towards strengthening the EU’s common effort to manage migration, the fight against cross border crime and the search and rescue operations.⁴⁹ Basically, Frontex has been given “a greater role in returning migrants to their countries of origin, according to decisions taken by national authorities”,⁵⁰ being allowed to intervene and offer assistance to the member states at the request of the Council and in exceptional circumstances (the failure of a member state to

comply with binding decisions, jeopardising the Schengen area).⁵¹ The proposal presented by European Commission in September 2018 deals with the same matters regarding the strengthening and expansion of the powers of Frontex.⁵² The “cornerstone” of the new Regulation (that will be enforced by the end of 2019) will be the institution of a permanent standing corps of 10,000 border guards (fully operational by 2027) that will offer support to the member states at all time. It is worth mentioning the important contribution of the Romanian presidency of the European Council consisting in the informal agreement with the representatives of the European Parliament, lately recognized by the EU ambassadors.⁵⁴

In the meantime, the massive flow of refugees has generated both a humanitarian crisis in the region of the Mediterranean Sea and a political crisis at the level of the EU. Building fences at the external borders of the Schengen area coincided with the image offered by the loss of human lives on the migration routes in the Mediterranean Sea, hence the discussion on the existence of an identity and values crisis at the level of the EU. Violating the regulations of the Schengen Borders Code (article 14, paragraph (2)), the decisional blockage in the Union, the rise of the anti-European populist and nationalist narratives, the “uncomfortable” negotiations with Turkey have all highlighted the limits of the cooperation between the member states, as well as the difficulties regarding the necessity of a swift response to the challenges that endanger the security of the borders. Slovakia and Hungary challenged in the European Court of Justice the decision of the European Council on the mandatory quotas (of relocation) of asylum seekers⁵⁵ however, they have been dismissed.⁵⁶ These actions draw attention on the lack of consensus between the institutions of the European Union and its members.

Surfaced in the context of the so called migrants and refugees “phobia”, Brexit reinforced the need for a swift and firm response supported by a common approach from the other 27 members. Unlike the political and ideological disputes caused by the migration crisis, the 27 members have joined forces and

designated one person as negotiator in the name of the EU and its members. The EU requirement to the United Kingdom to keep a soft (open) border considering “Northern Ireland’s peculiar situation”⁵⁷ (part of the EU’s single market and customs union)⁵⁸ highlights “the EU’s hegemonic stand in drafting regulations regarding its borders”.⁵⁹ The matter regarding the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland placed the negotiations of the Withdrawal Agreement at a standstill, even leading to psychological implications – Michel Barnier put an emphasis on the fact that “European integration helped to remove borders that once existed on maps and in minds. Brexit changes the external borders of the EU.”⁶⁰

(Re)shaping the borders is a complex process that requires the support of all EU members, a scenario that is less likely if we take into consideration the new legislature of the European Parliament and the increase in the level of fragmentation of political groups.

Conclusions

In this article we have highlighted the necessity of a unitary approach, as well as the fact that the EU and its members should use flexible tools to manage its internal and external borders. Our effort has emphasized the weaknesses in security and cooperation at the level of the European Community, thus identifying the main risks in the process of (re)defining and delimiting the EU’s internal and external borders.

Referring to the latest changes in the process of border management, we have identified the main progresses and steps that have contributed to achieving an area of security, freedom and justice within the Union, which still needs support from the member states in order to become stronger.

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

19 June 1990 Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (JO L 239, 22.09.2000)

Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece (JO L 248, 24.9.2015).

European Commission, “Speech by Michel Barnier at the Joint Houses of the Oireachtas (Houses of Parliament of Ireland)”, Dublin, 11 May 2017.

European Commission, “Joint report from the negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom government on progress during phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 on the United Kingdom’s orderly withdrawal from the European Union”, TF0 (2017) 19 – Commission to EU 27, 8 December 2017,

European Commission, “European Commission draft withdrawal agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community”, TF50 (2018) 33 – Commission to EU 27, 28 February 2018.

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 September 2017 *Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union* Actions for annulment – Decision (EU) 2015/1601 – Provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of the Hellenic Republic and the Italian Republic – Emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries into certain Member States – Relocation of those nationals to other Member States – Relocation quotas – Article 78(3) TFEU – Legal basis – Conditions under which applicable – Concept of ‘legislative act’ – Article 289(3) TFEU – Whether conclusions adopted by the European Council are binding on the Council of the European Union – Article 15(1) TEU and Article 68 TFEU – Essential procedural requirements – Amendment of the European Commission’s proposal – Requirements for a further consultation of the European Parliament and a unanimous vote within the Council of the European Union – Article 293 TFEU – Principles of legal certainty and of proportionality Joined Cases [C-643/15](#) and [C-647/15](#);

European Parliament, “Management of the external borders”, Fact Sheet EU, 2019.

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action n°98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) n° 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council, COM(2018)0631.

Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (codification) (JO L 77, 23.3.2016).

Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council

Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC (JO L 251 16.9.2016).

Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011 (JO L 983, 9.12.2017).

Regulation (EU) 2018/1860 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals (JO L 312, 7.12.2018).

Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, and amending and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 (JO L 312, 7.12.2018).

Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, amending and repealing Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU (JO L 312, 7.12.2018).

Secondary Sources:

ACOSTA ARCARAZO, Diego and Cian C. MURPHY (eds.), *EU Security and Justice Law After Lisbon and Stockholm*, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, HART Publishing, 2014.

BALIBAR, Etienne, *Politics and the Other Scene*, London, Verso, 2002.

BECKEV, Dimitar and Kalypso NICOLAIDIS (eds.), *Mediterranean Frontiers: Borders, Conflicts and Memory in a Transnational World*, London, I.B Tauris, 2010

BIALASIEWICZ, Luiza and Stuart ELDEN, Joe PINTER, "Constitution of EU Territory", *Comparative European Politics*, 3 (3), 2005, pp. 333-363.

BROEDERS, Dennis, "The New Digital Borders of Europe - EU Databases and the Surveillance of Irregular Migrants", *International Sociology*, 22 (1), 2007, pp. 71-92.

BROWN, Wendy, *Walled states, waning sovereignty*, New York, Zone, 2010.

CHEAH, Pheng and Bruce ROBBINS (eds.), *Cosmopolitics. Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1998.

DEBARDELEBEN, Joan (ed.), *Soft or Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005.

DIEZ, Thomas, "The Paradoxes of Europe's Borders",

Comparative European politics, 4, 2006, pp. 235-252.

FRIEDMAN, Thomas L., *The World is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century*, London, Penguin, 2006.

GILMARTIN, Mary and Patricia BURKE WOOD, Cian O'CALLAGHAN, *Borders, Mobility and Belonging in the Era of Brexit and Trump*, Bristol, Policy Press, 2018.

HUYSMANS, Jef, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38 (5), 8666, pp. 751-777.

JONES, Reece and Corey JOHNSON, "Border militarisation and the re-articulation of sovereignty", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 85(6), 2016, pp. 187-200.

JONES, Reece, *Violent borders: Refugees and the right to move*, London, Verso Books, 2016.

KOSTADINOVA, Valentina, *The European Commission and the Transformation of EU Borders*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

MIGNOLO, Walter, *Local histories/global designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledge, and Border Thinking*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000.

MINCA, Claudio and Alexandra RIJKE, "Walls! Walls! Walls!", *Society and Space*, 2017.

MÜLLER, Andreas, *Governing Mobility beyond the State. Centre, Periphery and the EU's External Borders*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

NEAL, Andrew W., "Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX", *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47 (2), 2009, pp. 333-356.

O'DOWD, Liam, "The Changing Significance of European Borders", *Regional and Federal Studies*, 12 (4), 2002, pp. 13-36.

SCOTT, James Wesley and Henk VAN HOUTUM, "Reflections on EU Territoriality and the 'Bordering' of Europe", *Political Geography*, 28 (5), 2009, pp. 271-273.

TILL, Karen E. and Juanita SUNDBERG, Wendy PULLAN, Charis PSALTIS, Chara MAKRIYIANNI, Rana ZINCIR CELAL, Meltem ONURKAN SAMANI, Lorraine DOWLER, "Interventions in the political geographies of walls", *Political Geography*, 33 (1), 2013, pp. 52-62.

WALTERS, William, "Border/Control", *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9 (2), 2006, pp. 187-203.

WALTERS, William, "Rethinking Borders beyond the State", *Comparative European politics*, 4, 2006, pp. 141-159.

ZIELONKA, Jan (ed.), *Europe Unbound. Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union*, London, Routledge, 2002.

NOTES

1. Vladimir-Adrian Costea is a grad student at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, under the supervision of prof. PHD Georgeta Ghebrea. (e-mail: costea.vladimir-adrian@fspub.unibuc.ro). He has published articles on clemency and the state of occupancy of Romanian prisons in magazines such as: *Studia. Romanian Political Science Review*, *Revista de drept constituțional (Constitutional Law Magazine)*, *Revista Ro-*

- mână de Sociologie (The Romanian Sociology Magazine) and *Revisita Polis (Polis Magazine)*.
2. Thomas L. Friedman, *The world is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century*, London, Penguin, 2006.
 3. Reece Jones, *Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move*, London, Verso Books, 2016; Reece Jones and Corey Johnson, "Border Militarisation and the Re-articulation of Sovereignty", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 41(2), 2016, pp. 187–200; Mary Gilmartin, Patricia Burke Wood and Cian O'Callaghan, *Borders, Mobility and Belonging in the Era of Brexit and Trump*, Bristol, Policy Press, 645², p. 54.
 4. Gilmartin, Burke Wood and O'Callaghan, *Borders, Mobility and Belonging in the Era of Brexit and Trump*, p. 54.
 5. Ibidem.
 6. Idem, p. 34.
 7. Walter Kignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 23, apud. Gilmartin, Burke Wood and O'Callaghan, *Borders, Mobility and Belonging in the Era of Brexit and Trump*, p. 78.
 8. Gilmartin, Burke Wood and O'Callaghan, *Borders, Mobility and Belonging in the Era of Brexit and Trump*, p. 78.
 9. Karen E. Till, Juanita Sundberg, Wendy Pullan, Charis Psaltis, Chara Makriyianni, Rana Zincir Celal, Meltem Onurkan Samani, Lorraine Dowler, "Interventions in the Political Geographies of Walls", *Political Geography*, 33 (1), 2013, pp. 52–62.
 10. Gilmartin, Burke Wood and O'Callaghan, *Borders, Mobility and Belonging in the Era of Brexit and Trump*, p. 56.
 11. Claudio Minca and Alexandra Rijke, "Walls! Walls! Walls!", *Society and Space*, 2017, available at: <http://societyandspace.org/2017/04/18/walls-walls-walls/>.
 12. Wendy Brown, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, New York, Zone, 2010.
 13. Gilmartin, Burke Wood and O'Callaghan, *Borders, Mobility and Belonging in the Era of Brexit and Trump*, p. 56.
 14. William Walters, "Border/Control", *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9 (2), 2006, pp. 187–203; William Walters, "Rethinking borders beyond the state", *Comparative European Politics*, 4, 2006, pp. 141–159, apud. Andreas Müller, *Governing Mobility beyond the State. Centre, Periphery and the EU's External Borders*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 23.
 15. Andreas Müller, *Governing Mobility beyond the State. Centre, Periphery and the EU's External Borders*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 1.
 16. Idem, p. 2.
 17. Ibidem.
 18. Dennis Broeders, "The New Digital Borders of Europe – EU databases and the surveillance of irregular migrants", *International Sociology*, 22 (1), 2007, pp. 71–92; Jef Huysmans, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38 (5), 2000, pp. 751–777, Andrew W. Neal, "Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX", *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47 (2), 2009, pp. 333–356.
 19. Liam O'Dowd, "The Changing Significance of European Borders", *Regional and Federal Studies*, 12 (4), 2002, pp. 13–36, apud. Müller, *Governing Mobility beyond the State. Centre, Periphery and the EU's External Borders*, p. 9.
 20. Thomas Diez, "The Paradoxes of Europe's Borders", *Comparative European Politics*, 4, 2006, pp. 235–252.
 21. Ibidem.
 22. Etienne Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene*, London, Verso, 2002.
 23. James Wesley Scott and Henk van Houtum, "Reflections on EU Territoriality and the 'Bordering' of Europe", *Political Geography*, 28 (5), 2009, pp. 271–273, apud. Müller, *Governing Mobility beyond the State. Centre, Periphery and the EU's External Borders*, p. 9. Valentina Kostadinova, *The European Commission and the Transformation of EU Borders*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 58–66.
 24. Etienne Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene*, London, Verso, 2002, pp. 78–81, apud. Müller, *Governing Mobility beyond the State. Centre, Periphery and the EU's External Borders*, p. 65.
 25. William Wallace, "Where does Europe end? Dilemmas of Inclusion and Exclusion", pp. 78–94 in Jan Zielonka (ed.), *Europe unbound. Enlarging and reshaping the boundaries of the European Union*, London, Routledge, 2002, apud. Müller, *Governing Mobility beyond the State. Centre, Periphery and the EU's External Borders*, p. 37.
 26. Raffaella A. Del Sarto, "Borderlands: The Middle East and North Africa as the EU's Southern Buffer Zone", pp. 149–176, in Dimitar Beckev and Kalypto Nicolaidis (eds), *Mediterranean Frontiers: Borders, Conflicts and Memory in a Transnational World*, London, I.B Tauris, 2010, apud. Müller, *Governing Mobility beyond the State. Centre, Periphery and the EU's External Borders*, p. 40.
 27. Jorg Monar, "The European Union's Integrated Management of External Borders", pp. 145–161 in Joan DeBardleben (ed.), *Soft or Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005, apud. Müller, *Governing Mobility beyond the State. Centre, Periphery and the EU's External Borders*, pp. 43–44.
 28. Luiza Bialasiewicz, Stuart Elden and Joe Pinter, "Constitution of EU Territory", *Comparative European Politics*, 3 (3), 2005, pp. 333–363; Etienne Balibar, "The Borders of Europe", in Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (Eds.), *Cosmopolitics. Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1998, pp. 216–229; Thomas Diez, "The Paradoxes of Europe's Borders", *Comparative European Politics*, 4, 2006, pp. 235–252; apud. Valentina Kostadinova, *The European Commission and the Transformation of EU Borders*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 4.
 29. Valentina Kostadinova, *The European Commission and the Transformation of EU Borders*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 52–53.
 30. Ibidem.
 31. Idem, p. 190.
 32. Cian C. Murphy and Diego Acosta Arcarazo, "Rethinking Europe's Freedom, Security and Justice", in Diego Acosta Arcarazo and Cian C Murphy (Eds.), *EU Security and Justice Law after Lisbon and Stockholm*, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, HART Publishing, 2014, pp. 2–4.
 33. Ibidem.
 34. Signed on the 14th June 1985 by five of the ten members of the European Economic Community.
 35. 19 June 1990 Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (JO L 239, 22.9.2000). at present 26 European countries are in the Schengen area. The United Kingdom, Ireland, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania are not.
 36. Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (codification) (JO L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1).
 37. European Parliament, "Management of the External Borders", Fact Sheet EU, 2019.
 38. Ibidem.
 39. Ibidem.

40. "These three regulations introduce additional categories of alerts to the system, such as alerts on unknown suspects or wanted persons, preventive alerts for children at risk of parental abduction, alerts for the purpose of return, an alert in relation to return decisions issued to illegally staying third-country nationals, in addition to palm prints, fingerprints, facial images and DNA concerning missing persons so as to confirm their identity." European Parliament, "Management of the External Borders", Fact Sheet EU, 2019.
41. Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, amending and repealing Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU (JO L 312, 7.12.2018, pp. 56-106).
42. Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, and amending and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 (JO L 312, 7.12.2018, pp. 14-55).
43. Regulation (EU) 2018/1860 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals (JO L 312, 7.12.2018).
44. European Parliament, "Management of the External Borders", Fact Sheet EU, 2019.
45. Ibidem.
46. Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011 (JO L 327, 9.12.2017), p. 20-82.
47. European Parliament, "Management of the External Borders", Fact Sheet EU, 2019.
48. Ibidem.
49. Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, JO L 251 16.9.2016, p. 1.
50. European Parliament, "Management of the External Borders", Fact Sheet EU, 2019.
51. Ibidem.
52. Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action n°98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) n° 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council, COM (2018)0631.
53. European Parliament, "Management of the External Borders", Fact Sheet EU, 2019.
54. Romanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, "European Border and Coast Guard: Council Confirms Agreement on Stronger Mandate", 1 April 2019, available at: <https://www.romania2019.eu/2019/04/01/european-border-and-coast-guard-council-confirms-agreement-on-stronger-mandate/>.
55. Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, JO L 248, 24.9.2015, pp. 80-94.
56. Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 September 2017 Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union Actions for annulment – Decision (EU) 2015/1601 – Provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of the Hellenic Republic and the Italian Republic – Emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries into certain Member States – Relocation of those nationals to other Member States – Relocation quotas – Article 78(3) TFEU – Legal basis – Conditions under which applicable – Concept of 'legislative act' – Article 289(3) TFEU – Whether conclusions adopted by the European Council are binding on the Council of the European Union – Article 15(1) TEU and Article 68 TFEU – Essential procedural requirements – Amendment of the European Commission's proposal – Requirements for a further consultation of the European Parliament and a unanimous vote within the Council of the European Union – Article 293 TFEU – Principles of legal certainty and of proportionality Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15.
57. The speech of the EU's chief negotiator for Brexit, Michel Barnier, January 2017. Gilmartin, Burke Wood and O'Callaghan, Borders, Mobility and Belonging in the Era of Brexit and Trump, p. 19.
58. European Commission, "Joint report from the negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom government on progress during phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 on the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the European Union", TF0 (2017) 19 – Commission to EU 27, 8 December 2017, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf, European Commission, "European Commission draft withdrawal agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community", TF50 (2018) 33 – Commission to EU 27, 28 February 2018, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/draft-withdrawal-agreement-withdrawal-united-kingdom-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-european-union-and-european-atomic-energy-community_en.
59. Idem, p. 24.
60. "European integration helped to remove borders that once existed on maps and in minds. Brexit changes the external borders of the EU." in European Commission, "Speech by Michel Barnier at the Joint Houses of the Oireachtas (Houses of Parliament of Ireland)", Dublin, 11 May 2017, available at: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-1276_en.htm.



The Security Dimension of the Turkey - EU Relations

Dr. Uğur Güngör¹

matter has always been an important issue influencing Turkey-EU relations.

The relations between Turkey and the EU have a long history, dating back to the late 1950's when Turkey first applied for associate membership of the EU (it was then the European Economic Community-EEC) on 31 July 1959. The EEC granted this membership to Turkey on 12 September 1963 under the "Agreement Creating an Association between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community", also known as the "Ankara Agreement". The relations continued with the Additional Protocol which regulates the transitional period of the association in the 1970's.

Turkey applied for full membership on 14 April 1987 and the relations reached an advanced level with the establishment of a Customs Union in 1996. Throughout this long process, the main aim in the Turkey-EU relations was to have full membership and this goal was the driving force behind the progress achieved in relations. The Helsinki European Council of 1999 confirmed Turkey's candidate status and accession negotiations started in October 2005. However, these negotiations have been practically frozen, with no progress made in recent years.

This paper evaluates the nature of Turkey-EU relations in terms of security, and suggests that Turkey's integration in the EU is significant for the EU's security role. Turkey is a preeminent strategic partner of the EU on issues such as migration and counter-terrorism, and the security

Turkey, with its three assets (its membership in NATO, its superior military capabilities, and its important geostrategic position) is an irreplaceable actor in the European security system in the post-Cold War era. First, by exercising its vote in the North Atlantic Council, Turkey has an institutional lever which can affect the EU's defence aspirations. Second, Turkey's military capabilities are vital for operations in the expanded European security area. Third, from a geopolitical point of view, it is clear that Turkey, because of its geographic positioning at the crossroads of South Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus-Caspian region, is destined to play a key role in European security and foreign policy issues².

In addition to these assets, some major events in recent history - including the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the Arab Spring and the refugee crisis - have proven the strategic importance of Turkey and the Turkey-EU relationship. Although the Cold War was a determining factor in the relationship in the past, the EU's approach to relations with Turkey in the last decade cannot be considered separately from the aforementioned crises and the changes in the international system.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) identifies international terrorism, proliferation and destruction, regional conflict, failed states and organized crime as the key threats to the EU security. These are also reflected in the Defence

1. Dr. Güngör served in ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2010-2011. He served as International Relations advisor of the Chief of Turkish General Staff during 2008-2011. He was the Chief of Staff of the Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism (COEDAT) during the years 2012-2014. In 2014-2015, he served as the political advisor of Turkish Army Commander. He retired from the Turkish Army in 2015 as Senior Colonel.

He is currently an Associate Professor of International Relations in Başkent University and Director of the School of Foreign Languages. He teaches at Başkent University, Military Academy Partnership for Peace Training Centre, Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Academy.

He is married with two children.

2. Baç, Meltem Müftüler. (2000) "Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies." Security Dialogue 31- 4. See also Ümit Kurt, "A Glance to Turkey-EU Relations from the Security Perspective: Incorporation of Turkey into the EU is Necessary for European Security would Strengthen the Prospects of Turkey's Integration", European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, ejeps-1, 2008, pp.59-76

White Paper 2000 of Turkey: "Turkey also believes that ... the fight against international terrorism in the world, the illegal arms trade, drugs smuggling and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction occupy an important place in providing regional and world peace". The EU member states may consider Turkey as a security opportunity if its values and views of the world and those of the EU converge.

On the other hand, in his white paper on the future of Europe, the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker identified security threats, irregular migration, declining soft power and aging societies as key challenges, which the EU has to tackle. On each and every one of these aspects, Turkey is already making meaningful contributions to the EU.

Contributions to the EU Operations and Missions

After the end of the Cold War, Turkey became a prominent contributor to the UN and NATO peace operations around the world. Since its participation to the UNOSOM missions in Somalia in 1992, Turkey has provided various military personnel, expertise, and technical assistance to several UN and NATO peace operations.

In addition to these operations, Turkey participated in the "Concordia" and "Proxima" operations led by the EU in the beginning of 2000's³. Turkey also participated with its nine personnel in the EU's first independently launched "Operation Artemis" in the Democratic Republic of Congo which was carried out between 15 June and 1 September 2003.

Turkey still contributes to the EU's several peace operations and missions such as the EU Operation Althea. Currently, Turkey's contribution to this operation is nearly 350 personnel. Turkey is also participating in the EU's first civilian crises management operation European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EU initiated the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) on 9 December 2008 and Turkey is currently contrib-

uting to this mission with 91 personnel. In fact, Turkey is the second biggest contributor to the mission among the non-EU countries after the USA.

Due to its participation in nine out of thirty EU-led operations, Turkey has been the biggest contributor to EU operations after France, Germany and Britain. Besides, Turkey's contribution to these operations could help the development of mutual trust between Turkey and the EU. Turkey is an important factor in the changing European security arena, and, with its participation, the EU-led operations may stand more chance of success.

Counter-terrorism

One of the most important aspects in the Turkey-EU relationship is the cooperation in counter-terrorism. If the EU wants to see its security interests preserved then Turkey's incorporation into the EU is highly significant. The post-September era has increasingly exposed Europe to the challenges of global terror. Given that the sources of global terrorism mainly originated from the Middle East, Turkey's inclusion within the EU would enable the latter to rely on Turkey's advanced military capabilities in its struggle with such threats⁴.

Turkey's accumulation of knowledge and experience in the area of fighting against terrorism shows the need for states to cooperate at the national, regional and international levels to prevent and eradicate terrorism. Turkey uses every opportunity to state that it is ready for all types of cooperation in this matter and is willing to share the knowledge and experience it has gained in its long-standing fight against terrorism.

Turkey's accession to the EU would provide a contribution to European integration with respect to terrorism, which now threatens mankind as a whole, and would demonstrate the resolution of the EU to combat terrorism.

In the framework of their regular exchanges on counter-terrorism, Turkey and the EU held the

3. The EU's first military mission Operation Concordia in Macedonia with 11 personnel. The EU took over the mission on 31 March 2003, from the NATO Operation Allied Harmony. Turkey's contribution continues in the follow-up civilian crisis management operation "Proxima" with eight personnel.

4. Oğuzlu H. Tarık (2003), "An analysis of Turkey's Prospective Membership in the European Union from a Security Perspective.

Turkey-EU Counter-Terrorism (CT) Dialogue in Brussels on 8 June 2016. Terrorism poses a direct threat to both Turkey and the EU countries and their citizens. The EU and Turkey recognised the importance of the need to work together closely as key partners and strategic allies to counter these threats to our security and peace.

Both sides strongly condemned the recent terrorist attacks in the EU and in Turkey and reaffirmed their determination to jointly combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, in accordance with international law, specifically the international human rights law and international refugee law. The EU and Turkey reiterated their commitment to urgently step up efforts to tackle the threat posed by DAESH and to stem the flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters.

The EU recognised that Turkey faces a grave threat from the PKK terrorism. The EU and Turkey also reiterated their determination to work closely to counter the terrorist threat from the PKK which has been designated as a terrorist organisation by the EU in 2001.

Migration and Refugees

The migrant crisis has brought out a new dimension in the EU-Turkey relations in terms of security. Since 2011, the civil war in Syria has displaced nearly 13 million people, more than half of the Syrian population. Syrians constitute the largest group within the 65.3 million forcibly displaced people worldwide. As of 3 October 2019, there are 3.671.553 Syrian refugees in Turkey. By hosting more than 3.5 million refugees and halting the flow of thousands via the Aegean Sea, Turkey has prevented a major humanitarian crisis in Europe. As a result of this, Turkey has become a key global and regional actor with regards to international migration.

Turkey initially responded to large numbers of Syrians crossing its borders with an open-door policy and gradually came to incorporate temporary protection, non-refoulement, and humanitarian assistance into its response as the incoming flow of Syrian migrants continued. EU's response to the refugee flows on the other hand, was mute until the summer of 2015, when the route of Syrian migrants changed course towards EU states and over a million refugees ar-

rived in Europe.

The Syrian refugee crisis which may transform into a "European crisis" fostered the development of bilateral relations between Turkey and the EU. Turkey has closed the Aegean Sea route, and stemmed the tide of migration towards the EU. More importantly, it has helped preventing the loss of life of the refugees.

S-400 Missile System

Turkey currently seems to be struggling to strike a delicate balance between its relations with Russia and those with the West. Turkey's decision to purchase a Russian-made S-400 missile system has also caused a great deal of international controversy over the country's place in the Western security block. However, Turkey signed an agreement on 8 November 2017 with some of the NATO members, like France and Italy, to develop its national air and missile defence systems assets to the available "space" through which Europe can engage more strongly with Turkey.

Conclusion

At the very time of writing this paper, Turkey launched the "Operation Peace Spring" into the North Eastern Syria on Oct. 9. The main goal of this operation is to provide border security and to ensure the safe return of Syrian refugees in Turkey. The safe zone formula in Syria crisis is the most practical method for the return of refugees. If Turkey cannot repatriate millions of Syrians to their homes this way, sooner or later, they will knock on Europeans doors.

If the EU failed to support the safe zone plan, it would result in an escalation of the migration crisis in Europe. However, Germany and France suspended arms exports to Turkey, saying Turkey's operation in the Northern Syria was a threat to European security. This security and migration issue is a shared responsibility that should be undertaken together by Turkey and the EU. The EU needs Turkey as much as Turkey needs the EU.

Regarding the Afghanistan Crisis, then German Defence Minister Peter Struck, in 2002, famously coined the phrase that "German security is being defended in the Hindu Kush" mountains. Today, regarding the Syrian Crisis, one can say that the security of Europe is being defended at the Turkish Syrian border.

The European Union and Migration. Perspectives and Challenges

Dinu COSTESCU

Foreword

Today we are witnessing the dynamic of a phenomenon that has already taken shape – migration – a phenomenon whose target is primarily Europe. Even if modern history shows Europe as one of the main migrant “suppliers”, for the last few decades it has become the main destination for the continuous and diverse influx of people who, for reasons that we already know, decided to leave their countries and roam, hoping that the “new European El Dorado” would offer them what they could not have in their countries of origin. We are referring to ensuring their existence, nourishment, proper social treatment, and respect for fundamental liberties and human rights.

In trying to develop and implement migration



policies that are in accordance with European values and identities, as well as with concepts regarding culture diversity, integration and cohabitation, Europe, and more specifically the European Union are facing a double paradox. On one hand there is the desire and interest to control the dynamic of a migration flux that is mostly characterised by a lack of regulation of reports between the immigrant and the host country. On the other hand, European policies continue to approach the issue of migration from a security and deterrence perspective, by taking legal and administrative actions. The current rising imbalance between the lapses that under-

mine these policies and the continuous raise of migration makes the perspectives of finding an effective and unanimously accepted solution to the problem almost unreachable and uncertain.

International Migration. Trends

Recent statistics highlight the fact that today 175-200 million people live, for various periods of time, in countries other than their own. These figures are surprisingly low, representing only 2.5%-3% of the world population. However, according to the same statistics, the flow of migration in the last 30 years has doubled and developed countries and societies have become preferred targets. Against this background, the management and social integration of migrants are major challenges for these countries. The difficulties are associated with predictable changes – the demographic evolution and structure of the host countries, the economic development and its relationship with the work force and last, but not least, the integration of migrants in the system of social and institutional values of these countries.

Estimates regarding the impact of migration on Europe are unanimous in showing that, over the next ten years, European countries will be able to manage only politically, and partially, the migration related issues. A real challenge will come from the host countries' civil society, as citizens will be pressured more and more to adjust to cultural diversity and to the mixture of ethnicities and customs. Nevertheless, an uncomfortable unease will make its presence known in all European countries. Its causes lie in the fact that at European level, the EU countries are still far from being able to produce the proper tools to manage, without incidents, the migration movement. This perspective requires - at this very moment, before it is too late - the EU countries and their governments to realize the fact that while “governing” through decrees and resolu-

tions can help manage certain areas, it is not enough for developing, legalising, and implementing a pan European migration policy.

Making Migration Policies Truly European

One cannot deny the fact that, at the level of the European Union, there is preoccupation and a real commitment to adopt a common policy to deal with the current and foreseeable issues related to migration. At the same time one must acknowledge the fact that a process to making migration policies "European" – through a shift from a government level to a true community level – is still slow and circumstantial. And this is mainly due to the cyclic discrepancies between national policies and the concept of real institutional solidarity, as well as between Schengen states and those outside this area, or between EU member states and states outside the EU or those that are not even candidates to a future and uncertain European integration. We are talking about a dysfunctional relationship between "Europeans" and "non-Europeans", and all the negative consequences it has on European policies and implicitly on policies regarding migration. We are referring to the limitation of freedom of movement and to the emergence of new judicial and social borders that substitute the national ones. To these we add divergences generated by actions related to the management of the massive flow of illegal migration, and by disagreements within the European community over this phenomenon.

It is not less true that many of the difficulties hindering the efforts to harmonize and unify the European migration policies come from the countries themselves. This is where policies are somewhat dependent on internal factors, on society and public opinion, on demographic problems, on to the structure and evolution of the work force, on the level of public education in relation to the cultural and personal feelings and taboos, on the potential of the economy and infrastructure, on the geography of the area and national borders – land and sea –, on the proximity of/or distance to migration nuclei etc. At the same time, the internal pro-migration policies keep on being opposed.

For almost two decades we have been witnessing a new kind of debate that cast aside the pre-occupation for security concerns related to migration, or the so called "zero migration" theory, while favouring urgent matters that in ten years' time could lead to crises. We are talking about phenomena that have a critical development perspective: the aging of European population, the rise in inter-European migration fuelled by aspirations for better living standards (financial and professional), the consequent contraction of the work force and, implicitly, a reorientation towards work force from outside EU borders, the migration of intellectuals and experts towards European destinations facilitating innovation/creative development etc.

We are also aware of the fact that, influenced by globalization, information and communication, there is a perception that the world is heading towards polarization – a developed North, and a developing or not so developed South. From a geographical perspective, Europe as seen from the South continues to be perceived as a pole of prosperity, a light house, and a destination for migration.

Given the persistence of discrepancies between the mechanisms that manage migration, an effective and rational "Europeanization" of relevant positions and approaches remains the best tool. On one hand, Europe should agree on the collective necessity to cast aside all confusion and discrepancies, and on the other it should forsake the hypocrisy that comes with the rhetoric regarding the challenge of migration.

It is the responsibility of the "new European Union" – after this year's parliamentary elections – to include on its agenda a more sustainable mobilization and activism of the EU member states and their over 500 million citizens. An innovative rethinking of the communitarian identity and role Europe should play on the global stage is needed. This can only be accomplished by learning from the lessons the European existence has taught us so far, and is the only way Europe will re-emerge and face tomorrow's challenges, including migration.



EU's Efforts to Combat Terrorism and the Phenomenon of Radicalization in Prisons. Structural and Conceptual Challenges

Vladimir - Adrian COSTEA¹

Abstract

In this article, we highlight the need for a multi-disciplinary approach, together with the use of complex tools from the EU and the Member States to combat terrorism and the phenomenon of radicalization in prison. Our aim is to identify the main vulnerabilities to the extension of the two phenomena into a universal prison. Our analysis captures the main risks to the post-detention reintegration process, thus emphasizing the need to individualize the instruments and programs of disengagement and deradicalization. Referring to the EU's efforts to combat terrorism, we identify the main shortcomings represented by the lack of a unitary, coherent and transnational approach that would facilitate the exchange of information and expertise between Member States.

Keywords: terrorism, radicalization, prison, European Union.

Introduction

The number of terrorist attacks and their victims has visibly increased between 2014 and 2018, in the European Union. The critical point was in 2015 when 17 terrorist attacks were registered (completed, thwarted, and failed), resulting in 150 deaths and 687 arrests². Starting with 2017 the number of terrorist attacks doubled; however, the number of deaths and arrests visibly decreased³. By comparison to 2014 (when two terrorist attacks took place, four people were killed, and 395 were arrested), in 2018 there were 24 terrorist attacks, 13 people were killed and 511 were arrested⁴. Terrorism (religious/jihadist) is still a threat to the security and interests of the European Union⁵.

Relating to the EU's *status quo* from the past years, in this article we talk about the phenome-

non of radicalization in prisons, aiming to highlight the newest challenges that EU and its members face in their efforts to prevent and counter terrorism. When speaking about the phenomenon of radicalization in prisons we mean to identify the main vulnerabilities that enable its amplification and expansion among convicts/ felons.

Our endeavour also aims at identifying the main course of action that the EU means to take as far as preventing, combating, and abolishing terrorism and the phenomenon of radicalization in prisons, while taking into account the good practices in the consultation process that were adopted by the European Council during the Romanian presidency.

Radicalization in a Criminal Environment: Dimensions and Challenges

Elusive concepts, terrorism and imprisonment have been defined by intelligence literature⁶, as well as criminal investigation and penology⁷ writings, as being the product of society⁸. Psychological constructs⁹, the two have been "dissected" and subjected to scrutiny with respect to the social phenomena and rifts that are ground for the existence and legitimacy of violent actions directed at a certain target/victim¹⁰. Defined according to different research tools and by the use of specific language and terms, the terrorist phenomenon and the prison system have been described by the phrase "the known unknowns"¹¹, in order to underline their unpredictability, caused, at the same time, by the actions of the social system generating them¹². Dedicated works described the two concepts as complex social phenomena, extreme forms of violence (physical and psychological) that damage societies¹³.

Depicted as phenomena that societies should

be defended and protected from¹⁴, the two concepts have had experts on the matter deal with the need to cast out/isolate (forever, or for a certain period of time), as well as deal with/understand/prevent. As far as their dynamic is concerned, researches on the matter have come to the conclusion that there are two main principles that define it: 1) the principle of the nuclear blast that triggers a chain reaction, and 2) the seemingly chaotic behaviour that doesn't abide by determining rules.¹⁵ The process of identifying the possible evolution of the two phenomena shows the main difference between them – it lies with a country's ability to monitor terrorist activities and control the prison system. In the first case, the main challenge is to identify, watch, and understand those who plan and are involved in terrorist activities, with state institutions forced to gather information from an environment beyond their control.¹⁶ In the second case, countries control, monitor, and make use of legitimized violence against the incarcerated.¹⁷ Ever since the beginning the convict is identified and placed in a certain prison.¹⁸ Prisons seem to have institutionalized the power to provide punishment, which entails “the compact use of punitive power: a particular preoccupation with the body and time of the convict, a categorization of their gestures and behaviour by a system of authority and examination; a staged orthopaedics conducted on the convicts with the sole purpose of correcting them individually”.¹⁹ The whole architecture of how the power to provide punishment was institutionalized can be seen in Jeremy Bentham's ²⁰ (philosopher and social reformer) *Panopticon*.²¹ The convict's awareness of the fact that he/she is always monitored contributes to the automatic functioning of the power, even if its action has discontinuities.²²

The strict regulation and delimitation of the incarcerated persons' lives leads to the restriction or even prohibition of any social interaction between the free world and convicts.²³ Following the logic of defending the national interest, prisons “protect the community from people that are considered dangerous by design.”²⁴ Just like retirement homes or centres for the blind, prisons are known for the fact that the welfare of detainees isn't their main concern, on

the contrary, as Gresham M'Cready Sykes points out, they function according to the idea that “a convict must live in poverty as a matter of public policy - some kind of 20th century imposed nunery”.²⁵

Besides the existence of this “fundamental segregation”²⁶ between convicts and their wardens, the main feature that describes the prison as an absolute institution is its ability to “take down all boundaries that separate the most important spheres of life: rest, recreation, and work”²⁷, which is why all activities take place under the authority of the prison.²⁸ Based on this concept of total isolation from the outside world, Sykes came up with the concept of an emerging culture inside the prison, which determines the detainees to try and fight against the absolute order enforced by the prison personnel.²⁹

To Bert Useem and Anne Morrison Piehl, prison represents “the ultimate intrusion by the state into the lives of its citizens”,³⁰ a space where the state has authority over the movement and activities of the convicts. Following the same sociologic approaches of Michel Foucault, David Garland, Loïc Wacquant, William Chambliss, Jerome Skolnick, and James O. Whitman both Bert Useem and Anne Morrison Piehl see prisons as “an effort at social domination and exploitation”. The prisons' official purpose of retribution and control over criminality are seen by Useem and Piehl as alibis for aggression.³¹ This point of view was amended by David Garland, according to whom, the way prisons are built shows the magnitude of the anxieties in the culture of modern society, affected by the risky and insecure social and economic relations.³²

The isolation of the convicts is illustrated by the French intellectual Loïc Wacquant, who has found a direct link between the prisons' level of overpopulation and the level of social domination and exploitation. High degrees of occupancy in prisons produce a high level of exploitation and social domination by employees. Exertion of pressure for a long period of time contributes to the isolation of the inmates from the outside world, reason for which the prison environment becomes typical for ghettos.³³ The symbiosis between the ghetto and prison is where, according

to Wacquant, political actors find legitimacy to implement policies for the construction of new spaces destined to exerting control.³⁴ According to Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, the phenomenon of segregation is the offspring of institutions, and its effect is structural, not solitary.

“The term <<ghetto>> means different things to different people (...). A ghetto is [a space] exclusively inhabited by the members of a group, where practically all the members of that group live”.³⁵

Bert Useem and Anne Morrison Piehl clarify this observation by affirming the fact that the penitentiary construction policies contribute to these facilities being transformed into spaces of segregation of inmates. On one hand, building more prisons leads to an increase in the number of crimes for which the courts set high penalties.³⁶ On the other hand, building new prisons leads to more social and economic problems. The state must decide whether to invest more in managing the prisons and their inmates, otherwise they would have to reduce the budget per inmate.³⁷ At the same time, raising the level of isolation of the detainees considerably lowers their chances of social reintegration.³⁸ Longer times spent in a prison's extreme ghetto environment lead to the “breakage” of their social connections and to the assimilation of the rules and customs of the prison environment.³⁹

Radicalization comes simultaneously with the isolation of the individual from the outside world, with his weakening and exposure to a criminal environment.⁴⁰ Use of extreme violence, defiance of rules, disregard towards sanctions and integration into crime groups accelerates the radicalization process in prisons.⁴¹ Radicalization gives inmates a sense of purpose in serving their sentence, a personal accomplishment in a system where they felt isolated and insignificant. An important role in this is played by the process of communication and interaction with both crime groups and followers of terrorists groups outside penitentiaries. We believe this comes from the need to motivate and control the behaviour and actions of the detainees. (Inter)

national terrorism is one of the greatest threats to global security. Its traits and the effects of its actions have a negative impact on national security, on many levels: economic, military, organizational, social and psychological.⁴²

The overlap of the two phenomena happens when people accused of terrorism go to prison and radicalization sets in while they are incarcerated. The main problem we refer to is represented by the effects generated by inserting radicals in prisons with a view to exploit breaches in the system and vulnerabilities of the prison staff and management. Overcrowding represent a vulnerability to the prison staff; the number of people a radical can interact with is higher, while the resources (human and material) the prison management has at its disposal to monitor the detainees is lower. Isolating vulnerable inmates and assigning them to activities that require a small number of participants are goals that management cannot achieve, which is why supplementary criteria for selecting and separating the convicts cannot be applied.

Overall, we identify three categories⁴³ of convicts that can turn into radicals: 1) people that have turned into radicals while at large, who the Intelligence Services know that are likely to engage in extremist-terrorist propaganda, and who have been convicted crimes representing threats to national security; 2) people radicalized while at large, who the Intelligence Services hold little to no information about, and who have been convicted of other crimes; 3) persons who are likely to turn into radicals while in prison, serving their sentence. The three categories are differentiated by the moment of radicalization and by the information the Intelligence Services have on activities conducted outside and inside the prison. The matter reaches an international level the moment the convicted has undertaken radical actions in countries other than theirs. A prompt exchange of information and cooperation between Intelligence Services contribute to the identification of these persons.

EU's Efforts to Combat Terrorism and Prison Radicalization

While “a national security privilege”,⁴⁴ terrorism and the process of radicalization have a

transnational dimension and have become a communitarian issues affecting the resilience of the European Union.⁴⁵ The main concern of the EU member countries is to identify the best way to integrate immigrants into the national system of cultural, social, and political values.⁴⁶

At the community level, EUROPOL (originally an inter-governmental cooperation group called TREVI) was created under the Maastricht Treaty, on the 7th of February 1992. It has since become one of the EU's key agencies, working to improve the efficiency and cooperation of relevant authorities from all member states, to prevent and counters terrorism, the illegal drug trafficking and other types of crimes.⁴⁷ Starting with 2003, EUROPOL focused its attention on countering terrorism, seeing it as the EU's top priority.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, the main lines of EU overall policy have been set by the Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, the main document regulating the fight against terrorism at the level of the European community. It was adopted in June 2002 with the sole purpose of ensuring "unity in the approach of terrorist crimes at the level of the EU".⁴⁹

Included in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy, the EU's strategy to countering terrorism "focuses on four pillars"⁵⁰: prevent, protect, pursue, and respond.⁵¹ The EU's strategy focuses on the identification of terrorist propaganda by using the media, the prison system, and the internet, while simultaneously improving the common infrastructure to prevent terrorist acts. The protection mechanism the strategy promotes is supported by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the European legal framework regarding the safety of European transport system, the inclusion of biometrical data on passports, and the setting up a viable name record system for all passengers.⁵²

The *pursue* component prioritizes the identification of suspect money transfers and freezing assets belonging to groups suspected of being involved in terrorist activities. The main instrument of the *tracking* component is the European Arrest Warrant **Agreement**, which has simplified the cross-border procedures needed for the ex-

tradition process (in some cases, the extradition period has been cut short from "no less than ten years to 42 days"⁵³). The Strategy's *response* pillar is unchanged. No significant progress has been made. For example, the Solidarity Clause has faded into the background (initially included in the Draft treaty establishing the Constitution of Europe, dated 2004). It stated that the EU member states were ready to offer assistance to member states victim of a terrorist attack, upon request.

Adopted in 2008 and revised in 2014,⁵⁴ the EU Strategy focuses on the need to protect its citizens and infrastructure, with a view to diminish vulnerability to terrorist attacks. The new approach is about "securing outer borders, improving the security of the transport system, protecting strategic targets, and reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructures",⁵⁵ and the main tool for that is the *Directive on the use of passenger name record (PNR)*.⁵⁶ The coordinated answer of all EU member states is yet to be achieved and the models of good practices identified by the European Council during the *inter pares* rounds of evaluation regarding the fight against terrorism have not been - eventually - adopted.⁵⁷

The Conclusions of the European Council on 6th of June 2019⁵⁸ highlight the urgent need to adopt effective measures to prevent radicalization in prisons, at the same time with carrying out rehabilitation and reintegration strategies. The European Council draws attention on the fact that in the next two years some of the terrorist and violent extremist offenders and criminals radicalized while serving their sentences⁶⁰ will be released from prisons. Based on recommendations from experts in the steering Committee on radicalization, and on the strategic guidelines regarding a coordinated EU approach to preventing radicalization in 2019, the European Council recommends EU member states to develop and implement "disengagement programmes allowing the rehabilitation and an effective reintegration of terrorist and violent extremist offenders".⁶¹ The good practices resulting from the consultations taking place under the Romanian presidency of the European Council are part of a multidisciplinary approach

based on four pillars: prevention, sanctioning/detention, rehabilitation and reintegration.⁶² The early identification of radicalization and recruitment in prisons requires efficient national policies of coordination, cooperation, and exchange of information.⁶³ De-radicalization, disengagement and social reintegration are defined by a multidisciplinary approach, with a focus on the need to customize the tools and special programmes based on the needs and special traits of the terrorist and violent extremist offenders (women, minors).⁶⁴ Another recommendation of the European Council highlights the need to train prison and probation staff in order to be able and observe cultural differences, “detect the early signs of a radical behaviour and find a way to offer alternate narratives”.⁶⁵ The solutions offered by the Council envisage member states joining the European Penitentiary Training Academies (an ongoing project that is co-financed by the “Justice” programme), and cooperating and training with EU agencies such as: the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training, or the Radicalization Awareness Network European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Services.⁶⁶ The exchange of information and experience, permanent risk assessment, the dispersion of radicalized persons in order to avoid their contact with vulnerable detainees and prevent them from establishing extremist networks, along with spiritual guidance from religious representatives who can provide “narratives against violent religious ideologies”⁶⁷ complete the models of good practices promoted by the European Council.⁶⁸

Conclusions

In this article, we highlighted the need for a multidisciplinary approach, together with the use of complex tools from the EU and the Member States to combat terrorism and the phenomenon of radicalization in prisons. Our aim was to identify the main vulnerabilities to the extension of the two phenomena into a universal prison. Our analysis captured the main risks to the post-detention reintegration process, thus emphasizing the need to individualize the instruments and programs of disengagement and de-

radicalization. Referring to the EU’s efforts to combat terrorism, we identified the main shortcomings represented by the lack of a unitary, coherent and transnational approach that would facilitate the exchange of information and expertise between Member States.

Bibliography

Main sources:

Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA).

The Council of the European Union, *EU Strategy to Combat Terrorism*, doc. 14469/4/05, Nov. 2005.

The Council of the European Union, “Information Pertaining the Content and Result of the Evaluations”, Coreper, 13153/2/10 REV 2, ENFOPOL 237, PROCIV 102, PARLNAT 78, Brussels, 22 October 2010 (27.10).

The Council of the European Union, *EU’s Revised Strategy Regarding Counter-Radicalization and Recruitment for Terrorist Purposes*, JAI 332, ENFOPOL 138, COTER 78, Brussels, 19 May 2014 (OR. en), 9956/14.

The Council of the European Union, “the Council’s Conclusions Regarding the Prevention and Combat of Radicalization in Prison and the Identification of a Solution Regarding the Issue of Terrorist and Violent Extremists Offenders”, CT 55 ENFOPOL 278, COTER 71, JAI 589, COPEN 237, Brussels, 6 June 2019, 9727/19.

EUROPOL, *TE-SAT 2019, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*, European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2019.

European Parliament and The Council of the European Union, *The 247/8672 Directive on the Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for the Prevention, Identification, Investigation and Inquiry of terrorist Actions and Serious Offences*, 32016L0681, 24 May 2016.

Secondary Sources:

AKERS, Ronald L. and Gary F. JENSEN (eds.), *Social Learning Theory and the Explanation of Crime: A Guide for the New Century*, Vol. 55, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction, 2003.

BENTHAM, Jeremy, *Panopticon, Works*, ed. Bowring, vol. IV, Edinburgh, William Tait, 1843.

BOGZEANU, Cristina, *Provocări actuale pentru securitatea europeană (Current Challenges to European Security)*, Bucharest, National Defence Academy “Carol I” Publishing, 2010.

BURNELL, Peter J. and Peter CALVERT, *The resilience of democracy: persistent practice, durable idea*, London, Frank Cass, 1999.

CHIRU, Irena and Cristina BARNA (coord.), *Contraterorism și securitate internațională (Counter Terrorism and International Security)*, preface prof. PHD. Cristian Troncotă, Cecilia Munteanu, Bucharest, Top Form Publishing, Bucharest, 2007.

- COYLE, Andrew, *Humanity in Prison. Questions of Deñition and Audit*, London, International Centre for Prison Studies, 2003.
- DURKHEIM, Émile, "Crime et santé sociale", *Revue philosophique*, Nr. 39, 1895, pp. 518-523.
- DURNESCU, Ioan, *Asisten a socială în penitenciar (Social Services in Prison)*, Iași, Polirom Publishing, 2009.
- FLORIAN, Gheorghe, *Psihologie penitenciară (Prison Psychology)*, Bucharest, Oscar Print Publishing, 2002; Ioan Buș, *Psihologie și infrafracționalitate (Psychology and Crime)*, Cluj-Napoca, ASCR Publishing, 2005.
- FOUCAULT, Michel, *A supraveghea și a pedepsi. Nașterea închisorii (To Surveil and Punish. How Prisons Came to Be)*, French translation, afterword and notes, Bogdan Ghiu, Second Edition, Pitești, Paralela 45 Publishing, 2005 [1975].
- FOUCAULT, Michel, *Trebuie să apărăm societatea (We Must Defend our Society)*, Second Edition, translation, Bogdan Ghiu, Cluj, Idea Design & Print, 2009 [1997].
- GARLAND, David, *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2000.
- GOFFMAN, Erving, *Aziluri. Eseuri despre situația socială a pacienților psihiatrici și a altor categorii de persoane instituționalizate (Asylums. Essays on the Social Status of Psychiatric Patients and Other Types of Institutionalized Persons)*, Iași, Polirom Publishing, 2004 [1961].
- JAYAKUMAR, Shashl (ed.), *Terrorism, Radicalisation & Countering Violent Extremism. Practical Considerations & Concerns*, Singapore, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
- JOSEPH, Jonathan, *Varieties of Resilience*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- LOWE, David and Austin TURK, Dilip K. DAS (eds.), *Examining Political Violence, Studies of Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Internal War*, International Police Executive Symposium Co-Publication, CRC Press, London, New York, Taylor & Francis Group, Boca Raton, 2014.
- MASSEY, Douglas S. and Nancy A. DENTON, *American Apartheid, Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 2001 [1993].
- NEUMANN, Peter R., *Terrorism in the 21st Century. The Rule of Law as a Guideline for GERMAN Policy*, Friedrich Erberto Stiftung, December 2008.
- RĂDULESCU, Sorin M. and Dan BANCIU, *Sociologia crimei și criminalității (The Sociology of Crime and Criminality)*, Bucharest, "Șansa" Publishing, 1996.
- SILKE, Andrew (ed.), *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism. Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform*, London, New York, Routledge, 2014.
- SYKES, Gresham M'Cready, *The Society of Captives. A Study of a Maximum Security Prison*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1974 [1958].
- TONRY, Michael (ed.), *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, Vol. 17, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993.
- TSANG, Steve, *Serviciile de informații și drepturile omului în era terorismului global (Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism)*, translation Irina Bondar, Cristina Dogaru, Laura Drăghici, Adelina Negoită, Foreword Ambassador George Maior, Bucharest Univers Enciclopedic Publishing, 2008.
- USEEM, Bert and Anne Morrison PIEHL, *Prison State. The Challenge of Mass Incarceration*, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- WAQUANT, Loïc, "Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh", *Punishment and Society*, nr. 7, 2001.
- WEBER, Max, *Politica, o vocație și o profesie (Politics as a Vocation)*, translation Ida Alexandrescu, Anima, Bucharest, 1992 [1926].
- WEBER, Max, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Londra, Allen and Unwin, 1930.

NOTES

1. Vladimir-Adrian Costea is a grad student at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, under the supervision of prof. PHD Georgeta Ghebrea. (e-mail: costea.vladimir-adrian@fspub.unibuc.ro). He has published articles on clemency and the state of occupancy of Romanian prisons in magazines such as: *Studia. Romanian Political Science Review*, *Revista de drept constituțional (Constitutional Law Magazine)*, *Revista Română de Sociologie (The Romanian Sociology Magazine)* and *Revista Polis (Polis Magazine)*.
2. European Parliament, "Terrorism in the EU. Attacks, Deaths and Arrests", 25th July 2018, updated 5th August 2019, accessed on the 20th August 2019, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/ro/headlines/security/20180703STO07125/terorismul-in-ue-atacuri-decese-arestari> (terrorism-in-the-EU-attacks-deaths-arrests).
3. Ibidem.
4. Ibidem.
5. EUROPOL, *TE-SAT 2019, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*, (European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2019), accessed August 20, 2019, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2019-te-sat>.
6. Irena Chiru and Cristina Barna (coord.), *Contraterorism și securitate internațională (Counter Terrorism and International Security)*, foreword. prof. PHD. Cristian Troncotă, Cecilia Munteanu, Bucharest, Top Form Publishing, Bucharest, 2007; David Lowe, Austin Turk and Dilip K. Das (eds.), *Examining Political Violence, Studies of Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Internal War*, International Police Executive Symposium Co-Publication, CRC Press, London, New York, Taylor & Francis Group, Boca Raton, 2014; Peter R. Neumann, *Terrorism in the 21st Century. The Rule of Law as a Guideline for German Policy*, Friedrich Erberto Stiftung, December 2008; Steve Tsang, *Serviciile de informații și drepturile omului în era terorismului global (Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism)*, translation Irina Bondar, Cristina Dogaru, Laura Drăghici, Adelina Negoită, Foreword Ambassador George Maior, Bucharest Univers Enciclopedic Publishing, 2008.

7. Michel Foucault, *A supraveghea și a pedepsi. Nașterea închisorii (We Must Defend our Society)*, Second Edition, translation, Bogdan Ghiu, Cluj, Idea Design & Print, 2009 [1997]; Loïc Wacquant, "Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh", *Punishment and Society*, nr. 7, 2001; Andrew Coyle, *Humanity in Prison. Questions of Definition and Audit*, London, International Centre for Prison Studies, 2003.
8. David Garland, *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2000; Sorin M. Rădulescu and Dan Banciu, *Sociologia crimei și criminalității (The Sociology of Crime and Criminality)*, Bucharest, "Șansa" Publishing, 1996; Michael Tonry (ed.), *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, Vol. 17, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993.
9. FLORIAN, Gheorghe, Psihologie penitenciară (Prison Psychology), Bucharest, Oscar Print Publishing, 2002; Ioan Buș, Psihologie și infracționalitate (Psychology and Crime), Cluj-Napoca, ASCR Publishing, 2005.
10. Émile Durkheim, "Crime et santé sociale", *Revue philosophique*, Nr. 39, 1895, pp. 518-523; Ronald L. Akers and Gary F. Jensen (eds.), *Social Learning Theory and the Explanation of Crime: A Guide for the New Century*, Vol. 55, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction, 2003.
11. Peter Wilson, "Pregătiri pentru a face față noilor provocări" (Preparations to Face New Challenges), for Steve Tsang (Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism), translation Irina Bondar, Cristina Dogaru, Laura Drăghici, Adelina Negoită, Foreword Ambassador George Maior, Bucharest Univers Enciclopedic Publishing, 2008, p. 237.
12. Gheorghe Văduva, "Terorismul: acțiuni, contracțiuni și reacții" (Terrorism: Actions Counter-Actions and Reactions), for Irena Chiru, Cristina Barna (coord.), *Contraterorism și securitate internațională*, foreword. prof. PHD Cristian Troncotă, Cecilia Munteanu, Bucharest, Top Form Publishing, 2007, p. 142.
13. Michel Foucault, *Trebuie să apărăm societatea (We Must Defend our Society)*, Second Edition, translation, Bogdan Ghiu, Cluj, Idea Design & Print, 2009 [1997]; Bert Useem and Anne Morrison Piehl, *Prison State. The Challenge of Mass Incarceration*, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
14. Michel Foucault, *A supraveghea și a pedepsi. Nașterea închisorii (To Monitor and Punish. How Prisons Came to Be)*, French translation, afterword and notes, Bogdan Ghiu, Second Edition, Pitești, Paralela 45 Publishing, 2005 [1975].
15. Gheorghe Văduva, "Terorismul: acțiuni, contracțiuni și reacții" (*Terrorism: Actions Counter-Actions and Reactions*), p. 142.
16. Ibidem.
17. Max Weber, *Politica, o vocație și o profesie (Politics, vocation and Profession)*, translation by Ida Alexandrescu, Anima, București, 1992 [1926].
18. Michel Foucault, *A supraveghea și a pedepsi. Nașterea închisorii (To Survey and Punish. How Prisons Came to Be)*, French translation, afterword and notes, Bogdan Ghiu, Second Edition, Pitești, Paralela 45 Publishing, 2005 [1975] p. 168.
19. Idem, p. 168.
20. "We know the principle on which it was based: at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheral building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. For every cage a small theatre where each actor is alone, a perfect individual permanently visible. Michel Foucault, *A supraveghea și a pedepsi. Nașterea închisorii (To Survey and Punish. How Prisons Came to Be)*, p. 699.
21. Jeremy Bentham, *Panopticon, Works*, ed. Bowring, vol. IV, Edinburgh, William Tait, 1843, pp. 60-64, apud. Michel Foucault, *A supraveghea și a pedepsi. Nașterea închisorii (To Survey and Punish. How Prisons Came to Be)*, p. 699.
22. Michel Foucault, *A supraveghea și a pedepsi. Nașterea închisorii (To Survey and Punish. How Prisons Came to Be)*, p. 256.
23. Ioan Durnescu, *Asistența socială în penitenciar (Social Services in Prison)*, Iași, Polirom Publishing, 2009, p. 87.
24. Ibidem.
25. Gresham M'Cready Sykes, *The Society of Captives. A Study of a Maximum Security Prison*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1974 [1958], p. 4, apud. Ioan Durnescu, *Asistența socială în penitenciar (Social Services in Prison)*, p. 87.
26. Erving Goffman, *Aziluri. Eseuri despre situația socială a pacienților psihiatrici și a altor categorii de persoane instituționalizate (Asylums. Essays on the Social Status of Psychiatric Patients and Other Types of Institutionalized Persons)*, Iași, Polirom Publishing, 2004 [1961], p. 18, apud. Ioan Durnescu, *Asistența socială în penitenciar (Social Services in Prison)*, p. 88.
27. Ioan Durnescu, *Asistența socială în penitenciar (Social Services in Prison)*, p. 88.
28. Ibidem.
29. Ibidem.
30. Bert Useem și Anne Morrison Piehl, *Prison State. The Challenge of Mass Incarceration*, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 3.
31. Idem, p. 4.
32. David Garland, *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2000, p. 194, Bert Useem and Anne Morrison Piehl, *Prison State. The Challenge of Mass Incarceration*, p. 59.
33. Loïc Wacquant, "Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh", *Punishment and Society*, No. 7, 2001, p. 97, Bert Useem și Anne Morrison Piehl, *Prison State. The Challenge of Mass Incarceration*, pp. 86-44.

34. Ibidem.
35. Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, *American Apartheid, Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 2001 [1993], pp. 2, 18-19.
36. Bert Useem and Anne Morrison Piehl, *Prison State. The Challenge of Mass Incarceration*, pp. 174-176.
37. Ibidem.
38. Ibidem.
39. Ibidem.
40. Andrew Silke (ed.), *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism. Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform*, London, New York, Routledge, 2014.
41. Shashl Jayakumar (ed.), *Terrorism, Radicalisation & Countering Violent Extremism. Practical Considerations & Concerns*, Singapore, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
42. Cristina Bogzeanu, *Provocări actuale pentru securitatea europeană (Current Challenges to European Security)*, Bucharest, National Defence Academy "Carol I" Publishing, 2010, pp. 49-51.
43. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Londra, Allen and Unwin, 1930.
44. Jonathan Adiri, "Dimensiunea juridică a războiului împotriva terorismului: Dilema democrației" (The Judicial Dimension of the War against Terrorism: the Dilemma of Democracy), for Irena Chiru and Cristina Barna (coord.), *Contraterorism și securitate internațională (Counter-Terrorism and International Security)*, p. 210.
45. Peter J. Burnell and Peter Calvert, *The Resilience of Democracy: Persistent Practice, Durable Idea*, London, Frank Cass, 1999; Jonathan Joseph, *Varieties of resilience*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018.
46. Irena Chiru and Cristina Barna (coord.), *Contraterorism și securitate internațională*, p. 43.
47. Gauri Khandekar, "The EU as a Global Actor in Counter Terrorism", July 2011, pp. 9-10.
48. Ibidem.
49. Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism (2002/475/JHA).
50. EU counter-terrorism strategy, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/>
51. European Council, *Strategia UE de combatere a terorismului (EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy)*, doc. 14469/4/05 November 2005.
52. Ibidem.
53. De Vries Gijs, *The European Union and the Fight Against Terrorism*, speech, delivered at the Center for European Reform, Brussels, 2006, Irena Chiru and Cristina Barna (coord.), *Contraterorism și securitate internațională (Counter-Terrorism and International Security)*, pp. 69-70.
54. European Council, *Strategie revizuită a Uniunii Europene pentru combaterea radicalizării și a recrutării în scopuri teroriste (EU's Revised Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment for Terrorist Purposes)*, JAI 332, ENFOPOL 138, COTER 34, Bruxelles, 19 mai 2014 (OR. en), 9956/14.
55. Consiliul Uniunii Europene, "Strategia UE de combatere a terorismului", <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/>.
56. European Parliament and The Council of the European Union, *The 681/2016 Directive on the Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for the Prevention, Identification, Investigation and Inquiry of terrorist Actions and Serious Offences*, 32016L0681, 24 May 2016.
57. The Council of the European Union, "Information Pertaining the Content and Result of the Evaluations", 13153/2/10 REV 2, ENFOPOL 237, PROCIV 102, PARLNAT 78, Brussels, 22 October 2010 (27.10).
58. The Council of the European Union, "the Council's Conclusions Regarding the Prevention and Combat of Radicalization in Prison and the Identification of a Solution Regarding the Issue of Terrorist and Violent Extremists Offenders", CT 55 ENFOPOL 278, COTER 71, JAI 589, COPEN 237, Brussels, 6 June 2019, 9727/19. „The conclusions of the Council of the European Union and its member states regarding the swift answer of criminal justice to terrorism leading radicalization and extreme violence”, 20 November 2015, which include "the conclusions regarding imprisonment, rehabilitation, reintegration and formation of offenders", Doc. 14419/15; "Revised guidelines regarding the EU's strategy on combating radicalization and recruitment for terrorist purposes" 30 June 2017, Doc. 10855/17; „EU and the Western Balkans common Action Plan regarding the fight against terrorism" October 2018.
59. The Council of the European Union, "the Council's Conclusions Regarding the Prevention and Combat of Radicalization in Prison and the Identification of a Solution Regarding the Issue of Terrorist and Violent Extremists Offenders", Brussels, 6 June 2019.
60. Ibidem.
61. Ibidem.
62. Ibidem.
63. Ibidem.
64. Ibidem.
65. Ibidem.
66. Ibidem.
67. Ibidem.
68. Ibidem

MIDDLE EAST

The Right or the Wrong Way. "The Deal of the Century", Where To?

Dr. MUNIR SALAMEH, Ramallah

I

The 13th of September marked the 26th anniversary when in front of the White House the "Oslo Accords" were signed. Following two years of difficult negotiations hindered by judicial bureaucracy, mutual mistrust and century old inertial mindsets, the Israeli minister of foreign affairs, Shimon Peres – on behalf of Tel Aviv and Mahmoud Abbas, the current president of the State of Palestine – on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization – signed the so called "Declaration of Principles on a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Arrangements". The declaration is commonly known as "The Oslo Accords" named after the Norwegian capital that had hosted most of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.



Signing the „ Oslo Accords“, Washington DC, 13.09.1993. Photo: Wikimedia Commons.

Following a century of conflict it was the first reconciliation agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Its fundamental framework was based on the continuation of the negotiations over a period of five years which would end with the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of other issues. Some of them included: the status of Jerusalem, the future of Palestinian refugees, borders, and Israeli settlements as well as economic and security issues. Under the watchful eye of the former US president, Bill Clinton, the Israeli Prime Minister

Yitzhak Rabin and the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, sworn enemies, shook hands thinking of a future that they would never have the chance to see.

II

On the 7th of July 2019, during a press conference in Ramallah, the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas warned about the possibility of suspending all the agreements of the Oslo Accords that were signed in Washington, in 1993. He announced the end of all security cooperation with Israel. The Palestine Liberation Organization would eventually stop recognising Israel as an independent state, and renounce the Resolutions (242 and 338) of the UN Security Council, should Israel refrain from taking action and unless it followed the engagements set by the Accords negotiated in Oslo and signed in Washington. The argument of the Palestinian leader was: "ever since the signing of the Oslo Accords, Israel has never stopped sabotaging and destroying what has been commonly convened and agreed on." Mahmoud Abbas would echo a series of former statements, where the Palestinians announced they no longer recognised the USA as the mediator and neutral party in the peace process and, as a consequence they would no longer agree to Washington's involvement in the peace negotiations and in the identification of a viable solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

After almost thirty years since the negotiation and signing of the Oslo Accords, the Palestinians were the first to see the document as moot; a document that was seen as historical at the time.

As it has failed to reach its original objectives – peace and co-existence between the two sides at odds and the establishment of a sovereign and long-lasting Palestinian state, the "Oslo process" is an utter failure. There are many causes to why this has come to be, and they involve both parties, but also the regional and international geo-

political occurrences. Assigning failure exclusively to one of the parties would be a shallow approach to a strong and complex process that is highly vulnerable to the impact of all mindsets and to the meaning the peace process has on both sides of the barricades.

However, besides the document's shortcomings, there is a series of tangible, visible and quantifiable elements that have eroded and sabotaged the continuity of the political and diplomatic endeavours. Some of the most dynamic ones are worth mentioning.

1. The Israeli political context that has enabled and even favoured the policies regarding the building of Israeli settlements in the "autonomous" Palestinian territories. If in 1993 when the "Declaration of Principles" was signed in the West Bank there lived 120,000 Israeli colonists, in 2014 their number increased to over 200,000 and later reached 382,000. A similar number (including Israeli Arabs) has been registered in East Jerusalem as well. There are currently 121 Israeli official settlements plus more scarce "islands" that have been illegally built.

2. The Palestinian Movement has been seriously damaged in 2006, when in Gaza Hamas – the Islamist fundamentalist movement and promoter of the old Muslim Brotherhood – won the elections. The movement doesn't recognise Israel, wants to create a Muslim Arab state on the territory of historical Palestine and claims that war and violence are the only ways to fight against Israel. A "Fatahland" and a "Hamasland" are arguments enough for Israel to avoid all peace negotiations, arguing the fact that the Palestinians aren't a constant, unified and believable partner for negotiation. The time between June 2006 and July 2014 the Israeli army has fought against Palestinian attacks (missile attacks and other violent actions) and against Hamas' so called "return marches" with no more and no less than five repressive operations that have registered great human and material losses – "Summer Rain" in June 2006, "Hot Winter" in February 2008, "Cast Lead" in December 2008, "Pillar of Defence" in November 2012 and "Protective Edge" in July 2014. An environment full of hatred determined the former Chief of

Staff of the Israel Defence Forces (Tzahal), General Moshe Ya'lon to publicly state that "the Palestinian conscience should be marked with a red hot poker so that the Palestinians understand that they have been defeated". At the same time, Palestinian officials in Gaza publicly instigated citizens to "kill as many Israelis as they can".

3. Donald Trump coming to the White House meant changing the USA's oriental foreign policy from managing Middle Eastern conflicts and the two-state Palestinian- Israeli disputes to interfering directly and subjectively in actions that entail the use of faulty projects. These projects put Palestinians at a disadvantage and openly support Israel's right wing policy, starting with the Likud party and its leader Benjamin Netanyahu. Recognising Jerusalem as the unified and permanent capital of Israel, relocating the US embassy in the "holy city", closing the Palestinian embassy in the USA and ceasing financial support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees are some of the examples representing the pragmatism of the new US policy towards finding a solution to the Palestinian issue. These endeavours have been recently accompanied by the famous "deal of the century", which, although was initiated almost a year ago, hasn't been finalised or completely made known yet, but has been a topic of live controversy.

III

Entrusted for elaboration and the coordination process to a couple of his closest advisors – Jared Kushner (son-in-law), senior advisor and Jason Greenblatt, advisor on Israel and special envoy for Middle East peace (he resigned from those posts mid September, for family reasons) – the US project that Donald Trump himself has labelled as "the deal of the century" would be made of two parts. Each deals distinctively with the economic and financial matters and with the politics of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. If on the first matter (economic and financial) the US Administration has revealed a series of information and public actions, the second, the political peace process, is a mystery. It would be brought to light maybe after the Israeli second round of elections – mid September 2019.



Jason Greenblatt (on the left) and Jared Kushner, Warsaw, Poland, 14.02.2019.
(Sean Gallup/Getty Images)

Awaiting for the American “D Day”, the economic forum in Bahrain (25th-26th June 2019) called “From Peace to Prosperity” was meant to reveal before-hand some of the benefits of development that the next “American peace” would so generously and abundantly bestow upon the Palestinians – an abstract notion that has nothing to do with the concepts of statehood and national identity. A financial aid of 43 billion Euros out of which 24 billion would go to the West Bank and Gaza, plus 7.9, 6.5 and 5.5 billion would go to the Palestinians in Egypt, Jordan and Libya, for a much desired economic integration of the areas. According to Jared Kushner, this means that in ten years’ time the GDP would double, the unemployment rate would decrease considerably and the Palestinian economy that had been suffering for decades would be revived.

“There is no question that we need financial assistance however, before that we need a political solution” said the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas.

The conference in Bahrain promised a prosperous “future” for the Palestinians because, as is the belief of one of the makers of the “deal”, the former presidential advisor, Jason Greenblatt, “peace would unlock the incredible potential of the Palestinian economy”. On the other hand, to the Palestinians, the real purpose of the economic forum in Manama was to “go around the political issue” and “bribe the Palestinians into giving up their state and national identity”.

In an interview for the Arabic newspaper “Al-Sharq Al-Awsat” (the London issue) Jason Greenblatt “revealed”, concisely for that matter, some insights regarding the political aspects of the US initiative. Explicitly stating that the phrase “two state” isn’t part of the text of the future “deal of the century”, the interviewee mentioned that the top priority for the accomplishment of peace and prosperity is finding a “solution” to the two “Gordian knots”. These are: 1) the presence in Gaza of the two movements – Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, that are the “main cause” of the suffering of the Palestinian people and 2) creating a perfect environment for the continuation of direct negotiations between Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli Prime Minister. They are the only ones who are able to establish the agenda of the negotiations as long as everything they agree on is acceptable to the USA. Reading Jason Grenblatt’s entire expose rather leads to the impression that he is talking about two vehicles that come from different directions, who pass by each other and whose drivers will most likely say hello by a wave of their hands. Unfortunately this isn’t enough for a deal of a century.

The Israeli Elections and the “Deal of the Century”

A week before the Israeli early elections on the 17th of September, the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu announced his plans to annex the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and claim Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and the territory north of the Dead Sea, should he remain the leader of the government. This announcement stirred strong critical reactions from the Arab governments, the League of Arab States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Was it a pre-election move, or the real deal, we can only find out after the formation of the new Israeli government. However, taking such actions in the context of an already damaged regional environment will probably have a negative impact over the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli peace processes.

After counting 95% of the votes the results of the elections on the 18th September pointed out

the strong head-start of the right winged parties. The leading parties of the elections were Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud, Benny Ganz's White and Blue (same ideology) and Avigdor Libermann's (former foreign affairs and defence minister) Yisrael Beiteinu (national secularist formation). None of these parties won all 61 seats necessary to ensure a rough majority that would enable the forming of the government. So, the Israeli political chessboard will witness intensive actions, talks and debates in order to form an alliance that would be the basis of a government of national union. However, even in this case it is difficult to foresee whether Israel's regional policy, even that regarding the Palestinian issue or the "burning" Iranian brief, would face major changes and head towards compromise. Benjamin Netanyahu promised that he would give his citizens a "strong Zionist government", while Benny Ganz and Avigdor Libermann talked about the necessity of a government that should have Israel voice over the global chessboard and stand its ground against the policies regarding the Middle East.

To the Palestinian leaders, the result of the Israeli elections is, according to Mahmoud Abbas' statements, a "simple internal matter" that won't bring anything good to the peace negotiations, while Hamas officials in Gaza publicized the idea that the Israeli elections won't represent a change for the better in the peace process, but the continuation, on a higher level, of the "fight against our Zionist enemy".

The Israelis have had their say in these elections. It is Donald Trump's turn to make public the famous "deal of the century".

*
* *

Two Years without the Caliphate. Is There Any "Daesh" Left?

Ambassador Professor Dumitru CHICAN

It will soon be two years since 9 December 2017 when Iraq's former Prime Minister, Haidar Al-Abadi, triumphantly and solemnly announced the liberation of his country's entire territory from the presence of the terrorist-jihadist organization, "The Islamic State" (DA'ISH in Arabic) and consequently the end of the war against the terrorist-jihadist phenomenon in the land situated between the Tigris and the Euphrates.

However, three more months were needed by the USA led coalition to make the announcement (on 24 March 2018) - in a much reserved manner when referring to the anti-terrorist front in Syria - regarding the "regional defeat" of the short-lived "Islamic Caliphate" in this country. Yet the announcement was accompanied by official warnings - that contradicted prior festive statements - regarding the activism and resilience of DAESH. They demand the continuation of all operations related to the actual elimination of the influence, structures, support and financial means of the Islamic-fundamentalist organization.



Ever since then and up until now, the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" hasn't stopped providing, on a daily basis enough evidence that the organisation is still out there and it not only is on a slow but constant mend but keeps on proving its ability to adjust to the new rules of

clandestine warfare. This reality is upon us and keeps on hitting us with various manifestations, such as violent attacks, suicide bombings and generally speaking, the same procedures, tactics and actions that have bled the region during DAESH's short life span. On 16 September the "Al-Furqan" Foundation, one of ISIS' media promoters broadcast a new audio message belonging to its "historic" leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi where he warned, "the terrorist attacks will go on and will soon reach a daily execution rhythm". Baghdadi's previous message had been broadcast this April, and had a similar content to the one on 16 September. It made analysts believe it had not been an imminent threat, but rather one of the "caliph's" attempts to mobilise new jihadist warriors and to reassert the fact that ISIS still existed and was regrouping, but it did not show any signs of ever being as harmful and active as in its heydays.

According to some jihadist statements (of DAESH terrorists in the custody of the Iraqi authorities) Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was harboured in the area of the Syrian city of Al-Bukamal, at the Syrian-Iraqi border. Similar information has been broadcasted by regional and Western media as well. The information, if true, posed another simple question: "if that was the case and the whereabouts of the terrorist were known, how come there haven't been any attempts to capture or kill him?" Is there anything to gain from his being at large only to be used, in times of need, in the complicated military and political game that still takes place in the area between the Syrian Euphrates and Iraqi Mesopotamia? An overview of the Syrian-Iraqi geographical area highlights the fact that dormant terrorist factions or so-called active "cells" are still there. In Syria, they can be found in the Eastern part of the river Euphrates, especially in the desert area surrounding Palmyra, and in the proximity of the city and governorate of Deir Ez-Zor in the North-eastern part of the country. In Iraq, groups can be found along the Iraqi-Syrian border and on a strip situated in the far South-western part of the Iraqi Kurdistan. The strip lies between the Sinjar district in the Northeast and Ramadi and the Northern part of Bagdad.

Frequent (and highly destructive) terrorist attacks and counter-terrorist military operations have raised, among analysts, the question whether we are witnessing the "reincarnation" of the terrorist group led by the imam Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. Or, is it just the resilience of the phenomenon that is meant, sooner or later, to slowly die until it becomes naturally extinct?

It is true that the disappearance of the units and organisational structure of DAESH does not necessarily mean the disappearance of its ideology and doctrine. At the same time, a look at today's facts must include the multiple and various differences between Syria and Iraq. We are referring to the social aspects, as well as to the different ways in which these countries have evolved domestically - after the demise of Saddam Hussein's Baas regime in Iraq, in 2003 and after the start of the "Arab Spring", in 2011 and that of the Syrian civil war.

Iraq: Between Will and Realities

"*Iradat Al-Nasr*" - "Victory's Will" was the name of a massive operation that was launched on 7 July 2019 by the Iraqi army and security forces against DAESH's multitude of separate factions. A year after the former Iraqi Prime Minister, Heidar Abbadi announced Iraq's defeat of DAESH, the planning and start of this operation is in itself a decisive argument in favour of all analysis that argue that the fight against irrational Islamism is far from over. The front of the operation covered an area stretching from Iraq's border with Syria in the West, to the Nineveh district and its capital, Mosul in the East. Nineveh is basically a "Sahel" that crosses Iraq from West to the East. Following the "official" end of the war against DAESH this region remains the main jihadist-terrorist "Bantustan" from where the terrorist cells of the former "caliphate" plan and launch their attacks in different areas in Iraq. The Islamic state managed to exploit the weaknesses of the Iraqi army and security forces that were exhausted and worn out by the three years of war, and quickly withdraw their Peshmerga and Kurdish fighters, only to further consolidate their

presence and rebuild their numbers. In the areas of the oil fields in Kirkuk and Mosul, the Iraqi National Army is mainly preoccupied with the protection and functioning of the oil fields, refineries, oil pipelines and hydrocarbon fuels. One may say that the Iraqi fight against terrorism is mostly a reactive response to the operations of the Islamic State and less a series of actions that prevent, identify and eliminate the Islamist terrorist cells in the country, locations that the Iraqi planners and strategists actually know.

Such a situation/scenario favours a guerrilla war led by the jihadists that have the environment (mountains and desert) on their side. It also favours the existence of some tribal Iraqi elements that are disappointed and displeased with the inability of the Iraqi government to meet their demands and provide them with the compensations and benefits they deserve, following the "victory" over the former Islamic State. What drew our attention was the fact that in one of the messages attributed to the "caliph" Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in the beginning of May, he clearly stated that "the war of Islam and that of the Muslim against the crusaders and their allies will be long. The war we fight today is temporarily a war of attrition against or enemies who must understand that Jihad will go on till the end of time."

Syria: A Dead, but Active "Caliphate"

In March, the last DAESH stronghold in Syria fell - close to the city of Baghouz, at the eastern border between Syria and Iraq. More tens of thousands of Islamist fighters - native Muslims and Westerners who took to Islam's ideology, and an important number of their families, including women and children - were captured by the Kurdish-Arabic alliance, or were arrested, and placed in detention camps and prisons. In Syria there are currently four such prison centres placed in the northern part of the country: camp Ain Issa, North of Raqqa, camp Al-Hol, in the eastern Hasaka countryside, and Al-Roj and Derek in the far north-eastern part of Syria, close to the Iraqi border. They

accommodate, in very poor conditions, roughly 70,000 people. The coalition forces, the Kurdish minority and government sources draw attention on the fact that, far from diminishing the fanaticism of those in custody, these facilities are active centres for the promotion of radicalism and fanaticism. Should they be released, the prisoners represent a serious threat and a source for the reappearance of the jihadist terrorist organization. As far as the "Islamic state" terrorists that haven't been captured are concerned, they have regrouped, just like their fellows in Iraq, in sleeping cells, but active as far as their ability to commit attacks is concerned (placing improvised explosive devices on major routes that have been used by the Kurdish and international allied forces, ambushes, car bombings and lethal attacks etc.).

One may say this is a time when the active jihadist terrorism in Syria and Iraq has as an ultimate purpose the close monitoring and upkeep of their surviving capabilities should their need to come back arise on both sides - in Syria as well as in Iraq. There are few social, economical, institutional, religious and political opportunities to get rid of the deep causes that have made possible the appearance, development and implementation of the militant Islamic Jihadist terrorism.

Between the will to win and obtaining an ultimate and certain victory the road is still long and unpredictable.

NOTE: This article was written before the operation of the US Special Forces that killed Daesh leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, on 27th October 2019.

Hormuz: from “Eye for an Eye and Tooth for a Tooth” to “Oil for Oil and Security for Security”

Dinu Costescu discussion and “conditional” negotiations, while constantly getting ready for war.

Starting with May, the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz were once again in the forefront of the confrontations and strategic rivalries amplified by a state of neither peace nor war that is characteristic to the climate of the relationship between the western community (or at least a part of it) lead by the USA on one hand and the Iranian theocratic regime on the other. There have been drone attacks, that are more likely related to terrorism, sabotages, and piracy against at least 19 commercial ships (oil tankers) sailing under different banners (including Iranian).

The war of the “oil tankers” doesn’t stand out by comparison to other previous conflicts, as it is accompanied by a parallel warfare - a highly hypocritical confrontational dialogue in which the parties keep on displaying openness for

This context is corroborated with Hassan Rouhani’s statement following that of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard who had announced the unveiling of three new types of medium-range missiles. Reinterpreting and acknowledging the old law of retaliation – enacted by the Code of Hammurabi and upheld by the Christian prophets and by the Islamic Shari’a - “eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth, hand for a hand”, the Iranian rhetoric brought to tour attention an innovative regional security equation formulated “security for security, strait for strait and oil for oil”.

Why are these three stakes mentioned by the Iranian head of state? Speaking of security Rouhani bore in mind the perfect argument according to which “the West cannot have its own security and cannot use military means, at



the expense of Iranians.” The proposed oil tank exchange is motivated by a more pragmatic argument: the release of the Iranian oil tanker seized by Great Britain in Gibraltar under the suspicion of delivering oil to Syria and as a reaction to the UK flagged oil tanker that had been seized by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz. It is the same, from an Iranian perspective, with the fossil fuels. Just as the West was and still is interested in protecting the oil flow coming from the Middle East, and particularly from the Persian Gulf area, Iran wants to be able to export its own oil and demands, as an absolute prerequisite to accepting contacts with the West the lifting of all sanctions and embargos that the Trump administration imposed on Tehran regime.

Following the first maritime incidents in the Gulf that Iran was accused of having caused, directly or indirectly, president Donald Trump called, in June, for the creation of an international maritime coalition that would protect the oil transport in this part of the world, most specifically in the Hormuz strait situated

between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. This would amount to an “armada” patrolling in a sensitive region, whose formation with a few exceptions is lagging, nevertheless. The USA’s argument is that every interested country should provide military escorts to their own ships that cross the area of the Persian Gulf and the Hormuz strait, with American air support. With the exception of France and the UK, the Europeans are sceptical about the project proposed by president Donald Trump and do not really wish to be involved in the “maximum pressure” policy adopted by the USA against Iran. Beyond the arguments destined for media, the European community, or at least a part of it, is still hopeful and remains interested in finding a friendly solution to the dispute that also ensures the continuation of the nuclear deal that the USA withdrew from in 2018.

A clear distancing of the German chancellor Angela Merkel from the US proposals was stated in Berlin, and it threatens to induce further tensions in the relationship between Germany and the USA. It is difficult to say whether this



situation is caused - according to some observers - by the Germany refusal to supplement its contributions to NATO's treasury, or rather by concerns at the White House regarding the intense relationship between Germany and the Russian Federation, which from an American point of view represents the danger of Germany and the European community leaning towards an economic reliance on Moscow.

Form the Oil Tankers War to the "Oil War"

In this context, on the 14th of September an unpredictable evolution took place, when two oil sites belonging to the Saudi colossus ARAMCO were the target of a drone and cruise missiles attack with around 19 points of impact, causing massive destruction; the Saudi oil production was reduced to almost half. The Washington administration pinned the attack on Iran (which denied the accusation, seeing it as just another pretext for the Trump administration to start a war against Iran). Nevertheless, the attacks were claimed by the Iran backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, through a statement noting that "Saudi oil is not more precious than Yemeni blood". Given the rich history of Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the affiliation to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard of the Yemeni rebels in Bab El-Mandeb, it is less significant whether the drones and the missiles came from Southern Yemen or Southern Iran, as long as in the case of this separatist movement Tehran proved, more than once, to be the planner of the attack, the supplier of the weapon, and the one pulling the trigger - by the hand of its proxies.

The attack against the Saudi oil colossus ARAMCO is relevant as far as the climate and the state of play of the tensions in the Gulf region are concerned, and their main characteristic can be described as hesitant and still in an exploratory stage. Hesitant because the parties do not want war, but embrace, at the same time noisy slogans such as "total war with many victims". Iran is well aware it cannot repeat the experience of the oil embargo imposed by the oil producers in the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973. That led to an end of the military confrontations, but it didn't

change anything of significance for the overall strategic equation. President Trump in his turn is aware that a new military endeavour in the Gulf that bears his signature isn't the best electoral offer that would determine the US citizens to grant him a second mandate.

The analyses and evaluations on this new Gulf crisis and on the strategic market of energy are still simmering. And the next issue of the Geostrategic Pulse could occur either in the context of a "Phyrrus victory", or in the context of different perspectives and global and regional approaches whose outlines are difficult to turn into a realistic projection.



We Sanction, but We Do Not Attack...

On one hand, the uncertainty that persists as far as the standings of the parties directly involved in the "oil war" (Iran, the USA, the Gulf monarchies, the Houthi rebels in the Yemen, the Iraqi militias - Popular Mobilization Forces) expresses the fact that none of them have taken a strategic decision and don't want to take one because it would lead to a huge deterioration of the conflict.

On the other hand, a war of attrition, through proxies, is seen in Tehran as an alternative with dual aim, while excluding a large scale war. It puts price pressures on the international fossil fuels market and implicitly on the western consumers, in the sense that they would change their minds regarding the sanctions imposed on Iran and regarding the "nuclear deal".

Last but not least Iran wishes to prove that its Arab neighbours and oil producers, starting with Saudi Arabia, are vulnerable and unprepared for a major military confrontation, relying on help

from their American ally and eventually Israel.

Besides, in his first reaction to the attack on the Saudi colossus ARAMCO, president Donald Trump didn't hide his frustration, stating: "The USA have not given up the idea of a political summit with Iran" (in the context of the UN General Assembly in the fall – where the summit never took place); he followed on with a meaningful phrase, underlying that "the USA are still open to dialogue and are willing to offer help to its allies, for a price and Saudi Arabia should take steps towards ensuring its own security."

A Weak Diplomacy

Starting with the recent G7 summit in Biarritz, the French president Emmanuel Macron kept advertising the intense French diplomacy towards a de-escalation in the US-Iranian relations and a reunion between the presidents Donald Trump and Hassan Rouhani in the context of the UN General Assembly session in the fall of this year. On his part, the British prime minister Boris Johnson proposed the negotiation of a new "nuclear deal" with Iran. Lastly, shortly before leaving for New York to address the world from the UN stand, the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani advertised his intention to propose the regional and international community a peace initiative that prevents the irreversible degradation of the situation in the Persian Gulf and a large scale war. The UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres warned that the situation produced in the oil region of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf was "on the edge" from a military and security point of view.

The backstage UN negotiations, consultations and dialogue have not brought the "light at the end of the tunnel". Donald Trump's speech could have been titled "The UN General Assembly - Iran, Iran, Iran", a speech devoted to the familiar paradigm of the balance between "extreme pressure" and the wings of the dove, metaphors that did not bring any significant change to the course of this conflict under discussion. On behalf of Iran, Rouhani proposed a romantic alternative - a peace deal between Iran and the rest of the world, including the US and Saudi Arabia. This was a formal proposition, the ball

fell on the other side's court and they chose to stand aside. Diplomacy, and along with it the UN proved to be below expectations, even if they were low.

NOTE

What was the meaning of the attack against an economic sector that was vital not only to Saudi Arabia, but also at the level of the entire global energy strategy?

It is certain that the attacks in Buqayq and Khurays were used by Iran mostly to narrow the options of the Trump Administration, proving that the "US policy of extreme pressure" can't make the Iranians comply with US imposed conditions. At the same time the attack was meant to be a "trial balloon" for the ability and willingness of the USA and the European community to implement the military warnings to the Iranian theocratic regime.

This is why a lack of resolute reaction from the West will be an indication for Iran's freedom of movement in the future. An international attitude of "non-combat" would mean, to Iranians, a proof that the USA and an international community directly affected by Iran's defiance are weak and disoriented.

Soon after the ARAMCO attack, the head of the US diplomacy, Mike Pompeo paid an emergency visit to Riyadh to discuss with the Saudi allies the response actions to be taken. In the same context, on the 17th of September the Israeli elections reconfirmed a continuation of the aggressive, right wing regional policy of Israel. This actually means the continuation of the confrontations between Israel and its neighbors supporting Iranian policies. Which equally means the perpetuation and even intensification of the conflict situations in the entire Middle East.

This status quo seems to be more and more dominated by the question when, not if, a war with Iran will take place and what forms will it take? If after the short "war of the oil tankers" - that didn't have major consequences to Iran - the Tehran regime will easily get over the tensions generated by the ARAMCO attacks, one cannot rule out the possibility that the current Iranian regime decides to take more steps forward, and

act against USA's regional allies - whether it is the Arab monarchies in the Gulf or Israel, or even against the US presence in the area. An escalation of the tensions won't let other actors stand by and watch, but encourage them to take

advantage of the events in the Gulf to solve or influence burning strategic matters: Russia - with the Syria and Ukraine dossiers; China - with the events in Hong Kong, or even North Korea and its complicated relationship with the USA.

Syria, from "Peace Spring" to Sochi, via Adana

Ambassador Professor Dumitru CHICAN

What was expected (especially from the three presidents - Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin) happened, even sooner than the most optimistic expert evaluations. Exactly two weeks after its launch, the operation "Peace Spring" in northern Syria, meant to remove the Kurdish "terrorists" from the northern border between the Syrian Kurdistan and Turkey ended, because "it was no longer necessary", as Recep Tayyip Erdogan said. The first reaction to this "historical" announcement came from the US president Donald Trump who, *urbi et orbi* advertised lifting all the sanctions against Turkey with one warning-amendment - they would be reinstated, should his Golden Horn ally relapse for some reason and let the "Peace Spring" flow again.

How was this possible?

Theoretically the answer is very simple. On the 3rd of October, reunited in Sochi for the umpteenth time, the Kremlin leader and his counterpart in the "White Palace" agreed, in only four hours of "friendly negotiations" on a *Memorandum of Understanding* regarding the end of operation "Peace Spring" and the long term implementation of an unanimously acceptable solution for the Gordian knot that is the Kurdish issue in the context of the Syrian civil war. To sum up this analysis, and for an informal and documentary purpose we hereby provide the full translation of the document, as published on the Kremlin's official site, as well as an interpretation of each and every point in the document.

1. "The two sides reiterate their commitment to the preservation of the political unity and territorial integrity of Syria and the protection of

national security of Turkey."

Interpretation: Both the Russian Federation and Turkey agree to act in a way that doesn't lead to the fragmentation of the Syrian territory, including by ensuring the perpetuation of foreign forces and interests. Turkey confirms once again that it doesn't plan future annexations of territories that legally belong to the Arab Republic of Syria.

2. "They emphasize their determination to combat terrorism in all forms and manifestations and to disrupt separatist agendas in the Syrian territory."

Interpretation: The Russian Federation is willing to continue its campaign against terrorism and to stand beside Ankara in its approach on Kurdish terrorism.

3. "In this framework, the established status quo in the current Operation Peace Spring area covering Tel Abyad and [Ras al-Ain] with a depth of 32km (20 miles) will be preserved."

Interpretation: The *status quo* established by the operation "Peace Spring" is, rhetorically speaking, just an euphemism destined to legitimize the indefinite stay of Turkish military forces on Syrian territory under their control (Turkey) at the signing of the Sochi agreement.

4. "Both sides reaffirm the importance of the Adana Agreement. The Russian Federation will facilitate the implementation of the Adana Agreement in the current circumstances."

Interpretation: The Russian Federation doesn't agree with the repeated Syrian protests against re-accepting the Adana agreement before Turkey withdraws its military presence from Syria. Russia also implicitly opposes all the international voices disagreeing with Turkey's regional policy.

Observation: The Adana agreement is a document signed by the former Syrian and Turkish presidents, Hafez Al-Assad and Suleyman Demirel, according to which Syria agreed to cease hosting and supporting the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), led by Abdullah Ocalan, and to allow Turkey to conduct anti-PKK raids five kilometres inside the Syrian territory.

While in Sochi, Turkey agreed to mixed Russian-Turkish patrols - a compromise actually, a change in the Adana agreement, since these mixed patrols wouldn't cover an area more than ten kilometres wide inside the Syrian territory, which is a severe reduction of the initial claims for the security area - to have a width of around 30 kilometres.

5. "Starting 12.00 noon of October 23, 2019, Russian military police and Syrian border guards will enter the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border, outside the area of Operation Peace Spring, to facilitate the removal of YPG elements and their weapons to the depth of 30km (19 miles) from the Turkish-Syrian border, which should be finalized in 150 hours. At that moment, joint Russian-Turkish patrols will start in the west and the east of the area of Operation Peace Spring with a depth of 10km (six miles), except Qamishli city."

Interpretation: The Russian Federation demands that the Government in Damascus and its forces and militias partner up with the Russian police to evacuate the Kurdish military forces from their whereabouts.

6. "All YPG elements and their weapons will be removed from Manbij and Tal Rifat."

Interpretation: The Kurdish "allies" will be forced to give up two of their previously owned strategic strongholds.

7. "Both sides will take necessary measures to prevent infiltrations of terrorist elements."

Interpretation: This is a vague article that doesn't clearly say what the locations that should be protected from terrorist actions are, especially in the "security area". One may interpret that the Russian forces will assist the Turkish ones.

8. "Joint efforts will be launched to facilitate the return of refugees in a safe and voluntary

manner."

Interpretation: It is another unclear and questionable article of the agreement, since it doesn't say whether the Syrian refugees in Turkey will be relocated in the "security area", just like Erdogan said, or will be free to go back anywhere in their home country.

9. "A joint monitoring and verification mechanism will be established to oversee and coordinate the implementation of this memorandum."

Interpretation: Each of the two parties will make sure that the other honours its promise, which to the Russian Federation means the Kurdish and Syrian issues and to Turkey means returning the refugees to their homes.

10. "The two sides will continue to work to find a lasting political solution to the Syrian conflict within Astana Mechanism and will support the activity of the Constitutional Committee."

To sum up the historical Sochi agreement that will certainly be followed by more such "historical" agreements, one should keep in mind that, over the few hours they spent together in the Black Sea resort, the Kremlin tsar gave the Hellespont sultan - who wished for it more out of pride than fear - a solution to the Turkish existential problems ("the security area" in the north-eastern part of Syria and, at the same time an easy exit from the overflowing Peace Spring which was a continuation of the Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch operations). All the military operations against the Kurds represent another step towards the validation of Turkey as a great regional power.

What surprised in all this Levantine "big deal" was the fact that the "missing player", Bashar Al-Assad, silently agreed to Syria's fate decided in Sochi. Moreover, he confirmed with a declaration according to which "the Syrian people are ready to cooperate with all the entities fighting the Turkish aggressor" - meaning the Kurdish minority. This minority sacrificed the lives of 11,000 fellow citizens and believers to defeat the caliphate lead by the schizophrenic imam Al-Baghdadi, a victory candidly claimed by ... Donald Trump but forgotten for the mere fact that "the Kurds did



not participate in the Normandy landing” and because the “USA cannot betray a NATO ally (that is Erdogan) for the sake of the Kurdish people.” The words of the resident in the Oval Office include a very serious and threatening warning that the French call *a bon entendeur salut* that translates into “a word to the wise is enough!”

All speculations aside, one should not ignore the fact that, if the Sochi agreement can be considered an important victory for *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri* - the Turkish Armed Forces - it isn't necessarily a loss for Syria led by Bashar Al-Assad, even if its provisions are below the voiced Syrian expectations. The arrangements between Putin and Erdogan leave room for changes, which will certainly occur. These changes are meant to meet Bashar Al-Assad's demands regarding the deployment of his armed forces in the northern part of the country, as well as expectations of the Kurdish rebels who will be allowed to keep - whether “Bantustan-like” or not - the so called administrative autonomy proclaimed before the defeat of the Islamic State.

Shortly after the Sochi summit, on the 23rd of October there was another “historical” moment, when the UN Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen said that, on the 30th of October, in Geneva the UN would launch the “Syrian-led,

Syrian-owned, credible, balanced and inclusive Constitutional Committee [made of] a diverse and broad pool of individuals - Government and Opposition representatives - that would take a first meaningful step towards a durable solution in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 [that calls for] a ceasefire and a transition period, and further expresses its support for free and fair [Syrian] elections.” Commenting on his communiqué, the UN Special Envoy said that the Geneva process, corroborated with the agreement between Putin and Erdogan “represented an important step towards giving up the weapons in favour of political negotiations to pacify Syria in the foreseeable future”, which he thinks was “quite impressive.”

Of course all this, and most importantly the end of the Turkish military operations in northern Syria are very encouraging even if Geir Pedersen's “impressive future” might not yet be that close.

Operation “Peace Spring” is over. What is the outcome?

At a first glance, the outcome of the Turkish military intervention in the Kurdish north and north-eastern part of Syria is somewhat confusing, since this operation, that lasted only two weeks, left behind a mixture of changes in the tactical framework of the Syrian civil war as well as a series of issues either unsolved or favouring a new possible deterioration of the already uncertain situation.

The first conclusion that can be drawn is that the Turkish Armed Forces, the 9th most powerful in the world, didn't manage to seize but a few scattered enclaves in the targeted territory, which was, with the exception of two cities - Tel Abyad and Ra's Al-Ain - a rural area full of villages with no particular strategic or economic relevance.

Secondly, but not less important is the remark that the conflict zone has known a dramatic change as far as the equation of the Russian and US military and political presence in Syria is concerned. On one hand, if before the operation “Peace Spring” the USA had at least ten military bases (17 to 20, according to different sources) spread between the far west and the far east of the Syrian Kurdish territory, today we basically cannot talk about a US military presence in Syria. On the other hand, after a long line of political, military and diplomatic ups and downs, the Russian Federation can be seen as the power that controls the whole Syrian front and to a large extent, the geopolitical and geostrategic evolutions in Syria and the Middle East.

We are also referring to the fact that, for the first time since the beginning of the Syrian civil war eight years ago, Bashar Al-Assad's army returns to the north-eastern part of the country that is considered Syria's main grain provider and the area where its main energy and water resources lie.

This outcome must include Turkey's failure to create a “safe zone” as planned (along the entire northern Syrian border, 30 kilometres deep in the Syrian territory). This raises serious questions as far as another of Erdogan's projects

is concerned - relocating in this “safe zone” over one million Syrian refugees, hosted as refugees on Turkish territory.

A humanitarian conclusion is yet to be drawn. According to the Norwegian NGO *Norwegian Refugee Council*, the military operations led to the death of 235 civilians - 22 of these children, to 677 wounded and 300,000 refugees, out of whom 4000 left for the Iraqi Kurdistan adding up to the 270,000 Syrians already hosted by the government of the autonomous region of Kurdistan.

Thus, the Turkish intervention proved to be a move that dried up the “peace spring” without bringing the prospects of a long term peace under the protection of the olive branch.

The Russian Federation: Four Years of Syrian War

Ambassador Professor Dumitru CHICAN

The 30th of September 2019 marked four years since president Vladimir Putin approved the Russian military intervention in Syria. The decision was officially based on the request of the Syrian government for military assistance against “foreign conspiracies” - mostly Western - that threatened the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Syria, as well as against “domestic terrorism and Islamist radical Jihad supported by foreign powers and forces”.

The Russian military actions included: air strikes, use of cruise missiles - launched by Russian ships deployed in the eastern part of the Mediterranean - active use of military counselors on the front, deployment of Russian Special Forces, as well as elite military units. They ran against the Syrian military opposition and against Islamic terrorist groups affiliated to the Islamic State in Levant and Iraq (DAESH) and to the Al-Nusra Front - the Syrian Al-Qaeda - as well as to other mercenary jihadist groups that employed fighters coming from over 60 countries - Arabic, European, Transatlantic and Asian.



After the first two and a half years of continuous involvement on the Syrian front, on 14th of March 2016 the Russian president Vladimir Putin said that the Russian military in Syria involvement "is almost at an end" so the majority of the Russian military forces were to be withdrawn. After a symbolic re-deployment, the Russian forces continued to be, and are still actively involved in supporting the Syrian government.

The Russian military involvement in the Syrian civil war and its successes and failures in the Levantine region were subjects of continuous debate in almost all world languages. All these actions weren't able to put an end to the questions that remain unanswered, and that mainly refer to the basis and the content of the strategy that Moscow developed in the past four years, to the real talent of policymakers or to the real interests of the Russians on the chessboard of Syria and Middle East. The turning point which was the Russian intervention didn't come from nowhere and should not be considered an isolated act. Let's not forget that a year before, in 2014, Vladimir Putin defied the entire western community by annexing Crimea, thus starting a new conflict whose main actor was Ukraine and redefining the geostrategic relations of the new century. Consequently, Russia's involvement in

Syria was but a new chapter of military and political escalation that Vladimir Putin set in motion in 2008 with his military intervention in Georgia, a starting point for redesigning the maps of Russian influence in the area of the former Soviet Union.

Today, four years since the start of the Russian military intervention in Syria, the same analysts and experts found out that, while developing and implementing its policy in Syria, the Kremlin faces a series of challenges and difficulties that keep on building up. One of these originates in the rifts that occurred in the agreement between the Russian Federation and Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Turkey. We are referring to the creation and function of the so called "de-escalation zones" or "security areas" in some of Syria's provinces, especially in the Kurdish zones and at the Syrian northern border with Turkey. To these we add the activity and the intensification of the US presence and military actions in approximately the same northern and eastern areas where they cross paths with the interests of the Russian Federation and Turkey. These elements carry the potential to significantly reduce the chances to implement some of the most important slogans that make the foundation of the Russian strategy. The most

important one is “the preservation and consolidation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Syria”.

Furthermore, the sudden degradation of the security situation in Idlib, in north-western Syria and the restart of the military operations to stabilize this area following the Astana negotiations (under the patronage of the trio Russia-Turkey-Iran) revive the doubts regarding the competition to reshape the area of influence and control among the parties that are involved in the Syrian civil war and among the militias that are practically spread all over the country. At the same time, this is a competition and a confrontation between Russia on one side and each of Turkey and Iran on the other. It means a more active involvement of Israel in settling scores with Iran and its militias. Under such circumstances one can see without much difficulty that Russia’s policy regarding the Syrian dossier is heading from accomplishing its initial goals - a swift end to the war and a swift victory, and the consolidation of the Russian presence in Syria and the Middle East - towards a deeper involvement in the amalgam of regional and international issues, influences, and agendas. To this we add the extra political, economic and military efforts that are inevitable and take an unpredictable amount of time.

No less concerning for the Russians is the evolution of the relations between the USA and Turkey. The tensions between Washington and Ankara regarding Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s “orientation” towards Russia, recently materialised by the delivery (to Turkey) of the “S-400” missile system, amplified by US steps to exclude Turkey from the F-35 program didn’t prevent Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdogan to agree on a *modus vivendi et operandi* in the northern and eastern Syria. We are referring to the creation of a “security zone” matching both USA’s tactical needs to support the Kurdish rebels on one hand, and Turkey’s interest in eliminating all Kurdish threats to its national and security interests on the other hand. These ups and downs raise serious questions regarding whether Moscow will succeed in implementing its long term strategy that is the result of the permanent

disagreements between Turkey and the USA regarding Syria and implicitly regarding the resilience of the cooperation between Moscow and Ankara. A serious misstep that would affect the alliance between Putin and Erdogan would cause Russia to lose its dynamism, efficiency and credibility gained during the Astana process.

This is Russia’s leverage over the process to finding a political solution for the Syrian civil war, in opposition to the Geneva negotiations, its western equivalent in “the Syrian competition”. Under these circumstances, the long term strategy of the Russian Federation faces a new obstacle, generated by the Iranian equation and by the difficulties faced by the desire and efforts to keep in balance the relations between Russia and Iran on one side and between Russian and Israel (with regard to both Syria and the West) on the other. It is true that last year Russia successfully managed to ensure the Iranian withdrawal to 80 km from the Syrian-Israeli border in the Golan Heights (thus giving in to Benjamin Netanyahu’s demands). It is also true that this agreement with Khamenei’s mullahs and “Pasdaran” proved to be purely formal and short-lived since, over the past few months, observers and media reported that the Iranian presence was strengthening in the southern part of Syria and in the south-western area close to the borders with Jordan and the Golan Heights. In the context of the Iranian repositioning and Hezbollah’s intense military activity in the proximity of the same area, commentators in Moscow draw attention on the fact that the Israeli government might, under a security pretext, stop asking for permission or even inform the Russians and take significant military actions against Iran and its militias. This undertaking would show the inability of the Russian Federation to really prevent a massive re-ignition of the Syrian front and would have serious consequences over Russia’s plans and strategies to pacifying and “preserving the territorial integrity and state sovereignty of Syria”.

* *

*

Vladimir Putin's decision, in the fall of 2015, to get involved in the Syrian civil war made him to ultimately believe that Syria - at that time at a turning point from a military perspective - offered Russia a last opportunity to widen its narrow strategic influence. This opportunity favoured a worldwide expansion and the involvement in a new regional and international security framework. The materialization of this framework proved to become, sooner or later, a reality that involved more or less all the actors taking part in the Syrian civil war. Under this approach, the Russian Federation had to be involved and had to ensure its own role in this undertaking. Moscow believed, at the same time, in having a balanced and peaceful relationship with all other powers active both on the Syrian front and in the Middle East.

Russia paid attention to cooperation with the influential powers in the region, thus aiming to enhance its leeway and diminish the limitations imposed on its policies by the West in general and the USA in particular. This explains the closeness and the agreements concluded by Russia with Israel, Turkey, Iran and the oil monarchies. It would be superficial to believe that circumstance and the conflicting interests of the regional powers would seriously damage Russian projects and the complex and diverse relationships between Moscow and the other regional capitals - Ankara, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Riyadh or Abu Dhabi. These misunderstandings can't make the Russian Federation significantly change its policy regarding Syria and the region. The Syrian civil war is far from over, even if its continuation means mostly affecting the Syrians.



“GEOSTRATEGIC PULSE” - founded in 2007
Bilingual Publication of Geopolitical Analysis, edited by
INGEPO Consulting - Bucharest
www.pulsulgeostrategic.ro; Tel: +4-031 1011934
J40/4984/2019, CUI RO19298677

Editor-in-Chief:
Constantin IACOBIȚĂ

Assistant Editor: Pompilia VLĂDESCU
Assistant Editor & Editing: Ciprian RĂDULESCU



ISSN: 1843-701X

Cover: Self Editing

SUBSCRIPTIONS (1 Year) - 599 LEI

You have free access to the site (www.pulsulgeostrategic.ro) and to all the other materials we publish

On request, we deliver the printed magazines at the address you indicate

The price includes the VAT and delivery costs

Advertising

Advertising is available.

For details and terms please contact us at office@pulsulgeostrategic.ro

This publication cannot be multiplied and reproduced without the written consent of INGEPO Consulting. Use of certain articles or quotations is allowed, as long as their wording and content are kept intact, and the source is mentioned.

The opinions expressed in the published articles belong to their authors, who take full responsibility for the content. These opinions do not necessarily reflect INGEPO Consulting's point of view.

Partners:



STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
The independent resource on global security


Stockholm
Beijing
Washington



Academia Română
Institutul de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale (ISPRI)



World Security Network
NETWORKING A SAFER WORLD



ifimes
MEDNARODNI INŠTITUT ZA BLIŽNJEVZHODNE IN BALKANSKE ŠTUDIJE
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE-EAST AND BALKAN STUDIES


RIEAS Research Institute for European and American Studies



DIPLOMAT
MAGAZINE
By / For Diplomats
www.diplomatmagazine.nl



American Military University
American Public University



AMU **APU**

School of Security & Global Studies




ISTITUTO DI ALTI STUDI DI GEOPOLITICA E SCIENZE AUXILIARI
ISAG



RIAC
Russian International Affairs Council

Geostrategic Pulse
Is studied at Harvard!



Borysten Intel

Starting with December 2010 **GEOSTRATEGIC PULSE** is registered in the international **INDEX COPERNICUS JOURNAL MASTERS LIST**